Notwithstanding the recent catastrophe of the TWA 800 flight in New York and due to the enigma of the case, I suggest that we focus our attention on previous cases. In September 1995, when USAir Flight No. 427 suddenly spun to the left at 6,000 feet and rushed out of Pittsburgh, the 132 souls aboard had no time to analyze the air risk. Then American Eagle Flight No. 4,184 abruptly changed its course of navigation, disintegrating in midair and spreading its wreckage over a little over 16 hectares (40 acres) in rural Indiana. The risk for the 68 people on board was infinite. Six weeks later, the American Eagle Flight No. 3,379 aircraft collided in North Carolina, with the tragic result of 15 deaths, in other words,15 people who had accepted the risk of a scheduled commercial flight.
This number of fatal accidents by airlines has revived public awareness, as well as sensitivity and even concern about the risks of flying. Risk is managed, of course, at many levels of society. Subsequently, however, each person manages their own risk on a personal level. So everyone is their own risk manager. This very particular risk assessment is probably responsible for the intense - and even fascinating - interest in the media in covering aircraft collisions. One way in which risk managers can gain credibility and support is within the sphere of influence of professionals, with whom they can discuss risk rationally and on a personal level,where everyone can feel identified with this potential problem to solve.
What causes such wide ecstasy regarding flight risk by airlines, especially after a collision? Why is aviation risk concern (via airline flights) so unbalanced compared to the risks of skiing, driving a car, smoking, or hunting, all of which carry about 1,000 times more risk than flying?
Following an accident in the US, airlines, their supporters, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) are very likely to address impersonal issues, such as aircraft design and maintenance, the management of cabin resources, air traffic control or weather forecasts. At least 10 factors from the passenger's subconscious can best be explained when the public is alarmed that commercial airlines hardly have one of those strange (rare) accidents. These factors, summarized in Graph N ° 1, are neither openly recognized nor discussed and can be emphatically denied by the different official spokespersons involved in the accidents. However, these factors do exist. Professional risk managers should not overlook or exclude serious consideration of these factors.
Risk Factors in Commercial Airlines (from the perspective of the passenger's subconscious).
The Unnatural Environment
As the aircraft is in a three-dimensional mode and removed from all contact with Earth, it is subject to sudden and unexpected impulses.
The Implicit Trust
Total dependence on others instead of depending on oneself to travel safely.
The Great Advantage in Time and Space
The attraction of traveling in aircraft, since vast distances are traveled in a short period when compared to other forms of transportation.
Public Acceptance
The wide, popular and unquestionable participation of the public in air transport.
The Economic Aspect
The financial pressure to accept the cheapest cost of personal transportation in terms of cost per mile and hour.
The Imperceptible Aspects of Health
Body degradation due to exposure to high altitudes, radiation, magnetic lines of force, and air conditioning.
Density in Fatality
The large number of fatalities caused by a plane crash compared to accidents that occur in any other form of transportation.
Rat Part of Victims and Wounded
In a plane crash, the chance of perishing is much greater than that of being injured.
Body integrity
The high probability of identifying the individual victim and recovering the mortal remains in a plane crash.
Mystery for the Causation of the Collision
There is a universal puzzle about why and how plane crashes occur.
The Function of the Subconscious
First and foremost, we must recognize the fact that flying is not a natural habit of humans. Until 1930, only an infinitesimal number of people had ever taken a commercial flight. At the time, travel on commercial flights was considered a novelty, a luxury, or an act of boldness. Why? Because people, traveling in an airplane, had no contact with Earth and were subjecting themselves to an unknown risk.
What has happened since then? We have overcome, to a large extent and under the good auspices of technology, the risks involved, but we have ignored the other problems. However, the flight of a commercial aircraft still carries many unexperienced risks on dry land. Whatever the airlines do to make us feel the same comfort as the living rooms and bedrooms of our homes - providing us with slippers, drinks, food, music, magazines, pillows, reclining seats and movies - it only has the ulterior purpose of hiding the risks.
