Business mortality rates are high, even higher than those of humans. Business infant mortality is even higher. Many companies disappear for not implementing succession rules, they are highly dependent on certain people. They are like small pools of water that evaporate. Companies that last add drops of water continuously so that the pool becomes a stream and then a river. A river is part of the landscape although the water droplets that compose it are different in time. However, long-lived companies also disappear, or become so weak that they are targeted by predators. Few renounce life voluntarily; Business suicides are rare. What are the causes of death? In some sectors the answer is clear: companies die because the environment changes.But the environment changes for everyone. For a few decades, it has been more turbulent, unpredictable, global; years ago it was inflationary, today, worldwide it plans deflation.
When the "know-how" of a company, its product range, its labor relations, are in harmony with the environment, the task of management becomes the allocation of resources. Human and financial resources will be allocated to those parts of the organization that are best placed to take advantage of a convergent and harmonious environment. The other side of the coin is that when the environment diverges, it is not very harmonious, growth policies must be replaced by survival policies. The change from one to the other often fails. In the euphoria of expansion, changes in the environment are not perceived or seen as what they are not. Furthermore, in the boom period the substructure of the company that benefited the most from the situation has become more powerful and independent.Companies continue policies that produced good results for too long and inadvertently go into crisis. Why? Why do companies not perceive the signs of change? Intriguing question for which it is important to find an answer. Psychologists answer it by saying that human nature resists change, which, in principle, is good not to undertake change for change. However, when change is a requirement of survival, you have to overcome resistance and the only way to do it is painful.Psychologists answer it by saying that human nature resists change, which, in principle, is good not to undertake change for change. However, when change is a requirement of survival, you have to overcome resistance and the only way to do it is painful.Psychologists answer it by saying that human nature resists change, which, in principle, is good not to undertake change for change. However, when change is a requirement of survival, you have to overcome resistance and the only way to do it is painful.
The business equivalent of pain is a crisis that lasts long enough for most members of the organization to feel it and be convinced that something must be done to resolve it. In crisis situations, the deeper they are, the more time and options are lacking. Crisis management is one way to solve it, but it is dangerous. This explanation does not provide much hope for improvement, compares the company to a Greek tragedy. And yet there is a wide range of improvement. It is possible to manage internal change by anticipating what to expect from the crisis on the condition of being able to see the changes in the environment in time. Long-lived companies show that it is possible to see the signs of change before most. Why, then, many do not see what is happening around them?
No one can see what the mind has not previously experienced; no one will see what evokes unpleasant emotions.
Argyris says that at the beginning of the century a group of British explorers arrived in an isolated valley in Malaysia. There they discovered a small tribe that was literally in the Stone Age. They had not invented the wheel. The explorers came into contact with the chief of the tribe who was a very intelligent man and profoundly knowledgeable about his world. They decided to carry out the experiment of taking the chief to Singapore, which at the beginning of the century was already a quite sophisticated society, technologically and economically. For twenty-four hours they walked the chief through this sophisticated world, subjecting him to thousands of signs of potential change for his own society, and then returned him to his valley. In amazement, the British discovered that this intelligent man had only seen something interesting for his own world:a man carrying more bananas than the boss had ever seen together. In the tribe world men carried them on their shoulders and in Singapore he had seen a vendor with a cart full of fruit. He had disdained all other signs: the mind cannot see what it has not previously experienced. This cannot be the only explanation for why companies do not see signs of environmental change.
Another, more recent explanation, - continues Argyris - is given by the Swedish neurobiologist David Ingvar in an article entitled “The memory of the future” in which he recounts the results of his research on the way in which the human brain manages the future. It seems that a part of the brain is continually busy making plans and programs for the future. These plans are organized sequentially, that is, they are temporary pathways to the future. The healthier the more temporal pathways the brain develops under both favorable and unfavorable conditions. And, what is even more surprising, the brain also stores alternative pathways. It may be a contradiction in terms but we have a memory of the future in addition to that of the past. Ingvar hypothesizes that this memory of the future has several functions.Obviously it helps to decide when the time comes but its fundamental role is to filter out irrelevant information. Too much information reaches the brain through the sensory organs and much of it must be ignored for our organ to function properly. However, if there is a correspondence between the incoming information and one of the stored alternative time routes, we do not ignore the data, we perceive its meaning. The message of this researcher is clear: we will only perceive those signals from the outside world that are relevant to some future option that we have developed. In many companies only one way, a project, the operational plan or the strategy is developed, and they only cover a rather near future. Argyris calls this phenomenon the "one-way business mind",which means seeing little because only one option for the future has been considered.
Finishing the previous paragraph we have introduced the word "project". Ingvar is not the only one that investigates and analyzes the “memory of the future”, the projects. In our country José Antonio Marina (1993) has masterfully developed the concept of the project as the foundation of creative intelligence. He defines it as "a thought unreality to which I give control of my conduct." Marina adds that like all living beings, man is thrown into the future, led to it by the dynamism of life. He says that creative or original projects - what in business terms we know as innovative - are those that move the subject away from their zone of foreseeable development. The first component of the project is the goal, the objective anticipated by the subject, as the end to be achieved.Except in very simple cases where the target is precisely designed, projects contain only an empty search pattern. Let's remember that Marina refers to creative intelligence, transforming intelligence.
