This paper is an essay about the importance of epistemology in the process of gestation of accounting knowledge. On this path, it is unavoidable to answer the following questions: How is knowledge possible? And if knowledge is possible, how does this originate?
epistemology-in-accountingA good help to understand such questions is to adopt epistemology as a discipline that enhances the self-monitoring of accounting knowledge.
The object of study is still an unfinished problem, since each essayist has explained in his own way relying on a scholastic philosophy devoid of self-criticism and rectifications that must exist in any constructive itinerary of a credible accounting theory. Indeed, there is a “forest of concepts” in accounting that confuses the true dimension of accounting. Reductionist concepts based on an ideological spectrum that has English empiricism as a reference system, making accounting a simple information technique that reduces its field of action.
In this context, epistemological self-surveillance is pertinent, but to get there we must understand and know the current epistemological positions and what their impact on accounting is, or how it could be applied to accounting to engender a unified and concrete theory. Such influence had, for example, Kuhn's paradigms, Popper's Falsificationist theory, Lakatos's research programs and The Critical and Systemic Realism of the Argentine philosopher Mario Bunge. These theories of science have been contributing to accounting, as noted by Professor Richard Mattesich with his Axiomatizing theory of Accounting.
Consequently, this work proposed to the XII Congress deals with a not very complex issue, such as:
"The thesis that we can find bicertility between reason and experience." In this epistemological walk we will try to postulate applied rationalism as a center of gravity for the development of accounting and as a self-regulating vector of our actions.
Only in this way will we be able to converge theory and practice, that is, a rationalism nurtured by empirical experiences. As can be seen in positive and normative accounting, there are some precepts of this nature that could make possible an epistemological reconciliation in the very process of creating accounting knowledge.
DISCUSSION GUIDE
- What is understood by conceptual polysemy in accounting and what are the factors that motivate it?
- What role does epistemology play in the process of building accounting knowledge?
- What are the current epistemological currents and what is their impact on accounting?
- How is accounting classified at present and what are its epistemological incidents?
- Why should there be epistemological self-surveillance in accounting?
3. THE OBJECT OF STUDY AND THE NATURE OF ACCOUNTING: An inconclusive debate.
3.1. General considerations.
The accounting community is currently debating two inconclusive problems: (i) the object of study and (ii) the nature of accounting. Indeed, it seems that scientists and conservatives still do not agree on this problem and, as Lord Robinson said "We all talk about the same thing but no one has agreed on what we are talking about." In these almost poetic phrases we understand that the renunciation of theoretical construction by conservatives must give way to the adoption of sufficient means to be able to find the true Esperanto of accounting theory.
In this theoretical walk bathed in explanatory nuances and critical analysis, we are finding empirical craters that have abolished in a certain way the commitment to reason. Thus, I have agreed to call these craters that have spread throughout the accounting community “the Anglo-Saxon economic scaffolding”. To tell the truth, there is a great positivist and empiricist influence of the Anglo-Saxon school on the accounting unions and, that is why there are still adepts who defend and understand accounting as a simple information technique.
Accounting thinking from the common perspective occurs without epistemological control, without qualitative purification that allows constituting a substantially improved knowledge. This in direct reason with empiricism, the persistence of reductionist concepts and the indifference to scientific research on the part of the "conservatives" have made accounting a discipline drowned in its own conceptual and theoretical incongruity. For this reason, accounting principles, international standards, company and market laws constitute one of the many “theoretical” baggage that makes an accounting theory presume; However, if we do a detailed analysis, it is totally implausible. To this we must add the lack of an accounting research policy, since,there is a divorce between the private company and the accounting researchers. Furthermore, the accounting unions do almost little about it. What to say about public entities, such as CONCYTEC that does not even have areas specifically related to accounting, which is why accounting research projects do not have funding.
Despite this, I believe that in the field of accounting scientific activity there is already a solid matrix that contributes in some way to the long-awaited theoretical construction; but, nevertheless, we have to go a long way to engender this new paradigm in the entire accounting community, praised by some independent researchers that, said the step, is worthy of being plausible.
3.2. Lack of epistemological vigilance.
Transcending judgments of fact is a peculiarity of scientific knowledge; and in opposition to this, common sense isolates itself within the limits of the facts and there are no antinomian questions to explain. In that sense, we will deal with common or vulgar knowledge and its consequences within accounting thinking.
Well, making an aversion to reason, ordinary knowledge starts - in many cases - from the perception of our senses. That is to say of the immediate. But "a well-known characteristic of common sense is that, if the knowledge it claims to possess can be accurate, it is rarely aware of the limits within which its beliefs are valid or its practices successful." In such a way that the subject and the object do not always tend to unequivocally explain their contexts. In other words, the primacy of sensible knowledge imposed by empiricism has made it a problem of conception, that is, of language.
