Five years ago, executives from McKinsey & Company, the most prestigious consulting firm in North America, launched what they dubbed "The Talent War." They sent thousands of questionnaires to managers across the country. In addition, they selected eighteen companies to which they visited and paid special attention. For days, in some cases up to three, they interviewed from the first executive to Human Resources personnel. McKinsey wanted to document how the best-performing American companies differ from others in how they manage the recruitment and promotion of their staff. But as they then went through the stacks of reports, questionnaires, and interview transcripts,They became convinced that the difference between winners and losers was much deeper than they thought: In the book they wrote, "The War for Talent," the three consultants who led the study -Ed Michaels, Helen Handfield- Jones and Beth Axelrod-they say "We looked at each other and suddenly the light bulb went on": The best companies, they concluded, have leaders obsessed with the question of talent. They recruit without stopping, searching and hiring all the best they find. They identify and segregate the “stars”, disproportionately rewarding them and continually invite them to climb to positions of greater responsibility. We are committed to natural athletes, those with stronger intrinsic abilities. ”They commend the comment made by a high-level executive of General Electric:"There is no need to be afraid of promoting stars above their direct bosses, even if they lack concrete relevant experience." According to Michaels, Handfield Jones, and Axelrod, success in the modern economy requires the "talent mindset," the "deep-seated belief that the company with the best talent at all levels outperforms its competitors."
This "talent mindset" is the new orthodoxy of American management. It is the intellectual justification for the high valuation placed on top tier business schools and explains why compensation and compensation packages are so generous for top executives. In the modern company the strength of the system is considered to be that of its stars and this message has been preached in recent years by consultants and "gurus" from all over the world. None with as much fervor as McKinsey; one of his clients took this talent mindset to unsuspected extremes. A company where McKinsey ran twenty different projects; in which McKinsey's bills totaled more than $ 10 million a year; its council was regularly attended by a counselor from McKinsey herself;the chief executive himself was a former McKinsey partner. The company was Enron.
Almost a year ago, the Enron scandal occurred. The reputations of the top two executives, Jeffrey Skilling and Kenneth Lay, have been destroyed; the Enron auditor; Arthur Andersen has been kicked out of the business world; And now investigators focus on Enron bankers. McKinsey is the only Enron-related company to come off fairly well, which is rare considering that it is largely responsible for the ideology on which the Enron culture was based, which was the company of "talent" by excellence. Michaels, Handfield –Jones and Axelrond tell us that when Skilling created the corporate division called “Enron Capital and Trade” in 1990, “he decided to recruit all the best high school graduates and MBAs he could find to fill the Company with talent”. In the nineties,Enron recruited two hundred and fifty newly graduated MBAs each year. Remember a former Enron manager: “We organized the Super-Saturdays in which I interviewed some newcomers from Harvard; Those guys were beyond me in everything. They knew things that I had never heard. " Incorporated into Enron, the most productive were disproportionately remunerated; they were also promoted without regard to experience or seniority. Enron was a system based on star employees. Former Enron President Lay confessed to McKinsey consultants when they visited him at the Company's headquarters in Houston that "the only thing that sets us apart from our competitors is our people, our talent." OR,As another CEO of the Company told Richard Foster - another McKinsey associate who wrote a book in 2001 titled "Creative Destruction," in which he praised Enron - "We recruit very smart people and pay them more than they think they deserve. "
In other words, Enron managers did exactly what McKinsey consultants said needed to be done to succeed in the modern economy. They recruited and rewarded the excellent and the brightest; the Company is bankrupt. We need not clarify that the reasons for this bankruptcy are complex. But what if Enron went bankrupt not despite his "talent mindset" but precisely because of it? What if smart people are being overrated?
At the core of McKinsey's vision is a process that advocates of the "War of Talent" call "differentiation and affirmation." They argue that employers need to sit down once or twice a year to talk about each employee in a "candid, exploratory, and unreserved" manner, and classify them into one of groups A, B, or C. "A" are required and disproportionately reward; the "B" need encouragement and reaffirmation; Cs have to improve their shape or are fired. Enron adopted this advice almost literally by instituting internal performance review committees.
