The intensification of the armed conflict in our country has shown us the strengthening of an actor who has directly participated in the new dynamics of the internal conflict in Colombia. Said actor is normally known as «paramilitary» or «paramilitarism», a term that is somewhat diffuse and incomplete when analyzing the dynamics of the internal war that is currently taking place.
The work I plan to carry out seeks to analyze the subject, seeking to establish the real social composition of paramilitarism, trying to criticize the positions adopted and seeking answers to the attitudes, intentions and acts carried out by paramilitarism, taking into account its different facets..
Based on the concepts provided in the Violence and Politics class, and based on the work, the publications and communications that can be obtained through the mass media of the "United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia" and some non-governmental organizations It will try to provide elements of judgment regarding the analysis of the paramilitary problem, always taking into account current events.
THE PARAMILITARY PHENOMENON
The violation of human rights has become a perverse custom in the dynamics of the armed conflict, this phenomenon affects the expectations of peace in our society and shows the barbarism and degeneration of our internal conflict.
Paramilitarism has violated international humanitarian law more than any other armed actor, for this reason I would like to present the phenomenon as a clear consequence of the strengthening of the guerrillas and the inability of our governments to eradicate the insurgency from the national scene.
As the main hypothesis of the work, it will seek to demonstrate that the strengthening of paramilitarism, as a form of fight against the guerrillas, results from a cumulative weakening of the Armed Forces and their inability to fight cleanly against the guerrillas, all the while keeping in mind He says that the strengthening of the guerrillas has been accompanied by new forms of violation of IHL and the usufruct of illegal businesses that directly affect many Colombians.
1.1 The paramilitaries at the negotiating table?
In the last three years, the paramilitaries have experienced rapid growth: increasing their numbers, expanding their range of action to the north, east and south east of the country, and strengthening the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, the coordinating body of some of these groups. They have intensified their actions against the civilian population that they consider the guerrilla's social base.
At the same time they have sought to gain recognition as a political and military project. They declare themselves independent from the State but defenders of the rule of law and uphold their counterinsurgency vocation. Recently, the most visible of its leaders, Carlos Castaño, pointed out that now it would not be enough to negotiate with the guerrillas for them to abandon the war, however they have their own demands against the State. They demand to be taken into account in a peace negotiation and they state that they will participate in the process "but at separate tables, on equal terms and with the same guarantees that are granted to the guerrillas."
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PARAMILITARISM
2.1 Paramilitarism, counterinsurgency strategy:
Since the beginning of the sixties, the Public Force and State security agencies have been formed under the parameters of the National Security doctrine and the application of the foundations of the Low Intensity Conflict. Within this purpose, mechanisms have been implemented that are ready to eliminate the "internal enemy", represented in the existence of communism, subversion or insurgency.
Thus, within the framework of said strategy at the beginning of the same decade, the formation of "anti-terrorist-type" organizations and for the "anti-communist struggle" was recommended by US military advisers. In development of such purpose, decree 3398 of 196S was issued, which was later converted into permanent legislation through Law 48 of 1968, by means of which the legal basis for the organization of "national defense" was given, "civil defense" and the promotion in the organization of "self-defense groups".
Under the protection of said norms and even overflowing, members of the Public Force trained, armed and indoctrinated inhabitants in areas of Conflict in order to directly involve the population within the Confrontation and support the official bodies in counterinsurgency fighting.
As a covert purpose of the criminal actions of these groups, intimidation of the population appears in order to generate an atmosphere of fear and fear that leads to the destruction of social, political, union and human rights organizations, and prevents the free expression of social nonconformity.
Up to the present, it has been verified how paramilitary groups have been developed in various regions of the country with the clear purpose of acting in defense and protection of political interests, of economic projects (exploitation of natural resources such as oil and coal), and the defense of sectors linked to agricultural activity and drug trafficking.
2.2 Methods of action of the Paramilitarism:
In the national geography, the paramilitary groups have not had a single model or method of action, but this has been determined by the level of conflict in the region, the level of organization of the popular movement and the resistance of the population against this type of projects and actions of the Public Force.
In this sense, three (3) action models are differentiable:
- a) The compulsive involvement of the population b) The formation of a permanent and closed structure, in which the size depends on the area of action c) The hiring of people from other places to carry out crimes, without being part end of permanent group.
The hiring of foreign mercenaries by economic sectors and high state authorities has also been verified, which have intervened in training paramilitary and military groups in different techniques and in the use and handling of sophisticated weapons.
The compulsive involvement of the population
Intimidation of the population through the carrying of lists has been common where the inhabitants are threatened and in general the inhabitants are instigated to join the paramilitary project, leave or face death. These groups have been justified as "self-defense groups", where it is stated that "organized peasant" patrols are protected by the army and participation in these groups is promoted by offering wages, obtaining the military passbook and other benefits.
Regarding their relationship with the security forces, it has been determined that they carry out joint patrols, the civilian population has been used to accompany them in them, the leaders or paramilitary commanders are transported in helicopters of the National Army and the military bases have have been prepared as a place of stay for the members of these criminal structures.