It is undeniable that when someone boards an aircraft they are placing their lives in the unrestricted hands of the airline. Most people enjoy planning their own destinations - controlling as many variables and empowered as possible. This control is foreign to the flight boarding. Once passengers are on the aircraft, passengers are implicitly accepting the risks inherent in flying, such as maintaining the aircraft, piloting the aircraft, misunderstanding communication (for example, between the cabin and the control tower), the unsuspected climatic conditions of the route to be used and the ineffectiveness of air traffic control, hoping (the referred passengers) that the government authorities have reduced the risk levels to an acceptable standard for travelers.
Some aeronautical risks are public knowledge, while others are hidden. The enchantment, which passengers "suffer" when they are quickly transported from one point to another, illustrates what was stated at the beginning of this paragraph. The so-called "enchantment" can sometimes exceed the criteria of common sense. There are many people who, despite the distances, prefer to travel by bus. Most people, in any case, prefer to travel long distances in very short times even when they have to face aeronautical risks. Aeronautical accidents are less frequent, but more severe (if not catastrophic), while buses, although they take considerably more time to travel long or short distances, are more likely to suffer a collision,with the clarification that the claims are infinitely less severe (the survival rate is much higher than that of aeronautical claims). It is very interesting to consider how it was made public, for many of the passengers of the two American Eagle accidents in the fall of 1995, when the choice was to fly in an ATR-72 aircraft, faced with the rigors of the northern climate the United States.confronted with the rigors of the climate of the northern United States.confronted with the rigors of the climate of the northern United States.
Some studies reveal that, for most people, the acceptability of risk is inversely related to the number of people who take part in that risk. This takes place even when the vast majority accept that moving by air involves virtually "zero" risk. This assumption is, by the way, another true factor hidden by the airlines. The vast majority of society has been led, by forcefully persuasive arguments, to high-risk situations. Occasionally, airline travelers are presented with an unknown to clear: "Could we be making a mistake?" Of course, the technical-scientific evidence to be transmitted to airline users is truly scarce. That is the reason why the federal government of the United States, the country that breathes,Globally, technologies applied to aviation (by way of Federal Aviation Agency standards), have officials who advocate for the legitimate interests of said aircraft users.
The economy rules the world. Commercial air transportation has become the normal and primary form of travel for those involved in business (or commercial) activities, government use, and even leisure and leisure activities. Aviation obviously offers us the cheapest and safest way to travel in relation to miles or kilometers traveled. This great tendency or propensity, however, does not reduce the existing aeronautical risks. The economic argument is simply another factor that is subtly concealed when considering the use of transportation by commercial aviation.
Most passengers, after flying through various time zones, have experienced the well-known reaction against the (human) body clock, a phenomenon known in English as <
On the same day that 132 people were killed on Flight USAir 427 around Pittsburgh, about the same number of people died from car accidents in the United States. The media did not report this news. Why? Probably for various reasons. First, western societies have come to accept that deaths from road traffic accidents are a normal result of vehicle driving, while deaths from aviation accidents are totally unexpected and a morally unacceptable exception. Second, millions of car accidents occur without fatalities, while aircraft accidents rarely do not involve consequential victims. As third place,the majority of the relatives or representatives of those who die in automobile accidents exercise discretionary control over the information related to death when the relatives and representatives of the deceased in aeronautical accidents have no control whatsoever to contain the dissemination of the news. Finally, in the United States, there is death by automobile accidents in all 50 states when the fatal precipitation of a commercial aircraft occurs in one place, at the same time involving a significant number of deaths for each accident. Focusing on managing future risks is important. Change must be promoted and enabled for future risks. It is the only way to prevent technical-legal reforms from being ignored or declined.
The total number of people injured by the sum of road or train accidents exceeds in an incomparable measure the sum of those of aeronautical origin. The key question, asked at the site where an airline ship collapsed, is: "Is there a survivor?" For a passenger, this factor subconsciously increases the risk even when the conscious person can rationalize the logic that allows suppressing the perception of facing a very risky risk.
It should never be discussed, in social events of small or large magnitude, the fact that the mortal remains (the body of the deceased) does not remain as a whole when suffering an aeronautical accident where the massive physical forces, in general, and the kinetics, in particular, they have a tremendous presence. Consequently, many efforts are being made to avoid this tragic reality. However detestable this factor is, in the perception of risk by the passenger, there is always the subliminal influence of an apparently unsolvable conflict.
