Reforming the Superior Audit of Michoacán implies a wide and profound modification to its operation. Derived from the recognition that the current model is clearly out of print. However, the design of its restructuring (not reengineering, it only makes sense in the private sector) must start from the analysis and reflection of the possible solutions that the deputies of the LXXIV Legislature have expressed, in order to foresee whether the proposals of change in the institutional design (Superior Audit Law and organizational structure) and its implementation will be able to combine human, financial and material resources to create an environment and culture of integrity, commitment and innovation in the staff of the Superior Audit and comply with with the objectives expected of the restructuring.
And given that the history in the ASM has been characterized by reforms that have not produced the expected effects, it is worth asking why nothing has happened? Then, the hypothesis: The modifications in the Law of Superior Inspection have not attempted a radical change (to go to the root of the problems) for that reason its failures. And now before the imminent process of legislative production, understood as the process of institutional change, it is necessary to observe it critically and its adequacy with the reality of the Technical Body and its relevance for resolution. And to do this, it aims to contribute to the reflection of those who legislate and those who are at the service of congressmen. The limitation is the lack of information regarding what is being carried out since the Superior Audit, and apparently only a few,those who are at its top have access and participation in the alleged restructuring, therefore, it is not feasible to assess its scope; and it seems that the auditors will know it again when it is published in the Official State Gazette. Furthermore, the opinions expressed are indicative of the vision or conception held in this regard, such as: The lack of the Evaluation and Control Unit has led to its inadequate functioning; the absence of full autonomy arises from the lack of budgetary autonomy; there is no legal framework in accordance with federal legislation; deficiencies in the regulatory and procedural framework; and, deficit in the workforce, as well as in the professional profile of the staff. Let's see:it is not feasible to assess its scope; and it seems that the auditors will know it again when it is published in the Official State Gazette. Furthermore, the opinions expressed are indicative of the vision or conception held in this regard, such as: The lack of the Evaluation and Control Unit has led to its inadequate functioning; the absence of full autonomy arises from the lack of budgetary autonomy; there is no legal framework in accordance with federal legislation; deficiencies in the regulatory and procedural framework; and, deficit in the workforce, as well as in the professional profile of the staff. Let's see:it is not feasible to assess its scope; and it seems that the auditors will know it again when it is published in the Official State Gazette. Furthermore, the opinions expressed are indicative of the vision or conception that is held in this regard, such as: The lack of the Evaluation and Control Unit has led to its inadequate functioning; the absence of full autonomy arises from the lack of budgetary autonomy; there is no legal framework in accordance with federal legislation; deficiencies in the regulatory and procedural framework; and, deficit in the workforce, as well as in the professional profile of the staff. Let's see:such as: The lack of the Evaluation and Control Unit has led to its inadequate operation; the absence of full autonomy arises from the lack of budgetary autonomy; there is no legal framework in accordance with federal legislation; deficiencies in the regulatory and procedural framework; and, deficit in the workforce, as well as in the professional profile of the staff. Let's see:such as: The lack of the Evaluation and Control Unit has led to its inadequate operation; the absence of full autonomy arises from the lack of budgetary autonomy; there is no legal framework in accordance with federal legislation; deficiencies in the regulatory and procedural framework; and, deficit in the workforce, as well as in the professional profile of the staff. Let's see:
- The amendments to the Superior Audit Law dated July 18, 2017, did not lead to the implementation of the Evaluation and Control Unit (in charge of monitoring the strict fulfillment of the functions in charge of the public servants of the Superior Audit). Since its origin and development, it has been conceived as a pyramidal, rigid and authoritarian structure, commanded by a one-person management that has not justified its actions or omissions, submitting the loyalty of its subordinates, not to the public and social interest of the Institution, but to the personal interest. Reproducing this form of authority at each hierarchical level. But the Good Control Practices recommend having control and surveillance systems that periodically examine the fulfillment of the Control functions. However,There is confusion and ambiguity about it. On the one hand, legislators have externalized the concept "the Evaluation and Control Unit will be the right arm of the ASM Inspection Commission." Which, although it deconcentrates the exercise of power in the Superior Audit; It should be considered that Good Governance is also required of the Superior Audit Institutions through inclusion, respect for the work of the audit and recognition and promotion based on effort and dedication. And the other, has been established, "The head of the Unit will be administratively responsible to the Commission and Congress" (Article 9 Octies, LFS). That is to say, one and the other or both; which would lead to