Media, electoral campaigns and a feeling of insecurity

The instrumentalization of crime: politics, communication companies and insecurity. On how insecurity managed to position itself at the top of the public agenda in Venezuela.

The existing relationships between the media, electoral campaigns and the feeling of insecurity are analyzed. Such relationships are explained through the experience of the last campaign for the presidential elections held in Venezuela.

media-of-communication-electoral-campaigns-and-sensation-of-insecurity

First, a contextual and theoretical framework is developed, to then expose how insecurity has become the main issue on the public agenda in the country.

Keywords: Mass media, subjective insecurity, electoral campaigns, criminal policy.

Our analysis will be immersed within the complex and dynamic Venezuelan political environment, specifically in the Venezuela of 2006. Why 2006? Because in this year two phenomena that are closely related occurred: on the one hand it was the year of the presidential elections (which in the Venezuelan context meant the re-election or not of Hugo Chávez as president); and on the other, in that same period, citizen insecurity becomes the first issue on the country's public agenda.

In these lines we will try to make a socio-political analysis on these variables: media, feeling of insecurity and electoral campaigns. Our study will be based on the theoretical legacy of critical criminology, symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, and especially the approaches of the researchers McCombs (2006) and Noelle-Neumann (1995) will be taken as bases. The first studied the impact of the media on the establishment of the public agenda, and the second studied public opinion as a form of social control.

Both researchers were the presidential elections as the starting point of their work, in the case of McCombs the US elections, and in that of Noelle-Neumann the federal elections in Germany; A good part of their arguments and reflections were very useful for our analysis. However, it should be noted that for this it was necessary to contextualize and reinterpret their ideas, coming from "central" countries, and observe to what extent they adapted to our "peripheral" realities (Prebish, 1981).

First, we will give a panoramic and very general look at the Venezuelan political and institutional context of 2006, sifting it through the aforementioned theoretical analyzes, emphasizing criminal policy. Later, in the second part, based on the monitoring of four emblematic cases, we will explain how insecurity came to have a leading place in the country's political debate.

1. Contexts and pretexts

1.1. Screenshot or attempted socio-political context

The current Venezuelan political system (for some under construction) has as a precedent a system in which the citizens did not trust. The public did not trust the political parties, the institutions, or the government. Two events mark our recent history: in 1989 the so-called Caracazo ^{1 occurred}and in 1992 there were two attempts to overthrow the government. The representative system is called into question and electoral abstention progressively increases. Representative democracy enters a crisis and antiparty thinking appears again in public opinion. All this sets the stage for the “electoral collapse of the traditional political parties in 1998, the immediate triumph as president of the one who had been the protagonist of one of the military rebellions of 1992 and the approval of the 1999 Constitution, which replaces the representative democracy for a participatory and protagonist democracy ”(Rey, 2003).

The promulgation of the new Constitution of 1999 has been only the beginning of a series of political and social changes that the country has been experiencing, which although their beginnings cannot be located in this year, it is from the same year that such processes accelerate. Three years later, on April 11, 2002 (A-11) there was a coup in which the President was deposed and reinstated 48 hours later. Two years later -in 2004- a presidential recall referendum is held, in which new-

1 The popular uprising called “El Caracazo” (February 1989) was a protest reaction against the accentuation of the neoliberal policies with which the government of that year was inaugurated. The repression by the government of Carlos Andrés Pérez was harsh and fierce, there is no certainty of the real number of victims, since the government said there were 200, Amnesty International referred 500, while several NGOs assured that the real number reached 3,000 victims. According to some scholars , this phenomenon opened the way “for a more generalized use of violence by the population” (López, 2005: 36-37 and Sanjuán, 1997: 232).

mind the President. Finally, in 2006 his first term ends and in December the presidential elections will be held in which he will participate as one of the candidates.

In each one of these conjunctures the role of private communication companies has been leading, in the face of the crisis of the traditional political parties, they have become the representatives of the most conservative sectors and of the national right; In this way, businessmen have found in the "media" an instrument to achieve the positioning of their interests in the country. This is how the private media have become an important political platform for opposition to the government. There is already abundant literature in this regard, about his participation in relevant and concrete political activities of the Venezuelan opposition.

For example, the Global Media Observatory, on its website (http://www.observatoriodemedios.org.ve), has several reports and measurements on favoritism by the opposition of the main private communication companies. In this same sense, the participation of these companies in the Coup d'état of 11-A stands out. Reporters Without Borders, harsh critics of the Chávez government, denounced the active role of television channels and the private press during the coup. In their report they state:

“On April 13, while Hugo Chávez supporters took to the streets and rumors circulated about the return of the President, private television channels broadcast cartoons and soap operas (…) vice-minister of the Secretariat of the Presidency of the short-lived government de facto, he claimed to have organized a meeting between various press bosses and Pedro Carmona, on the morning of April 13 (…)… the floor, to ask the President to leave the government's communication management in the hands of all of them (…)… The directors of the communication media (…) endorsed a government that, in just 48 hours, carried out a much more severe repression against the press considered close to Hugo Chávez, than the ones undertaken by him against the private press ”(Reporters Without Borders, 2003: 5-6) ².

