Political marketing applied to the presidential campaign of Fernando de la Rúa in Argentina

Political marketing applied to the presidential campaign of Fernando de La Rúa in Argentina

Our choice of topic is based on the interest that the dissertation of the specialist in Political Marketing, Alejandrina Retamar aroused in us. For this reason, we decided to deepen the knowledge acquired in the chair by analyzing a practical case.

We selected to carry out this activity, the successful case of the presidential campaign of Dr. Fernando De la Rúa, carried out for the elections of October 24, 1999. We consider that for it, an excellent job was carried out, with the participation of distinguished professionals, motivating us to carry out a detailed investigation, recognizing the various steps of a political marketing plan.

PART II

CASE ANALYSIS

1. Brief historical review of the candidate and the party

Since the democratic course was resumed in 1983, Argentina has attended three presidential elections within a framework of civil liberty and full operation of the institutions established by the National Constitution.

On October 24, 1999, the fourth election was held, for which Eduardo Duhalde (PJ), Domingo Cavallo (Action for the Republic), Patricia Walsh (United Left) and Fernando De La Rúa ran as candidates. (Alliance), among others.

The political force that supported the candidate to be analyzed, Fernando De La Rúa, was the Alliance (Alliance for Work, Education and Justice), formed in 1997 and more firmly in the 1999 general elections by the UCR and the FREPASO, to which some provincial parties joined. (Source: electoral guide.com.ar)

Brief overview of the formation of the Alliance:

In February 1997 an important meeting was held at the Argentine Foundation for Freedom of Information of leaders of the UCR (Unión Cívica Radical) and the FREPASO (Frente Grande, the parties of the Socialist Union, the Christian Democrats and the Intransigent party), in which cooperation between both parliamentary blocs was raised. On March 13, 1997, FREPASO approved a document that called for a government of concertation based on that force and on the UCR.

It was a progressive proposal that stimulated ideological competition with the idea - force of the Menem conservative revolution.

The main reason for the existence of the Alliance was to solve the problems of the people, especially the social debt. Argentina was going through a "moral crisis" symbolized by the partiality of a justice system that left citizens unprotected. The Alliance was the alternative to the Argentine crisis.

This formation of a coalition of political parties was motivated by the evidence that only through this union could they prevent the consolidation and permanence, for a long time in power, of a populist conservative socio-political bloc.

Biography of Fernando De La Rúa

He was born in Córdoba on September 15, 1937, he is married to Inés Pertiné and is the father of three children. He attended high school at the General Paz Military High School in that province, obtaining a "Gold Medal." At the University of Córdoba, he finished his law degree at age 21, also obtaining the "Gold Medal."

Later, he obtained a doctorate in the same house of higher studies for his thesis on "Appeal for Cassation in Argentine Positive Law". Affiliated with the Unión Cívica Radical since his youth, he served as adviser to the Ministry of the Interior when he was 26 years old, during the constitutional mandate of President Arturo Illia (1963-1966).

His political career continued as a senator for the Federal Capital, a position for which he was elected on April 15, 1973. Months later, he joined the presidential formula together with Dr. Ricardo Balbín. He served as a legislator in the Upper House until the military coup that overthrew the constitutional government in 1976.

In 1983 he was a pre-candidate for President of the Nation, and after the interns, he headed the list of senators, a position to which he acceded by 60% of the votes. In the elections of May 14, 1989, he won the election for National Senator for the third time, but was displaced from his seat by a minority agreement in the Electoral College.

Having won the party internals for two consecutive times in 1991, he was elected President of the Capital Committee of the UCR and became a candidate for National Deputy, a position he obtained in the general elections by a wide margin.

There he served as President of the Block of National Deputies of the Radical Civic Union, until he was elected again as a National Senator (period 1992-2001) after having prevailed in the elections by more than 50% of the votes.

Another milestone in his political career was the fact that he was elected on June 30, 1996 as the first Head of Government of the City of Buenos Aires, with 40% of the vote.

On October 24, 1999, he was elected President of the Nation with 48% of the votes.

His government stood out for the slowness and lack of decisions and actions that led, after several internal government crises, to his resignation on December 20, 2001.

2. Description and analysis of the business environment

While in the country democracy was consolidating with the electoral exercise and the alternation of power, in the economic sphere there were successively periods of inflation, hyperinflation and stability. Likewise, phases of stagnation and vigorous growth were experienced; There were lapses of increases in employment followed by persistent and high unemployment.

In the period 1983-1999, Argentina is presented as an extraordinary laboratory of social experiments due to the variety and importance of the changes produced both in politics and in the economy.

• Demographic factors Economic factors

The electorate is influenced by macroeconomic policy and macroeconomic policy is affected by voter preferences. Those in charge of national policy, through macroeconomic intervention measures, influence their electorate. A key assumption in all recent political economy models is that voters are rational and maximize their expected utility by including their own well-being and not that of the community as a central argument. To do this, making use of available information, they evaluate the present and past performance of the parties that are fighting for power and vote accordingly.

The apparent contradiction between the rationality of the voter and an electoral behavior that rewards or punishes current and past government action ceases to be so if we make some assumptions regarding the information set of the model. For example, the existence of asymmetric information between voters and rulers, or of rational ignorance

among voters, or even the presence of uncertainty regarding the outcome of the elections, or long-term uncertainty may allow the existence of models in which efficient markets and rational voters coexist with political-economic cycles. Obviously, the electoral process and the subsequent results of the polls do not respond solely to the economic conditions prevailing in a country or province, but rather involve a complex mix of political, economic, social and cultural factors whose weighting may vary over time and across countries. electoral jurisdictions.