Los miembros de los comités se reunían dos veces al año y calificaban a las personas de su área utilizando diez criterios diferentes en una escala de uno a cinco. Llamaban a este proceso “clasifica e incómoda”. Los calificados como los mejores de su unidad recibían incentivos dos tercios más altos que los evaluados en el treinta por ciento siguiente. Los valorados como insuficientes no recibían incentivos ni más opciones sobre acciones. En algunos casos se les despedía.
How should such an assessment be made? Unfortunately McKinsey consultants spend little time talking about it. One possibility is simply to recruit and reward the smartest. But the link between, say, IQ (IQ) and job performance is clearly very weak. On a scale where 0.1 or less indicates that there is no correlation; and 0.7 or more, which implies a high correlation (for example, the reader's height has a 0.7 correlation with that of his parents), the one that exists between the IQ and success at work is between 0.2 and 0.3. Says Richard Wagner, a psychologist at Florida State University "What would happen if IC doesn't grasp the effectiveness of operating with common sense things,especially to work with other people? The criteria with which we evaluate students are useful when it comes to just working on yourself; When we work with others in schools, we call it copying. When you come into the real world, everything you do involves working with other people. ”
Wagner and Robert Sternberg, other psychologists at Yale University, have designed a test to measure this practical component: they call it "tacit knowledge," which includes questions such as how to manage yourself and others, and how to navigate social situations. complicated. Here is one of the questions from his test:
“You have just been promoted to head of an important department of your company. The former has been transferred to an equivalent position in a less relevant department. You believe that the reason for this move is that the performance of the department, as a whole, has been mediocre. It is not that there have been clamorous deficiencies, but regular instead of very good. You have been tasked with getting the department in shape and you are expected to get results quickly. Evaluate the quality of the following strategies so that you succeed in this new position:
a) Always delegate to the most novice person to whom the task can be entrusted.
b) Continually inform their superiors about how things are going.
c) Announce a total reorganization of the department, including the dismissal of those whom you believe to be a “dead weight”.
d) Concentrate more on your people than on the task to be performed.
e) Holding people fully responsible for their work. ”
Wagner indicates that the results of those who do this type of test predict how they will perform their role at work. Good managers will favor b) and c); the bad, by c).However, there is no clear relationship between this type of tacit knowledge and other forms of knowledge or experiences. The process for assessing skills on the job is much more complicated than it sounds.
What employers want is to assess performance, not potential; which is also complicated. In "The Talent War," the authors comment on how the Royal Air Force used the A, B, and C rating system to classify its pilots in The Battle of England. But to evaluate military pilots there are a limited number of performance criteria (for example, downed enemies and the ability to get formations back to base safe and sound); It is much easier than evaluating how the head of a new department is working, for example in marketing or business development. Also, from whom will you ask for that manager's qualification? There are studies that prove that there is very little correlation between the evaluation made by colleagues and that of the boss.The only rigorous way to assess performance, as human resources specialists say, is to use criteria that are as concrete as possible. It is assumed that managers carefully record throughout the year everything related to the performance of their subordinates in order to eliminate possible subjectivities in the evaluation processes. You can only evaluate someone if you know their performance well. In Enron's irresponsible culture this was totally impossible. People considered “talented” were continually assigned new tasks, who were also continually challenged. Due to promotions, annual turnover was close to twenty percent. Linda Clemmons known as "the weather girl" because she created the weather-based derivatives business within Enron,in seven years she went from being an operator to a deputy director, then to a director and finally the first executive of her business unit.
How to evaluate the performance of someone in a system in which nobody lasts in his position a minimum of time that allows such evaluation? The answer is that you end up evaluating performance without relying on your own performance. Among the many glamorous books written about Enron before his fall, is the "best seller" titled "Leading the Revolution" by consultant Gary Hamel; it tells the story of Lou Pai, promoter of the energy market business of said Company. Pai's group debuted with a disaster: It lost tens of millions of dollars selling electricity to residential customers in recently deregulated markets. Hamel explains that the problem was that the markets were not really liberalized:"In the states that opened their markets to competition, regulations were still in force that provided enormous advantages to electricity companies that had previously operated."
It didn't occur to anyone that Pai should have analyzed those standards much more carefully before risking millions of dollars. He was immediately given a new opportunity: to develop the business of electricity outsourcing; again several years of large losses before last year he left the Company with two hundred and seventy million dollars of compensation. Since Pai had "talent" he was given opportunities and, when he did not succeed, more opportunities… because he had talent. Hamel writes, as if it's something commendable that, "At Enron failure, even the kind that makes headlines in the Wall Street Journal, doesn't necessarily ruin a career path." Businesses that want to encourage risk-taking are supposed to tolerate mistakes. However,What use is talent if it is defined as something other than performance?
