This article focuses on the problem of the classification of scientific research methods. Probably protected by the theoretical nature of the research, not only the scientific has been awarded to the knowledge that is obtained in it, but also to the method with which it is obtained. Is there any logical probability that sustains the methodological consistency of the classification of the methods that are instituted in said science? What reason assists in the defense of the idea, according to which the methodology of scientific research is built through empirical methods, when, regardless of whether the empirical constitutes the source of scientific knowledge,The theoretical and the empirical are exclusive natures of knowledge.Why does universal pedagogical thought undoubtedly cling to the absolute and medieval canons that the concept of method as a way or path supports? Would we not be far from the scientificity that to it par excellence and definition should it be conferred?
The basal idea to defend and which must subsume the previously formulated questions must be the irrevocably dialectical relationship between method and knowledge, from which the classification of the former necessarily comes.
Keywords: classification, scientific knowledge, method, research method.
TITLE: "THE METHODS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH SHOULD NOT BE CLASSIFIED EITHER EMPIRICAL OR THEORETICAL"
Summary
This scientific paper focuses the problem of classification of methods of scientific research. Probably covered in theoretical research, not just what they have been awarded scientific knowledge that it is obtained, but also the method by which it is obtained. Is there any chance that supports logical methodological consistency of classification methods in this science are instituted? What reason attends the defense of the idea, that the methodology of scientific research stands through empirical methods, where, regardless of the empirical constitutes the above to the scientific level, the theoretical and the empirical are exclusive natures of knowledge? Why cling undoubtedly the medieval universal educational thought to absolute canons and the concept of method as a way or path holding ?,we would not be far from the scientificity that he quintessential definition and it should be given?
The basal idea is to defend and to subsume questions formulated above is to be irrevocably dialectical relationship between the method and theory, which necessarily comes first classification.
Keywords: classification, method, method of research, scientific knowledge.
Introduction
The compelling ideas to be brought to the fore in this article revolve around the following working hypotheses.
First. That the training of all professionals not only depends on the unappealable construction of socially existing scientific knowledge, but also on the methodological-instrumental system corresponding to obtaining it.
Second. That if as science advances and the concepts defined by it for a given historical reality cease to be strictly relevant in the latest theoretical investigations, then the concept of method must be subjected to such theoretical semantic changes in favor of its precision.
Third. That all simpler reasoning may well be reduced to the subject-method-object of knowledge triad, where not only the method has to be considered the inexcusable core of that triad, but the core of the relationship itself.
Fourth. That the research methods should not be classified as empirical or theoretical, but rather into information gathering methods and information processing methods.
Development
The problem of the formation of knowledge, and especially that of scientific knowledge, as well as the methodological-instrumental formation of those who learn at the highest levels of education, acquires today a peremptory importance, if we take as a pivot the incidence of the latter in the relevant preparation of future professionals. "… A nation that wants to keep up with science," says the German thinker F. Engels, "cannot do without a theoretical thought" (ENGELS, 1965, p. 403). And, in effect, the training and development of scientific thought also depends on the professionalism of the person, sustained in their cognitive and instrumental structure, understanding by the instrumental, in our opinion, all those executions - actions and operations and their respective mastery levels:skills and habits-that allow you to know reality and transform it.
Paraphrasing Albert Einstein, the creations of the intellect experience the thunderous commotion of the generations and throughout the centuries fill the world with light and heat… But this is not the case of the social sciences in their relationship with the method, as an object of research. Why does universal pedagogical thinking undoubtedly cling to the absolute and medieval canons that the concept of method as a way or path supports? Until when to assign topicality to what “… Ketteler said of Döllinger:“ this man has defended so many absurdities in his life, that he may well defend one more, that of infallibility ”(ENGELS, 1968, p. 40) (Sic.), and that as a transcendental brass noise, paraphrasing Engels, sounds in our methodological intellects as a predetermined idea? It hurts to notice how the social sciences in general,bridging the distance from the legal sciences, perhaps due to their involvement with justice, they have already become perennial shifting sand, where concepts are promiscuted, overlapped, confused, imprecise, equaled by definition, without any theoretical reason. Where is the canonical limit of conceptual tolerance of these sciences to be found, which dictates, without ambiguity, the obligation to observe the Aristotelian law of identity that concerns correct thinking?unambiguously, the obligation to observe the Aristotelian law of identity that concerns correct thinking?unambiguously, the obligation to observe the Aristotelian law of identity that concerns correct thinking?