controversies, doubts, and uncertainties.legislators have externalized the concept "the Evaluation and Control Unit will be the right arm of the ASM Inspection Commission". Which, although it deconcentrates the exercise of power in the Superior Audit; It should be considered that Good Governance is also required of the Superior Audit Institutions through inclusion, respect for the work of the audit and recognition and promotion based on effort and dedication. And the other has been established, "The head of the Unit will be administratively responsible to the Commission and Congress" (Article 9 Octies, LFS). That is to say, one and the other or both; which would lead to controversies, doubts, and uncertainties.legislators have externalized the concept "the Evaluation and Control Unit will be the right arm of the ASM Inspection Commission". Which, although it deconcentrates the exercise of power in the Superior Audit; It should be considered that Good Governance is also required of the Superior Audit Institutions through inclusion, respect for the work of the audit and recognition and promotion based on effort and dedication. And the other has been established, "The head of the Unit will be administratively responsible to the Commission and Congress" (Article 9 Octies, LFS). That is to say, one and the other or both; which would lead to controversies, doubts, and uncertainties.although it deconcentrates the exercise of power in the Superior Audit; It should be considered that Good Governance is also required of the Superior Audit Institutions through inclusion, respect for the work of the audit and recognition and promotion based on effort and dedication. And the other has been established, "The head of the Unit will be administratively responsible to the Commission and Congress" (Article 9 Octies, LFS). That is to say, one and the other or both; which would lead to controversies, doubts, and uncertainties.although it deconcentrates the exercise of power in the Superior Audit; It should be considered that Good Governance is also required of the Superior Audit Institutions through inclusion, respect for the work of the audit and recognition and promotion based on effort and dedication. And the other has been established, "The head of the Unit will be administratively responsible to the Commission and Congress" (Article 9 Octies, LFS). That is to say, one and the other or both; which would lead to controversies, doubts, and uncertainties.it has been established, “The head of the Unit will be administratively responsible to the Commission and the Congress” (article 9 Octies, LFS). That is to say, one and the other or both; which would lead to controversies, doubts, and uncertainties.it has been established, “The head of the Unit will be administratively responsible to the Commission and the Congress” (article 9 Octies, LFS). That is to say, one and the other or both; which would lead to controversies, doubts, and uncertainties.
In addition, the head of the Unit "Planning and scheduling audits has been conferred on the various areas that make up the Superior Audit" (Article 9 Nonies, I, LFS). And, how will the Control and Evaluation Unit audit auditors when the Audit Law and secondary regulations have not determined what the audit is, when audit is confused with control and when the secondary regulations that are lacking are lacking. regulate it and determine its validity? And regardless of whether the above is resolved, the most recommendable thing would be to eliminate the term of audits (in the Control Unit) by analysis, evaluation or revision. And the same objective would be fulfilled; together with taking into account the development and institutional maturation in the Superior Audit in its planning and restructuring,as well as in the Evaluation and Control Unit, so that it becomes a first stage of the process, a more preventive than punitive instance, and in case, if serious administrative offenses are detected, the Principles and Guidelines that govern the action Public Servants according to the Law of Administrative Responsibility for the State of Michoacán, would frame and sanction them.
- It is emphasized that full autonomy is achieved through budgetary autonomy. But it is wrong. Although it would be highly appropriate that the Superior Audit will have a budget exercising it autonomously, the question of autonomy goes beyond the budget. For what it is necessary to remember, in 1977 the delegations of the Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI) met within the framework of the IX Congress of the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) where they approved the Declaration of Lima, in other aspects highlights, the independence in the audit as a fundamental premise for the effective fulfillment of the functions in the Inspection Entities. Then, in 2007, the XIX Congress of SAIs in Mexico City,It was recognized that currently, no Superior Audit Entity complies with all the basic points and Good Practices to achieve independence. And later, the Report of the 21 United Nations / INTOSAI Symposium on Government Auditing, held in Vienna from July 13 to 15, 2011, in Conclusions, says “It was highlighted that the Supreme Audit Institutions strive to be recognized as institutions independent models to influence the lives of citizens and echo the demands of accountability and the eradication of corruption ”(page 19). The foregoing, in my opinion, shows, first, autonomy or independence is the primary issue to be resolved in the Supreme Audit Institutions. Second, there is currently no definitive solution in this regard. And third,Compliance with autonomy is carried out through a gradual process in the implementation of international procedures and standards and with the determined support of endogenous and exogenous elements for the achievement of a timely and reliable audit.