Inexorably we find ourselves facing the universal question: "What happened?" More than 2,000 years ago, Marco Tulio Cicerone said: "… The causes of events are always more interesting than the events themselves…" Although virtually everyone is aware of the fact that airline accidents are rarely due to simple causes, the media, "acting in defense of the best interests of public opinion", generally focus their search on the cause of the incident in a reason suitable for the media themselves. An aura of mystery persists that "… it would be what caused the accident…", intriguing airline passengers and, at the same time, adding another risk factor concerning commercial transportation by aircraft.
Aeronautical Risk is Complex
Everyone loves and seeks simplicity. However, the risk from airline aircraft is intricate. This involves much more than aircraft, aviators, and airports. Understanding this true fact, which also has a diverse etymology, is essential to make the corresponding risk assessment object of analysis in this material.
There is no other form of public transportation that uses as many facets of technology as aviation requires. Each technological component, while contributing greatly to "… flying safely…", also inserts complexity and with it the inevitable risks that must be wisely managed.
AREAS OF INFLUENCE OF COMMERCIAL AVIATION
AIRCRAFT
Commercial air transportation vehicles.
AIRLINES
Corporate entities that conduct air transportation.
AIRPORTS
Physical facilities for entering or leaving commercial air transport.
AIR SPACE
Medium through which the ships of the commercial aeronautics move.
AVIATION
Technological base for commercial aviation.
GOVERNMENT
Public safeguard against commercial aeronautical risk.
PASSENGERS
Income source of commercial aeronautics.
HUMAN RESOURCES
All personnel involved with commercial aeronautics.
PUBLIC
People who subsequently determine the destinations of commercial aeronautics.
Note the areas of influence and / or competition of commercial flights in Graph N ° 2. Each one of these areas of influence, in return, is made up of numerous factors that affect the risk of commercial aircraft:
The aircraft. Flight characteristics, rat part between weight and power on impulse, initial cost, aircraft hull insurance, reliability, wing opening and spread, engine noise, capacity (passengers, luggage and fuel load), fuel combustion efficiency, operational costs, pilot response capacity, the degree of autonomy of the autopilot, maintenance, the social, economic and political impact of an eventual fatal collision, the range of aircraft autonomy, the ability and ability to avoid collisions, the availability of facilities to practice with flight simulators, the variety in the configuration of aircraft, operational procedures, potential evacuations of emergency,damage to foreign objects (while in flight), the degree of operations and critical processes of the aircraft, the capacity and type of fuel, the landing gear (width, full weight, radius of turn), the weight of the aircraft itself (empty, loaded with passengers and luggage, maximum gross weight), the exact position of the wingtips according to all parts of the aircraft fuselage (as well as the specifications regarding generation and the duration time of the aforementioned “tips” of the wings), the height between the track and the main entrance door, the number and type of exits, etc.the weight of the aircraft itself (empty, loaded with passengers and baggage, maximum gross weight), the exact position of the wingtips according to all parts of the fuselage of the aircraft (as well as the specifications regarding the generation and duration time of the aforementioned “tips” of the wings), the height between the track and the main entrance door, the number and type of exits, etc.the weight of the aircraft itself (empty, loaded with passengers and luggage, maximum gross weight), the exact position of the wingtips according to all parts of the aircraft fuselage (as well as the specifications regarding the generation and duration time of the aforementioned “tips” of the wings), the height between the track and the main entrance door, the number and type of exits, etc.