The "War of Talent" is nothing more than an argument to spoil employees A, to flatter them. According to Michaels, Handfield Jones and Axelrod: “You have to do everything possible to make them happy and involved, even happy. You have to discover what they like to do the most and direct their careers and responsibilities in that direction. Resolve any issue that could make them leave the company, such as a boss who frustrates them or travel demands that overload them. ” In this, no company has surpassed Enron. It has been recounted many times that Louise Kitchin, a twenty-nine year old gas operator in Europe, became convinced that the Company should develop the gas business on the internet.He told his boss and started working on the project in his spare time until he had a support team of two hundred and fifty people throughout Enron. After six months, Skilling (the chief executive) was informed, who later said: “I was never asked for capital or people. They bought the servers themselves, they refurbished the building; When I got the first news they had already made legal inquiries in twenty-two countries. It is exactly the type of behavior that will allow the growth of this Company. ”When I got the first news they had already made legal inquiries in twenty-two countries. It is exactly the type of behavior that will allow the growth of this Company. ”When I got the first news they had already made legal inquiries in twenty-two countries. It is exactly the type of behavior that will allow the growth of this Company. ”
It should be emphasized that Kitchin's qualification to direct EnronOnline was not that he was the right person to do it, but because he was what he wanted to do, and Enron was a place where the stars did what their real will asked of them. Skilling stated to the Mc Kinsey team: “Smooth movement is absolutely necessary in our Company. And the type of people we recruit reinforces that dynamic. The system is such that it not only contributes to the level of involvement of all managers; It is also leading Enron in the most attractive direction for its managers, ”Skilling continued, adding that if“ driving Enron's business in the direction its managers decide is more exciting; if many of them are inclined towards a new business unit, it is a good sign, an indicator that the opportunity is good;if the unit does not interest, it is clear that it is a business that Enron should not enter. " It is assumed that the chief executive officer (CEO) says that if a business unit cannot easily attract customers, it is clear that the company should not approach it, because it is also assumed that the activities of a company have to focus on those that its managers identify as more profitable. But at Enron, the needs of customers and shareholders were secondary to the needs of its stars.that the activities of a company must focus on those that its managers identify as the most profitable. But at Enron, the needs of customers and shareholders were secondary to the needs of its stars.that the activities of a company must focus on those that its managers identify as the most profitable. But at Enron, the needs of customers and shareholders were secondary to the needs of its stars.
A dozen years ago, psychologists Robert Hogan, Robert Raskin and Dan Fazzini wrote a brilliant essay entitled “The Dark Side of Charisma”. They argue that there are three types of incompetent managers. One is the "I want to please" (High Likability in the original), an empty being who ascends in the company almost effortlessly because he never makes difficult decisions or makes enemies. Another is the "Resentful Man" (homme de ressentiment in the original), rabid under the surface, conspiring against his enemies. The most interesting of the three is the "Narcissist," whose energy, self-confidence, and charm lead him inexorably to climb the corporate hierarchy. Narcissists are nefarious managers who do not accept suggestions because they think they may be considered weak; also,they don't think anyone can tell them anything valuable. Hogan and colleagues write: ”Narcissists tend to sign up more than their share, and not to acknowledge responsibility for their failures and deficiencies for the same reasons that lead them to sign up for so many. In general, they make judgments with more confidence than those who are not, and because they are so convinced, others tend to believe that narcissists have a decisive influence on group situations. Finally, precisely because of the self-confidence they exhibit and the great need for recognition, they tend to "self-choose"; When a leadership need arises in a group or in an organization, they rush to meet it.no longer recognize responsibility for their failures and shortcomings for the same reasons that lead them to join so many. In general, they make judgments with more confidence than those who are not, and because they are so convinced, others tend to believe that narcissists have a decisive influence on group situations. Finally, precisely because of the self-confidence they exhibit and the great need for recognition, they tend to "self-choose"; When a leadership need arises in a group or in an organization, they rush to meet it.no longer recognize responsibility for their failures and shortcomings for the same reasons that lead them to join so many. In general, they make judgments with more confidence than those who are not, and because they are so convinced, others tend to believe that narcissists have a decisive influence on group situations. Finally, precisely because of the self-confidence they exhibit and the great need for recognition, they tend to "self-choose"; When a leadership need arises in a group or in an organization, they rush to meet it.precisely because of the self-confidence they exhibit and the great need for recognition, they tend to "self-choose"; When a leadership need arises in a group or in an organization, they rush to meet it.precisely because of the self-confidence they exhibit and the great need for recognition, they tend to "self-choose"; When a leadership need arises in a group or in an organization, they rush to meet it.