2 The documentary The Revolution will not be broadcast, made in 2003 by an Irish television group, describes part of the events of the Coup d'état of 11-A, in which the participation of private communication companies in it is also denounced. It is available on the web: http://video.google.es/videoplay?docid=2192459744675391361. Serrano (2008) in his book Medios Violentos. Words and images for hatred and war, where he analyzes the role of communication companies in specific political situations in different countries (Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Haiti, India, Chile, Spain, Somalia, Cuba, Colombia, Iran, USA, Afghanistan, Israel,

For its part, the government has had virulent reciprocal relations with private communication companies, in a clear mutual political aversion. Given the relevance that the political-media diatribe has reached with the private communication companies, the government has created new state media, as well as promoted the emergence of alternative media.

1.1.1. The reform of the criminal procedure system and legislative criminal policy in Venezuela

Already in the field of the justice system, the context in which the transformations of the criminal process were manifested could find a reference in a work on judicial reform in Venezuela carried out in 1998 by the UNDP, called "Justice and Governance", which arrived to the following conclusions: 1. Justice must be transformed; 2. The population does not have confidence in that justice; 3. The Judiciary is the institution with the least credibility in public opinion; 4. People don't report because they don't trust; 5. The “E” stratum of the population (the poorest) prefer to take justice into their own hands; 6. The great problem of the Venezuelan justice is corruption (Rodríguez, 2004: 3).

This scenario is not very different in the rest of Latin America, which is why transformation processes have been taking place in its criminal justice systems, a common reform has been the change from the inquisitive criminal procedure model to another of an accusatory nature. Reform process that was not alien to Venezuela.

But beyond this incorporation into the region's criminal procedural reform, criminal policy has not exactly been one of the strengths of the current government, much less in legislative matters, where serious contradictions can be found with its political-ideological, social discourses. and inclusion. A brief, incomplete and superficial synthesis of what he had done before 2006 (the period that is the object of our analysis) could be the following: regressive reform of the Penal Code of 2005, in which approximately 25 articles that were the object of the reform are unconstitutional, for violating fundamental principles and guarantees such as: proportionality, legal security, legal equality, guilt, legality and presumption of innocence; ³ the sub-

Indonesia and Kosovo) devotes a couple of chapters to the Venezuela case. In these, he not only refers to the Coup d'etat of 11-A, he also addresses the continuity of the political militancy of the communication companies during the years 2005 to 2007.

3 For example, this reform created the crime of trespassing, thanks to which many tenants and other needy and low-income families are persecuted and criminalized (not counting the increased penalties for crimes against property).

subsequent reforms of the COPP that increasingly resemble the inquisitive Code of Criminal Procedure; the promulgation of the Organic Law against Organized Crime, and the reformed Organic Law against Illicit Traffic and the Consumption of Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances, legislative matters of clear North American influence ⁴, etc.

1.2. Citizen insecurity and criminal show: the media about the real

Critical Criminology has already explained how Criminal Policy, instigated by the social communication media, is commonly characterized by the search for immediate and symbolic responses at the expense of human rights (increased penalties, more repression, decreased fundamental rights, etc..). Its objective is to give the population the feeling that something is being done, no matter how deep down these policies really solve the problem or worse, deepen it; the important thing is the show, the appearance, trying to create a feeling that the criminal problem is being attacked. Attacking, as if we were in a war. A war, in which the enemies are the most vulnerable in society, the excluded, who find all access to the system and the satisfaction of their basic rights difficult,but at the same time they have a privileged right to be persecuted and punished by the penal system. The worst of the case is that in the construction of this show of the penal system, the victims of the system themselves are the ones who demand more symbolic and repressive policies (Avila, 2006).⁵ And in this process the role of the mass media is fundamental.

• Contradictory and wrongly, these laws were promulgated in a context of strong questions about the participation of DEA agents in Venezuela, due to a violation of national sovereignty. In this same year (2005) the law against acts of a terrorist nature was pending in a second discussion. Within this penal spectacle it is not taken into account that criminal policy should be part of a social policy that encompasses it, as it is considered not very technical and effective (which should not mean that the specific concretion of policies in this matter is lost); furthermore, these social approaches do not give the "feeling" of offering "immediate" or "magic" solutions, and consequently they do not get media footage. This situation in the case of the current Venezuelan government has been a weakness, not to say a void,in its criminal policy, since it has diluted the issue within the generality of social policy, perceiving an absence of concrete and specific proposals (immediate and medium term) in the face of the serious problems of urban violence in Venezuela. On this point we shall return later.

Authors such as Del Olmo (2000) ⁶ and Zaffaroni (1998) consider the media as the “propaganda apparatus of the Latin American penal systems (factories of reality)”, which today are essential elements for the exercise of power of the entire penal system. This logic, according to the Argentine author, operates on two levels: the transnational (which spreads a globalized homogenizing discourse that builds Manichean stereotypes, violent and authoritarian interventions, fears, etc…) and the national (which obeys local situations).

This is how the well-known and popular speeches of “strong hand”, “fight against crime”, “lead to the underworld”, “let them rot in jail”, end up legitimizing repressive criminal policies. These are well known as the result not only of authoritarian conceptions on the part of some political actors of the State, “but also of the demand that power groups exercise on their governments, which in turn operate on the media that, capable of generating great social alarm from a scandalizing dissemination of criminal acts, undertake law campaigns and order ”(Arslanián, 1998: 25) ⁷.