The airline. The real and factual understanding of operational factors by management, the hierarchy of values (profitability versus safety), operational understanding of profitability, the "war" of tariffs (the number of options and restrictions), the routes (competition and selection), the equipment used (acquisitions, maintenance, replenishments), the influence of shares on the stock market (especially those called "greenmail" - see glossary at the end of this writing), operating costs (personnel, fuel, capital investment, food), integration of merged airlines (operational differences, values, historical background), merger activities and new shareholder-management control, programs for frequent travelers (the benefits,the influence of the reinforcement of the profit), the credibility in the programmed schedules (the arrivals and the takeoffs on time), the safety of the routes (the procedures for the control of terrorism), the influence on the part of the trade associations (the Association of Air Transport, the Association of Aircraft Owners and Pilots and the International Association of Air Transport), the classes of in-flight services (the number, the seats, the tariffs, the distribution), relations with the labor unions, the moment in the day in which the flights are scheduled, the frequency of flights for each city and public relations (reputation, image, customer satisfaction).route safety (terrorism control procedures), influence by trade associations (the Air Transport Association, the Association of Aircraft Owners and Pilots and the International Air Transport Association), classes of in-flight services (number, seats, fares, distribution), relations with workers' unions, the time of day on which flights are scheduled, the frequency of flights by each city and public relations (reputation, image, customer satisfaction).route safety (terrorism control procedures), influence by trade associations (the Air Transport Association, the Association of Aircraft Owners and Pilots and the International Air Transport Association), classes of in-flight services (number, seats, fares, distribution), relations with workers' unions, the time of day on which flights are scheduled, the frequency of flights by each city and public relations (reputation, image, customer satisfaction).the Association of Aircraft Owners and Pilots and the International Association of Air Transport), the classes of in-flight services (the number, the seats, the tariffs, the distribution), the relations with the labor unions, the moment in day on which flights are scheduled, the frequency of flights for each city and public relations (reputation, image, customer satisfaction).the Association of Aircraft Owners and Pilots and the International Association of Air Transport), the classes of in-flight services (the number, the seats, the tariffs, the distribution), the relations with the labor unions, the moment in day on which flights are scheduled, the frequency of flights for each city and public relations (reputation, image, customer satisfaction).
The airports. The location, the weather characteristics (the haze around the airport - including the runway and the range of vision of the corresponding control tower, the wind forces, the obstacles for aircraft trying to take off or land, the accesses at the gates, which interconnect the physical infrastructure of the airports with the aircraft (the location and number of these accesses), proximity to a massive number of population, security provisions, facilities for supporting / supporting aircraft (for fuel, defrosting, repairs), luggage handling capacity, noise reduction requirements, control of flights arriving and departing, the number of runways at each airport (number, condition, the direction, the width,length), assistance for landings, competition between different airports (air traffic, volume of airline aircraft), ground transportation (capacity, frequency), the ability to respond to emergency situations, the density of aviation traffic in general, the diversity in the mix of air traffic, government control (of local, municipal, regional and national governments), the similarities between neighboring airports (the confusion in approaches to land), the local population of birds and other animals, the aircraft's driving equipment, flight traffic (density, scheduled times),the normal distance between the runway -properly said- and the extent of the normal distance of the runway up to its maximum limit, the traffic interference between airport and airport (s), the distance between the passenger and the airport.
Airspace. Pollutants (volcanic ash, birds, precipitation of rain and / or hail and / or snow), climatic phenomena (lightning, tornadoes, thermal conditions, wind friction, currents produced by "propulsion to jet ”from other aircraft), magnetic anomalies, cosmic radiation, the route of several zones of hourly use at the same time, the levels (heights) of glacial formations, the national airspaces -which are restricted-, the control zones of air traffic, the concept of “seeing and being seen”, lightning (the angle of the sun, cloud cover, visibility in daylight versus night light) and the properties of air (temperature, dew point).
The aviation. International competition (aircraft, aeronautical engineering), technology transfer from military programs, cutting-edge technologies (advances and obstacles), culture, folklore and traditions, cockpit (layout, checklists, visibility), flight automation technology, collision avoidance (concepts, equipment), management of all cabin resources (techniques, specification acceptance levels), the interaction of “man” and “machine”, that is, the aircraft (pilot versus autopilot), innovative concepts (vertical takeoff, short take-off and landing craft - “STOL”,the spaces inside the aircraft -in mid-flight- that are lighter than air) and the various propulsion alternatives.
Government. The Federal Aviation Agency, known by its acronym “FAA” (regulations, consultancies, approvals), oversight of Congress (technical competence), control of the FAA Department of Transportation (managerial conflicts), the Plan of the “Naval Air Station” - known in the USA as “NAS” - (financing, implementation, priorities), air traffic controllers (quality of competition, labor struggle, drug abuse), the location of the airport, the level of demand for air transport services, the National Council for Transportation Safety (objectivity, credibility of recommendations, influence), the source of the pilots (the background of civil pilots versus those of military pilots), security surveillance (regulations,deregulations, re-regulations), airport ownership, internal conflicts of interest of the FAA (the regulator, the operator, the implementer of regulations) and bureaucracy (its expansion, inefficiency).