The weapons they have have been delivered to them through state agents and institutions, with resources received from the peasantry, which has been forced to pay a series of "taxes" illegally collected for the maintenance of these groups.
Tas is the case of the projects implemented in the municipalities of El Carmen and San Vicente de Chucuri (Santander), and in some municipalities in the department of Casanare, adjacent to the Cusiana oil exploitation.
The formation of a permanent structure
For the formation of these groups, the participation of drug trafficking sectors, emeralds and landowners in their financing has been important, which have acted in common agreement with the Public Force regarding the provision of weapons, training and actions aimed at exercising control in certain areas.
Since 1983, the then Attorney General of the Nation, indicated the participation of personnel from the Military Forces in the formation of these groups. In addition, the testimonies of ex-members of these groups are abundant, showing their modus operandi, structure and role of State agents in their promotion and protection.
These groups have acted especially in areas such as Urabá, Córdoba, Sucre, Meta, Norte de Santander and Sur del Cesar, among others. Its typology of action has been framed in the execution of selective executions, up to the execution of indiscriminate massacres, such is the case of the massacres of Segovia, Honduras, La Negra, El Tomate and Pueblo Bello.
Although arrest warrants have been issued against recognized paramilitary leaders such as Fidel Castaño, alias "Rambo", it is clear the authorities' lack of interest in making them effective.
The hiring of people to carry out specific events:
This modality has been used in some places in Antioquia and Norte de Santander, where economic sectors (such as the coffee growers) and even the Military Forces themselves, through their informant networks, have hired personnel from other municipalities or departments to carry out extrajudicial executions, torture, disappearances.
The purpose of this action is to hinder the investigations of these groups and to cover up those responsible for the commission of crimes against humanity.
It has been possible to determine how Public Force personnel have intervened to procure the escape, to coordinate actions regarding the time and place of execution, and to equip those involved in the crimes with weapons.
Despite the fact that the conformation of these groups, their financing mechanisms, their relationship with the security forces and their responsibility in the execution of crimes against humanity have been extensively documented at the level of control agencies and the jurisdictional branch, the great Most of the events remain in impunity, high-ranking officers of the Public Force have been promoted and paramilitary groups have extended their actions and power in the national territory.
From the National Government, the persecution and destructuring of these groups is reduced to the issuance of a series of State of emergency (former state of siege) decrees, in which it places them outside the law, without thereby influencing his existence. On the contrary, through various decrees they have been granted benign treatment.
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW BY PARAMILITARIES
The phenomenon of paramilitarism is closely related to the violation of international humanitarian law. A report on violations of IHL by these groups by Human Rights Watch will be presented below, which shows the harshness of the phenomenon.
EXISTENCE OF PARAMILITARY GROUPS IN COLOMBIA
THE UNITED SELF-DEFENSES OF COLOMBIA
3.1 Human Rights Watch report
The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) encompasses at least seven paramilitary groups: the Peasant Self-Defense Forces of Córdoba and Urabá (ACCU), the largest and best-known group; the Self-Defense Forces of the Eastern Plains (also known as Los Carranceros, by the name of their leader, Víctor Carranza); the Cesar Self-defenses; the Autodefensas del Magdalena Medio, the oldest group; the Self-Defense Forces of Santander and southern Cesar; the Casanare Self-defenses; and the Self-Defense Forces of Cundinamarca.
The application of international humanitarian law to the AUC does not grant them any special status or recognition. AUC units frequently operate in direct coordination with the Colombian security forces. They are defined as paramilitaries due to their historical and constant relationship with the Colombian armed forces. Within Colombia, these groups can also be called “self-defense groups,” a definition used by the AUC.
However, AUCs operate independently and have a command structure, a supply source for weapons and supplies, and separate operations planning. The leader of the AUC, Carlos Castaño, has repeatedly expressed his willingness to commit his forces to respect international humanitarian law. However, it has also said that its forces will not respect the lives of guerrillas out of combat or civilians suspected of collaborating with the guerrillas, exceptions that show that their supposed support for international humanitarian law makes little sense.
3.2 The AUC
The AUC are the heirs of Death to Kidnappers (MAS), an alliance formed in the eighties between the Colombian Army, the Police and businessmen and ranchers from Magdalena Medio. At that time, the Army and the paramilitaries described their activity as necessary to reject guerrilla incursions.
However, in 1983, the Office of the Attorney General had registered more than 240 political assassinations by MAS, whose victims included elected officials, farmers and community leaders. In his report, Attorney Carlos Jiménez Gómez identified 59 active members of the Police and Army who belonged to MAS, including the Commander of the Bomboná Infantry Battalion. In an interview with Human Rights Watch, Carlos Castaño, founder of the AUC and the most powerful paramilitary leader in Colombia, placed his first participation in paramilitary activity in the training he received in the early 1980s in the Bomboná Battalion.
Castaño began as a guide, fought with the troops and identified suspected subversives. Meanwhile, his older brother, Fidel, was making a fortune from drug trafficking. Fidel invested his profits in land and became one of the most powerful ranchers in Colombia. With the benefits of Fidel as well as with the contributions of landowners and businessmen, the Castaños decided to form their own army in the mid-eighties, known as “Los Tangüeros,” by the name of the Castaño ranch.