We believe that we would not risk assuming that this period in the development of the social sciences is being characterized especially by a suppression and violation, for lack of foundation, of the scientificity that must rigorously permeate theoretical knowledge. We would not like to be mistaken, but the truth is that as the investigations in this field advance, the violation of the aforementioned law is increasing, which must be present without appeal in the correct thinking. A peculiar conception of the whole has been unleashed, the central point of which is the idea of absolute contempt and undermining by the correct use of the word-concept in the language of these sciences. In other words, the social sciences are at an inescapable crossroads: they have to support themselves and express themselves through words,but only those that have become concepts, scientific concepts.
Let's make a necessary digression. The scientific concept is a concept, but not every concept is scientific in nature. Likewise, every concept is a word, but not every word is a concept. Every concept is a generalization - empirical or theoretical - but not every word is a generalization. Thus, word, empirical concept and theoretical (scientific) concept are three very different forms of expression of human psychic life. The word is a mode of manifestation of the psychic, but not necessarily of consciousness, which is configured in concepts. The word in the early child, as the research in evolutionary psychology affirms, is found fused with the object, or what is the same, word and object are one and the same thing. From the appearance of self-awareness, around the age of 3,and under the aegis of social groups such as family and school, the minor begins to construct concepts of an empirical nature. But, let's not fool ourselves, the priority of the development of the psyche in these early ages corresponds to the unconscious nature of human psychic regulation, that is, to the word. In such a way that the child does not learn concepts, but words. All the cultural and linguistic baggage of the young child is of an unconscious nature, and therefore, perceptual-motor. To assert this idea once more, it is enough to rely on the research of the Geneva psychologist Jean Piaget, in which the sensory-motor and operational stages in the first stages of their development stand out by periodizing the development of the infantile intellect. by its absence what concerns the concept.The concept appears, according to the most relevant contributions of evolutionary psychology, from the age of 3, with the possibility of generalization granted by the activation of the frontal and prefrontal lobes of the brain.
This psychic fact is essential to note when operating with concepts, as is the case when it comes to science. The social sciences are not constituted by just any words, but by those that, by becoming concepts, respond, in the first place, to logic, to the law of identity, as the sine qua non law of correct thought.
Indeed, whether we like it or not, a leading place for sciences is occupied by the definitions of the concepts that configure them, especially scientific concepts.
If we accept the idea that it is the use of the method that discovers not only the truth, but also its beauty, expressed in terms of essentiality, then the method becomes the guiding category, not only for methodological sciences, but above all for construction. the theory itself, for the configuration of knowledge. Hence the inescapable need to delve into the definition of that concept, which like a Trojan horse, introduces doubt into the very heart of instrumental philosophy, of the philosophy of method. If the method is the main instrument of man to reflect and transform reality and, with it, himself; if the method is essential for the investigation of the truth and it is the one who perfects the so-called human capacities that sustain the search for it,then the method becomes an axiomatic statute on which knowledge is based. That is why the method cannot be ignored as an object of meticulous investigation and as an undoubted focus of attention and reasoning. The seventeenth-century French methodologist Renato Descartes dedicated his life and work to this: to use again and again the analytical approach in the investigation of the method itself.
Let us dwell on the definition of the concept of method.
In our opinion, the superposition of the concept of method with the concepts of technique, procedure, operation, means and process has been excessive. Let us analyze the following definition.
“Techniques can be called, CERVO and BERVIAN (1992) affirm, those specific procedures used by a science…”. (p. 43) (Sic.) And these authors continue: “the techniques in a science are the correct means of executing the operations of interest of such science”. (p. 43) And later, they do not take care to express: “the set of these general techniques constitutes the method. Methods are, therefore, sufficiently general techniques to become common procedures to an area of science or to all sciences ”. (p.43) (Sic.) Finally, these authors, without any neatness and adverse to scientificity in the analysis, declare that “there is, then, a fundamentally identical method for all sciences. It comprises a certain number of scientific procedures and operations… ”. (P.43) And without stopping an iota to think about what they write, they argue that "… method is understood as the set of processes that man must undertake in the investigation and demonstration of the truth". (p. 19) How is it possible that the authors do not understand themselves, juxtaposing all these concepts, even when they are closely related due to their methodological nature?