Indeed, what exists - beyond a divergence of opinions - is a differential of concepts, the scientist and the experimenter do not always speak the same language; and therefore, they cannot exchange their information. Or at least, they find it difficult to understand each other. But there is something else, the common man, isolated from the daily events that surrounds him, seems condemned to stimulate his perceptions of the world in which he experiences; therefore he is blindly building his naive conceptions and adopting a common language that precisely allows him to express that feeling.
Consequently, throughout history this common type of concepts has fed and regulated the accounting doctrine, thus equating an uncompromising pragmatism. In other words, the empirical and non-rational moments of Western philosophy solidified the conceptual frameworks of accounting from a conventional and utilitarian perspective, distorting true rationality, creating reductionist concepts that have only hindered the scientific progress of accounting. accounting.
By this we mean then that common knowledge begins with a posteriori judgments of the context. Well, what is the common man's vision of science? To answer this question, we will state the following example: If we asked the common man about the light that illuminates our living room, kitchen, dining room, etc. at night. it might take several minutes to respond. Or I would say that light is the energy coming from a power source (electricity) through the incandescent lamp, induced from a hydroelectric power plant or a nuclear reactor. This is true, but not enough. Let's analyze why. For the common man, light is vaguely conceptualized from its context. Here there is already a problem of conception; that is to say that in common sense,light is nothing other than the culmination of electrical energy. On the other hand, the concept of light for the physicist has another connotation that consists of a duality: matter and energy; therefore they are two different languages.
But now let's look at a simple example from the accounting horizon, so as not to go too far from it. Compare the common man with the beginning student in accounting and the scientist with the more experienced student. Let us therefore suppose a simple operation, the purchase one. For the beginner, the purchase operation is reduced to a simple handling of accounts and calculations, believing that this implies the end of the entire operation; and in some cases they even memorize the accounts of a purchase to reproduce it in subsequent operations of this same nature.
Instead, the experienced student has another very distant concept of the operation. For him, many aspects such as economic, financial and regulatory are involved. That is, the completion of the purchase goes beyond the use of some accounts and calculations; on the contrary, it systematizes within its thought concepts that fully explain this operation.
Nótese que este concepto integral de la operación de compra, posee una naturaleza relativa, por que tiene como sistema de referencia al contexto, y que éste va acrecentándose conforme el sujeto – estudiante – ahonda y reconoce más los componentes de la operación. Por último, el contador profesional tiene el concepto más nutrido de todos; puesto que la operación de compra para él, es más que simples asientos contables, y a menudo se pregunta ¿cuál es la incidencia en los estados financieros?. Vemos acá pues, el concepto de predicción. No solo interesa el asiento contable sino su incidencia en los resultados de la empresa; por que para él, una compra implica costos, aspectos tributarios y normativos, beneficios, etc.
In summary, I would say that the beginner has a naive concept compared to the professional who has a holistic conception (the operation as a system), therefore the divergence is substantially not of opinions, but of conception, that is, of arguments. Therefore, it is tacit to see that there are substantial differences between scientific knowledge - the result of scientific research - and ordinary knowledge (the result of everyday life). In the first place, scientific knowledge rationalizes experience, explains through logical propositions (hypotheses) the context of the facts; while ordinary knowledge only describes the facts and isolates itself in them, their results do not transcend. On the other hand, scientific knowledge is clear and precise,Although it is not free of errors, but it has techniques that help you to find those errors and take advantage of them; instead ordinary knowledge is vague and full of contradictions.
Finally, scientific knowledge is systematic and methodical. The first denotes that it is a set of ideas, characterized by a set of logical hypotheses that will later develop a theory; and the second, implies that scientific knowledge as an activity begins with the specification of the problem, statement of the objectives, formulation of the hypothesis, sets the units of analysis and their empirical tests. On the contrary, ordinary knowledge is unsystematic and does not have a special method.
In this regard, there are several epistemologists and methodologists who explain the differences between common sense and scientific knowledge, however we can summarize in its generality through the following table.
In short, we will say that accounting knowledge is a corpus of increased concepts without any epistemological control. Its point of reference is the usefulness of the information, beyond its logical and systematic rationality.
To speak of conceptual imprecision, is to elucidate the reductionist concepts of accounting, which still persist today, especially by those called conservatives. To demonstrate this assertion, it is enough to review any book that exists in the tangled accounting literature and start analyzing the concept of accounting. There, we will find authors who fanatically repeat and persist concepts that are outside the current context, defining it as an art. Moreover, they often tend to define it as a trilogy, that is, as science, technique and art; without knowing in many cases the nature of each of these categories.
In the first case, we appreciate the contextual primacy of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), since the definition coined in the year 1970 persists until now in the thoughts of many authors. In that sense, they have isolated accounting within an irrational conceptual framework, without any commitment to reason, on the contrary they give greater emphasis to the emotional intuition of the subject in opposition to the objectivity of knowledge.