Market:

Electorate behavior

We consider that the atomization of the party offer, the drop in the levels of presenteeism in the elections, the personalization of electoral options and the erratic mutation of the voters' preferences, would be evident symptoms of the severe social destructuring and consequent apathy and disinterest for the politics suffered by the great masses in Argentina.

Even with candidates that are not too charismatic, what prevails when choosing is the personal trustworthiness that the candidate for the position in dispute deserves and not the political proposal that he or she raises and the political party that it integrates. Thus, without parties with differentiated and clearly identifiable proposals and programs that serve as a frame of reference, popular mobilization assumes an intermittent nature, outside of formal institutional channels, generating a climate of acute uncertainty in relation to the consistency and future of the democratic institutions.

The electorate is afraid of repeating the Menem experience again.

The vote of fear, as one of the variants that our political class offers to the rational and premeditated vote, is invading a part of the independent electorate, the one that would have to dispassionately define who will win in the next elections. The alternative proposals of minority parties from across the political spectrum are not listened to either: if the citizen is not interested in studying and comparing the governance platforms of the majority parties, he will do so less with the small ones. There seems to be no possible alternation under these conditions. And we know that there is nothing democratic about it.

At the gates of the year 2000, without even knowing if the millennium will find us united, dominated or virtual, the vote to punish impunity and abuse of power is presented as another alternative to the independent average citizen.

The vast majority of voters for the Alliance would be moved by resentment and hatred for so much conduct that is incompatible with the republican ethics and democratic values ​​of a country in crisis.

The lack of work is not a cause but rather the symptom of a real evil that needs to be solved, which is the absence of investment policies or labor laws in accordance with reality. The low quality of education is the palpable sign of the lack of interest (read budget and specific policies…) for culture, art, training, and instruction of the new generations. The insecurity is the evidence of the absence of social support plans for the unemployed, for adolescents who no longer have ideals or a future left, for the effective occupation of the working mass expelled from that old elephantian state. Nobody wants to talk or hear about the foreign debt, a tremendous monster that devours billions of dollars every year and only for services. It is clear that capital is, at this point, priceless.There is no politician, nor does there seem to be a responsible citizen, who wants to address the issue that involves the future of several generations of Argentines. No one has investigated the origin of this debt, its legitimacy, its perpetrators, its consequences.

All this political behavior of candidates and voters, which clearly frames the presidential election, determines that the sad modality of voting, punishment or fear, is mostly present when opting for one party or another.

Below we found it pertinent and useful to analyze the market, include expert opinions, about the behavior of voters:

Julio Gambina, economist, university professor and director of IDELCOOP: “… I believe that a proper reading of the last elections would indicate that there is a demand for changes in the style of conducting public management, in terms of the ethics expressed by the government, and also a claim to put limits on corruption. This does not mean that a mutation of the model or of the policies that define its operation is being demanded.

However, there are certain indications that the subjectivity of citizens in general is changing. I want to say that there is a greater predisposition to put an end to a decade of Menemist hegemony, to enter another stage, where there can be a greater level of opposition, protest, resistance. Perhaps this is an aspiration of what I think can trigger the vote.

Is that an important part of society, since the 1997 elections and up to the present, has deepened its desire for change, and this may translate into growing pressure on the new government, which seeks to compensate for the pressure it will receive from financial organizations international In this sense, I highlight the vote of the left, which, although it is still marginal in the overall result, would have consolidated as a fourth force, if its figures could be added. Curiously, no one was predicting it, not even the organizations themselves that have far exceeded their performance compared to previous elections… "

Ricardo Rouvier, Sociologist and head of the opinion consultancy Rouvier y Asociados: “Today, when we talk about change, we are not referring to the substitution of one system for another, as was the case in the 1970s. When we asked the population what is change, tells us that it is the decrease or disappearance of the problems we have today. For example: that the number of unemployed decreases substantially. But immediately it is added: we know that unemployment is going to take a long time to resolve. It is also defined from the end with public insecurity, or with corruption. Something is being demanded within the system, a construction is not being proposed outside the given. At no time does the proposal of profound changes appear, not even as an illusion.

Atilio Borón Sociologist, university professor, Executive Secretary of CLACSO, former vice-rector of the University of Buenos Aires: “I believe that there are expectations of change in the people and that, in some way, a very vast sector of the population expressed their distaste in relation to to the menemism, that is to say to the political expression that neoliberalism acquired in Argentina. The answer to the question remains: how much further do you want to go? But you can foresee the immediate future with more transparency, less corruption, and those are not marginal data.

Underestimating that transformative claim would be dire for the Alliance. It is to be hoped that they do not make the mistake of thinking that the demand at the polls is reduced to exchanging a farandulous Menem for a serious and circumspect guy.

The analysis of the election provides some material to think that it is possible to try transformations. I think that society is not going to settle for an austere driving style; will claim concrete things. This election has illuminated a central political fact and that is that two very strong coalitions have crystallized in Argentina, which also has to do with the future of the left.

On the other hand, the Alliance is in such a situation that, if it breaks down, it disappears as a real competitor in the world of politics.

Now is there any possible change? I believe that the Alliance, if it decides to try to gain ground by undermining something of the popular base for the right-wing bloc, can do interesting things without departing from the model. It is not true that you cannot do anything.

In this sense, the will of the people for change can be deepened, because the Alliance now has one challenge after another.

Previous quantity and behavior

• 1989 presidential election:

Election of President and Vice President of the Nation

Date: May 14, 1989

Electoral system: D'Hont system of proportional representation.