Transformative intelligence is a learning process that examines and evolves from the current assumptions under which the organization operates and develops new organizational practices based on new assumptions.
It is important to distinguish between knowledge and practice. Knowledge can generally be articulated. As a practice, I understand unspoken skills that generally cannot be articulated. It is the difference between the theory of how to ride a bicycle and the bodily knowledge of how to do it.
To make transformative intelligence a reality we have to have more than new knowledge and insights. New knowledge must be embedded in unspoken organizational practices that become routines.
Adaptive action differs from transformative intelligence in that the former tries to improve the set of current assumptions but without examining or questioning them. That is to say, it improves and refines the practices based on the old assumptions but it continues to accept them as the correct way of thinking about the company's affairs.
We start with the question of why organization after organization first takes on revolutionary ideas, such as empowering and empowering employees, total quality, forward-thinking leadership, networking, reengineering, information technology, and so many others who prescribe academics and consultants as means to reach the future; then they launch crash programs to put them into practice; and after some time they come to the conclusion that ideas don't work.
Why does the idea of giving employees power and responsibility, of involving them in the changes that will affect them - concepts that have been known for decades - have to reappear from time to time with new labels and still ignite in few companies? Or, even worse, why do so many companies claim that they give true responsibility and power to their employees, and daily practice shows that they hardly change?
Why do many organizations neglect the Y theory of Mc. Gregor, the assumption that individuals are capable and willing to contribute to their organizations, an idea that he defended in his classic "The Human Side of Enterprise" (1960) because they think that employees are basically lazy and therefore should be motivated and controlled by managers, according to theory X?
First. So far, the most conservative and cynical model of nature and human and organizations, which many call the "command and control" model, has worked. Businesses have been able to function effectively with these cynical perceptions of human nature and have grown under the assumption that hierarchy is a necessary and sufficient mechanism of control and coordination. The reason is that companies have been able to operate under these assumptions in a reasonably predictable and stable environment, in defined markets that changed slowly, with technologies that evolved slowly; and in politico-economic settings that made success possible even with relatively low levels of efficiency and effectiveness.
But we know that environments today change at very fast rates, as do technologies and markets, and globalization requires competing with companies that are much more productive and efficient. The need to change and transform companies is much greater today than it was ten, twenty or thirty years ago. However, when we look at the results of the transformation attempts, we find few organizations that manage to manage these changes well. We have to conclude that there must be reasons that explain this slowness in generative learning.
The second cause lies in the cultures of the companies and even in the national cultures in which the cultures of the organizations are embedded. And it is that cultures evolve very slowly and, unless there are cataclysms or massive destruction and the birth of new organizations, fundamental cultural changes are rare. Of course, we are referring to real cultural changes, not the occasional hot cloth programs that we call ourselves as "creating a new culture."
When examined in detail, the latter are nothing more than minor adaptations within a given culture or if the changes to be implemented call into question the basic assumptions of the organization, they meet resistance, subversion or misunderstanding. In other words, the second reason that explains why organizational transformations are so rare is that they require us to give up some deep cultural assumptions and to remake the company on new assumptions. And that kind of unlearning and subsequent learning is necessarily painful and slow.
According to Schein, explanations of the “resistance to change” type are insufficient, “human nature is like this (although in part this is how Professor Nigel Nicholson shows in a recent article and that is commented elsewhere in this book). Schein says that in every business there are at least three sub-cultures, two of which have their roots outside the organization and are therefore more entrenched in their particular sets of assumptions. Every organization develops an internal culture based on its operational successes and this would be the "operational culture". But all organizations also have design functions within them, and technocrats who report their basic technologies; it would be the “engineering culture.” Finally,Every company has its first or team of first executives who are part of the "executive culture". These three cultures are often uncoordinated, and it is the lack of coordination that causes the learning failure of the organization. This raises the question of whether, instead of talking about organization-wide learning, one should focus on learning from those who embrace engineering and executive cultures.
Because its components have the fundamental role of innovating and inventing new forms and processes. Let's see some examples.
Example 1.- In a computer systems design and execution company, the new product development team, made up of four telecommunication engineers, worked with the consultant to develop their learning capacity using the techniques described in this book. The work obtained positive results: the level of trust among the team members increased and as a consequence also internal communication. One of the results was the improvement of the research and development processes, which were previously much more individual, which produced overlaps and "rediscoveries of the wheel"; Of course, the culture and the incentive system in the company favored this individualistic approach and did not stimulate the group. But the company management,he believed that he was losing control over the group, because it was he who set the calendar and the agenda. Although the results improved markedly, the management did not assume the anxiety of "loss of control" and, little by little, it was undoing the team.