“It is tacit to understand then, the theoretical gaps that this extreme of accounting thought engender. We cannot accept that intuitions take over from rationality, they simply serve to be destroyed. Intuitionism is the enemy of reason and a kind of charlatanism, because the complexity and universality of human reason is left aside. "
In the second approach (accounting as a technique). We visualize exclusive positions. That is, they reduce accounting as an auxiliary information technique and believe that they see the very essence of accounting in that same recording technique. These two approaches mentioned, are opposed to a scientific position. That said the step, many defend it as a science but they do it out of simple professional pride and, even some are radical and orthodox; therefore we must exclude those who speak of accounting science for simple reasons of status and prestige, without being able to demonstrate the scientific bases and methods of their discipline.
In general, the first two positions exposed (art and technique) constitute a theoretical scaffolding with conventionalist and utilitarian supports; and those who, supported by pragmatism, make accounting a whimsical discipline to manipulate their information in relation to their economic interests.
This implies, as Professor Orlando Malpartida says that I know “continues to redesign the curriculum based on the reduced concept of accounting and based on the traditional role (bookkeeper) of the accountant. The pragmatist concept of accounting, which (continues) to prevail in the professional field, is the main cause for the stagnation of the profession ”and therefore, professional training is incongruous with the professional profile that is so widely touted.
TRADITIONAL COMPOSITION OF CURRICULAR AREAS
SOURCE: Orlando, MALPARTIDA. Op CIt. p. 145
4. IMPORTANCE OF EPISTEMOLOGY IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE.
4.1. Philosophy of science.
To better understand the philosophy of science or epistemology, it is inescapable to take a look at philosophy. But what does philosophy have to do with this? In truth, a lot. Philosophy allows us to have a critical and discursive vision of our context, that is, it makes our reason an incessant prototype ready to carry out analysis of all the possible problems of our reality, even going beyond it. Jesús Mosterín, 7 renowned Spanish philosopher, tells us in this regard that, “today we are all bombarded by a constant avalanche of information through radio, television, books, magazines and the Internet, etc. Anything sneaks into all these media. So today, more than ever, a filter is required to separate clear and reliable information from confusing or misleading information.It is important that our ideas are the most reliable, for which there has to be a critical instance, a filter. That instance, that filter is philosophy ”.
These exposed premises lead us to ask another question: What is philosophy? It is not so easy to answer this question, because in itself, the word philosophy means something more than LOVE FOR WISDOM. That is, there are as many definitions in this regard as there are philosophical schools that have been responsible for defining this category. However, one essential concept can be found. This is, way of reflecting on science.
In its beginnings, philosophy was in charge of reflecting on the totality of knowledge, however, this holistic attitude lasted until the seventeenth century with the arrival of the renaissance of science. From there, its fragmentation begins, because some sciences find their object of study and with this, the autonomy of their knowledge system.
7 Interview conducted in the city of Iquitos after concluding the VI National Congress of Philosophy, on October 5, 1996, by LAVADO, Lucas (compiler).
Tasks of philosophy. p. fifteen
HISTORICAL VIEW OF PHILOSOPHY
Currently, branches that have not yet found their object of study, such as ontology, axiology, ethics, aesthetics, religion, etc., remain within the trunk of philosophy. But philosophy and the sciences never fell apart, they acted in a disjunctive way; Even the works of the modern age have a philosophical framework. For example, Isaac Newton wrote his "mathematical principles of natural philosophy"; John Dalton, publishes his "new system of chemical philosophy"; Jean Lamarck presents in 1,809 his main theoretical work "zoological philosophy".
In such a way that, we all have philosophical positions, the same ones that we let our contextual reflections rest on. In accounting, for example, not all that glitters is gold, not everything that is said about "accounting theory" is all-encompassing, if not, they are in some cases simple verses and poetry from accounting literature, for this reason it is necessary to adopt a critical commitment, a commitment to reason in order to engender and solidify a true theoretical construction of accounting. But, we should not adopt a dogmatic philosophy, but rather visualize an overall philosophy that is critical, discursive and dialectized; that is to say, a philosophy of science, that is, epistemology, so as not to continue being prisoners of Anglo-Saxon rhetorical speculations; we must stop being slaves to the four lines of balance.
Therefore, we have seen that there are two well-defined categories: philosophy, a subject that we have already explained, and epistemology or theory of knowledge, which we will deal with now. It is true that epistemology is the branch of philosophy that studies scientific research and its product, scientific knowledge. Mere leaf of the tree of philosophy half a century ago, epistemology is today an important branch of it. However, half a century ago the semantic, ontological, axiological, ethical and other problems that arise in meta-scientific reflection had not yet been noticed. This adherence to philosophy lasted until the moment when epistemology began its professionalization.8 And that is why today we speak of particular epistemologies: philosophy of physics, biophilosophy, iatrophilosophy,among other.