Let us say, once again, what logical right does these authors have to identify first the techniques with the procedures and then with the means? In other words, are the concepts of technique, procedure and medium one and the same thing? Is it the same to wield –use, apply– the concept of technique as that of procedure and means? It is not necessary to be very seasoned in the methodological sciences to notice that those authors not only identify the concept of method with that of techniques, but also with that of processes. So, according to these positions, method, technique, procedure, means and process are one and the same thing. But we note that they return again and again to show off their "conceptual immunity" when they express: "the process is subordinate to the method and is its essential auxiliary" (CERVO and BERVIAN, 1992, p. 21).And now? It turns out that the method is no longer a process in itself, but is superordinate to the process. Therefore, the method is no longer a process as they claimed, since the first is subject to the presence of the second without identifying with it. What science resists the onslaught of such overlapping terms? What educational professional risks using one of those concepts so full of ambiguity, imprecision and vagueness in the planning and execution of a scientific investigation or a pedagogical activity as vital as the classroom?What science resists the onslaught of such overlapping of terms? What educational professional risks using one of those concepts so full of ambiguity, imprecision and vagueness in the planning and execution of a scientific investigation or a pedagogical activity as vital as the classroom?What science resists the onslaught of such overlapping of terms? What educational professional risks using one of those concepts so full of ambiguity, imprecision and vagueness in the planning and execution of a scientific investigation or a pedagogical activity as vital as the classroom?
The textual example that we have cited is not an isolated event; it is a recurring expression of what is reflected in recent publications. The “method - states RAMOS (2008) - is the set of logical procedures through which scientific problems are posed and the hypotheses and the investigated work instruments are put to the test”. According to this author, it turns out that the method must be restricted to its intellectual dimension, ignoring those methods that contribute to the collection of information and its statistical processing. On the other hand, why consider that the method are procedures and, furthermore, logical? What is a logical procedure? Are scientific problems formulated by virtue of a method? Which)? Indeed, research methods are used to test hypotheses,but not to test the research instruments, since the very fact of testing them would imply that the research was carried out on the effectiveness of the instruments themselves, which, consequently, would no longer constitute in themselves the methods for that research, when they should be. In other words, where did the vaunted idea that the method itself is an instrument go? If we appeal to Custodio Ruiz (2008), when he points out that “… the independent method of the object to which it is applied has the objective of solving problems” (Sic.), Then the opposition with the previous author would not be long in coming, by emphasizing that the method aims to solve the problem, not formulate it. It is not difficult to lose sight of the strict nature of scientific research,when they generate definitions with different or antinomic perspectives of the concepts. "The method in investigative practice, expresses Guanipa Pérez (2009), constitutes the orderly and systematic way to know a situation, event or phenomenon" where "the systematic, comprises that set of rules and procedures that contribute to achieving the determined objectives". Now the method is a way, whose systematic character is who understands rules and procedures. If you applaud this idea, then method, manner, system, rule and procedure are one and the same thing?it comprises that set of rules and procedures that contribute to achieving the determined objectives ”. Now the method is a way, whose systematic character is who understands rules and procedures. If you applaud this idea, then method, manner, system, rule and procedure are one and the same thing?it comprises that set of rules and procedures that contribute to achieving the determined objectives ”. Now the method is a way, whose systematic character is who understands rules and procedures. If you applaud this idea, then method, manner, system, rule and procedure are one and the same thing?
The same happens when we refer to the concept of methodology, understood as the science that studies methods.
And the author continues: “the research methodology, or that set of procedures…” (Ibídem) (Sic.). Here identity flourishes between methodology as a series of steps and a set of procedures; In other words, the methodology, for this author, is not only a set of procedures, but also a series of steps. If we jealously and strictly unite these definitions that have been overturned on the concept of methodology, then we will obtain that this concept can well be defined as a set of methods, or ways of applying those, or as a series of steps or as a set. of procedures. What science can hold like this? What laws and methodological categories could one speak of, if they, according to these authorial positions,are so significantly variable before the irreverence of any researcher in this area of knowledge?