The election is carried out indirectly through an Electoral College made up of 600 voters.

Date of meeting of the electoral colleges in each district: June 22, 1989

Date of meeting of the Legislative Assembly of scrutiny: July 7, 1989

Voter Register: 20,021,849 registered

Voters: 17,086,704

Voter turnout: 85.34%

• 1995 presidential election:

Election of President and Vice President of the Nation

Date: May 14, 1995

Electoral system: direct election in double round as established by the National Constitution, amended in 1994

Voter Register: 22,178,154 registered

Voters: 18,203,452

Voter turnout: 82.08%

Participation of the electorate in the presidential elections of the years 1983, 1989 and 1995:

	10/30/1983	05/14/1989	05/14/1995
Province
	Voters	%	Voters	%	Voters	%
Country total	17,929,951	85.6	20,034,252	85.3	22,178,154	82.1

Source: Ministry of the Interior, National Electoral Directorate. (Indec)

Election Results of the 1989 and 1995 Presidential Elections: 1989 1995

	1989	nineteen ninety five
Matches	President	%	President	%
Total votes cast	17,086,704	100.00	18,203,452	100.00
Total positive feedback	16,746,257	98.00	17,394,851	95.56
In white	221,585	1.30	653,434	3.59
Canceled	115,686	0.68	125,105	0.69
Minutes error compensation	3,176	0.02	30,062	0.16
Appealed and challenged
Total positive feedback	16,746,257	100.00	17,394,851	100.00
Radical Civic Union (UCR)	5,433,369	32.45	2,914,241	16.75
Alianza Concertación Justicialista para el Cambio			7,818,036	44.94
Justicialist Party (PJ)
UCR - FREPASO
Popular Justicialist Front (FREJUPO) (PDC,
MID, MOPALI and others)	7,956,628	47.51
Alliance Front Country Solidarity (FREPASO)			4,934,814	28.37
Big Front			54,008	0.31
Big Front Crusade Alliance			57,311	0.33
Country Front Alliance			28,382	0.16
Dignity and Independence Movement (MODIN)			291,306	1.67
Popular Anti-imperialist Democratic Movement (MODEPA)			12,917	0.07
Union of Democratic Center (UCeDe)			456,594	2.62
Center Alliance (UCeDe with others)	1,201,015	7.17		-
Popular Union			-	-
Popular Socialist Party (PSP)				-
Socialist Unity Alliance (PSP and PSD)	237,683	1.42	-	-
Socialist Workers Movement			45,970	0.26
Authentic Socialist Party			32,174	0.18
Free Homeland Current			24,326	0.14
Intransigent Party (PI)			-	-
Integration and Development Movement (MID)			30,588	0.18
Christian Democratic Party (PDC)			-	-
Progressive Democratic Party (PDP)	(one)		-	-
MAS-PTS-Workers Front Alliance			574	-
Movement to Socialism (MAS) -Party of the
Workers for Socialism (PTS)			26,968	0.16
Movement to Socialism (MAS)			-	-
Front of the People (FREPU) (MAS and PC)				-
SOUTH Alliance			68,845	0.40
South-Labor and People's Party (PTP)			2,418	0.01
Labor and People's Party (PTP)			357	-
United Left Alliance	409,751	2.45		-
Communist Party (PC)				-
Alliance Front of Patriotic Coincidence (FRE.CO.PA.)			3,147	0.02
FUT-Workers Party Alliance			29,000	0.17
Tabajadora Unit Front (FUT)			507	-
Workers Party (PO)	45,762	0.27	2,888	0.02
Popular Line Movement (MOLIPO)				-
Green party				-
Humanist-Green Front	42,319	0.25		-
Humanist-Ecologist Party			-	-
Humanist Party			31,202	0.18
Federal Party (PF)			59,545	0.34
Independent Federal Confederation (CFI) (PF				-
with others)	779,182	4.65		-
Republican Force Party (FR)			79,609	0.46
White Party of Retirees	317,934	1.90		-
Retired Front			74,561	0.43
Autonomist Party			-	-
Alliance for Work, Justice and Education
Action for the Republic
Democrat
New Party Front
Development and Justice
Neuquén Popular Movement
Chaco Action
Other parties	6,122	0.04	-	-
District parties	316,492	1.89	314,563	1.81
(1) With the Alianza de Centro.
(2) Provisional results.
Source: Ministry of the Interior, National Electoral Directorate.

Parties and candidates

• Unión Cívica Radical (UCR): Its origins date back to the year 1889, when the group called "Unión Cívica" arose, waving flags to combat electoral fraud. In 1890 she launched a revolution, which, although defeated, achieved the resignation of President Juárez Celman. The following year the Unión Cívica was divided, and the intransigent sector was renamed the Unión Cívica Radical.

The UCR rudely confronts the Perón government. Before the 1958 general elections called by the military government, radicalism was divided: on the one hand the UCRP (Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo) led by Ricardo Balbín, and on the other the UCRI (Intransigente) whose main figure is Arturo Frondizi.

After the military process generated by the 1976 coup, radicalism prevailed over its traditional Justicialist adversary, in 1983, with Raúl Alfonsín as candidate. In 1989 the government returned to the hands of the justicialismo with Carlos Saúl Menem, who governed until 1999, when the radical Fernando De La Rúa, as candidate of the Alliance with Frepaso, reached the first magistracy.