"Guerrillas can act outside the law, so this battle is uneven," he told Human Rights Watch in an interview. "We realized that we could use the same strategies as the guerrillas and adopt their combat methods."
For example, in Las Tangas, foreign mercenaries and active-duty Army officers taught paramilitaries and professional hitmen who worked for drug lords how to shoot, bomb, and ambush in the mid-1980s.
The Castaños' strategy ended with a particularly violent record, described by a government commission as "one of the most miserable chapters of the country's recent violence." For example, on January 14, 1990, the Tangüeros kidnapped and murdered 42 people from Pueblo Bello, in Urabá, apparently as revenge for the death by the PLA of several Castaño gunmen.
Months later, the bodies of six of the kidnapped were found in clandestine graves that contained a total of 24 bodies in Las Tangas and Jaraguay, another ranch of the Castaños.
Fidel Castaño was convicted in absentia for his participation in that massacre. Carlos Castaño has admitted the participation of his family in the Pueblo Bello massacre, but has stated that it was "a mistake" due to poor training. "Our military strength had grown tremendously, and sometimes men used weapons for bad purposes," he said.
The massacres by the Tangüeros caused massive forced displacement during the second half of the eighties, and entire municipalities were emptied by terror. According to an organization that works with the displaced, the same drug traffickers turned landowners who paid for the Castaño army bought the abandoned land at cheap prices, which promoted the campaign to get rid of the guerrillas and their suspected supporters in the region.
This trend continues and drug traffickers continue to buy large tracts of land abandoned by displaced families. "The purchase of land by drug traffickers changes the course of the war, because the new landowners switch to the paramilitary organization," said Alejandro Reyes, a sociologist who has studied political violence, in an interview with Human Rights Watch. "Then begins the territorial defense of drug traffickers."
The Tangüeros established a clear operating model, which is still used by the AUC. First, rumors of an impending attack, graffiti, and written death threats circulate. On the night in question, heavily armed men arrive in vehicles at the scene and begin to remove people from their homes to kill them. None of the people we interviewed in the Córdoba department in 1992, including government authorities, had knowledge of a confrontation between the Tangüeros and the security forces; on the contrary, well-known paramilitary leaders used to sleep in military installations apparently to protect themselves from guerrilla attacks.
For example, in the municipality of El Tomate, whose inhabitants were considered by the paramilitaries to be sympathizers of the EPL, armed men seized a public bus and killed five passengers on August 30, 1988. The gunmen executed another ten residents. Tomato after removing them from their homes. They burned down 22 houses and the public bus, with the driver handcuffed behind the wheel.
People considered sympathetic to the guerrillas or their ideology (including teachers, community leaders, trade unionists, human rights activists, and religious workers) were also legitimate targets despite not having actively participated in the conflict. Often it was their own work that put them in danger. Among the victims of the Tangüeros is Sergio Restrepo, a Jesuit priest who administered the Tierralta parish in Córdoba. Restrepo apparently became a target because of his work with the poor, who was considered pro-guerrilla and communist. In 1988, a Castaño hitman shot him down at the entrance to the Jesuit parish house.
As Castaño themselves have recognized, some of the victims were also bystanders killed by mistake.
After another series of massacres carried out by the Magdalena Medio paramilitaries and their leaders in the Army in 1989, including the murder of two judges and ten government investigators in La Rochela, Santander, the government of Virgilio Barco issued Decree 1194, which established criminal sanctions for civilians and members of the armed forces who recruit, train, promote, finance, organize, lead or belong to "armed groups, misnamed paramilitary groups, that have been formed into death squads, gangs of hired killers, self-defense groups or groups that take justice into their own hands. ”
Despite this Decree, neither Fidel nor Carlos Castaño have ever been arrested for their participation in the leadership of a private army or for ordering massacres, although both have multiple convictions and pending arrest warrants.
In 1990, the PLA guerrillas had been decimated by the combined action of the Army and the Tangüeros. In August, Fidel Castaño and some paramilitaries from the Magdalena Medio offered to surrender their weapons if the EPL dissolved, an agreement that led to the demobilization of more than 2,000 EPL militants on March 1, 1992. Castaño also handed over some weapons to the authorities. Through a family foundation, with the name of Fundación por la Paz de Córdoba (FUNPAZCOR), the Castaños donated land, money and livestock to hundreds of former PLA guerrillas to establish small businesses, farms, commercial networks, schools and programs training.
However, the peace did not last long. When the former EPL members formed Esperanza, a legal political party, the FARC had expanded their activities to northern Colombia and occupied much of the former EPL territory. Some PLA members rejected the terms of the negotiations and resumed arms. Carlos Castaño told us that, for this reason, his family decided to reactivate his army like the ACCU and turn it into a national force to defeat the guerrillas.
In press interviews, Carlos Castaño has stated that his older brother, Fidel, disappeared on a land trip from Colombia to Panama in 1994, shortly after writing a letter to the then interior minister Horacio Serpa expressing his desire to participate in the negotiations. of peace between the government and the guerrillas. The offer received no response. Since Fidel's disappearance, Carlos has become the leader of the ACCU and after the AUC.