Not surprisingly, order is the first law of heaven, philosophers affirm, as an imperative need to address related concepts from the general to the singular. The little mastery of philosophical knowledge and the science of logic in the structuring of scientific knowledge mercilessly leads the men of social sciences to a dead end. We say little mastery of philosophical knowledge because from there the well-known historical-logical method can -and must-be used, which par excellence has to allow us to trace the stages through which the object of study has passed in its development and assess the levels of essence with which it has been generalized to the relevant concept. It is not idle to note, as F. Engels does, the need to systematically order the enormous positive material of knowledge,accumulated by empirical research based on its internal relationships, which responds to logic, a science that has to deal predominantly with the structuring of scientific knowledge, with its organization.
The supreme and cardinal thesis to which we must go back in this article must be the strict differentiation of methodological science and the concept of method, without departing one iota from the classification of the latter.
Thus, today the need to systematize - reduce to a system - these terms in order to shed clarity on the cognitive structure in which they are inserted is imposed with greater force.
It is not difficult to say that methodology as a science should be devoted to the study of methods. Why should there be a field of theoretical knowledge that focuses on the examination of methods? Because of accepting lawful that there is a science directed to the investigation of knowledge itself, as is the case of gnoseology, without which science would not be able to speak of the levels of its essence, nor of its origin, nor of its structure, etc., there must be a science that is dedicated to the study of those performances by virtue of which knowledge is obtained, as is the case of method. So the basis of scientific certainty is to be found in the method. Hence, the method is instituted as the first category - if there is another - of methodological science. And this idea, in our opinion,it must become a truism. This brings us to the definition of the concept of method. What to understand by method?
At this point, two important ideas emerge.
First. That knowledge and the method with which it is obtained are not one and the same thing.
Second. That while knowledge is a generalization, the method is the action with which it is built. So when you talk about methodology, you are referring to the study of methods, their structure and function within science.
Why consider the method an action?
We will return to this later. Now we want to show once again how in the social sciences the fact of the superposition of terms becomes unquestionably visible, which makes them inexorably vulnerable, fragile, in the sense of sustaining and defending a body of concepts that are exclusive or inherent only to them. It is enough to submit to analysis the concept that assists us of method and we will come face to face with its versatility of meanings.
Faced with the question: what to understand by method ?, professors and researchers from the universities mentioned expressed the following.
| Higher frequency responses | |
| Professors and researchers at the Agrarian University of Havana | Professors and researchers at the Metropolitan University of Ecuador. Guayaquil Headquarters |
| What to understand by method ? | |
| Empirical concept: | Empirical concept: |
| - Via,
- Road, - What we use to acquire information and knowledge, - Technique to collect information, - Way of reaching a goal, - Way to specify the objective, - Process, - Tools to reach a conclusion, - Execution to reach the goal, - Procedure to achieve an objective, - Instrument to collect information, - Process to achieve results, - Steps in a process, - Technique. |
- Via,
- Road, - Form to carry out a process, - Steps to do something, - Address to carry out a certain action or study, - Means to an end, - Tactic to be able to train what is needed, - Mode, form or manner of doing something systematically organized and / or structured, - Technique or set of tasks, - Usual way of doing something for a person, based on experience, custom and personal preferences. |
Table No.1.- "Concept of method, according to professional opinion"
Source: self made.
It is not necessary to be very seasoned in the analysis to notice that the method, according to the respondents, is a way, a way, a way, a way, steps, means, tactics, instrument, process, procedure, execution, etc.
We will dwell on this later.