These law and order campaigns create, or rather increase, a feeling of insecurity that is usually far above the actual rates. ⁸ Thus we can appreciate that there are two levels regarding the feeling of insecurity (or sense of security):

• Del Olmo states that "the concept of social alarm comes to guide the decisions that a State may make in matters of criminal policy at a given time, which is why the media has been incorporated as part of the contemporary criminal system" (Del Olmo: 82) "These campaigns take place through the" invention of reality "(distortion due to the increase in advertising space dedicated to blood events; direct invention of events that did not occur)," self-fulfilling prophecies " (Public instigation to commit crimes through meta-messages of "slogans" such as "impunity is absolute", "minors can do anything", "prisoners enter through one door and leave through the other", etc.; publication of new methods to commit crimes, facilities, etc.),production of moral indignation (instigation to collective violence, self-defense, glorification of "vigilantes", presentation of extermination groups as "vigilantes", etc.). These campaigns take place (…) also when a coup d'état is near… ”(Zaffaroni, 1998: 133). It cannot be omitted from mentioning that Baratta also points out that a characteristic of these campaigns is to carry out “a regular distribution of the roles of the victim and the aggressor, respectively, in guaranteed and“ respectable ”social groups and in those marginal and“ dangerous ”(foreigners, young people, drug addicts, poor, without work or without professional qualification) ”(Baratta, 1997: 84).These campaigns take place (…) also when a coup d'état is near… ”(Zaffaroni, 1998: 133). It cannot be omitted from mentioning that Baratta also points out as a characteristic of these campaigns to carry out “a regular distribution of the roles of the victim and the aggressor, respectively, in the guaranteed and“ respectable ”social groups and in those marginal and“ dangerous ”(foreigners, young people, drug addicts, poor, without work or without professional qualification) ”(Baratta, 1997: 84).These campaigns take place (…) also when a coup d'état is near… ”(Zaffaroni, 1998: 133). It cannot be omitted from mentioning that Baratta also points out that a characteristic of these campaigns is to carry out “a regular distribution of the roles of the victim and the aggressor, respectively, in guaranteed and“ respectable ”social groups and in those marginal and“ dangerous ”(foreigners, young people, drug addicts, poor, without work or without professional qualification) ”(Baratta, 1997: 84).in guaranteed and “respectable” social groups and in those marginalized and “dangerous” (foreigners, young people, drug addicts, poor, without work or without professional qualification) ”(Baratta, 1997: 84).in guaranteed and “respectable” social groups and in those marginalized and “dangerous” (foreigners, young people, drug addicts, poor, without work or without professional qualification) ”(Baratta, 1997: 84).
  1. Objective level: real situation of the criminal phenomenon. Subjective level: perception that people have of the criminal phenomenon.

Both levels are linked, but are independent of each other; When there is a decrease in the objective level, there will not necessarily be a decrease in the subjective level, as has been shown by the bulk of empirical research on this matter (Sozzo, 2000: 105; Del Olmo, 2000; Pegoraro, 2002: 31).

Thus, for example, McCombs in the American context presents several cases in which there is no coincidence of the objective level with the subjective levels caused by the media ⁹: Vietnam (in some cases coverage increased as the problem showed signs of improvement, or decreased as the problem worsened, departing from the historical trends of the 1960s); the national concern about drugs in the 1980s (the relevance of the issue in the news media occurred even though there was no change in the real incidence of drug use throughout that period); the discovery of the environment between 1970 and 1990 (the interest of public opinion on this issue was not related to the relevance of these problems, which in reality indicated a downward trend in global pollution);fear of shark attacks in the summer of 2001 (when actually marine scientists pointed out that there was nothing unusual about the number of attacks that summer). The interest of public opinion in all these cases, however, I do keep a direct correspondence with the media coverage of them (McCombs: 55-69).

Among the cases studied by McCombs, those related to the issue of insecurity are of special interest for our analysis, whose establishment within the agenda, in the 1990s, operated with “extreme independence.

• "Security crises, then, more than crises, can be political constructions on a situation of insecurity that is chronic in the urban environment" Aniyar (1999: 6-7; 2003: 82). In the cited work of McCombs is found the idea of ​​"pseudo-environment", created by Walter Lippman (1922) -decades prior to the works of Berger and Luckman-, this is a vision of the world that exists in our mind, and that is always incomplete compared to reality, and often inaccurate. “Our behavior is a response to this pseudo-environment, and not the real environment, Lippmann affirmed (…) The result is that the news media present a limited vision of a wider environment (…) The media construct and present to the public a pseudo-environment that significantly shapes the way it sees the world ”(McCombs: 55-58).

dependence on any underlying reality ”. While public concern about crime grew to unusually high levels, statistical measures of the criminal reality indicated that the crime rate was actually falling. "Of course, a likely source of this growing public concern, at the time of a declining crime, was crime news in the news media" (McCombs: 64). The OJ Simpson cases and the murder of Latin singer Selena helped sustain this interest, both taking up nearly one-sixth of crime coverage from the summer of 1994 to the fall of the following year. According to McCombs, it could be argued that the coverage of these two spectacular murder cases,explains much of the concern about crime among the public. Later he points out:

"Newspapers are not the only culprits, in this case, television, and perhaps even more entertainment programs than news programs, can promote citizen insecurity and fear of violence (…) This is a statement supported by many evidence, on the establishment of the long-term agenda of entertainment television (…) In summary: citizen insecurity and concern about crime as a social problem have much more to do with the media agenda than with the realities of crime in the neighborhood, the metropolitan area or the entire country ”(Ibid.: 62-68).