"In 1993, we had 600 weapons. We began to establish fronts in other regions to fight the guerrillas. A front was established at the request of people living in the region who were willing to pay for it. ”
The ACCU quickly became the largest and most organized paramilitary group in Colombia. Although each front has a local leader, Castaño says they all coordinate through the central command. Castaño is the commander in chief. Like the guerrillas they consciously imitate, the ACCUs have a joint staff consisting of leaders from each regional paramilitary group. Regional groups also have regional staffs. The combat force is divided into two types of units: the local self-defense boards and the support groups; and the shock fronts, better trained and equipped and able to move quickly throughout Colombia. The ACCU has former EPL guerrillas, some of whom turned themselves in directly to the paramilitaries.
Both local and special fighters receive a base salary in addition to food, a uniform, weapons and ammunition. The funds to cover these expenses come from local ranchers and entrepreneurs. In addition, new evidence has appeared linking Castaño to drug trafficking in Antioquia and Córdoba, a business that has earned a fortune for the family.
A businessman explained to Human Rights Watch how he had been told to attend a meeting called by Castaño in northern Antioquia to collect funds for an ACCU unit. "Each person had to pay a fee of between $ 3,000 and $ 5,000, and everyone knew what it was for," he told us.
In contrast to the 1980s, when the Castaño army was a fundamentally regional force, the ACCU sponsored a national summit to form an alliance of like-minded groups in December 1994, which led to the founding of the AUC. According to Castaño, within the AUC, "each front is autonomous and responsible for its region in the financial field and must vindicate or deny the actions attributed to it." However, the regions share ammunition, weapons and even men. Proponents agree that Castaño ultimately exercises control of the AUC, and he is the one with the clearest vision of the future.
Castaño denies working with the Army, although he acknowledges that there is "sympathy" between the ACCU and the security forces. He told Human Rights Watch that, sometimes, if the paramilitaries are fighting the guerrillas and the Army appears, "it is natural that we combine forces with the Army to defeat a common enemy." During its Third Summit, the group recognized a continued relationship with the armed forces, who "want to use us, as it is well known that we are the ones who ultimately lay down our arms in combat and in good part of the anti-guerrilla operations."
In fact, there is abundant and consistent evidence that Castaño frequently coordinates with the Army, even in prominent political assassinations. For example, the Attorney General's Office accused Castaño of participating in the 1994 murder of Senator Manuel Cepeda, carried out with the alleged assistance of the Ninth Army Brigade.
The ACCU began their campaign to eliminate guerrillas in Urabá and later expanded southward in the departments of Antioquia, Chocó, Bolívar and Sucre. When we spoke with Castaño in 1996, he stated that he had more than 2,000 trained, armed and equipped fighters distributed on five fronts, in addition to his headquarters in San Pedro de Urabá. Analysts from the Colombian government estimate the same combat force, which can increase by hundreds depending on where Castaño plans to carry out an operation.
At the end of 1996, the AUC had paramilitaries from the Magdalena Medio, led by Ramón Isaza, and from the Llanos Orientales, led by Víctor Carranza. At that time, the AUC planned to establish new fronts in the departments of Guaviare and Putumayo, jumping to the southernmost border of Colombia. For their part, the ACCU also crossed the northern Colombian border with Panama in pursuit of guerrillas, who for years have used this sparsely populated area as a refuge.
After the ACCU was linked to 90 murders over a 22-day period in late 1996, the Colombian government announced a "total offensive" against them and a $ 1 million reward for information leading to the capture of Castaño..
However, during the following months, the security forces made no effort to find and arrest him. In fact, Castaño continued to meet regularly with reporters, municipal and national government officials, and representatives of the Church in areas controlled by him. When the reward was repeated a year later, this time along with Castaño's photo, the government promised to send a special team led by the police against him.
At the time of writing this report, the Attorney General's Office and the Police had captured paramilitary leaders, including Víctor Carranza. However, Castaño continues to operate freely and has launched a new offensive in the Putumayo department.
3.3. The AUC and international humanitarian law
The AUC has recognized some principles of international humanitarian law and accepts ICRC training in humanitarian law. However, it still has to adjust its conduct on the ground to these principles. Instead, the AUC have called for "negotiations" with the guerrillas to "reach an agreement that allows the civilian population to be marginalized and thus be able to comply with International Humanitarian Law," ignoring the fact that negotiations are not needed to immediately apply these beginning. Talks with government representatives have been sporadic but constant.
Within the AUC, the ACCU is the most responsive organization. ACCU statutes prohibit the forced recruitment of members and the attack on people who are not directly involved in the conflict. Fighters who disobey orders are sanctioned and can be expelled, according to statute.
In another document, the AUC has prohibited the recruitment of fighters under the age of 18; forced displacement and the kidnapping or enforced disappearance of civilians.