R. Descartes, like no other thinker of the seventeenth century, considered that his objective was not only, and even not so much, the investigation into the structure of his theoretical works, but to make method the fundamental instrument of the creation of the new science, so he tried to build it thanks to constant retrospection of the path he had trodden himself. Let's not forget your de ómnibus dubitandum! (Doubt everything!) With which he indicated the shedding of scholasticism and methodologically organizing the destiny of science. Accordingly, his way of explaining movement changes and, instead of the circle, in whose elements all possible displacements had to be represented, the description of the methodological process emerges through an algorithm. Great! Two hundred and fifty-four years later, the American psychologist BFSkinner proposed to the world one of his well-known learning principles in the psychological sciences: the slow progression or principle of small steps, through which the idea of executing the activity through a certain number of tests -– actions or operations is derived., within our conceptual system. Since then, there is nothing more plausible in methodological terms: the algorithm! It is understood as successive concatenated actions –or operations– organized hierarchically or not – that are executed to obtain a result. This thesis has been imposed even on the antitheoretical brain, on concrete thought. Such is the assertion of this fact.through which the idea of executing the activity through a certain number of tests -– actions or operations, within our conceptual system emerges. Since then, there is nothing more plausible in methodological terms: the algorithm! Being understood as successive concatenated actions –or operations– hierarchically organized or not, that are executed to obtain a result. This thesis has even imposed itself on the antitheoretical brain, on concrete thought. Such is the assertion of this fact.through which the idea of executing the activity through a certain number of tests -– actions or operations, within our conceptual system emerges. Since then, there is nothing more plausible in methodological terms: the algorithm! Being understood as successive concatenated actions –or operations– hierarchically organized or not, that are executed to obtain a result. This thesis has even imposed itself on the antitheoretical brain, on concrete thought. Such is the assertion of this fact.understood as successive concatenated actions –or operations –hierarchically organized or not-that are executed to obtain a result. This thesis has been imposed even on the antitheoretical brain, on concrete thought. Such is the assertion of this fact.understood as successive concatenated actions –or operations –hierarchically organized or not-that are executed to obtain a result. This thesis has been imposed even on the antitheoretical brain, on concrete thought. Such is the assertion of this fact.
What reasons help us to affirm that the method can be defined as an action?
Scientific knowledge itself is the same, only that the concepts diverge for each of the contexts in which science is built, or are simply extrapolated from one area of knowledge to another. Let us say, when we approach the examination of values, a concept that is extremely well considered in our days and which constitutes the undoubted category of axiology, in psychology it is coined as a personal meaning. In such a way that value and personal meaning is one and the same thing, at least in the moral sense, for the ethics, or in the partial sense, as an inherent property of the psychic. It is not difficult to see how many researchers in the social sciences resort, probably unconsciously, to concepts that belong to the exact or natural sciences.It is enough to point out the theory of assimilation-accommodation of the Geneva biologist Jean Piaget to explain and periodize the psychic development of the infantile intellect or the social situation of development of LS Vigotsky, a Russian scientist, graduated in history, to explain the origin and evolution of the psychic in the human being. / In this treacherous world, nothing is true or a lie /, –as stated the poet Fernando de Campoamor– / everything is according to the color of the glass you look at /. And indeed, take as an example, the facts that we expose below./ In this treacherous world, nothing is true or a lie /, –as stated the poet Fernando de Campoamor– / everything is according to the color of the glass you look at /. And indeed, take as an example, the facts that we expose below./ In this treacherous world, nothing is true or a lie /, –as stated the poet Fernando de Campoamor– / everything is according to the color of the glass you look at /. And indeed, take as an example, the facts that we expose below.
Suppose we are in front of a man and a woman who are kissing on the mouth. From this fact, which has to be the same for any observer, multiple ideas can be drawn, according, say, to the professional context to which people belong. If the person observing the event was a microbiologist, it is very likely that his interpretation points to the idea of the mutual transmission of oral bacteria or pathogenic microorganisms. If the observer were now a demographer, it is very likely that the idea would revolve around population growth, while if the idea of affection and affection among those is extracted from the observation, the probability is high that the observer is a psychologist; if he were a lawyer, seeking evidence to litigate a divorce,I would say that right now those would enter into litigation and would end up in court. The fact, whether we like it or not, is the same. But human subjectivity, by becoming partial to it, adapts it, "transports" it to its head, by virtue of its cognitive and instrumental resources, that is, predominantly in function of the knowledge and skills it possesses to build the new knowledge.