- The history of the State Audit Entities in Mexico has been their permanent adaptation of the changes that the Superior Audit of the Federation has adopted. From the Accounting Offices it was transferred to the Superior Audits, although it never showed or demonstrated what such superiority consisted of. Or, if the ASF privileged the practice of performance auditing or forensic auditing, the implementation of such types of audits was also incorporated into the Superior Audit Law. But it is evident that to date, the Superior Audit of Michoacán has not carried out either. Which means, it is not sufficient or pertinent to copy without further articles or provisions of the Federal Law to the local control legislation. And certainly there are questions that should be in agreement,such as the Principles that govern the practice of inspection, since it is absurd that the Superior Audit Office of Michoacán intends to comply with 16 Principles, when the Superior Audit Office of the Federation is only governed by 4. The foregoing only by way of example, and It is not intended to carry out an exhaustive analysis of what is appropriate and what is not. The subject is complex and involves examining that the current audit paradigm is related to the exhaustion of the accountability system, that is, the Public Account. In other words, a comprehensive analysis is required, which allows us to interpret that the problems are not isolated. And so we could generate a multifactorial and assertive vision in the crisis of oversight, accountability and impunity.since it is absurd that the Superior Audit of Michoacán intends to comply with 16 Principles, when the Superior Audit of the Federation is only governed by 4. The above is only given as an example, and it is not intended to prepare an exhaustive analysis of what is suitable and what not. The subject is complex and involves examining that the current audit paradigm is related to the exhaustion of the accountability system, that is, the Public Account. In other words, a comprehensive analysis is required, which allows us to interpret that the problems are not isolated. And so we could generate a multifactorial and assertive vision in the crisis of oversight, accountability and impunity.since it is absurd that the Superior Audit of Michoacán intends to comply with 16 Principles, when the Superior Audit of the Federation is only governed by 4. The above is only given as an example, and it is not intended to elaborate an exhaustive analysis of what it is. suitable and what not. The subject is complex and involves examining that the current audit paradigm is related to the exhaustion of the accountability system, that is, the Public Account. In other words, a comprehensive analysis is required, which allows us to interpret that the problems are not isolated. And so we could generate a multifactorial and assertive vision in the crisis of oversight, accountability and impunity.The above is only given as an example, and it is not intended to elaborate an exhaustive analysis of what is appropriate and what is not. The subject is complex and involves examining that the current audit paradigm is related to the exhaustion of the accountability system, that is, the Public Account. In other words, a comprehensive analysis is required, which allows us to interpret that the problems are not isolated. And so we could generate a multifactorial and assertive vision in the crisis of oversight, accountability and impunity.The above is only given as an example, and it is not intended to elaborate an exhaustive analysis of what is appropriate and what is not. The subject is complex and involves examining that the current audit paradigm is related to the exhaustion of the accountability system, that is, the Public Account. In other words, a comprehensive analysis is required, which allows us to interpret that the problems are not isolated. And so we could generate a multifactorial and assertive vision in the crisis of oversight, accountability and impunity.A comprehensive analysis is required, and it allows us to interpret that the problems are not isolated. And so we could generate a multifactorial and assertive vision in the crisis of oversight, accountability and impunity.A comprehensive analysis is required, and it allows us to interpret that the problems are not isolated. And so we could generate a multifactorial and assertive vision in the crisis of oversight, accountability and impunity.
It is easy to say that there are deficiencies in the regulatory and procedural framework, however, there are no analyzes or hard data in this regard, derived from the discretionary and opaque operation in the Superior Audit; although neither is it intended to exempt the legitimate sphere of confidentiality from both the Public Account and the audit practice, but the fight for accountability is the fight to redefine and reduce the legitimate areas of confidentiality information, especially if it is engages in illegal and ineffective actions. So it is not daring to help decrease the opacity and partiality in the ASM while observing:
There are type audits, financial compliance to the 2017 Public Account with observations, such as: lack of attendance control and updating of personnel files. Which indicates, rigorously, that they are not financial compliance audits. A documentary analysis would allow to prove the deficiencies in the audits that are carried out.
On July 09, 2018, financial and budgetary compliance audits were initiated to the 2017 Public Account, and on December 07, 2018, the Superior Auditor signed the Certificates of Valuation of Final Results and Preliminary Observations. But it is incongruous that the certificates are of final results and preliminary observations; or they are final or preliminary (although it only does what the Control Law says, plus the exhaustion of the control model represents the lack of strength of its Technical Body for manifesting the absurdities and inconsistencies established in its Law). In addition, the time elapsed from the beginning to the date of the aforementioned ID is five months, which is excessive, especially if the municipalities have a medium budgetary and financial importance.And if we consider that the audits are not yet finished or closed (a major problem in the ASM is the deficiency in closing or ending the audits) due to the conception and deadlines granted by the Superior Audit Law. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Superior Audit of Michoacán is not governed by the principles of speed, efficiency, effectiveness, quality of service and timely technical inspection. And it should be noted that the Final Results Valuation Certificates and Preliminary Observations dated December 9, 2018, were received fifteen days later, which shows that the date of said Certificates is not the true one, given that, if it had been the date of receipt of the same would have occurred three or four days later. Then,How does Higher Audit intend to become an example if it does what it reprimands the audited entities?