In Latin America, Pablo Angarita (2000) offers us another example: the news broadcast through communication companies after Pablo Escobar's death. At the end of 1993, the idea that Medellín had become a safe city after Escobar's death spread, and this opinion became general. However, the statistics did not show such information, on the contrary, the number of homicides increased.

For all of the above, critical criminology has given "maximum consideration" to the role of public opinion ¹⁰ (understood as "grassroots political communication") and to the "ideological and psychological processes that develop, support and legitimize it. the current unequal criminal law ”(Baratta, 1998: 217). Which is why, it seeks to create an "alternative consciousness in the field of deviation and criminality", through a work of "ideological criticism, scientific production and information." Promoting the discussion of these issues beyond academics, taking the debate to society in general with special emphasis on the most deprived (Baratta, 1997: 218-219 and 231).

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10 Concept difficult to define. For Noelle-Neumann this concept has increasingly dissolved until it became totally useless for practical purposes. The author presents three elements that are related to the process of public opinion, empirically researchable: 1. the human capacity to perceive the growth or weakening of public opinions; 2. the reactions to this perception, which lead to speak more confidently or to keep quiet; 3. the fear of isolation that makes most people tend to submit to the opinion of others. With these three elements she constructs an operative definition of public opinion: opinions on controversial issues that can be expressed in public without isolating herself (Noelle-Neumann: 83-90).

1.3. From setting the agenda to public policy

As we have already pointed out, McCombs has spent more than 40 years studying the capacity of the media to influence political, social and cultural agendas in many aspects, his theory deals with the role of mass communication as a fixer of the public agenda. According to this author, in almost all the topics of the public repertoire, citizens see a second-hand reality, which is structured by the information that journalists give about these events and situations. This information is selected and filtered, from the choice of the topic, through the space that is dedicated to it or the amount of time or repetitions that are made of it.

On the other hand, it should also be considered that newscasts need to focus on a few issues a day, since their capacity is limited, and they only have room for a small fraction of the news that is available each day. They focus opinion on only a handful of issues. Finally, the public makes use of this information to organize their own agenda. "Consequently, the news media agenda becomes, to a large extent, the public agenda" (McCombs: 12-40,53) ¹¹.

11 McCombs, however, cautions against any determinism of his theory: “Agenda setting is not a return to the hypodermic needle (or bullet) theory: it does not postulate all-powerful media effects. Nor does he consider audience members to be automatons, who are waiting for the media to come and program them. But the agenda-setting does assign a central role to the news media when it comes to starting the repertoire of the public agenda. (…)… The information provided by the news media plays a central role in the construction of our images of reality ”(McCombs: 31,41,43).

The influence of the media on the establishment of the public agenda, in a cause and effect relationship, has also been corroborated in numerous field studies (in a variety of settings ranging from Spain to the United States, through Germany, Argentina and Japan, from 1968 to now), as well as in controlled laboratory experiments (McCombs: 47-52 and Noelle-Neumann: 35-37).

Noelle-Neumann in her study - apart from the laboratory experiments that demonstrate the influence of public opinion on people - also makes a journey through classics of Western political theory and in them she finds the incidence of public opinion on governments. She describes, for example, how David Hume in 1739 points out how people tend to pay attention to opinions and conform to them, opinion being essential to the affairs of the State. Hume is guided by the principle that he affirms: "Government is based only on opinion." This principle "became the doctrine of the founding fathers of the United States." The author affirms with Hume that: “the perspective from which we face the issue of opinion shifts from the pressure it exerts on individuals to that it exerts on governments:exactly the point of view that Machiavelli presented to the prince (…) Today we recognize the weight of public opinion in the political sphere ”(Noelle-Neumann: 103106). Later he analyzes the work of Rousseau, in which he finds ideas such as the following: "The prince must decide which convictions of the people are vivid enough to support legislation"; “Opinion, queen of the world, is not subject to the power of kings; they themselves are its first slaves ”(Rousseau, 1967 in Noelle-Neumann: 115-116). We will return later on about the influence of the public agenda on specific public policies.in which he finds ideas such as the following: "The prince must decide which convictions of the people are vivid enough to support legislation"; “Opinion, queen of the world, is not subject to the power of kings; they themselves are its first slaves ”(Rousseau, 1967 in Noelle-Neumann: 115-116). We will return later on about the influence of the public agenda on specific public policies.in which he finds ideas such as the following: "The prince must decide which convictions of the people are vivid enough to support legislation"; “Opinion, queen of the world, is not subject to the power of kings; they themselves are its first slaves ”(Rousseau, 1967 in Noelle-Neumann: 115-116). We will return later on about the influence of the public agenda on specific public policies.

After completing this brief theoretical-contextual tour made in this introductory part, we will now analyze the Venezuelan case.