8 BUNGE, Mario. Epistemology. Pp. 13–15.
“The concrete fact is that along with the appearance of each new scientific and technical branch, a new epistemology or philosophy of science and technology also appears. This awareness has revealed the need to promote a scientific philosophy and a science with a philosophical perspective ”as it occurs today, especially with neopositivists, poststructuralists and hermeneutics. Without forgetting, of course, the influential existential philosophy.
Under this configuration, we can define epistemology through three polyconceptual approaches: (i) Critical - philosophical study of science, (ii) Study of the constitution of valid knowledge and (iii) Study of the passage of minimum states knowledge to the most rigorous states of knowledge. However, it should be clarified that characterizing the origin and development of epistemology would lead us to write a whole chapter, reason enough to have the need to synthesize it. Good assistance for this task is given by Jean Piaget; which we can visualize in the following table.
SYNOPSIS OF THE GREAT FORMS OF EPISTEMOLOGY
SOURCE: adapted from Jean Piaget. Op. Cit. Pp. 26-64
With this, we want to make clear the role of epistemology as a self-regulating discipline of scientific knowledge. Therefore, the considerations presented open a reflective path for us in the accounting field, because in a certain way they have been influenced by some epistemological positions generated throughout the evolutionary period of accounting knowledge. Great influence had, for example, Karl Popper with his falsificationist theory, Thomas Kuhn with his historical epistemology, Lakatos, with his research programs and recently Bunge, with his critical realism. The latter is having a strong influence on accounting researchers, who are trying or trying to build conceptual frameworks based on this pedantic and emergentist realism.
This is fruitful, but not enough. In certain cases some accounting essayists overestimate the real context of accounting. That is, they leave the rational context of accounting to arrive at a philosophism loaded with demagoguery and dogmatism, lacking the internal and external dialogue that must exist in any itinerary aimed at building systematic and credible concepts. We must, therefore, adopt a philosophy of accounting on the basis of which accounting facts must rest, as dependent on meta-theoretical theories and rules; of course, previously the theoretical construction must be carried out, even better if we rely on epistemological studies.
4.2. Applied rationalism
So far we have spoken, apart from the analyzes carried out, only about introductory aspects about what it is: philosophy, epistemology and its effects on accounting knowledge (without which it would be inert to understand the central theme of this chapter); However, there is something more plausible to explain, that is, the dialogue philosophy between applied rationalism and technical materialism that at first glance seems a cryptogenic discourse of philosophical thought, but that fearful impression will fade as we better understand the function of theory and practice. It is not my intention, therefore, to employ complex philosophical rhetoric, but rather pedagogical, because I am not a philosopher. But if I try to frame my position, within a conceptual philosophical framework and,that is what I intend to do and explain in this section, hoping of course they will excuse me, for some neologist positions.
But before exposing, let me warn you that I am not trying to impose a new accounting school, much less dogma; Rather, what I will try is to explain the linking of the rational and the real, so that from there we turn our gaze towards the horizon of the scientific rigor of accounting knowledge. At the end of the day, the rationalism applied to already born, and the one in charge of putting it in the light of our eyes was the French philosopher Gastón Bachelard; in whose thoughts my reflections have been inspired. The truth is that this philosophical system has served as the basis for contemporary epistemology, so much so that the new approaches are circumscribed, and in some cases tangentially, to this Bachelardian circle. I cannot find, therefore,any justification for not being able to include it as a philosophical matrix for this research work.
In that sense, I will go on to explain and analyze this system of thought, converging as it could not be otherwise with accounting knowledge. Specify What kind of knowledge is accounting? and What is the nature of it? It has been up to here, at least that is how I perceive it, one of the disjunctive problems of accounting. And here too many essayists have failed, trying to make accounting a hybrid product without any referential system, unavoidable for doing science; in other words, outside of a social, historical and economic context; although I must admit some laudable exceptions.
What is most interesting in any evolutionary process is the conceptual, even more so the doctrinal, because from this we can carry out a rational dialogue of the object, although not independently of the subject, since subject and object are a discursive bicertility that in higher instances will reward with a more objective and less teleological knowledge. However, pragmatists and accounting scientists have departed from this bicerticity. On the one hand, pragmatists unequivocally believe in experience and by induction generalize its concepts; on the contrary, the scientists repudiate the pragmatists as vague and inaccurate. However, if we review the history of science both empirical and rationalists have contributed to the search for truth, although the truth is never given, if it does not have to be built.