"In the past, self-defense groups made mistakes," Castaño told reporters for the newspaper El Tiempo in 1997. "It was a product of lack of professionalism and ignorance, but we began to enter a recovery process. There were groups in many places that we gave a kind of coup d'etat: we took away their rifles and threw them away. A debugging was done and so we unified the movement. ”
At the same time, however, Castaño has argued that the nature of Colombia's war (with many fighters without uniforms or identification) makes strict principles difficult if not impossible to apply. Instead, it has defended a "Creole" version of international humanitarian law, adaptable to the Colombian irregular war.
"We have not shot people indiscriminately," he told Cambio 16 magazine in December 1997. "The massacres do not exist… The only thing I accept is that I kill guerrillas out of combat."
After a detailed review of the cases and interviews on the ground, Human Rights Watch has concluded that far from trying to respect international humanitarian law, the AUC depends on the clear, deliberate and systematic violation of these norms to wage war. Furthermore, government investigators, members of the Church, humanitarian aid organizations and victims of the AUC agree that they only defend the protections contained in Common Article 3 and Protocol II in word. The AUC have repeatedly and vigorously flaunted their disdain for international standards through the commission of massacres, killings of civilians and combatants out of combat, torture, mutilation of corpses, death threats, forced displacement, hostage-taking, arbitrary arrest and looting,among other violations.
"People die because they live in areas dominated by the guerrillas and because they are considered sympathizers of the guerrillas by the paramilitaries," a government intelligence analyst told Human Rights Watch.
In 1997, the Data Bank registered at least 155 massacres apparently committed by units allied to the AUC, making the latter responsible for the vast majority of the murders considered a violation of international humanitarian law in Colombia. In that same period, the Human Rights Unit of the Prosecutor's Office filed allegations in 271 cases with members of the AUC involved, many of them related to massacres.
For their part, the ACCU, the AUC's most powerful group, have rejected hundreds of allegations that their members routinely capture people and mutilate and decapitate the bodies of those they have executed. However, these complaints are coherent, generalized and based on credible sources, which is why we consider that they are not only habitual, but a concrete strategy that is not punished. Of the 150 cases of torture registered by the Data Bank in 1997, 141 were attributed to paramilitary groups. Of these, most of the tortured were later killed. Furthermore, in many cases, bodies are dismembered, decapitated and mutilated with electric saws, acid and blows of a machete.
In interviews, Carlos Castaño can be direct and not regret strategies that violate international humanitarian law. In an interview with journalist Germán Castro Caycedo, Castaño said the Tangüeros' strategy of deliberately massacring civilians who they believed were bringing food, medicine and other provisions to the guerrillas was a useful tactic that the AUC has used with energy.
"We realized that we were able to isolate them and we saw that it was a strategy that gave very good results… Today we continue to apply the same mechanism here… with the same excellent results produced at that time."
In their conclusions on the Third Summit in 1996, the AUC practically offered a list of people considered military targets, completely ignoring the careful distinctions that combatants must make to protect civilians. "All the inhabitants of a region dominated by either side, are potentially combatants, either in their capacity as active sympathizers, who do not take a direct part in the conflict but do assume the decisive responsibility of transmitting orders and information, supplying lines of communication, provide supplies of all kinds, infiltrate the enemy, 'raise' funds, exercise the political commissariat, etc.; and also serve as a connection between the action groups and the population… And the passive sympathizers who take on the task of seeing nothing, hearing nothing and especially,know nothing."
A statement from the ACCU released in the department of Bolívar in December 1996 condenses Castaño's strategy. According to the statement, ACCU fighters planned to carry out a population census to distinguish "people who are dedicated to working honestly from those publicly known as guerrillas… who will be arrested and executed." The second category included "those who support ideologically and materially, because this is how we are hitting the guerrilla bases, thus contributing to the task of destroying them."
As is clear, these statements and the conduct of AUC units on the ground reflect a deep rejection of international humanitarian law, despite the fact that Castaño has learned to praise them in public documents and interviews.
During 1996 and 1997, AUC units established a clear systematic practice of violations of international humanitarian law. A unit entered a municipality, executed civilians considered guerrilla sympathizers, and left. As the sociologist Alfonso Reyes pointed out in the newspaper El Espectador, in hundreds of cases, the massacres of civilians achieved a definitive but brutal purpose.
"The massacre of suspects is an effective notification to the population to cut their ties of support for the guerrillas," he said. "Many who collaborate with it are scared and flee the region, with those who remain, preferably the victims of the guerrillas, the self-defense network is organized and the region is recovered."
For example, on April 2, 1997, about 200 ACCU members crossed the Colombian-Panama border and entered the municipalities of La Bonga and Titiná, Panama, occupied by Colombian refugees. Paramilitaries reportedly killed three residents after forcibly removing them from their homes. The fourth victim, Remberto Arrieta, was killed while trying to escape. Although the ACCU, which claimed responsibility for the attack, said that the dead were guerrillas, the human rights organizations that interviewed witnesses later described them as a lumberjack, a peasant woman, and two farmers, whom the paramilitaries accused of assisting the guerrillas and that they did not participate directly in hostilities. As a consequence, many fled the area.