The passengers. Fear of flying and demand for flights (services, entertainment), frequent flyer incentives, lack of concern about safety procedures (procedures, level of participation), handicapped rights (by sitting, information, the role of evacuation), diversity (age, agility, intelligence, size, weight, attitude, language, motivation), terrorists (detectability, cabin reaction), alcohol consumption (boarding poisoning, hostility), the variety of languages and cultures (understanding information, the role of emergency evacuations), folklore or idiosyncrasy (sitting for survival, receiving additional drinks),impatience with the state of the luggage accompanying the passenger (hand luggage versus luggage located in the cargo compartment), personal hygiene (bathroom habits, impact on other passengers), the issue of smokers versus non-smokers, the food service (time, quantity, type, diversity of appetites, hygiene, special requests), health (sick, wounded, deceased on board), comfort (noise, crying children, temperature, ergonomics of seats, legroom, level and clarity or not of light, turbulence), over-reservation (refunds, delays of flights, the general disorder, the passengers uncomfortable and annoyed by this cause), the classes of services (the separation,the distinctiveness of some services - for example, first class and business class, marketing) and the scheduling factors of departure and arrival times (departures and arrivals on time, the convenience of working hours).
The staff. Training (pilots, flight attendants, air traffic controllers, airport maintenance personnel, ticketing agents), ability (intellectual, physical), fluent use of type of aircraft, physical conditions (general, during working hours), disability (drugs, personal disorder, injuries, pain, aging), concern (sexual, interpersonal relationships), obsession for doing everything on time, compatibility (within the crew, in relations between the crew and others), communication (understanding the language), the hierarchy of values (prejudices, partiality, chauvinism), folklore and idiosyncrasy (the forces of the wind surrounding an aircraft, terrorism,hazard response capacity), operational diversity to perform the same function (from airline to airline), requirements (education, experience, skill development), Instrumental Flight Guidelines - “IFR” versus Visual Flight Guidelines - “VFR” (looking at other aircraft in traffic), dependence on automated aircraft systems (time spent on fundamentals, low challenges), physiological factors (“jet lag” -see glossary-, the biorhythm, the visual focus at a distance), the relief of frustrations (canceling the devices and alarms of "warnings" -powered by passengers, assaults), the scheduling of flights,assimilation of previous experiences (learning from past accidents) and unionization (hostility during strikes).
The Public. The growing acceptance and encouragement of traveling by air, the demand for transports that travel long distances (quickly, when needed, availability), expectations (fly without accidents, on time, economically), the media (accident coverage, media exposure, news stories, documentaries), attitude (litigation actions increase and the exploitation of unsatisfied satisfactions).
The widely spread alarmist news of the "aeronautical risk" - made up of multiple factors that are constantly evaluated and controlled for commercial flights - should explain why those, who are widely knowledgeable in the matter, are convinced that this risk is really low.
Aeronautical Risk Education
The public, at present, does not have a reasonable basis for estimating the risks involved in flights through commercial aircraft, and this public has not been exposed to exercising the panoramic vision. In this way, alarmists, detractors and self-promoted experts underpin their prejudices as a precept. Risk managers, on the other hand, have a golden opportunity to apply their professional skills to this pressing problem.
First, risk should be defined as "the magnitude of probable loss of time". The death of each one defines the maximum magnitude of the loss. This is the type of risk people are interested in when they board a scheduled flight. Everyone recognizes that death is inevitable, but people still want to control its occurrence in particular aspects, such as the time, place, and conditions of its occurrence. The public needs new insights and better communication processes about the risks it faces, in order to make informed, rational and timely decisions, weighing the intuition of the subconscious with extensive efforts to control aeronautical risks.
What is the first statement offered by both public and private officials when an aircraft accident occurs? The invariable answer is a statistical statement about the aircraft and the airline. Certainly, the precipitation of the aircraft can be described as a probabilistic event. And, in addition, many risk managers are actuaries well versed in statistics.