• Justicialista Party (PJ): Created in 1945 by Juan Domingo Perón, at that time with the rank of colonel and member of the military government, he participated in the 1946 elections under the label of the Labor Party. This was a small party, of union origin, and with the contribution of other sectors such as the Radical Civic Union, the Renovation Board, nationalist groups and the majority vote of the workers, Perón managed to become President. The party later adopted the name of the Peronist Party and later the Justicialist Party. The name came from the motto of the movement, which proclaimed social justice, economic freedom and political sovereignty. In the return to democracy in 1983, the PJ suffered a severe defeat at the hands of radicalism in the presidential election and in many important districts of the country,some of them justicialist strongholds, such as the province of Buenos Aires. But in the fourth year of the radical government, the justicialismo carried out a large election in almost all the districts, and in 1989 it consecrated Carlos Saúl Menem as President, who was reelected in 1995. In 1997 he lost the legislative elections against the newly formed Alliance, and in 1999 its presidential candidate Eduardo Duhalde was defeated.

Duhalde's model (candidate for president for the Justicialist party):

-The one who opposes labor flexibility and Precarious employment.

-Opposes economic monopolies and the concentration of wealth against the impoverishment of the middle class.

-Oppose the privatization of Banco Nación and the Province (the second most important in the country and in expansion)

-You want compulsory education for the entire high school, with scholarship plans.

-I reform education and improve the level of educational quality (Based on a UNESCO study)

-His administration was the only one that did more public works since the time of JDPerón

(For example, he made hospitals that had not been carried out for 40 years)

-Reduced the external debt of the Province from 2,500 million to 1,000 million.

Eduardo Duhalde: his advisor advised him to be more uninhibited in his speeches (a task for which the help of an actor was required). They also advised him to change his hesitant attitude and present himself "as the hero who comes to solve the problems of people".

They also advised him to incorporate humor into his speech, and from that moment on people noticed a more cordial and affectionate Duhalde.

The dissemination of his public works in Buenos Aires was also part of his strategy.

• Frepaso (Frente del País Solidario): In 1993, the Frente Grande was formed in the city of Buenos Aires, made up of sectors in dissidence with the Justicialista Party, and others from the Christian Democrats and leftist groups. Its top leader is Carlos "Chacho" Álvarez. He participated in the deputy elections of that year and obtained 13.7% of the votes. The following year he achieved victory in the city for conventional constituents, with 37.4% of the votes, and also triumphed in the province of Neuquén. At the end of 1994, the Frepaso (Frente País Solidario) was formed, made up of the Frente Grande, PAIS (of the ex-justicialista Octavio Bordón), the Socialist Unit and a sector of the Christian Democrats. Participates in the presidential elections of 1995 with the Bordón-Álvarez formula,where it obtains slightly less than 30% compared to almost 50% of Menem, but surpassing the radicalism that barely obtained 17%. In 1997, together with the UCR, he formed the Alliance (Alliance for Work, Education and Justice) and thus participated in the legislative elections of that year, although the Alliance did not manage to be constituted in all the districts during that year. In the general elections of 1999 the Alliance, already consolidated, triumphs in the elections of national deputies and obtains the Presidency of the Nation. The Frepaso leader Carlos Álvarez occupies the Vice Presidency.although the Alliance did not arrive during that year to be constituted in all the districts. In the general elections of 1999 the Alliance, already consolidated, triumphs in the elections of national deputies and obtains the Presidency of the Nation. The Frepaso leader Carlos Álvarez occupies the Vice Presidency.although the Alliance did not arrive during that year to be constituted in all the districts. In the general elections of 1999 the Alliance, already consolidated, triumphs in the elections of national deputies and obtains the Presidency of the Nation. The Frepaso leader Carlos Álvarez occupies the Vice Presidency.

• Action for the Republic (AR): Created and directed by the former Minister of Economy of the Justicialist government and author of the convertibility plan that ended the inflationary process, Domingo Cavallo, debuted in the legislative elections of 1997. He obtained 2 national deputies in Federal Capital and 1 in Córdoba. In the general elections of 1999, he presented the presidential formula Cavallo-Caro Figueroa, and obtained third place with 10% of the votes. Another 9 national deputies were elected, thus managing to assemble a block of 12 deputies.

(Source: electoral guide.com.ar)

Domingo Cavallo His strategy is to show a different profile than the coldness of the electorate, he exploits his story as a "humble boy" and performs a self-imposed diet and physical exercises.

The elector

Image of political leaders:

Fernando De la Rúa was the political leader with the best image. Indeed, it received the best positive rating (42.5%) and obtained the lowest levels of negative evaluation (18.5%). Behind him is Graciela Fernández Meijide with 35.7% positive opinions and 29% negative evaluations. Next are Eduardo Duhalde (32.6% positive evaluation and 33.9% negative opinions) and Ramón Ortega (27.9% good opinion and 39.9 unfavorable opinion).

The imaging experts diagrammed the characteristics of an "ideal candidate":

* Must appear honest

* You must be credible when you promise to take care of the poor. Voters have to feel that they fully trust him, even if they can't explain why.

* You have to appear as someone who knows how to manage money and deal with the powerful.

* Must have a successful personal biography (Ramón Ortega is the paradigmatic example)

* The electorate highly values ​​the traditional family image

* It is not convenient that it seems too "canchero" this is linked to corruption.

* You have to talk about the role of the country in the international context, show yourself as a statesman who can contain conflicts.

* It must emphasize justice, insecurity, and especially unemployment.

* Must look like one more voter. Facelifts and flashy suits are not recommended. The natural wave, the "new age" of politics, is in fashion.