The important thing must be scientific research, because through it what is art today, tomorrow can be a science and what is science today tomorrow can be an art; It is like saying the prince of today can be the beggar of tomorrow and the beggar of yesterday can be the prince of today. I insist that the most important thing is to carry out scientific research, look for new paradigms or at least new paradigm projects, that is to say to have a scientific spirit, because in the end it is the reason for being born in this world. It is possible to base accounting science without entering into a dialogue between the rational and the real, without answering the two questions:Under what conditions is it possible to account for a precise phenomenon? And under what conditions is it possible to bring real proofs of the validity of a mathematical organization of experience? In any case, a bicertitude is imperative, or rather a double certainty, which consists of: (i) That the real is in direct relation to reason, such a foundation has been conceived as a critical realism, as Mario Bunge professes. and (ii) That rational arguments must pertain to experience.
So, “here it is not important that some, relying on empiricism, emphasize more the facts and that others, invoking rationalism, emphasize the principles more. Ultimately, both empiricism and rationalism have contributed in the same way, so that incessant scientific optimism has become one of the most… ”12 energetic engines of the emergence of knowledge. However, this optimism is a brief illusion in accounting knowledge, since throughout evolutionary history, there are textures that in some cases converge and in others do not; Such is the case, for example, of positivism and normativism that is currently developing, especially in Europe. The first, abandons all value judgments and the second, underlies the facts with its teleological principle, until it reaches subjective criteria.This does not mean the invalidity of the two positions, but we must guide them to an epistemological dialogue and thereby specify a mixture, rather adopt a convergent theory, which is ultimately where I intend to arrive. But neither can we start from the naive, that is, from the real, because they are simple picturesque facts; in such a way that science does not begin with the facts, but with the problems and with the effort to solve them, because the real thing never has the initiative, meanwhile, it can only be fruitful to the extent that it is questioned. If you do not take the doublets of reason and experience, you will not be able to have an exchange of values, less the efficiency of knowledge, that is, the certainty that something is working correctly can only be seen within an overall philosophy.No object can be an object of knowledge unless a question arises, that is, a problem. In such a way that starting from naive data (without problematizing) is like believing in the thesis of technocentrists, who say that in the future the computer will be able to do everything that the human brain can do, this is absurd, because the computer helps solve problems but cannot pose problems; then, processing data and finding data are different things, they cannot be confused, it is like adding beans to a fruit salad. Because who finds the data? Isn't it the man? Without a doubt, it is the man who finds new data and poses new problems, not the machine. Therefore, in Bachelardian words,"The epistemological vector surely goes from the rational to the real and by no means the other way around, from the real to the general" as advocated by naive empiricism.
From the aforementioned, it leads us to doubt the immediate (naive), the sensations and the experience, because "we must not forget, that the real never has the initiative since it can only respond if it is questioned" 14 Indeed, believing in the simple impressions of the real is an illusory way of finding the verisimilitude and therefore it is not knowledge, it is deceptive like the sensations. Let us sketch, by way of example, the attached drawings.
FIGURES WITH VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS
SOURCE: VOLLMER, G. "Gundlagen einer projektiven erkenntnistheorie" Pp. 82-86, in URSUA, Nicanor. "Brain and knowledge: an evolutionary approach"
Pp. 64-68.
With this example, we want to make it clear that the immediate is not knowledge, that is, that sensations cannot relegate reason. By this same principle, it is that "when one tries to see these drawings and various interpretations are obtained, then the interpretive operation that the perceptual apparatus performs is noticed" In these simple examples, therefore, perception, that is, interpretations can be in different ways. In such a way that, to believe in the immediate is to fall into intuitive simplicity, because “the simple idea is not known except in composition, due to its role in the compounds in which it is integrated.” 16 Consequently, there are three types or levels of the Objective reconstruction, these are: (i) Sensations, (ii) Perceptions, (iii) Experience and (iv) Scientific (theoretical) knowledge.
5. EPISTEMOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES IN ACCOUNTING.
5.1. Kuhn's historical epistemology.
Without a doubt, Thomas Kuhn, built in his work published in 1962 the Structure of scientific revolutions, a different and revealing vision of what until then was had on scientific progress. Although at present, its main postulates are being questioned; as is the case of the concepts: paradigm and incommensurability. However, in response to criticism, he has corrected and expanded his theory, indicating that all science is shaped over time with the contributions of the scientific community that contributes not only with new cumulative knowledge, but also with qualitative changes. That is, new changes of perspective with the creation of new paradigms that open new horizons for science, conceived, therefore, as something open and evolving.
But let's take a better look at some of its main principles and then explain some paradigmatic perspectives in the accounting field. The Kuhnian position essentially starts from three stages: normal science, anomalies and scientific revolution. But this implies asking some questions, which could very well serve as a starting point to better understand these considerations: What is the nature of normal science? What is a paradigm? What are anomalies? and finally, what does a scientific revolution mean?