However, the public acquires little comfort when they learn that 2,500 Type 737 Boeings make 17,000 flights a day and each of these aircraft take off every 5 seconds. Or when one becomes aware that 737 accidents occur once in every two million trips. An adverse event out of a million, of this nature, could happen to you right now. When the time comes for a pilot to perish in a plane crash, is it perhaps also the time for passengers to perish? So when do passengers decide that the risk of flying is not worth it?
Scientific research has shown that the average person is willing to accept, in round numbers, up to 1,000 times of risk voluntarily than he or she would accept involuntarily. Consequently, the root of passenger concern is not that commercial flights are perceived as high-risk events, but rather that it considers, however small the risk, unacceptable to assume random situations that are unintentionally imposed.
Are government regulations the answer to aeronautical risk? If so, how much regulation is enough (to be really effective)? When do regulations become an integral part of the problem rather than at least the solution to some degree?
What is at stake is too much for passengers to blindly believe that airlines will voluntarily reduce their profits to invest in risk control. However, the public's expectations regarding a regulatory agency such as the “FAA” (Federal Aviation Administration) are undermined by misconceptions. Citizens act as if the FAA is a panacea for aviation risk control. After the crash of an aircraft, the public will demand that more inspectors join, and that regulations be stricter.
However, the FAA has not, cannot and will never make aeronautics completely risk-free. Under the best scenario, the FAA is a regulatory and regulatory component that establishes and imposes standards that, if they are obeyed, the probability of occurrence of a claim is much lower. So who actually prevents these accidents from happening? Those who control the scene in which the accident occurs, such as pilots, maintenance personnel, aircraft manufacturers, those who predict weather conditions, and air traffic controllers.
When an accident occurs, the pilot is suspected early and unfairly. The human condition of the fervent of those who attribute failures to pilots is exactly the same as that of people who make mistakes. However, the "pilot error" is an ambiguous phrase, equivalent to saying: "… Something went wrong because it didn't work…"
Subsequently, people cause accidents, be they planners, designers, testers, operators, or managers. Even the so-called "Acts of God or Nature" involve personal decisions at the scene of the incident. In this way, the mistakes made by ubiquitous humanity are inevitable in a calamity. This maximum truth, however, does not resolve the reduction or elimination of the risks that originate claims.
It is more appropriate to reduce risk by establishing the correct and specific functions of the people who, on a day-to-day basis, carry out actions for the airline. Today, there is a massive and persuasive campaign, which has made relative progress in replacing all humans with machines. This trend is reversed by the emerging concern regarding modern airline glass cabins, in which the pilot's functions decrease in favor of automation, creating a variety of new concerns. One of the central issues due to aeronautical risks is to seek, in practice, an optimal human-technological combination (not only in the cabin, but also in all the functions inherent to aeronautics, in general, and that of the process commercial per se,in particular).
What is the solution?
Is society correctly oriented with regard to safety in commercial aeronautics? Do recent accidents in commercial aeronautics presage dangers in this form of mass transportation? Is there anything, if any, that needs to be executed differently?
Beyond the required education of the public about aeronautical risks, there is a need for everyone to have a fresh vision of the aforementioned risks. All parties, public and private, involved in scheduling commercial flights must rethink (a) the meaning of the risk and (b) how to manage those risks.
Historically, risk reactions have spread like weeds in a garden. Creative and sagacious individuals have detected a deficiency in the normal course of life. They have given it a name, recruited for that cause, built dedicated communities, and finally convinced management to make this initiative a permanent function of the staff. All the nine specialties in Chart N ° 3 have followed the same path towards posterity.
But there are two fundamental flaws in the chronicle of commitment to that concern. Each specialty of the risk lacks the awareness of its own mind with fierce and limited vision (panoramic vision is required instead). Instead, each branch of specialty becomes one in itself. The result is the self-perpetuation of fiefdoms dedicated to each specialty. Even worse, each specialty begins incorrectly, isolating its organizational function rather than incorporating the necessary judgment within the functional lines where risk control is achieved.
There has to be a way to arbitrate a formula to solve this situation. How can it be done? First, you have to start managing risk as a whole and not as a dissociated group of "hostile allies." In the background, the systems methodology must be applied (please see detailed explanation at the end of this writing) to the entity (the airline, the aircraft, the airport), the risks of which must be managed. Only in this way will it be possible to move from reactive moralism to proactive management.