2. "In Venezuela insecurity and impunity are rampant"

2.1. Four crimes that affected sectors with the power of social claim ¹²

In Venezuela in mid-2006 - the year of presidential elections - the communication companies gave an impression of coverage of four cases: 1) Infamous murder of 03 university students in the Kennedy sector (Caracas) by police forces; 2) Kidnapping and subsequent murder of the Faddoul brothers and their driver; 3) Assassination of the influential businessman Filippo Sindoni and 4) Assassination of the priest Jorge Piñango, who was found dead in the room of a capital hotel. Let's take a brief look at each of them: ¹³

A) Murder of three students in the Kennedy sector: on June 27, 2005, six university students were driving through the sector

• This might sound a bit similar to "4 Crimes, 4 Powers" novel written by Fermín Mármol León (former director of the defunct Judicial Technical Police and former Minister of the Interior) in the late 1970s (1979), which became a best seller in Venezuela; two of the four cases of the novel were taken to the cinema, it is said that due to pressure the other two deliveries could not be made. This novel is based on four crimes that scandalized Venezuelan society in the 1970s; Each of them was linked to different sectors of power: the economic, the religious (the Catholic Church), the military and the political. In each of these cases the perpetrators belonged respectively to each of these sectors,which resulted in the fact that none of them were prosecuted for those who were truly responsible. These cases became "crabs" (cases that police and judicially are almost impossible to resolve). In this sense, it is necessary to highlight that the cases that are analyzed below are different, they have an inverse logic, in these it is the victims who belong to sectors with the power of social claim, which brought as a consequence -among others- the rapid prosecution of the same and the conviction of those responsible, as will be explained below.For this analysis we are based on a study in which we follow the media treatment of these cases throughout 2006 in the main print and audiovisual media of the country: El Últimas Noticias, El Nacional, El Universal, El Mundo and TV channelsmore representative and polarized: Globovisión (identified with the opposition and the political right) and Venezolana de Televisión (pro-government state channel); We have also relied on the Annual Report of the Public Ministry of the same year in which we work directly.

Kennedy, in Macarao, when they ran into a group of armed people (police) located in an alcabala (set up by inquiries about the recent death of a policeman in that sector). The students were scared because they thought they were criminals and accelerated, fleeing. Officials began firing rounds. Then a strong persecution began until they found the students and attacked them. The Public Ministry charged 24 police officers with qualified homicide carried out against three of these students and for injuries caused against the other three. The trial began in May 2006 and culminated three months later with the conviction against all the accused. The penalties ranged from 3 to 30 years according to the type of crime.

Throughout the process, the case had a leading place in the news headlines, being used by opposition groups to carry out mobilizations against the government. The speech consisted of accusing the government of murdering students, trying to bridge the gap between this case and an alleged repressive policy against the student sector; between citizen insecurity due to lack of policies and a repressive authoritarian government. From this case, the opposition student movement ¹⁴ was born in an incipient way, which was nurtured later in 2006 with the protests over the Faddoul case ¹⁵and the presidential reelection; and finally, in 2007, it reached its peak with protests against the non-renewal of the concession for the open (public) signal of the RCTV channel, together with the constitutional reform proposal of that year ¹⁶.

Assassination of the influential businessman Filippo Sindoni: the Italian-Venezuelan businessman Filippo Sindoni was kidnapped on March 28, 2006 in Aragua State, the next day his lifeless body was found in Lara State. For the murder of this businessman, the Public Ministry charged 8 people (7 civilians and a police officer) for the crimes of qualified homicide, kidnapping, aggravated robbery of a vehicle, improper use of uniforms, among others. A year and a half after the event, the defendants were sentenced to sentences ranging from 2 to 29 years in prison.

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• 14 http://www.eluniversal.com/2005/07/04/expol_fot_04A574635.shtml15 http://www.globovision.com/news.php?nid=25060, 16 http: //www.eluniversal. com / 2006/04/07 / ccs_art_07401A.shtml, http://www.cadenaglobal.com/Noticias/default.asp?Not=21292516 Various documentaries have been produced on the future of the opposition student movement, including: “New faces, the same goal ”http: // www. dailymotion.com/Guarataro/video/x3q7re_nuevas-caras_news, “United States, the conquest of the East” (French documentary on the influences of the North American government and Otpor in countries of Eastern Europe, analyzed in the Venezuelan context) http: // www.aporrea.org/tiburon/n128728.html, “Student movements, forgers of the country”

Kidnapping and subsequent murder of the brothers Faddoul and suchofer: Jhon Bryan, Kevin and Jason Faddoul Diab (all adolescents and children of a Lebanese businessman) and their driver Miguel Rivas, were kidnapped since February 23, 2006, almost six weeks later, on April 4 their bodies were found dead in the State of Miranda (less than a week from the Sindoni case). Six of the 19 implicated admitted the facts at the preliminary hearing and the other 13 were convicted after the trial. Four of those convicted were from the Metropolitan Police, who worked in conjunction with the common underworld. Conviction sentences ranged from 2 to 30 years in prison, the last ones were handed down in April 2009. As already mentioned, this case was a trigger for the mobilizations of students opposed to the government together with other related political sectors.The leadership of the Catholic Church, an important sector opposed to the government, also had several pronouncements on the subject.¹⁷

Assassination of priest Jorge Piñango: 22 days after the Faddoul case, priest Jorge Piñango Mascareño was found dead in a hotel room in the capital. The top leaders of the Venezuelan Church tried to create the matrix of opinion that it was a crime of the State against the Church. To counter this matrix, the Attorney General of the Republic made a statement (abundant in forensic details) in which he explained that the physical evidence found showed clear signs of sexual violence, which indicated the existence of a passionate motive ¹⁸, thus discarding the political motive. ¹⁹These statements were taken as an offense to the dignity of the deceased priest and by extension also to the Catholic Church itself. During the hearing, the accused of the crime expressed in court his willingness to admit the facts and was sentenced to serve a 15-year prison sentence.