If this idea is valid and reasonable, then it is not absurd to define the concept of method from psychology. Why? Not only because of the logic already exposed, but also because restricting it to the definition of a road or path is not feasible and much less operational for science. The concept that cannot be operationalized in indicators, has no instrumental or construct validity and, therefore, is not methodologically functional in scientific research. If the method is irrevocably called “…. to become the fundamental instrument of the creation of the new science ”(LIÁTKER, 1990, p.49), according to Descartes, then it is imposed with extreme peremptory to elevate it to other planes of essence, given, in our opinion, in the identity with action. In other words, we may well define the concept of method,methodological category, as an action, concept of psychological nature. What in methodology as science is called method, in psychology is called action. So method and action are one and the same. Now, if the action –according to ANLeontiev- is an execution that is subordinated to a conscious objective, the method as action is an execution of a conscious nature that is subordinated to an objective of the same nature. Thus, once the objective has been formulated, as an anticipated representation of the result to be achieved, –according to this same researcher- the action must be executed to achieve the result represented in the objective. Now, the method is subordinated to a goal and is applied to achieve the desired result, projected onto the goal. In short, the method is an action that, subordinate to an objective,runs to achieve expected result.
We have stopped in the definition of the method as an action prior to its classification. The question of rigor at this point would be: how to advance in classificatory terms without "burning" the history of methodological science?
If we were to focus on the methodology of teaching and learning as a science, the methods inherent to it would unquestionably be the teaching methods and learning methods. We should not be more explicit in this regard, since the objective of our article is directed at the methodology of scientific research.
Precisely in the context of the classification of methods that the methodology of scientific research concerns, we well know that it has revolved around empirical and theoretical methods. Let us dwell on this fact.
Apart from considering that empirical methods approach the knowledge of the object through their direct knowledge and the use of experience, which only reveals the extreme philosophical and methodological weakness of the author, such a classification is found in the generality of the texts on the subject. The classification of scientific research methods into empirical and theoretical (logical, cognitive, etc.), we think, is philosophically, logically, and psychologically inconsistent.
In the first place, the empirical and the theoretical are very different levels of knowledge about reality. If the empirical is based on experience, as its name indicates, and the knowledge obtained in scientific research is reasonably scientific, in which the essence of the object of study prevails, what reason assists thought to defend the idea of the application of an empirical method in order to produce scientific knowledge? Secondly, it is contradictory that knowledge and method respond to the same classification criteria, when it comes to very different philosophical, logical and psychological objects of study. There is no doubt that both concepts have been divided by their empirical and theoretical nature. From the philosophical point of view, knowledge is a gnoseological, epistemological,while the method is a methodological category. From the logical point of view, one thing is the concept, as knowledge, and another thing is reasoning as method. From the psychological point of view, knowledge is a generalization, empirical or theoretical, according to the research of D. Davidov (1975), whose results we fully share and which are obtained by virtue, according to the author himself, of the inductive and deductive pathways, respectively. What are those ways, if not the actions of inducing or deducing to obtain knowledge, empirical or theoretical? Logically expressed, if knowledge and method are two psychic phenomena of a different nature,Is there the possibility of classifying them in the same way? Could we admit the same classification criteria to configure a typology of knowledge and one of method? A truism truth is the answer: no! From the psychological point of view, empirical knowledge is obtained through perception and reasoning; while conceptual-rational-knowledge is built by virtue of reasoning -of the intellectual instrumentations for obtaining knowledge, namely, the comparison, classification and evaluation and the instrumentations for applying knowledge: identification, characterization and demonstration, in our judgment. No action is empirical or scientific, because with the same action, let's say value, we can obtain a knowledge subtracted from everyday experience,or a scientific knowledge, according to the indicators of essence, exposed by us in previous works (see "Psychology of scientific thought", 2001).