Tyco Corporation and WorldCom were the “Greedy Corporations.” Enron, the “Narcissistic Corporation,” a company that claimed more success than was reasonable, that did not take responsibility for its failures, who cunningly sold its genius to others., and who replaced the self-bombing with disciplined management. In a passage from his "Leading the Revolution," Hamel recounts the career of a top Enron executive, and what he recounts without batting an eye - braggadocio, self-satisfaction - could be an epitaph to the talent mindset:
«When I was running“ Enron Capital ”and“ Enron Capital and Trade Resources ”(ECT) - the largest American natural gas operator, and the largest buyer and seller of electricity - Ken Rice, dressed in a black T-shirt, blue jeans and boots As a cowboy, he drew a square on the tarpaulin comparing his business unit to a nuclear reactor. Inside it he painted several small circles that were the “contract creators”, the gunmen in charge of signing businesses and creating new activities; next to each circle, arrows pointing in all directions: "We allow our people to go in any direction they want," says Rice.
It is important to distinguish the “Greedy Corporation” from the “Narcissistic Corporation” because the way we value our achievements helps us determine our behavior. Carol Dweck, a psychologist at Columbia University, argues that many people have one or two convictions about their intelligence: either they consider it an immutable characteristic, or something that is malleable and can develop over time. Five years ago, Dweck studied at the University of Hong Kong, where classes are taught in English. Together with several colleagues, she asked a large group of social science students if they wanted to take a course to improve their command of English. Previously, these university students had undergone a test to measure their level in this language.It could be assumed that those with low scores would accept the offer. The University of Hong Kong is a very demanding institution, and it is difficult to study social sciences if you are not fluent in English. Interestingly, only those who believed that intelligence is malleable were interested. Those who believed that his intelligence was an immutable characteristic were so apprehensive that his deficiency was found that they preferred to stay home. Dweck writes: “Students who have a fixed view of their intelligence take so much interest in showing that they are smart, that they act stupid, because what could be more stupid than not taking the opportunity to learn something that is essential for personal success. ? ”and it is difficult to study social sciences if English is not mastered. Curiously, only those who believed that intelligence is malleable were interested. Those who believed that his intelligence was an immutable characteristic were so apprehensive that his deficiency was found that they preferred to stay home. Dweck writes: “Students who have a fixed view of their intelligence take so much interest in showing that they are smart, that they act stupid, because what could be more stupid than not taking the opportunity to learn something that is essential for personal success. ? ”and it is difficult to study social sciences if English is not mastered. Curiously, only those who believed that intelligence is malleable were interested. Those who believed that his intelligence was an immutable characteristic were so apprehensive that his deficiency was found that they preferred to stay home. Dweck writes: “Students who have a fixed view of their intelligence take so much interest in showing that they are smart, that they act stupid, because what could be more stupid than not taking the opportunity to learn something that is essential for personal success. ? ”Those who believed that his intelligence was an immutable characteristic were so apprehensive that his deficiency was found that they preferred to stay home. Dweck writes: “Students who have a fixed view of their intelligence take so much interest in showing that they are smart, that they act stupid, because what could be more stupid than not taking the opportunity to learn something that is essential for personal success. ? ”Those who believed that his intelligence was an immutable characteristic were so apprehensive that his deficiency was found that they preferred to stay home. Dweck writes: “Students who have a fixed view of their intelligence take so much interest in showing that they are smart, that they act stupid, because what could be more stupid than not taking the opportunity to learn something that is essential for personal success. ? ”
In a similar experiment, Dweck passed a test with many complicated problems to a class of pre-teen students. When they finished, he praised a group of them for the effort they had put in; to the other, he praised his intelligence. The latter were later reluctant to undertake difficult tasks and soon began to lower the level of their performance in other tests. Dweck then asked the boys to write a letter to students at another school describing their experience. He discovered something interesting: Forty percent of those who were congratulated for their intelligence lied about the test score, adjusted it upwards. It was not that they were especially deceitful boys, nor less intelligent, or that they did not trust themselves.They simply did what we all do when we move in an environment that only an innate "talent" recognizes. You identify with that description and when hard times come and threats to your own image occur, it is difficult for you to bear the consequences. They will not accept private classes. They will not accept their errors before the shareholders or before the public opinion. They prefer to lie.