In the first instance, normal science "means research firmly based on one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community recognizes for a certain time, as a basis for its later practice." In other words, it is an accepted theory that solves the world's scientific problems, on the basis of which experiments and observations of reality are regulated. This presupposes the finite duration of the accepted theory until the moment when it can no longer solve certain scientific problems; then there will be periods of crisis or anomalies.
But there is something else, as normal science are scientific realizations, then their efficiency in solving anomalies will depend on the plausibility of the paradigms, since these are “accepted examples of current scientific practice, examples that include at the same time law, theory, application and instrumentation and provide models from which particular research traditions emerge ”19 within a scientific community. Therefore, “men whose research is based on shared paradigms are subject to the same rules and regulations for scientific practice. This commitment and the apparent consent it provokes are prerequisites for normal science, that is, for the genesis and continuation of a
particular tradition of scientific inquiry. "
From this particularity, we are concerned to point out that normal science is cohesive to the concept of paradigm, that is, it is related to it. Therefore, a paradigm is not only limited to the explanation, but it goes as far as the prediction of the facts. This means that a paradigm is more than a theory; it is a methodological guide, because it implies rules and norms for selecting and solving scientific problems.
However, for the modern concept “a paradigm is what the members of a scientific community, and only they, share; and conversely, it is the possession of a common paradigm, which constitutes a group of people in a scientific community, a group that would otherwise be made up of unrelated members. " Said in a more pedagogical way "a paradigm is what the members of a scientific community share and, conversely, a scientific community consists of people who share a paradigm" As a result of the above, it is declared that a paradigm for its development It must solve all kinds of enigmas (problems), otherwise it would reach a state of anomaly. Since no paradigm could completely solve the problems facing the scientific community,in such a way that researchers are moving away from the useful rules and norms for research lawfully imposed by this paradigm. And consequently the transition to a crisis begins, adopting another paradigm that is capable of solving the problem.
Indeed, "once the status of a paradigm is reached, a scientific theory is declared invalid only when an alternative candidate is available to take its place" because to reject one paradigm without replacing it with another is to reject science itself "24 is to drown in a sea of illusory discourses, instead of seeking the epistemological break to better explain reality, that is, more objectively. In all cases it is rejecting the very essence of the new scientific spirit.
In this context, all crises end with the emergence of a paradigm candidate and with the subsequent struggle for acceptance. However, the transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new one from which a new scientific tradition (normal science) may emerge is far from being a cumulative process, since it is not an articulation or an extension of the old paradigm; if not a reconstruction of the field, based on new foundations, a reconstruction that changes some of the most elementary theoretical generalizations of the field, as well as many of the methods and applications of the paradigm. In other words, it is a scientific revolution.25
Scientific revolution that our discipline unfortunately has not yet experienced; But whatever the reason, I am convinced that accounting will achieve its scientific status, by evolution or revolution, in the style of the Kuhnian revolution. From all the above, it is not utopian to say that these epistemological considerations have penetrated accounting thinking; We affirm this since there are accounting works framed within this epistemology. One of those jobs is by MC Wells. For this Anglo-Saxon author, accounting has overcome the process of scientific revolution in the 1940s, and from that time on, various accounting schools began to come to light, each explaining the disciplinary matrix in their own way, to later become normal science. In that process,characterizes accounting in three categories: (i) Symbolic generalizations, represented by the double entry method, earnings, asset classifications, etc.; (ii) Shared commitments, denoted by the principles of realization, going concern, etc.; and (iii) The copies, which constitute the various books published in a period "tn".
In this same perspective, it is to take into account another interesting work developed by the American Accounting Association (AAA), it is about: "Declaration and acceptance of accounting theory (SATTA)" this association, made up of accounting professors, analyze accounting theory from a multiparadigmatic dimension, establishing three paradigms and within each of them they conceive useful methodological guidelines for accounting analysis. The first is called the classical approach: composed of two traditions, inductive / positive and deductive / normative. The second has a utilitarian approach, that is, the decision model both individual and collective, that is, individual and market decision-makers. Finally, there is the theory of economic value, which beyond a theory proper,it is a regulatory way of presenting economic information; using statistical techniques and inferences.
PARADIGMATIC APPROACHES OF THE AMERICAN ACCOUNTING ASSOCIATION
5.2. Lakatos's approach.
Before starting to explain What is a research program ?, Let's do a little history: Faced with the epistemological controversy led by two illustrious teachers, Karl Raimund Popper and Thomas Kuhn, about the falsifiability of theories and the displacements of paradigms respectively, the philosopher Imre Lakatos appears with his research programs, aimed at reconciling, although not in an eclectic way, these two positions. However, Lakatos, is part of a group of postpopperian epistemologists, we must not forget that Lakatos was a disciple of Popper; however, he constructed his arguments independently of both epistemologists.