Compliance with the principle of legality and accountability should become the guiding guide for actions in the ASM. However, changes have been taking place in the Departments Headquarters, in the Office of the Special Audit of Municipal Inspection and in the Administrative Delegation. On December 18, 2018, the end of the year meal of the Municipal Inspection was held, during the event, Eng. Artemio Zaragoza Tapia, Manager of the Office of the ASM, communicated to the attendees the change of CP Jacobo García Renteria for the CP Consuelo Sandoval López in the Office of the Special Audit of Municipal Inspection. And it was learned that the same day the change occurred in the Administrative Delegation. Corroborated the fact with circular 01/19 dated January 10, 2019,Signed by the current Administrative Delegate, where she states "I inform that on December 18, 2018, I will take office." Both appointments were made verbally, being that until January 10, the Administrative Delegate reports his own possession. And the accountant Jacobo Renteria, communicates that the CP Consuelo Sandoval already has the respective appointment. However, the Superior Auditor is responsible for “Issuing the appointments of the public servants of the Superior Audit” (Internal Regulations, article 7, XX). Therefore, the changes in the Department Headquarters, Audit Directorates, Special Audit of Municipal Inspection and in the Administrative Delegation, if there were appointments they would be null,and if they sign official letters they will incur in illegal acts (as long as the new head of the ASM to designate does not issue them). Furthermore, if there was no legality in the appointments, the delivery-reception processes are not legal either. Because the Comptroller's Office of Congress lacks the attribution to intervene in said processes. For this reason, it is remedied in the Superior Audit Law regarding the Control and Evaluation Unit that will carry them out. Then, accountability for the changes that have occurred is a pending issue.For this reason, it is remedied in the Superior Audit Law regarding the Control and Evaluation Unit that will carry them out. Then, accountability for the changes that have occurred is a pending issue.For this reason, it is remedied in the Law of Superior Inspection regarding the Control and Evaluation Unit that will carry them out. Then, accountability for the changes that have occurred is a pending issue.
- Insufficient staff are stressed, but it is clear and evident that there are idle auditors and administrators. That the middle and upper managers surround themselves with personnel more for their complacency than for their competence. And the work environment does not encourage or strengthen innovation or research, on the contrary, the phrase that permeates is "quiet you look better". And professionalization in Superior Auditing is the greatest myth. And it is not past, it is what happens in the present. Given that the recent appointments have lawyers, veterinary doctors, and a psychologist (as Director of Audit); and yes graduates, but ignorant of auditing and oversight. And even, there are certified accountants but they are unaware, paradoxically, the problems of auditing and control. In the background,the crisis in the Control and Inspection Bodies not only in Mexico but in the world, has to do with the crisis in the professional profile of the auditor dedicated to the public field. And determining the set of capacities and competencies that the training of an auditor requires in the Superior Audit Institutions is a job and construction to be carried out. And this is related to its fundamental concept, the auditor's autonomy or independence. Since without autonomy there is no legitimization of the audit.And determining the set of capacities and competencies that the training of an auditor requires in the Superior Audit Institutions is a job and construction to be carried out. And this is related to its fundamental concept, the auditor's autonomy or independence. Since without autonomy there is no legitimization of the audit.And determining the set of capacities and competencies that the training of an auditor requires in the Superior Audit Institutions is a job and construction to be carried out. And this is related to its fundamental concept, the auditor's autonomy or independence. Since without autonomy there is no legitimization of the audit.
The above is just the tip of the iceberg. Moreover, if it is intended not to remain with the appearances or superficialities that are presented in the various reports, it is necessary that the Superior Audit does not continue to hide information or send files to its basements and keep errors and deficiencies under the table. For this reason, it is intended to draw the attention of the ASM Inspection Commission in order to objectively examine the actions and decisions that are being taken for its correction and amend through the restructuring, performance and operation of the Superior Audit of Michoacán.
The LXXIV Legislature has the historic opportunity to start a true transformation in its Technical Body, as long as it faces the root of its problems; and although a new institutional and organizational design is essential, and it must have a committed and honest staff. It must also be considered that to face great challenges it is necessary to implement great strategies.
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Mario Alberto Gómez Maldonado
Staff of Special Audit of Municipal Inspection
February 2019.