Example 2.- A wholesale food products company decided to simplify systems and document management, including receiving and issuing invoices through an intra-net connected to its suppliers and customers. The consultant was entrusted with the human-organizational aspect of the change to the paperless office, working as a team with the company that designed the information technology. The change involved, on the one hand, a reduction in the workforce at the central offices, located in an easily accessible place in Madrid, very comfortable and with a continuous working day. The management of the company decided that, as a consultant and a computer company, the training programs for all personnel affected by the change and who, once the system is in place,the management would decide the people who should either leave the company or be reassigned to inventory and warehouse control that were located on the outskirts of Madrid. The conditions and hours of work were less satisfactory than those of the central office, although a bonus would be offered. No one would be fired. The training process failed miserably because literally "nobody wanted to learn": anxiety about change, misinformation, fear of losing something without knowing what would be gained in return.The training process failed miserably because literally "nobody wanted to learn": anxiety about change, misinformation, fear of losing something without knowing what would be gained in return.The training process failed miserably because literally "nobody wanted to learn": anxiety about change, misinformation, fear of losing something without knowing what would be gained in return.
Example 3.- A factory of chemical products, additives for the construction sector, insulators, waterproofing and also for cleaning and maintenance of workshops and companies in the metallurgical sector. The founder and chief executive of the company is a person with a clear vision and commercial orientation: "My company will supply any type of chemical product requested by construction and metal transformation companies." The company has a spectacular growth process and three years after its creation, its turnover is several billion pesetas. The CEO calls the consultant because "the company gets out of hand." The culture of the company,In the image and likeness of its founder, it had neglected the administrative and inventory control aspects and the consultant's task was to work with a coaching program for the chief executive so that he was aware of how his style and culture permeated the of the entire organization and that it was necessary to look for counterweights and controls without affecting the business dynamics of the company. Again anxiety transmitted to the organization.
How can learning take place? What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for unlearning and re-learning? To understand it, we need to examine some of the psychological dynamics of anxiety. When our old models stop working we experience a lack of confirmation or lack of confirmation. We enter a state of anxiety that we can call survival anxiety. Unless we change we will not reach our goals, we will achieve our ideals and, in extreme cases, we will not survive.
However, we are also anxious at the prospect of giving up some of our unspoken assumptions and practices. We call it learning anxiety.
If I allow myself to become an apprentice I will become incompetent and I may even lose my identity. The greater the anxiety I experience, the more I will defensively deny de-confirming data and hold on to my known systems. We call this process resistance to change and it is natural and expected. Consequently, if we are logical, we will conclude that for change to occur it is necessary that survival anxiety surpass learning anxiety. The normal approach for this to occur is to scale survival anxiety to such high levels that potential learners become even more defensively paralyzed, deny or rationalize to dismiss the misconfirming data, or pretend to learn to take the pressure off of managers.
An alternative and better way to start the learning process is to realize that if we reduce learning anxiety, it will be less than survival anxiety. Edgar Schein calls this process the creation of psychological security, making the apprentice feel that it is possible to learn without losing his or her self. The problem is that it is often very difficult to create enough psychological security to overcome learning anxiety, especially when, simultaneously, increases in productivity are required. It is absent when organizations are in the process of downsizing or reorganizing into more "lean" and agile structures. To feel psychologically safe we need time and space to reflect so that the data of deconfirmation settle in our consciousness,We need training to learn to learn, supportive counselors, fields to practice and positive visions of the future.
According to Schein, all forms of learning and change begin with some type of dissatisfaction or frustration generated by data that de-confirm our expectations and hopes. Whether it is adapting to new circumstances in the environment that frustrate the satisfaction of a need or if we refer to the generative and creative learning that Peter Senge refers to, a prerequisite is the imbalance based on non-confirming information. Unconfirmation functions as a driving force in a quasi-stationary equilibrium situation. However, this information is insufficient, because we can ignore it, reject it as irrelevant, blame others or bad luck for the undesired event or, more frequently, deny its validity.To be motivated by change, we have to accept information and connect it to something that matters to us. Lack of confirmation will provoke what we have called survival anxiety or the feeling that if we do not change we will not get what we need or we will not achieve the goals or ideals that we have set ourselves ("survival guilt")
To feel survival anxiety or guilt we have to accept the de-confirming data as valid and relevant. We have previously referred to "learning anxiety". It may be more desirable to adapt and not reach our goals than to take risks. Learning anxiety is the most important restraining force and it increases proportionally to the increase of the de-confirmation and that it leads to the maintenance of the balance avoiding defensively the de-confirmation.
Therefore, the consultant must contribute to generating a sufficient level of psychological security and therein lies one of his skills, a mixture of technique and art. For example, working in groups, creating parallel groups that provide a certain distance from each day's work, facilitating "practice fields" in which mistakes are assumed rather than feared, dividing the learning processes into more manageable parts, facilitating learning processes. "Coaching" to executives and managers
Lewin demonstrated that motivation is not enough and that cognitive processes need to be redefined.
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