But let's take a better look at Popper's central thesis, in order to address Lakatian thought. In this sense, for Popper, scientific progress lies in learning from our mistakes and through this, increasing our knowledge. That is, by exposing our mistakes, it makes us understand the difficulties of the problem we are trying to solve and that is how we come to acquire a deeper knowledge and be in a position to propose more mature solutions. Consequently, the object of science is the falsification of its theories and this therefore presupposes the growth of scientific development by refutation of theories. Under this context, the Popperian thesis opposes Kuhn's arguments that we have referred to previously; in that sense,poperian scientific progress is cumulative and teleological. In this context, Lakatos proposes a new epistemological profile based on research programs. He agrees with Popper, regarding his opposition to the hegemony of theories without criticism; However, Lakatos notes, he is wrong to demand a ruthless rebuttal. As for Kuhn, he considers that he has the right not to criticize a theory that develops; but he makes the mistake of excepting the whole field. However, Lakatos accepts Kuhn's historical thesis, stating that “the philosophy of science without the history of science is empty; the history of science without the philosophy of science is blind. " 9regarding his opposition to the hegemony of theories without criticism; However, Lakatos notes, he is wrong to demand a ruthless rebuttal. As for Kuhn, he considers that he has the right not to criticize a theory that develops; but he makes the mistake of excepting the whole field. However, Lakatos accepts Kuhn's historical thesis, stating that “the philosophy of science without the history of science is empty; the history of science without the philosophy of science is blind. " 9regarding his opposition to the hegemony of theories without criticism; However, Lakatos notes, he is wrong to demand a ruthless rebuttal. As for Kuhn, he considers that he has the right not to criticize a theory that develops; but he makes the mistake of excepting the whole field. However, Lakatos accepts Kuhn's historical thesis, stating that “the philosophy of science without the history of science is empty; the history of science without the philosophy of science is blind. " 9affirming that “the philosophy of science without the history of science is empty; the history of science without the philosophy of science is blind. " 9affirming that “the philosophy of science without the history of science is empty; the history of science without the philosophy of science is blind. " 9
Consequently, "a research program consists of heuristic rules, some of a negative nature, insofar as they tell us which research paths to avoid, and others positive, since they indicate the paths to be followed." Therefore, these research programs can be considered as a set of theories related to each other, and in the process of development with two fundamental components: The hard core and a heuristic belt.
But what impact does this epistemological stance have on accounting knowledge? Answering this question, therefore, will be the task of the following paragraphs. The first manifestations of the Lakatian application to accounting are made by the distinguished professor Richard Mattessich. Indeed, for Mattessich there are accounting research traditions that some communities adopt, or rather, from which they guide their research. To do this, it presents “two questions, firstly, that in accounting as in any other discipline, there are different research traditions that compete with each other if and not there is a single dominant paradigm, and secondly, which is the most important, each tradition research constitutes an entire network of theoretical elements, and that somehow compete with each other,but in a more moderate and secondary way ”that must evolve as the theoretical matrix element is overcome.
Another approach to research programs is presented by Professor Leandro Cañibano. In his opinion, “there are three research programs, within which accounting elaborations have been developed, which he calls
legalistic, economic and formal.” 32
RESEARCH PROGRAMS MAIN FORMS
A. Legalistic Approach
It begins with the discovery of the double entry by Lucas Pacciolo. 33 Allowing merchants of the time to know their financial situation; the use of accounting information is exposed as proof of guarantee against third parties; However, in the face of this legalistic facet, the economic aspect was practically nullified.
B. Economic Approach. It can be said that from the end of the First World War, this program began. Inasmuch as, the accounting information was no longer less objective due to the effects of inflation and from there, the purpose of the accounting information was linked to the knowledge of the economic reality.
C. Formal Approach With the advancement of computer science and operations research, a new approach is visualized through an axiomatized language, establishing a series of axioms, definitions, theorems and requirements based on matrix algebra.
ACCOUNTING RESEARCH PROGRAMS ACCORDING TO CAÑIBANO
SOURCE: adapted from Leandro, CAÑIBANO. Op. Cit. Pp. 12-17.
In summary, Professor Cañibano conceives three research programs: (i) The Legalist, which began in the 14th century with the work of Pacciolo; (ii) The economic approach, placing it historically with the end of the First World War that occurred in 1918, although in reality, its beginning occurs with the work of Eugene Schmalenbach who published in 1919 "The dynamic balance" and (iii) The program formalist, which had its first attempt in the mid-nineteenth century, with the work of Richard Mattessich: "Towards a general and axiomatic foundation of accounting" in 1957. Consequently, according to Leandro Cañibano, this last program is the current accounting research program. However, we must add that currently accounting research has diversified multidisciplinary,Of course, with the advances in algorithms we can formalize accounting, but apart from this, it is inescapable to first build a unified or joint theory. Other more audacious essayists and supported by positivist philosophy, such is the case of Túa Pereda, have classified three research subprograms for the regulation of accounting normalization, which coincide with the crisis periods of the capitalist economy, today subtly called economics. market. The same ones that we list below:that coincide with the periods of crisis of the capitalist economy, today subtly called the market economy. The same ones that we list below:that coincide with the periods of crisis of the capitalist economy, today subtly called the market economy. The same ones that we list below:
Generalized acceptance subprogram (1,9171,959)
Logic applet (1,959 - 1,973)
Teleological subprogram (1973 - onwards) The first subprogram is subordinate to the generally accepted term, from the level of inductions, without being able to discern the essence of the facts. In this sense, the referential framework of this subprogram rests on the STATUS QUO of the practice, this makes the theoretical construction isolated and disabled. In other words, accounting rules are the product of experience.