* For television, the ideal is to wear a plain, opaque and clear shirt or blouse, a bright colored tie, a plain suit. You should always have your hands in view so that it does not seem that you are hiding something, and always look at your interlocutor.

(source: alypso)

Characterization of the voters' vote:

The imminent arrival of the elections for the presidency in the Argentine Republic finds a citizenry devoid of concerns to discover new proposals for the political future of their country. However, the situation is aggravated considering what is heard in the average independent voter: he will use the never forgotten resources of the vote of punishment or the vote of fear. A sad epilogue for the decade governed by Carlos Menem and a dangerous prologue for the future president of the destinies of this Nation.

A strong feeling of bewilderment is seen in Argentine independent citizens, those who do not have a specific affiliation with any specific party and who consecrate their vote with absolute freedom of action.

3. Demand forecast

Voting trend by parties (March 1999, UBA research):

The intention to vote for President in 1999 by party shows an important advantage for the Alliance over the PJ (41% and 31.5% respectively, in voting trend). However, when making comparisons with the measurements made throughout the year, a constant recovery of the PJ is observed, to the detriment of the Alliance. Applying a regression line on the values ​​already obtained shows that, if this trend continues, the PJ and the Alliance would find themselves in a situation of parity in voting intention in March 1999.

Presidential candidacies:

Eduardo Duhalde leads the preferences among the preferred candidates for President with 22.4% of the mentions. Next are Fernando De la Rúa (21.4%) and Graciela Fernández Meijide (21%), while Ramón Ortega obtains 17.4% of the preferences. Domingo Cavallo concentrates the preferences of 6.8% of those interviewed, while other PJ candidates receive 2.6% of the accessions.

Presidential elections (mid-August 1999 polls, by Julio Aurelio):

Now it is Julio Aurelio himself, the official pollster of the Justicialista Party campaign committee, announcing that the presidential candidate of the Justicialist Party has risen, in twenty days, from a vote intention of 27.6 percent to 34.8 (that is,, has had a growth of 26.06 percent).

The tremendous jump has taken place, according to Aurelio, between August 15 and the beginning of September. In other words, it has coincided with the entry on the scene of Duda Mendonça, the political strategy luminary hired by Duhalde in Brazil, and with the announcement of the concertation plan, with which the justicialist candidate has tried to drag Dr. Fernando De la Rúa to your own corner.

Data from the official PJ pollster reveal that the Alliance's formula has 44.7 percent of the votes and that of the Justicialist Party, 34.8 percent.

On August 16, Julio Aurelio concluded his penultimate poll in the entire country: De la Rúa obtained 46.8 percent of the votes and Duhalde 27.6 percent.

The difference was therefore 19.2 per cent; that is, two tenths above the estimate of Mora and Araujo, which he started from Duhalde.

4. Identification of the opportunity based on market research

• Strengthen and strengthen the Alliance as a political force.

• Win the presidential elections on October 24, 1999.

6. Segmentation

7. Marketing mix

Product Policy Strategy:

Candidate analysis

The political advisor, Dick Morris, advised Fernando De la Rúa to abolish the custom of flexing the arms bringing the hands towards the shoulders, because he says "it gives the feeling that his arms are short."

He has also performed surgery for cosmetic purposes: He has removed a mole located between his nose and his eye, but he has done it two years ago, so as not to be accused of frivolous at the time of political campaigns for his presidential candidacy.

The Alliance candidate wants to show that he is authentic by avoiding sympathy. He shows himself as an understanding father who, although he does not celebrate jokes, tolerates them.

He was defined as Mr. Ingles, sober, serious, even boring, as opposed to the Menem party, with the idea of ​​strong, safe, (remember that he used a lot the navy blue color that is security); before the stunning of Menem's way of dressing.

Match analysis

The central force ideas of the Alliance are:

• Organize the Nation as a modern Democratic Republic.

• Guaranteeing society economic growth that includes upward social mobility and the eradication of poverty.

• Provide the State with qualified officials and an honest and transparent administration.

• Achieve that unemployment falls back to acceptable historical rates. Eliminate work in black and precariousness and reach the goal of stable work in white and for an indeterminate time.

• Have an independent and proven justice system, eradicating corruption and impunity.

• Ensure the republican operation of state institutions, the independence of powers.

Fernando De la Rúa was the political leader with the best image. Indeed, it received the best positive rating (42.5%) and obtained the lowest levels of negative evaluation (18.5%).

Program analysis

Electoral program of the Alliance:

• FULL EMPLOYMENT: Launch an economy that will progressively generate the productive and stable jobs that are needed to end the indignity of unemployment.

• EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES: Enforce the constitution and laws to all, without exceptions or privileges. Combat all forms of discrimination: personal, social and regional.

Force super-evaders to pay their taxes and take care that wealth, instead of being concentrated in a privileged group, reaches the whole of society.

• THE BEST EDUCATION: Guarantee that public education at all levels has the necessary resources to fulfill its function. All its function.

• HEALTH AS A RIGHT: To ensure health for all. Create a system with universal and equal coverage, which will provide care to all inhabitants: from prevention and primary care to highly complex medicine.

• A STATE WITHOUT CORRUPTION: Be relentless with corruption. Those who have committed crimes against the public administration must be held accountable to justice. Close all the holes through which the money that is needed today escapes, and turn it to the attention of the vast social sectors with unsatisfied basic needs.

• A COMMUNITY WITHOUT FEAR: Restore security to Argentines, fighting crime.

Carry out projects to close loopholes in criminal law, continue fighting for reliable justice, and build professional, efficient, and clean police forces.

At the same time, act on the social conditions of violence and widespread crime: exclusion and injustice.