When Human Rights Watch asked Carlos Castaño why the ACCU had killed several butchers in and around Tierralta, Córdoba, in 1996, he recognized the group's responsibility for the killings and demonstrated its policy of violations of international humanitarian law. Castaño said that the guerrillas steal cattle from ranchers, which they exchange for cattle owned by small farmers. When the small farmers take the stolen cattle to the local slaughterhouses, the butchers buy it. Therefore, according to Castaño's reasoning, the butchers assist the guerrillas and lose their civilian status. "The murder of butchers was intended to send the message that people cannot continue to offer this financial support to the guerrillas," he told Human Rights Watch.
Castaño has also admitted attacks on left-wing politicians for the sole reason that they are, violating the protection guaranteed to civilians by international humanitarian law. In the conclusions of the First Summit of the AUC in 1994, it is stated that as long as the guerrillas continue executing members of the security forces and the families of paramilitaries, they consider the “extreme left-wing political and union cadres to be the main targets,” which implies a clear violation of IHL
Castaño confirmed his position in 1997, when he told reporters that his forces would kill candidates considered guerrilla sympathizers.
It is clear that these attacks are violations of international humanitarian law, which protects civilians even when they publicly pronounce themselves in favor of one of the parties to the conflict, to the extent that they do not take an active part in hostilities. Nor does international humanitarian law make exceptions for abuses committed in response to violations committed by the enemy; all sides are obligated to respect international humanitarian law, regardless of whether their enemies do so.
Human rights defenders who report paramilitary abuses are also targets of the AUC. After the Santander and Southern Cesar Self-Defense Group killed 11 people and arbitrarily detained at least 34 in Barrancabermeja, on May 16, 1998, human rights leaders protested and appealed to the authorities to investigate. As a consequence, the paramilitary group, belonging to the AUC, disclosed a threat in which it named the president of the Regional Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CREDHOS), a human rights group that works in the Magdalena Medio region., Osiris Bayther, and declared her "military objective" for allegedly collaborating with the guerrillas. On June 4,Government investigators announced that paramilitaries had told them that at least 23 of the detainees had been shot and that their bodies had been cremated, a serious violation of international humanitarian law.
To counter allegations of AUC abuses, Castaño says his group consults with at least three unrelated intelligence sources to confirm that a possible target is a combatant before carrying out the murder. Castaño has told reporters that the suspects are only executed after being convicted by a panel of three paramilitary judges, who must gather evidence from two independent sources before sentencing.
It should be noted, however, that the AUC rarely even complies with these blatantly inadequate measures before killing those it accuses of supporting the guerrillas. Therefore, the mentions to the evidence meeting and the panels of judges are part of a cynical public relations initiative aimed at justifying the unjustifiable: the massacres and executions of civilians and fighters out of combat.
Human Rights Watch was able to verify "the judicial processes" of the AUC in the case of a person we knew well and of whom Castaño had said that he was a guerrilla verified by his so-called independent intelligence sources. According to Castaño, this person had provided stores, food and medicine for the guerrillas, and had traveled in areas controlled by the guerrillas. Castaño noted that for this reason his name was on a blacklist.
We indicate that the person in question, a humanitarian aid worker, was at that time assisting hundreds of families of displaced persons forced by the armed conflict. It is possible that this person had delivered provisions to a guerrilla; however, their job was to distribute stores, food and medicine to displaced families, without distinguishing between civilian-clad guerrillas and civilians who were not directly involved in hostilities, or denying aid based on this criterion. The person in question did not directly participate in the hostilities at any time.
Castaño accepted that his sources were not always reliable and that they might not have taken that person's work into account. However, it was clear that for the AUC this type of reasoning serves to make almost any human being who lives or works in areas with a guerrilla presence a military target.
NARCO-TRAFFIC, VIOLENCE AND PARAMILITARISM
The production, trafficking and abuse of drugs has reached an enormous magnitude worldwide. In Colombia, the problem has acquired very particular connotations, because it is the largest trafficker of coca leaf, basic paste, and especially cocaine.
The paramilitary phenomenon is no stranger to this reality, a fact that notably affects the credibility of the AUC as a political force and that it does not pursue private interests.
The illegality of the drug industry gives it a peculiar character: organized crime, violence and corruption are its natural components. Drug trafficking exercises its power to penetrate the structures of civil society, to intervene in decision-making networks and to control part of national territories. And it uses force through paramilitary groups to destabilize states and impose their own laws and values, violating human rights and jeopardizing the permanence of the democratic system. Drugs affect the health of those who consume them, and particularly that of young people and children. The various options to combat drugs are discussed both at the level of the countries involved and at the international level. Under the leadership of the United Nations,A policy based on the principle of shared responsibility, respect for the sovereignty of states, the elimination of the use of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of countries is being shaped, all laudable but perhaps contradictory objectives.
The drug economy connects production, marketing and finance in an intricate network that ignores national borders, and that extends to all continents. The clandestine or underground nature of the drug economy makes it extremely difficult to analyze its effects on societies involved in the production, manufacture, trafficking and consumption of narcotic drugs.