The following (logical) subprogram, arises as a subsidiary of the first one that had entered into collapse, while it had not reached its end, namely, the uniformity in the consolidation of financial information. Moreover, with the aim of unifying accounting regulation, they incur another methodological sin: believing that the accounting disciplinary basis is built in dependence on consensus, the primacy of the unions and the adherence of the accounting office.
This implies that “… the model was not built from the top down, it was made from the bottom up, that is, the observation, the creation of classifications and finally the justification of the practices, there does not appear a formulation from the concepts of logic or of psychology that can be considered as hypothetical deductive. It is a pragmatic model to which a supporting corpus was built that is far from being a systematic or scientific corpus of knowledge. "
As the last subprogram, there is the teleological one that was born as a consequence of the unsuccessful attempt to standardize the accounting standards proposed by the logical subprogram. The central project of this new grievance lies in deriving accounting standards from observing the objectives of financial information, this implies that the objectives must have a teleological criterion, that is, to provide usefulness to financial information for decision making, mainly for the safeguard in the stock market investment. This is undoubtedly a gregarious and illusory vision, since it departs from the true theoretical-methodological itinerary; it leaves aside the “`… business anatomy that describes the structure and shape of its organs and the organic structure of its capital; business embryology,that studies the development of companies and capital And also (leaves aside) business pathology, which examines the morbid states, the diseases of companies to apply the most recommended therapy through economic and financial sanitation in their process of developing."
From all that has been explained, we can conclude that accounting is not alien to epistemological and philosophical positions, rather it feeds on them. We could suggest then, that this is the true task of every accountant, to overlap with science and epistemology to build the desired unifying theory, but unfortunately very few conceive it that way. While it is true that this overlap is fruitful, it does not mean, on the contrary, to have reached the end of the investigation, in any way, it is rather a brief leap towards the scientific revolution, where we must always be vigilant.
5.3. Classification of accounting thinking and its gnoseological incidents.
Positive accounting is nothing other than the body of systematized knowledge about "what is". "The school of positive thinking, in general terms, approaches accounting in a systematic way, based on a rigorous logic and empirical correspondence, placing the emphasis on neutrality, or the absence of value judgments in relation to accounting events" This is visualized clearly in the accounting pronouncements, which we have referenced in the previous chapters. For example, a clear radical positivist conception is the PAT (positive accounting theory) whose main objective is the description, explanation and prediction of accounting practices.
But the problem with the PAT is that it "has an unacceptably narrow definition of what evidence is, restricts the research methods used, and ignores evidence that disagrees with the researchers' claims." However, in the selection of the observations themselves, they have acted normatively (a priori), perhaps unconsciously, but that makes it a tubular or narrow vision of accounting.
Normative accounting is characterized by being prescriptive; that is to say, “what should be”. Therefore, normative accounting deals with the usefulness of accounting information. It is characterized by having value judgments in its foundations and therefore differs from positive accounting, which rejects the concept of value, advocating factual judgments instead; Meanwhile, normative accounting, as it accepts the concept of utility or value, is always linked to certain categories, such as: should not be, good, bad, efficient, inefficient, etc.
In this context, normative accounting also engenders the teleological principle: "must be", constituting this in the very essence of normative reasoning. The incessant search to solve the needs posed by the objectives of accounting information, is an evaluative fact since it must, in short, generate useful applications. So it starts from a simple premise: the value of accounting information, whether for third parties, the State and shareholders.
Consequently, this extreme of accounting thinking is related to applied science, because both seek practical utility apart from the truth. According to Mattessich: "an applied science is subject to normative dyes and its objectivity is based precisely on the clear disclosure of its objectives and other value judgments within a specific context or situation" 39 however, it lacks an additional ingredient, systematize it within a theoretical model.
We must differentiate it then, from basic or pure science, because value judgments no longer work there; That is to say, the scientist cannot be limited to evaluative dyes, but rather to the search for truth, rather to the deepening of knowledge, regardless of whether it is useful or not; In any case, that would fall to the technician, but we will explain it later. Let us therefore see how normative accounting is outlined.
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