McKinsey and his acronyms at Enron's most important shortcoming is their assumption that the intelligence of an organization is only a function of the intelligence of its employees. They believe in stars because they do not believe in systems. In some ways this is understandable because our lives are clearly enriched by individual brilliance. Groups do not write great novels, and the theory of relativity was not developed by a committee. But companies operate with different rules. Don't just believe; they also execute, compete, and coordinate the efforts of many different people. Those who best perform their tasks are those where the star is the system.
A clear example of this is the history of the so-called "Eastern Pearl Harbor" (North of the Pearl Harbor of the east, that is to say of the American east coast) of World War II. In the first nine months of 1942, the United States Navy suffered the catastrophe of the German U-2s operating off the North American Atlantic coast and in the Caribbean, sinking merchant ships at their discretion. The German captains did not believe their luck. As one of them wrote: “In this clear sea, in backlight, the silhouettes of totally recognizable ships passed by, so American, almost as sharp and with profiles as delimited as if they were photographs from a sales catalog; all we had to do was push the button ”
What is truly puzzling is that on the other side of the Atlantic the British had much less trouble defending their ships from U-2 attacks. Also, with the utmost diligence, they passed on to the Americans everything they knew about sonar, from launchers. depth charges and destroyer construction. Despite everything, the Germans paralyzed the American coastal areas.
One can imagine the conclusion McKinsey's consultants would have reached: that the US Navy did not have the talent mindset, that President Rooservelt should hire the best and promote them to key positions in Atlantic command. That is what he did. At the beginning of the war, he removed from command as Chief of Naval Operations the solid but unspectacular admiral Harold R Stark and replaced him with the legendary Ernest Joseph King. In his book "The Tenth Fleet," a story of the Navy battles with the U-2s, Ladislas Farago says of him, "He was a great realist with the arrogance of geniuses. He had unlimited faith in himself, in his vast knowledge of naval subjects, and in the strength of his ideas. Just as Stark tolerated incompetence around him,King had no patience with fools. "
In other words, the Navy was very talented at the top. What she did not have was the proper organization. Eliot A. Cohen is a scholar of military strategy at Johns Hopkins University. In his brilliant book "Military Misfortunes in the Atlantic" he writes:
To do the anti-submarine war well, analysts had to gather pieces of information, position search systems, visual observations, decoders, and the attack pattern of a U-2, so that it could be used by a commander to coordinate efforts. of warships, aviation and convoy commanders. This synthesis had to take place very close to real time, in hours and sometimes in minutes.
The British performed this task excellently because they had a centralized operating system. The controllers regulated the movement of their ships in the Atlantic like chess pieces to overcome the wolf packs that were the U-2s. By contrast, Admiral King was a strong advocate of decentralized management structures. In their opinion, managers should never order their subordinates the "how" or the "what". In the current jargon we could say that he believed in a management with the minimum of control, the one defended in 1982 by the consultants of McKinsey Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman in their "best-seller" "In search of excellence". But decentralized management does not serve to locate the U-2s. Throughout most of 1942,the US navy insisted on acting intelligently on the basis of technical know-how, stubbornly rejecting the operational lessons of the British. The American Navy lacked the organizational structure necessary to apply the technical knowledge it had in the theater of operations. Only the situation changed when she created the Tenth Fleet, a coordinating unit for all anti-submarine action in the Atlantic. In the year and a half prior to this creation, May 1943, the Navy sank thirty-six U-2s. In the following six months the figure was seventy-five. As Cohen writes, “The creation of the Tenth Fleet did not mean that there was a greater contribution from talented people to the anti-submarine war. What the Fleet meant, due to its organization and mandate,was that these people were more effective than before. " The talent myth assumes that people make organizations smart. Often it is the other way around.