Each risk specialty in Figure 3, as established, exhibits benign schizophrenia. To reach the realm of management, the importance of the deficiency to be corrected must be over-emphasized. But, at the same time, the corresponding reality is under-emphasized. The last factor is directly related to the budget - with its inability to link investment with its amortization. Thus, for example, airline data security describes hazards exclusively in terms of severity (magnitude) and probability, without considering the financial implications (whatever they may be).
The time has come, for the managers of each risk specialty, to not only integrate efforts with those of other specialties, but it is also time to unite the integral management world, which operates within three and not two dimensions - “the cost ”,“ The performance ”and“ the schedules ”(the schedules). Investments are required to implement counter-measures that help eliminate or control the potential losses identified.
The aeronautical risk of airlines will never be optimally managed as long as it is seen as the function of the personnel responsible for a given task (specialists, advisers, non-participating personnel, external representatives). In this sense, "the personnel responsible for a given task" involves insurers and government regulatory bodies. Immediately, risk can be managed only by those who make decisions where the loss can be truly controlled: this is the functional line of management.
Decline the historical pattern of risk management through a collection of special interests that either try to control or exceed the functional activity of each line of specialization can be annoying. Until now, a discovery in the resolution of these risks is very pending and even delayed. Until the aforementioned discovery is made, the aeronautical risk of the airlines will probably remain at the same level. What will happen - with this revolution - in relation to organizations dedicated to various risk specialties? They will be transformed into professional sources in the systems methodology applied to strategic risk management so that specialized organizations apply it (to the systems methodology), with all effectiveness, in risk control.
So how should risk managers respond when asked if it's "worth it" for people to take the risk of getting on commercial flights? The answer must be invariably and forcefully "YES", for all the reasons explained in this writing. In any case, we must remember that driving a car or hunting are 1,000 more hazardous activities than flying.
GLOSSARY
FAA: United States Federal Aviation Agency. Government entity of that country regarding the legal norms and the operating and safety procedures of aircraft.
Greenmail (or "green-mail"): the purchase of a large number of shares of a company in anticipation that management, fearing to lose control of it, buys the aforementioned shares with the surcharge of a premium.
Hardware: 1. Metal goods and utensils such as locks, tools and cutlery. 2nd Computer Science. A computer and associated physical equipment directly involved in the performance of data processing or communication functions. b. Machines and other physical equipment directly related to industrial, technological or military functions. 3. Informal. Weapons, especially military weapons.
Input: 1. Something that is introduced into a system or consumed in its operation to reach <
Jet Lag: traveling very quickly, through various zones of time use, in a supersonic ship, will accentuate the very well-known reaction against the "body clock" (human), which causes some disorders and discomforts, a phenomenon known in English like <
Loop: 1.a. The length of a line, die (for threading), tape or band, or any other thin material that is curved or has an opening. b. The opening formed by a double line. 2. Something that has the shape, order or outline of a circular movement or that is curved on itself. 3. Electricity. A closed circuit. Computer science. A sequence of instructions that are repeated a specified number of times or until a particular condition prevails.
Systems Methodology: this expression, widely explained in the present writing, is synonymous with “Systems Approach”. It is noteworthy that some authors give this same sophisticated management practice the following names: "Systems Analysis", "System Concept", "Systems Work", "Systems Design", etc. However, the author of this writing prefers to speak of "Systems Methodology", first, and, secondly, of "Systems Approach".
Output 1. The act or process of producing; production. 2.a. A quantity produced or manufactured for a certain time. b. Intellectual or creative production. 3.a. The energy, force, or work produced by a system. Computer science. Information produced by a computer from a <> specific.
Computer Science Software. 1. The programs, routines and symbolic languages that control the operation of the <
USAF The acronym in English for the United States Air Force.
What is a "System"?
What is the Si stemas Methodology?
The material investigated, developed and presented by him, under the name "RESTRICTIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF THE METHODOLOGY OF SYSTEMS TO SOCIO-ECONOMIC NEEDS"
(5.0) WHAT IS THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SYSTEMS?