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• 17 Monsignor Berlocco “affirmed that the Holy See and Pope Benedict XVI are informed of the murder of the Faddoul brothers and their driver, Miguel Rivas. "He has also been informed of these peaceful and heartfelt demonstrations by the majority of the Venezuelan people," he said. "I believe that this is a moment to awaken a conscience and it is a very positive aspect for the Venezuelan people to react and to achieve the wishes of peace, respect for life and harmony of all the Venezuelan people." http://www.eluniversal.com/2006/04/07/pol_art_07107B.shtml 18However, the Church maintained its position for months afterward: “… convictions of the Christian people unfortunately collide with the harsh national reality of the moment (…) Criminality shocks the country. Without forgetting any case, we cannot help but refer to Fr. Jorge Piñango (…) who at the time of his murder was the Undersecretary of the Episcopal Conference. The intention of some sectors to discredit the Church and intimidate it, did not have an echo in the population. The Church, for her part, knows that the cross and persecution are inseparable consequences of the prophetic vocation and Christian discipleship, and she also knows that "the truth will set us free" (Jn 8:32). (…) We are in an electoral year, a few months before the presidential elections. The questions and concerns are many. Uncertainty,fear and mistrust seem to be the psychological traits and socio-political attitudes that define the general mood of Venezuelans. What is going to happen in the country? it is the most common question, which generates anguish and paralysis ”Episcopal Conference, July 12, 2006.http://www.diosbendice.org/nuestrosobispos14.htm From here the discursive strategy of the opposition was already looming, which will be discussed later.

But what did these cases have in common?

2.2. The political-conjunctural: private communication companies and the presidential elections

Before explaining the commonalities that these cases share, it is necessary to consider the following:

1. The Global Media Observatory monitored the media coverage of the 2006 electoral campaign, the result was a total "imbalance in information and opinion content" in the public and private Venezuelan media. ²⁰ The private media, according to this report, are fully identified with the opposition.McCombs has studied the presidential campaigns in the US since 1968 and in all of them (1972,1976,1983,1986) he has found insecurity, law and order, among the seven main themes that dominated the media and public agendas. ²¹ Their relevance to voters was “almost identical to what they deserved in the news coverage”.

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• 20 21 It was not then a novelty by Tatcher and Reagan, nor by Giuliani or Bratton. Löic Wacquant (2004) in his work Las prisons de la miseria describes the genesis and the entire political, economic and media framework of the neoliberal version of North American political marketing entitled “zero tolerance”, a modality of this type of discourse popularized in the decade of the nineties.

Taking these two factors into account, we can see that the main point in common that the cases mentioned in the previous section have is their instrumentalization by the political opposition for the electoral campaign; what is as serious as government inaction regarding “citizen security” (PROVEA, 2008: 364; 2007: 333).

What other points in common do these cases have?

1) The repudiation and collective consternation towards them; 2) The participation of police officers (except in the case of the priest); 3) That the victims had the power of social claim (Gabaldón / Birkbeck, 1996, 1998) and achieved media impact: university students (middle class and “student movement”), children (emotional factor) –also students- were children of businessmen like Sindoni (upper class and economic sectors), and finally there was all the power of the Catholic Church; 4) All these cases were tactically exploited by the communication companies allied with the political right to generalize these events, turning them into a great "wave of insecurity" ²².

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• 22 Phenomenon -which are its nuances and peculiarities- was very similar to the one that occurred in 2004 in Argentina with the Blumberg case. For details of the case see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_6086000/6086240. stm. On the other hand, it can also be affirmed that with this entire campaign the upper-middle-class “thriller” projected in the Venezuelan film - racist and classist - “Secuestro Express”, very timely in electoral year, became a reality. http://www.divxonline.info/pelicula-divx/2924/Secuestro-express2005/. It is necessary to complement the above by explaining that during these years the issue of kidnappings was also very present in public opinion. Thus, for example, in the reform of the Penal Code of 2005, several modifications were made to the crime of kidnapping, the result of which was an extremely complicated type of crime plagued by technical errors and practical difficulties. According to official figures, the pcmh kidnapping rate in 2000 was 0.28 at the national level, increasing by 68.66% the following year with a rate of 0.46. The rise is maintained and thus for 2002 and 2003 there are 0.80 and 1.08 pcmh kidnappings respectively (this last year being the one that has presented the highest figure of this period), falling in 2004 to 0.89; in 2005 there was a rate of 0,78 and finally in 2006 one of 0.86 is reflected. For the year object of our analysis, although the figure is high -11% more than the previous year- which represents a significant and constant increase in kidnappings during this five-year period, in 2005 and 2006 the phenomenon did not reach its peak. maximum expression (PROVEA, 2006: 343; 2007: 341). In mid-2009, in line with this tradition, the Law Against Kidnapping and Extortion was enacted.The Law Against Kidnapping and Extortion has been enacted.The Law Against Kidnapping and Extortion has been enacted.