Pricing Policy Strategy

The electorate felt a high cost of doubt, because the Alliance was a new force, so they could not compare with previous results the fulfillment of the promises made in the campaign.

The economic and temporal costs are present in all elections, but we cannot estimate them specifically for these elections.

The price asked of the voter is his vote, which is considered as the sum of these costs.

Distribution Policy Strategy

Among the methods used to bring Fernando De la Rúa closer to the electorate we can mention: visits to the provinces, to television programs, public events, interviews in the written press, advertisements, among others.

Likewise, work was carried out at the headquarters of the political party, which consisted of informational work and support for the campaign.

Communication Policy Strategy

Communication tools:

• Television, radio, outdoor and graphic advertising.

• An internet page was designed (www.alianza.org.ar).

• Public relations public events were held in different parts of the country.

• Sales promotion: brochures containing the Alliance's proposal were designed and distributed on public roads throughout the country.

When De la Rúa had to choose who would be in charge of publicity for his political campaign, he did not know Ramiro Agulla.

Agulla did what he does best, synthesize. He said: "Fernando, what you mean is that you can stabilize a country and be corrupt, but you can't grow a country without being honest."

At that time, the political scene was dominated by Carlos Menem (69), his obsessive struggle for re-election and his fight with Eduardo Duhalde (58). Agulla did not take half a afternoon to put together his initiatory commercial: De la Rúa stopped, hitting the desk with his fist (with an obviously amplified punching sound) telling Menem to read the Constitution.

Agulla's work was not limited to advertising. It also consists of building the image of the candidate, an image that people want to buy. Agulla worked mainly on language and gestures. In the first point, the idea was very clear: it was necessary to avoid at all costs that De la Rúa adopted the typical and traditional radical language. Regarding the gestures, the advice was to emphasize the speech with the arms, which should always open, go outwards (nobody did it better than Perón) and never in the opposite direction.

Meetings of the Alliance communicators team are usually held once a week. Agulla, Lopérfido, Antonito de la Rúa, Carlos Souto, Luis Sthulman and David Ratto participate.

Advertising messages:

They showed the idea of ​​seriousness, in addition to being the voice of the hopeless: “I will be the doctor, I will be the teacher, I will be the one who works….” That was the idea, which is also boring.

A strong feeling of hope in the music and the stories put together by the publicist Agulla, came out as from the bottom of the soul "WE ARE MORE", those of us who want change, we are more those who fight against Menemist corruption or Menemduhaldism.

For this reason, the differentiation of Ruckauf, Duhalde and De la Rúa was important.

But this had a strong media campaign in favor of the Alliance, you could see that the complaints were to exasperate people, generate that anger that De la Rúa channeled well, and also because of the economic context, De la Rúa won.

The idea of ​​using De la Rúa's monotonous and definitely boring tone as a campaign element had been discussed countless times in the communication team. Luis Sthulman had written a brief document on the point, where he said: De la Rúa's boredom has to be a strategic advantage of the campaign, versus Menem's amusement.

Agulla prepared the advertising message, where the main idea was: -They say I'm boring, it will be because I don't drive Ferraris. It will be for those who have fun while there is poverty, it will be for those who have fun while there is unemployment, for those who enjoy themselves with impunity. Is the inequality of justice funny, is it funny that we are mugged and killed in the streets, is the lack of education funny? I am going to end this party for a few. I am going to build a different Argentina that is going to educate our children, protect the family, and imprison the corrupt. And whoever doesn't like it, let him go. I do not want a people suffering while a few have fun. I want a happy country, I want a happy people.

All agreed that, in addition, the script of the advertisement had other advantages: on the one hand, it displaced other defects of the candidate that were highlighted in the polls, such as his weakness, and insisted on the confrontation with Menem, who was the terrain in which the Alliance had moved better, and that left Eduardo Duhalde out of the game. Even so, there were still preventions.

Outdoor advertising (posters): The photo shows the candidate in a very close-up of 3/4 profile that focuses on the gaze: a gaze that is not directed at the viewer of the poster but at an "out of the field": what is not portrayed, the future. Georges Pèninou calls this «construction of the image in the third person», a modality that is characterized by a weak implication and emotional distancing. Here an attempt is made to "erase" the subjectivity of the enunciator, it is the reader who has the illusion of "discovering" the scene, in contrast to the first-person construction in which the frontal gaze supposes a strong appeal to the reader. In this way, the way that can be recognized in this advertising statement is the Indicative (the "invisible", the presupposed,the indication of values ​​that are accepted or rejected in a given social framework), as opposed to the imperative mode recognizable in the other poster (the instance - put in evidence - to vote for the candidate).

In the small poster "De la Rúa Presidente" strategies that can be defined as more "traditional" are displayed: close-up, frontal gaze, frontal lighting, relaxed expression, affable smile. In addition, you can see the jacket and tie, which from the design and combination, refer to the feeling of a "relaxed formality". As a whole, the photographic image conveys tranquility, relaxation, relaxation. This allows us to think of it in opposite terms with the image on the “Presidente De la Rúa” poster: the expression is grim, serious; the gesture suggests concentration, commitment, concern, which could be interpreted as a gesture consistent with the general situation of the country. Referring to the cultural "a priori" updated in the poster,We can say that this expression of seriousness and commitment responds to the expectations regarding the future president's management.