The dictionary offers us at least four definitions for the word "system", as follows:
- A set of things or parts that make up a whole. An ordered group of facts, principles or beliefs. A plan or scheme. The body of an animal (rational or not) as an organized whole.
Ironically, none of these definitions satisfies what is called "system" in this writing. However, there is an entire group of coincidence points that fit our definition. The four dictionary definitions speak of the following:
- A reason for being or an intended goal. A singularity or a whole, built from diversity. An interaction or activity between many parts. A process from start to finish or the amount of material that a process requires in a given period, as is the case, for example, of a computer.
With these characteristics in mind, the following system definition seems to be very logical:
"… A system is a compound, at any level of complexity, of operational or support teams, human resources, (physical) facilities and computer (intelligence) systems, which are used as a whole as an entity capable of exercising or support an operational role that results in the exchange of <
As noted and by means of this definition, a system can be simple or complex, animate or inanimate, expensive or economic and natural or artificial. A cup of coffee can be a system. Likewise, a garden, a soccer team, a company or the whole world can be a system. Take special care to consider that the definition does not imply "computers". Many people in general think, wrongly and automatically, about computers when they hear the word "system".
(5.0.0.1) A Resource Consuming Transformer
The most fundamental of the descriptions of a system is “an entity for the transformation of <
Graph N ° 5, below, illustrates the simple concept of a system. Note the following facets of a system in this graph:
- A System is well sectorized or defined. The “Box” (see Graph N ° 5) represents this important fact. The Transformation (the conversion of the <
> known for < > desired) occurs within the box or system. Resources (for example, materials, money, labor force) are used to achieve the transformation. The Units or Dimensions of the transformation are costs, performance and schedules (or chronographs). Usually there is feedback (< >) of the < > back to the < > (learning process), which tunes or modifies the < > over a period of time.
Systems methodology has its most palpable origin in a broad reaction to managerial complexity in the final years of the 1950s. The initial seeds of seeing each element in its interaction within a whole, dates from the times of the Greeks, especially in the time of Aristotle and Plato. Additionally, there are multiple applications in holistic management, highlighting two real milestones of the twentieth century. The first is attributed to Henry Ford and the second to the Apollo Project. Please see below, Graph No. 6-A and Graph No. 6-B. It should be noted, in addition,that the systems methodology has, among many other applications, a powerful effectiveness in the strategic management of a wide range of companies, as well as risks and in the systematic prevention of losses.
Sources consulted
- GOONAN, KATHLEEN JENNISON, MD, THE JURAN PRESCRIPTION (JURAN INSTITUTE), 1995.DONABEDIAN, AVEDIS, Ph.D., “THE END RESULTS OF HEALTH CARE: ERNEST CODMAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO QUALITY ASSESSMENT AND BEYOND, 1989.THE CHARTERED INSURANCE INSTITUTE RISK MANAGEMENT, 1991. ARTHUR WILLIAMS & RICHARD M. HEINS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE (MC GRAW-HILL INTERNATIONAL EDITIONS), 1989. (DR.) VIRGINIA BOTTOMLEY, MD, GREAT BRITAIN'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH, “HELPING THE MEDICINE GO DOWN ”(HEMISPHERES), 1994.ROLLIN H. SIMONDS & JOHN V. GRIMALDI, Ph.Ds,“ SAFETY MANAGEMENT ”(IRWIN), 1963.DONABEDIAN, AVEDIS, Ph.D.,“ BENEFITS IN MEDICAL CARE PROGRAMS ”(HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS), 1976.THE WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC PILOCY COUNCIL, “THE PRESIDENT'S HEALTH SECURITY PLAN - THE CLINTON BLUEPRINT”, 1993.HAMMER MICHAEL AND JAMES CHAMPY, “REENGINEERING (STANDARD), 1993.DRUCKER, PETER, “MANAGEMENT FOR THE FUTURE” (NORM), 1995. MANANGELLY, RAYMOND L. AND KLEIN, MARK M., “HOW TO DO REENGINEERING” (NORM), 1994. SPENDOLINI, MICHAEL J., “BENCHMARKING” (NORM), 1992.BERSTEIN, PETER L., “THE NEW RELIGION OF RISK MANAGEMENT” (HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW), MARCH - APRIL 1996.