Even when we stumble upon these ideas, in the specialized literature there are authors who foresee, perhaps without intending to, the classificatory incongruity with which the method has been treated. “Participant observation is understood,” RODRÍGUEZ et al. (1996) - as "an interactive method for collecting information that requires the observer to be involved in the events or phenomena he is observing". Excellent idea! In our opinion, obviously, the methods of scientific research can well be classified into methods of gathering information, which, once obtained, must be axiomatically processed. Hence the information processing methods. According to our positions, the latter methods can be subdivided into intellectual and statistical.Within the intellectual methods used in the processing of the collected information, the analytical-synthetic, historical-logical methods, systematization (reduction to a system) of the information, modeling, etc., can be considered, while the statistical methods can be subdivided according to with the type of statistics used, eg, descriptive or inferential statistics. Other methods of the same nature underlie the latter, such as parametric and non-parametric statistics, as well as multivariate analyzes. In turn, parametric statistics, for example, subsume correlation coefficients, linear regression, t-test, analysis of variance, analysis of covariance, etc.systematization (reduction to a system) of the information, modeling, etc., while statistical methods can be subdivided according to the type of statistics used, eg, descriptive or inferential statistics. Other methods of the same nature underlie the latter, such as parametric and non-parametric statistics, as well as multivariate analyzes. In turn, parametric statistics, for example, subsume correlation coefficients, linear regression, t-test, analysis of variance, analysis of covariance, etc.systematization (reduction to a system) of the information, modeling, etc., while statistical methods can be subdivided according to the type of statistics used, eg, descriptive or inferential statistics. Other methods of the same nature underlie the latter, such as parametric and non-parametric statistics, as well as multivariate analyzes. In turn, parametric statistics, for example, subsume correlation coefficients, linear regression, t-test, analysis of variance, analysis of covariance, etc.such as parametric and nonparametric statistics, as well as multivariate analyzes. In turn, parametric statistics, for example, subsume correlation coefficients, linear regression, t-test, analysis of variance, analysis of covariance, etc.such as parametric and nonparametric statistics, as well as multivariate analyzes. In turn, parametric statistics, for example, subsume correlation coefficients, linear regression, t-test, analysis of variance, analysis of covariance, etc.
Consequently, the information gathering methods are not restricted to observation or experiment, but constitute a whole host of methods, whose function is none other than to obtain information about the object of study of the planned research. Within the latter we can find the survey, the interview, the focus groups, the sociometric test, the documents (files), the ethnographic method, the audio / video recordings, the autobiographies, etc.
Let us show such ideas under the following scheme.
Scheme 1. "Proposal for the classification of scientific research methods"
Original text
| Cientific investigation methodology | ||||
| Cognitive body (scientific knowledge) | Instrumental body (methodological) | |||
| Methods | ||||
| of collection | of Processing | |||
| of information | of the information collected | |||
| Intellectuals | Statistics | |||
|
Likert-type scaling |
§ Measures of central tendency (mean, median, mode) § Measures of variability (range, standard deviation, variability) § Graphics § Z scores |
|||
| § Semantic differential
Guttman scalogram |
§ Public records § Physical or electronic files § Record by devices (polygraph, Doppler gun, scanner) |
§ Pearson's correlation coefficient
§ Test t § Contrast test of the difference of proportions § One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) § Factorial variance analysis § Analysis of covariance § Chi squared § Spearman and Kendall coefficients § Coefficients for cross tabulations It would not be idle to end this article by brandishing the idea that, although didactics has imposed in the arena of social sciences the thought that the objective is the leading category compared to the method, there is no sufficient reason, there is no reason of any kind, to prove. The goal is essentially a psychological concept, not a didactic one, and the method is the categorical pinnacle of methodology, be it teaching, learning or research. Of course, it is in the performance of the person, in their activity or communication, in which the determination and formulation of an objective is required before carrying out an action, the execution of the method. The method as action has no other function than to reflect or transform our reality, always guided by the projection of the objective.The method as action and the objective are inseparable as inseparable are the sciences of man, the social sciences, which must try to explain human conduct and behavior with the most careful logic possible. The methodology as science has to deal with the study of the action of man in a certain context - investigative, teaching, learning. Conclusions
Bibliographic references
____ (2004): "The laws of learning." (First edition). Havana: People and Education. ____ (2001): « Psychology of scientific thought «. (First edition). Havana: People and Education. ____ (2000): « How to use the observation method? «. (First edition). Havana: People and Education. orsotti, Carlos. Research methodology topics in Science Cazau, Pablo. Introduction to Research in Social Sciences. 2006. Cazau, Pablo. Introduction to Research in Social Sciences. 2006. Cazau, Pablo. Introduction to Research in Social Sciences. 2006. Cazau, Pablo. Introduction to Research in Social Sciences. 2006. Chenail, Ronald J; Duffy, Maureen; St. George, Sally & Dan Wulff. 2009. The identifying-demonstrative method constitutes the dialectical negation of the inductive-deductive method of science, according to the theoretical foundation of Rodríguez Rebustillo, M. and Bermúdez Sarguera, R. (See Rodríguez Rebustillo, M. and Bermúdez Sarguera, R. (2007): «Psychological diagnosis for education « (First edition). Havana: People and Education). Download the original file
Editor's choice
|