Colombia suffers from the seventies the stigma of being the main producer and exporter of cocaine in the world. Beyond the multitude of ideas devised in this regard, however, the economic, political and social effects of drug trafficking on the march of the country have been as enormous as they are difficult to assess with certainty.
For some specialists, the Colombian economy itself already depends to a certain extent on the income from drug trafficking, especially external accounts. The drug cartels have been strengthened because they have managed to infiltrate the country's political structure. A part of the large income from drug trafficking, scholars consider, is used for investment, generates jobs and contributes to financing the growing external deficit, maintaining exchange rate stability and having high monetary reserves, which would explain Colombia's strength in the face of to international financial problems. The recent "tequila effect", for example, had little impact in the country, while in other Latin American nations it forced severe economic adjustments.
Other analysts, on the other hand, assure that the nature of the problem of drug trafficking in Colombia has been distorted. Due to the degree of development achieved by the country, they argue, the economy does not depend so much on drugs and the sovereign capacity of the State to combat it subsists. They also underestimate the economic benefits of the phenomenon when considering that the excessive income of narco-dollars unbalances domestic demand, affects tradable production, alters prices, generates expectations without solid bases and causes, in the long term, total chaos.
Through this work we will seek to analyze the different aspects that influence the construction and development of drug trafficking consolidation in our society, seeking to examine the problem from as many perspectives as possible.
4.1 Relationship between paramilitarism and drug trafficking.
Although one wants to show an ideology behind the phenomenon of paramilitarism, it is an obvious fact that paramilitarism is also financed by the assets that result from drug trafficking.
It is stated that in the last decade the drug trafficking phenomenon has three main characteristics: geopolitical settlement guided by the desire for power; notorious increase, despite social control policies; and use of new and more sophisticated technical mechanisms for recycling illicit money from it.
Regarding the recycling of illicit money, it is suggested that very significant legal and technical implementation steps have been taken. However, the reality of the increase in money laundering figures belies the effectiveness of such regulatory instruments and urges the search for preventive instruments with greater operational capacity to minimize the phenomenon.
The paramilitary phenomenon has shown that there are clear coincidences between the ways of operating the paramilitaries and drug traffickers, including terrorist techniques, mobilization and intelligence operations, and infiltration in the highest social spheres.
At the same time as it generated colossal surpluses, the Colombian drug trafficking organization became increasingly powerful and complex. The risks of illegal activity and the persecution of the authorities also increased, forcing the cartels to seek judicial and political immunity.
Drug trafficking has broken into the political arena since the 1970s through bribery and violence: "drug or lead" was offered by drug traffickers and they fully complied.
In the 1980s, the Medellín cartel, led by Pablo Escobar Gaviria, managed to control the country's cocaine commercialization and subdue the rest of the drug trafficking organizations. At one point, it has been claimed, most of the intelligence services and police forces came under the control of the powerful cartel, which, by financing electoral campaigns by legislators and governors, gained political influence in certain areas of Colombia.
The organization created a terrorist group, the infamous "Extraditables," to lobby for the government not to lift the ban on extraditing nationals to the United States. With the slogan "Better a grave in Colombia than a cell in the United States," the Extraditables unleashed one of the most serious waves of violence in recent Colombian history, on at least three fronts: within the organization itself and against other cartels of the drug; against independent officials and figures with unfavorable opinions to the drug barons, and against political leaders and organizations. With this, a new word was born: «narcoterrorism». Those who did not receive "the silver" seldom escaped from the lead. The multiplication of murders (including those of three presidential candidates, an attorney general,a minister of justice and numerous judges and civil servants of the judicial power), as well as the wave of kidnappings and attacks, impelled the State to fight without fear the fearsome cartel. Finally, this one was disarticulated at the beginning of the current decade when Escobar died at the hands of paramilitary public forces.
Defeated the extreme terrorism of the Medellín cartel, another more complex organization occupied the leadership of the drug business: the Cali cartel.
Unlike the leaders of Medellín, those of Cali cultivated an image of respectable businessmen, with significant investments in various economic activities, from the construction industry, commercial chains, banks and radio stations to soccer teams. The Cali drug barons are not supporters of violence, although they do not hesitate to exercise it if necessary. The following words of the Rodríguez Orejuela brothers, the main leaders, enclose the poster's philosophy: "We don't kill judges… we buy them."
For the rest, the organization's complex intelligence system, considered in the United States as the most efficient of its kind in Latin America, allows it to know in advance covert operations, government movements, bribery politicians, etc.
PARAMILITARISM AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT
“Forced displacement caused by« especially paramilitary »violence is a relevant socio-demographic problem in the context of the national situation, since it represents approximately 2% of the total population. In other words, one in every 60 Colombians was forced to migrate due to factors of violence in the last ten years. ”
The phenomenon of violence is not new in our country, where the displacements generated by this phenomenon are very common and unfortunately frequent.
Approximately 110,000 homes suffer from this problem, families that must be cared for, transported and relocated, so that they return to employment and obtain a decent standard of living and, if possible, under a lack of subsistence economy.
5.1 Refugees and displaced persons.
Refugees are people who “due to well-founded fears of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a certain social group or political opinions, must change their places of residence in order to flee their fears. When forced migrations occur within the national territory for reasons of internal armed conflict and / or systematic violation of human rights, among other violent causes, migrants assume the category of internally displaced persons.