What was specifically sought with all this?

2.2.1. Clearly defined policy objectives

A) Cohesion of opposition supporters: when we described the cases, we mentioned who were the direct victims, as well as the actors who had a leading reaction to them: the upper middle class, businessmen and the church. Between 2005 and 2006 there were 32,968 homicides throughout the national territory (PROVEA, 2007: 336), the vast majority of which belong to the less favored classes (both intraclass and intraracial homicides, as well as those caused by the police ²³), on this there are already abundant empirical investigations, as well as rivers of ink that demonstrate it; If this is so, why the choice of these four cases within this huge universe of homicides? One explanation could be that the strengthening, integration, and cohesion of the sectors of the Venezuelan opposition were sought.

This idea is based on the approaches of Noelle-Neuman, who in her research shows how public opinion produces integration and social cohesion. According to this author, people capture the majority opinions regardless of the numbers of any published survey; most people adhere to the most accepted point of view even when they are sure of its falsehood. ²⁴This is how the process of the spiral of silence occurs, people "swallow" their own opinions and remain silent until, in a spiral process, one point of view comes to dominate the public scene and the other disappears of public consciousness by silencing its supporters. The spiral of silence could be one of the forms of appearance of public opinion. It could be a process by which a new public opinion grows, or by which the transformed meaning of an old opinion is propagated (Noelle-Neumann: 22,30,60-62,85). ²⁵

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• 23 The number of cases of extrajudicial executions between 2000 and 2007 was 6364, source: Public Ministry, extracted from Ávila, 2009: 28.24 This is what Tocqueville described as follows: “Fearing isolation more than error, they claimed to share the opinions of the majority ”.25 Later on, the author analyzes the ideas of Gabriel Tarde, who studied the capacity for and the human tendency to imitation, he referred to a human need to agree in public with others. However, the reason for wanting to avoid isolation (it is the force that sets the spiral of silence in motion), according to the German researcher, seems much stronger than the idea of ​​imitation.

The fear of isolation, bad reputation, unpopularity, leads to the need for consensus. When people try to avoid isolation, they are not overreacting to trivialities. It is a vital matter that can pose real risks. Society demands quick conformity around issues that are undergoing change. It must do so to maintain a sufficient degree of unity to allow it to remain integrated (Noelle-Neumann: 13,23,80-81,87,103). These are the effects of public opinion, no longer on the agenda, but on people. In the cases raised, the message was addressed to certain social sectors who ended up mobilized before it. The emotional factor (anger, fear,pain) together with the identification with the victims were elements that could contribute to the cohesion of these sectors.

B) That the sectors of the middle class, product of media fear, create street disorders, in the search for models of private justice, which would destabilize the government.

C) Consequently, it was expected that the government would react in a violent and authoritarian manner, to highlight in this way anti-democratic features.

D) Giving the greatest possible publicity to the deterioration or abuse of the police institution which undeniably delegitimizes the State and especially the government.

E) Take collective fears to the maximum for their political-electoral management.

The latter was evidenced in the campaign adding the opposition for the presidential elections in December of that year, with slogans such as that of his first presidential pre-candidate that read: "for a Venezuela without fear" ²⁶ or that of the second and final one who used a song whose chorus was: "Dare yourself." ²⁷ In a clear emotional manipulation, especially of people's fears; the bombing revolved around these ideas: dictatorship, repression, insecurity, if you go out into the streets they kill you, "impunity spreads", etc, etc…

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• 26 “A society dominated by fear has been created. Fear of exercising and claiming rights, fear of losing or not obtaining work for political reasons, fear of crime, fear of the police, fear of losing social benefits, fear of political uncertainty and the fate of our society and the nation itself, fear of the future, fear of losing property, fear of invasions, fear of authoritarianism, fear of autocratism, fear of militarism, fear of corruption; fear of fear itself. This can not go on like this. I aspire, and I am sure that with this I express the feeling of all, that we can live in a Venezuela without fear. " Teodoro Petkoff, late April 2006, http://movil.globovision.com/not.php?nid=26403, http://www.venezuelasinmiedo.com/27

Finally, we want to warn that, following the proposals of Noelle Neumann (Ibid.: 38), we do not believe that the message was intended solely and exclusively for the Venezuelan opposition, although this was its main receiver, the “signal” as it was “ completely open and public ”, could produce“ a change of climate in favor or against a particular party, person or idea ”if the message“ is perceived almost simultaneously everywhere by all groups of the population, all groups of age, all occupation groups. " In Venezuela, an attempt was made to make this turnaround, however the opposition did not achieve the desired results.

2.3. The positioning of "insecurity" in the public agenda: the subjective vs. the "objective"

What is the most important problem facing the nation today? This is the question that has been used in the last seven decades to probe the issues that have occupied the public's attention (McCombs). Starting from everything explained so far, let's see below how the issue of insecurity took the first place on the public agenda as of 2006, specifically from April onwards (contemporary with both the Sindoni, Faddoul and Piñango cases, as with the Kennedy trial).