The poster "De la Rúa Presidente" belongs to a moment in the campaign prior to the internal party campaign in which the presidential candidacy of Fernando De la Rúa was defined. In it, the resort to a relaxed and distended image of the candidate responds to the stereotype of "boring" that had been assigned to him. On the other hand, in the poster “Presidente De la Rúa” a positive assessment is assigned to the supposed “boredom”, equating it to the values ​​of commitment, seriousness, and low profile. This strategy is designed from a contrast with the profile assigned to the then president, Carlos Menem, a member of the opposition party. Menem's administration was characterized by the president's repeated appearances in the media, many times in relation to "scandals" related to his private life (his divorce from Zulema Yoma,various romances, alleged unrecognized children). In addition, his links with characters from the "show business" and show business in general, as well as attitudes that could be characterized as "frivolous" (always traveling accompanied by his personal hairdresser, undergoing supposed cosmetic surgeries), contributed to reinforcing this profile. Not coincidentally, he circulated socially a slogan that condensed these defining features of the image of his administration: "pizza with champagne." Phrase that not only refers to a regular meal, at that time, in the presidential fifth, but also refers to the idea of ​​the festive, the carnival, the grotesque of combining such dissimilar elements. So, the aforementioned strategies in relation to defining a profile for the opposition candidate,they tended to construct a "response" - as we have seen, in terms of opposition - to the "frivolity" assigned to President Menem.

This counterpoint was reinforced from different places in what we could call the "discursiveness" of the campaign: austerity and honesty versus the waste and corruption attributed to the Menem administration; the search for consensus and agreements versus authoritarianism, whose emblematic figure is constituted by the "decrees of necessity and urgency" to which Menem repeatedly resorted.

To conclude this analysis, we find it interesting to focus our attention on the inversion of the strategies and, therefore, the meaning, which operates between the two posters. From the legend, which functions as a relay in relation to the image, the smallest poster uses the traditional formula of any candidacy, this is to put the last name before the position to which the candidate aspires. Thus, "De la Rúa Presidente" operates in terms of proposal and evidence in the search for votes. On the other hand, the inversion of the legend in the other poster, “Presidente De la Rúa”, redefines the whole message, to the extent that from the verbal formula it invests the candidate with a position to which, in reality, he aspires. It is presented as a concrete present, which in truth constitutes a possible future. From the look,the change of direction marks a change in the "horizon" of the message: the small poster explicitly sets out the objective of obtaining the vote of the eventual reader. The goal then is the choice itself. On the contrary, in the large poster, the gaze directed to the supposed future, shifts the goal to a “beyond” the electoral body.

«We are more»: In this photo the analysis of the iconographic level is interesting, in which social stereotypes come into play: stereotype of men and women, but of men and women politicians, executives: shirt and jacket for him, also for her. A sober ornament and short, discreetly enameled nails "show" a woman capable of coping in a man's environment, but who retains her femininity. We will pay particular attention to the bracelet, since in the image as a whole it constitutes a distinctive element of the woman's arm. It is a bracelet with straight shapes, sober both in color and in design. The femininity, which seems to emerge from the bracelet, is a combative, fighter, tenacious femininity.

The plastic level, chromatic sublevel contributes to reinforcing the stereotype: dark colors (gray, black, brown) are frequently assigned for men's clothing and pastel colors (in this case, old pink) for women's clothing.

In addition, it is interesting to highlight what is culturally encoded: the visual synecdoche is completed from the understood that it is the hands of Fernando De la Rúa and Graciela Fernández Meijide.

Arms raised with clasped hands refer to a convention that constitutes them an expression of triumph.

The coexistence, in a metonymic superposition of the arms and the A of the Alliance, reinforces the meaning, "infecting" each other the attributes, both from the "form" and from the "content". In relation to the morphological, the impact is visual. Meanwhile, from the supposed contents, the A of the alliance condenses the most exposed sense of the political coalition, as well as refers to the achievement of a consensus, of an agreement between different parties. The hands enter into an interesting rhetorical game with the relay that the legend “we are more” supposes: we are more between men and women, we are more between radicals and frepasistas, we are more “us” than “them”. It is worth stopping here to reflect on the inclusive “we” proposed from the “we are” of the legend.An original reflection in relation to this form of enunciation is suggested by Leonor Arfuch, who points out: “The comparison between enunciator and addressee suggested by the inclusive 'we' is repeatedly reinforced by the particle 'all', which appears as a synthesis of a broad social and sectoral spectrum where the discourse was intended to produce recognition effects: workers, businessmen, producers, intellectuals, women, youth and the elderly. "young and old. "young and old. "

Regarding inclusive interpellation, Javier Auyero, quoting Emilio De Ipola, states: “As De Ipola demonstrates, there is a permanent ambivalence, a tension, a back and forth between inclusion and exclusion. According to De Ipola, 'We can paraphrase this ambivalence in the following terms:' I am like you, I am also a soldier; I am the same as you, since I am your brother, but I am also different from you, since I am your older brother; I am, like you, a worker, but unlike you I am the first worker, 'and so on.

Finally, it is interesting to note how the reference to the condensation of cultural "a priori" characteristic of political advertising discourse becomes evident in this poster in a particular way: in this case, the large number of elements of the statement that they must be replaced from cultural competencies. The absence of elements in the image shows the presence of a set of "a prioris" that complete the reading.

8. Results achieved with the implementation of the commercial strategy

As can be seen in the following table, the Alliance triumphed in the presidential elections, thus achieving the objective set out in the marketing plan.

Fernando De la Rúa obtained 48.5% of the votes in the electoral market, followed by the formula presented by the PJ (Duhalde - Ortega) with 38%, and in third place was the Action for the Republic party, with its candidate Domingo Cavallo, with 10.5%.