5.2 Demographic information.
According to the results of the national survey of pastors:
"In Colombia there are between 544,801 and 627,720 people displaced for violent reasons in Colombia in the last ten years."
Displaced population by sex.
Sex% No People
Women 58.2 341,204
Men 41.8 245,261
Total 100.0 586 261
Household heads by sex
Sex%
Men 75.4
Women 24.6
39,316 people lost their husbands or one of their children in violent acts, before moving (data from 1997).
Age of Other Family Members (Estimate of the total displaced population)
Years% No People
1 to 4 8.9 42,538
5 to 9 14.7 70,260
10 to 14 18.7 88,900
15 to 19 17.1 81,253
20 to 24 12.6 60,223
25 to 29 9.0 43,016
30 to 34 5.5 26,288
35 to 39 3.9 14,388
40 or more 9.6 46,842
Total 100 477,060 + (108,301)
+ Heads of Family
The forced displacement generated by violence is a clear consequence of the action of both subversive and paramilitary groups, clearly violating human rights and unfortunately using this fact as political booty or show of force.
STRATEGY AGAINST PARAMILITARISM
Below are some suggestions, both personal and compiled from the bibliography regarding the paramilitary struggle.
- Dismantle paramilitary groups, and investigated and sanctioned crimes against humanity from these groups, and the presence and action of mercenaries in the national territory should also be prevented. In addition, make effective the arrest warrants against members of paramilitary groups Investigate and punish To its funders, members and the authorities that have intervened in its promotion and / or protection. Refrain from giving special or benign treatment (amnesties, pardons, quasi-amnesties, quasi-pardons) by virtue of eventual peace negotiations with the executive. Repeal all the rules or administrative acts that authorize, order or favor the creation or constitution of paramilitary groups, as well as those that make benign or favorable treatment possible, especially Art.34 of Decree 3567 of February 1994. To immediately dismiss, by administrative means, the security forces personnel who have been identified by national or international organizations as committed to the formation, promotion or instigation of this type of group.
PERSONAL CONCLUSIONS
- The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia are disguising private interests with a political and social platform, which is inconsistent with their actions and methods. The links between the paramilitary groups and the national army are evident, however there are no clear policies on the part of Our rulers to eradicate this phenomenon The main factor in violation of IHL is attributable to paramilitary violence. Forced displacement in our country is mainly caused by the struggle between the guerrillas and paramilitarism. The links between paramilitarism and drug trafficking are clear, it is possible affirming that the methods used by drug traffickers are very similar to paramilitary methods. Paramilitaries cannot be considered as a belligerent force,much less as a political actor pursuing social benefits for our people. We must emphatically reject the existence of paramilitarism in all its forms.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
- Human Rights Watch report: «VIOLATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW BY PARAMILITARIES. Apart from an article published on the Internet at www.hrw.org 1997 National Parish Survey. "Violence and Forced Displacement in Colombia" National Episcopal Conference: Colombian Social Problems. "Armed Conflict and Paramilitarism in Colombia" Article published on the Internet: Editor: Equipo Nizkor PO Box 15116 28080 Madrid - Spain Fax / Phone 34.1.5170141 [email protected] http://www.derechos.org/nizkor GONZALES Patricio. Money laundering: a criminological challenge. Chilean Law Review. (Santiago, Chile), Vol. 22, No. 2, 1995. p. 321-324.STEINER SAMPEDRO, Roberto "Colombia's income from the export of illicit drugs," Economic Situation Vol 26 No 4 December 1996 Colombia against Drug Trafficking, A long-term challenge, study published by Fundapresencia, located at www.fundapresencia.org.co. RICARDO PEÑARANDA S., EDUARDO PIZARRO L. and JAIME ZULUAGA N. Analysis of the Colombian Situation «Institute of Political Studies and International Relations». UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE COLOMBIA.www.semana.com.cowww.fundapresencia.org.co Notes and opinions expressed in the class «Violence and Politics» Prof. Jaime Zuluaga.
RICARDO PEÑARANDA S., EDUARDO PIZARRO L. and JAIME ZULUAGA N. Analysis of the Colombian Situation «Institute of Political Studies and International Relations». NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF COLOMBIA.
Taken from: «Armed Conflict and Paramilitarism in Colombia» Article published on the Internet: Editor: Equipo Nizkor PO Box 15116 28080 Madrid - Spain Fax / Phone 34.1.5170141
www.derechos.org/nizkor
Human Rights Watch report: «VIOLATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW BY PARAMILITARIES. Apart from an article published on the Internet at www.hrw.org
STEINER SAMPEDRO, Roberto "Colombia's income from the export of illicit drugs," Economic Situation Vol 26 No 4 December 1996
- Colombia against Drug Trafficking, A long-term challenge, study published by fundapresencia, located at www.fundapresencia.org.co.
Data: National Parish Priest Survey 1997. «Violence and Forced Displacement in Colombia» National Episcopal Conference: Colombian Social Problems, April 1997.
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