Ample evidence of this principle is found in the most successful American companies. Southwest Airlines hires very few MBAs, pays its managers modestly, and promotes them based on their seniority, not by differentiation and assertion. The Company is by far the most profitable of the American airlines because it has created an organization that is much more effective than that of its competitors. An industry productivity index is the time it takes to put an airplane on the runway from the moment it lands. In Southwest the average is twenty minutes with a ground crew of four, plus two more at the gate. (On United Airlines, this time is close to thirty-five minutes and they need twelve people on the ground plus three on boarding).
Let's look at the case of the department store giant Wal-Mart. In 1976 he went through one of the most critical moments in its history. Sam Walton had not yet retired when he had to invite his successor, Ron Mayer, to leave. He was barely over forty, ambitious, charismatic. It was in the words of a Walton biographer "the young genius of finance." But Walton realized that Mayer, as McKinsey's would say, was "differentiating and asserting" at corporate headquarters, challenging Wal-Mart's egalitarian culture. Meyer left the Company and it survived. Because the company is an organization, not a team made up of stars. Walton hired David Glass from the Army and Southern Missouri State University as CEO. Nowadays,Wal-Mart is number one on the Fortune 500 list.
Procter & Gamble also doesn't have a star system. As well? Would the most qualified Harvard or Stanford graduates move to Cincinnati to work in detergent, giving up reinventing the world earning three times as much in Houston? Procter & Gamble is not glamorous. Its CEO is from the house of a lifetime. A former Navy officer who began his corporate career as Deputy Product Manager for Joy, a liquid dishwasher. If the best of Procter & Gamble played Trivial with the best of Enron, there is no doubt that the Houston team would win on the street. But Procter & Gamble has been a leader in consumer products for almost a century because it has painstakingly designed a management system, a rigorous marketing methodology,that has allowed him to win the battles of the Crest and Ride brands for such a decade. In the Procter & Gamble Army, Admiral Stark would have had his place. But a horizontal steering committee would have created the Tenth Fleet even before the start of the war.
In the end, one of Enron's most pernicious elements was something that its managers were very proud of. In McKinsey terminology they had an "open market" to recruit people. In this open system - McKinsey's assault on the idea of a stable organization - anyone could apply for the position they wanted without being prevented by any manager. "Sneaking" (attracting people from other parts of the company) was encouraged. When an Enron executive named Kevin Hannon addressed the Company's global broadband unit, he launched the "Quick Hire Project." One hundred performance leaders from across the Company were invited to the Houston Hyatt to hear Hannon's harangue. Contracting “stands” were installed next to the conference room. Michaels, Handfield Jones and Axelrod write:"At the end of the week Hannon signed the top fifty for his broadband unit, and his colleagues were left with fifty holes to plug." No one, not even the consultants who were paid to think about the Enron culture, seemed concerned about how those fifty holes could alter the functioning of the affected departments; that the stability of existing business units could be good, and that the aspirations of self-fulfillment of star employees could perhaps conflict with the general interests of the Company.He seemed concerned about how those fifty holes could disrupt the functioning of the affected departments; that the stability of existing business units could be good, and that the aspirations of self-fulfillment of star employees could perhaps conflict with the general interests of the Company.He seemed concerned about how those fifty holes could disrupt the functioning of the affected departments; that the stability of existing business units could be good, and that the aspirations of self-fulfillment of star employees could perhaps conflict with the general interests of the Company.
This is the kind of question that consultants should ask. But Enron's were from McKinsey who was as much a prisoner of talent as his clients. In 1998 Enron hired ten Wharton MBAs; McKinsey, forty. In 1999, Enron, twelve; McKinsey sixty-one. McKinsey consultants practiced what they preached at Enron at home. "It wasn't for a week when we hired them," recalls a former Enron manager referring to Mc's brilliant boys and girls. Kinsey was seen by the Company's offices. "Rather they stayed between two and four months, they were seen at all hours." They were looking for people who had the talent to think outside the box (N del T: in the original "thinking outside the box"); it never crossed their imaginations that if everyone had to deviate from the norm,perhaps the validity of that rule should have been reconsidered.
Copyright 2002, Malcolm Gladwell.
Article written by: Malcom Gladwell. Are Smart People Overrated?
In the April 13, 2005, issue of TIME magazine, Malcom Gladwell is rated as one of the hundred most influential brains in the world.
Translation performed by: Carlos Herreros de las Cuevas cherreros.