Election of President and Vice President of the Nation

Date: Oct 24, 1999

Electoral system: direct election in double round as established by the National Constitution amended in 1994.

Voter Register: 24,201,563 registered

Voters: 19,878,018

Voter turnout: 82.14%

Votes obtained by political party

Political party or alliance	Votes Amount%
ALLIANCE FOR WORK, JUSTICE AND EDUCATION *	9,165,032	48.37
JUSTICIALIST CONCERTATION ALLIANCE FOR CHANGE **	6,439,862 ***	33.98
- JUSTICIALIST	164,391	0.87
ALLIANCE ACTION FOR THE REPUBLIC ****	1,859,461	9.81
United Left Alliance	151,208	0.80
Worker	113,898	0.60
Humanist	131,779	0.70
Christian Social Alliance	53,135	0.28
Resistance Front	57,112	0.30
Socialist Workers Movement	43,899	0.23
Authentic Socialist	43,137	0.23
Others	726,709	3.83
Positive votes	18,949,623	95.33
Blank votes	728,408	3.66
Canceled	199,987	1.01
TOTAL VOTES	19,878,018	100.00

* The Alliance for Work, Justice and Education was made up of the following groups: UCR, Frente Grande, Progressive Democracy, Intransigent Party, Democratic Socialist Party, Popular Socialist Party, Christian Democratic Party, MID, Autonomist Party (Corrientes) and the Liberal Party (Corrientes).

** The Alianza Concertación Justicialista para el Cambio was made up of the parties: Justicialista, Popular Conservative, Open Policy for Social Integration, Retired Front, Social Progress, Labor Confederation, Regional People's Movement (Salta), Pampean Federalist Movement, New Party (Córdoba and Corrientes), Bonaerense Popular Movement, Popular Unity Movement (Santiago del Estero), Chubutense Action, Patriotic Liberation Movement (San Luis), Federal Party (Mendoza), All for Entre Ríos Alliance, Union for the New Alliance Chaco, United for Catamarca Alliance, People in Communion (José C. Paz), Neighborhood Union (Esteban Echeverría), Federal Integration Front Alliance (Federal Capital), Front Alliance for the Change of Catriel (Río Negro), Front Alliance of the Unit (Formosa),Justicialist Front (Santiago del Estero and Salta), Front for Change (Misiones), Justicialista Front of Hope (San Juan), Justicialist Concertation for Change (Buenos Aires, Jujuy and Salta), Retirees in action (Federal Capital) and Citizen Action (Federal Capital).

*** The votes of the parties that the candidates of the justicialist formula carry on their ballots are not included

**** The Action for the Republic Alliance included: Action for the Republic, Federal Party, Rionegrino Provincial Party, Popular Patagonian Movement (Río Negro), New Republic in Action Alliance (Mendoza) and Union of the Democratic Center

(Santa Fe)

Source: official data from the electoral board

PART III

EVALUATION OF THE DEVELOPED STRATEGY

In our opinion, the strategy created for the electoral campaign of the Alliance was excellent. The candidate's weaknesses were transformed into important strengths appreciated by the electorate, in contrast to the image radiated by Menem, thus achieving a competitive advantage.

Consistency was observed from planning to implementation of the strategy: in the objective, the message transmitted, the image communicated, the government proposals presented, the media plan selected for the campaign and the commercial mix.

The result obtained in the presidential elections shows the excellent work carried out, both by the political advisor and by the team of communicators. Almost half of the electoral market was decided by Fernando De la Rúa at the time of voting.

For more data, we suggest looking at Plan 2000, there you will see the political context issues of why De la Rua's triumph, remember that this was carried out on 8-30-99 and the elections were on 10-24.

Data sheet:

SAMPLE: 2959 cases

general over 18 years old able to vote with habitual residence in the places where the survey was carried out.

GLOBAL STATISTICAL ERROR: ± 1.8%

LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE: 95.45%

INSTRUMENT OF

DATA COLLECTION: Structured and precoded interview card for home application.

SAMPLE DESIGN: Probabilistic by multi-stage conglomerates with selection of the final unit according to sex and age quotas.

DATA COLLECTION PERIOD: July 27 to August 7, 1998

BIBLIOGRAPHY

• Seprin consulting service 10/27/2000

• News Magazine May 13, 2000

• www.historiadelpaís.com.ar

• www.alipso.com

• Clarín zone 11/28/99

• Idelcoop Magazine - Year 2000 - Volume 27 - N ° 123

• PJ survey. THE NATION (09/07/99)

• Micro Seminar 10/22/99 year: 9 nº: 376 Edited by the Press Office of the Faculty of Exact and Natural Sciences of the University of Buenos Aires.

• V Congress of the Latin American Association of Communication Researchers (ALAIC) April 26-29, 2000 Santiago de Chile. An analysis of Fernando De la Rúa's political advertising campaign. Sonia SANAHUJA - Ana SILVA

• HORACIO FERRECCIO (urban vision) 3rd year Journalism student

• almargen.com.ar By Eduardo Rodríguez Leirado

• Economic Determinants of Electoral Results in Argentina.

1. Evidence from Panel Data. Emanuel Abuelafia and Osvaldo Meloni * National University of Tucumán

• Julio aurelio www.aresco.com.ar

• Gabriel E. Vitullo (Master in Political Science from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. He is currently pursuing a doctorate at that same University. Graduated in Law and Political Science from the University of Buenos Aires)

• Book: La Alianza (Formation and destiny of a progressive coalition) by Julio Godio, Editorial Grijalbo, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1998.

Download the original file