TOPICS	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005		2006		2007	2008
Feb	Apr	Jul	Sep	Nov
UNEMPLOYMENT	26.75	36	32.25	37	37.5	25.3	34.25	28	2. 3	2. 3	19	twenty	14.5	10.6
UNSAFETY	25.5 19.75	22.25 27.5	10.75 34.5	14.3 fifteen	10.75 14.75	9.6 14	10.25 24.5	14 27	twenty 33	14 34	13 43	10 39	eleven 36.75	8.6 43.3
ECONOMY	10.5	10.25	10.75	12	12.5	15.6	13.25	12	9	10	10	10	12.25	17.3
CORRUPTION	9	2.75	1.5	1.6	2.25	1.3	2.5	5	5	4	3	5	4.25	3
POLITICAL SITUATION		2.5	5.5	twenty	22.25	3. 4	15.25	14	10	fifteen	12	16	21.25	16

These data on national perceptions of the country's main problems speak for themselves. ²⁸ However, to complete our analysis we consider it necessary to cross this information with the “objective dimension” related to the phenomenon of “insecurity”: the national crime rate (pcmh).

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• 28 It is interesting to see how the topic “political situation” also gained its space on the agenda: in 2002 it achieved second place when it came practically from nowhere, this year it was the Coup d'état against Chávez; in 2004 it was the main issue, possibly motivated by the presidential recall referendum campaign; Again in 2007 it obtained a second place, this year was quite politically moved: creation of the PSUV, non-renewal of the RCTV concession and the elections for the first constitutional reform proposal. It is from the year 2002 that this issue has taken center stage.

TOTAL CRIMES

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Own elaboration with data from the UCV Center for Peace.

In the graph it can be clearly observed that the years under study 2005-2006 present the lowest crime rate in the last fourteen years: 877 and 881 respectively, in a period whose average rate is 1021 crimes pcmh. Even in 2001, in which insecurity was also ranked as the first national problem (according to opinion polls), in that year the crime rate fell from 977 to 915 pcmh crimes. Observing - at first glance - an important lack of correspondence between the subjective and objective levels of safety.

However, even this analysis would be incomplete, since although the crime rate in general has had a downward trend, it has an inverse relationship with the dramatic increase in criminal violence, especially in regard to criminals. crimes of homicide (PROVEA, 2009: 354). ²⁹ During the

• • In recent years, the rate of homicides has increased constantly and worryingly, ³⁰ which could have an impact on subjective levels of insecurity. Let's see the figures:

Years	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Homicide rate PCMH in Venezuela	25	33	32	38	44	37	37	Four. Five

Prepared by the authors with data from the Ministry of Popular Power for the Interior and Justice, calculations from the Center for Peace-UCV, extracted from PROVEA's 2007 Annual Report.

We observe how between 1999 and 2000 the homicide rate rose 8 points, however in these years unemployment was the first point on the public agenda with almost 09 points above insecurity. In 2001, the homicide rate dropped one point, but with subjective insecurity it rose 7 points, passing unemployment by 2.25 points. Then between 2001 and 2003 there is again a significant increase in the homicide rate, this time of 6 points each year (12 in total!), Despite this, in this period, unemployment regained the first place in the schedule; the feeling of insecurity fell in 2002 by nineteen and a half points (19.5) and the following year it fell by another half point, from 34.5 in 2001 to 14.7 in 2003. In a total inconsistency with the rising rates of homicides. Thus,Noting the sad increase in the homicide rate in 2006 as a determining factor in positioning insecurity as the main topic on the public agenda would not be entirely consistent. This corroborates our hypothesis of the media positioning of insecurity regardless of the real levels of criminal violence.

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• 29 The increase in criminal violence in the country is a phenomenon that dates back to the last century (López: 38-39; Sanjuán: 232). The increase in homicides has been a constant over the last fifty years, as Briceño (1997: 198) points out: “Deaths from homicides and suicides, which by 1955 were ranked 16th among the causes of death in the country, it moved to sixth place in 1993. The average annual homicide rate for the five-year period 1975-1979 was 9.13 per 100,000 inhabitants, for 1980-1984 it was 12.1, 10.7 for 1985-1989 and 19 for 1990- 1994, that is to say, almost double than in the previous five years. " This sustained increase in violent crime has accelerated in recent decades. Thus, for example, in 1990, 13% of the crimes registered were against persons, while homicides amounted to 1%;Ten years later -in 2000-, crimes committed against people reached 21.8%, that is, almost double than in the previous decade, while homicides totaled 3.4%. From all of the above, it is important to highlight that homicides have almost quintupled their national occurrence in the last 28 years, since their rate in 1981 was 11 homicides pcmh, and in 2009 it was 52 (Sanjuán, 2003: 121. Own data update). In Latin America, the figures also show a constant increase: “homicide levels in the region, for example, rose to 44% during a period of 10 years between 1984 and 1994. Consequently, in half of the countries of Latin America and In the Caribbean, homicides are the second leading cause of death for the population between the ages of 15 and 25.A report (…) of the World Bank disclosed that each year 140,000 Latin Americans are murdered. The extent of this violence has spilled over into a generalized climate of crime in the region ”(Tulchin / Garig, 2003: 13-14).30 An important aspect to consider within the increase in objective insecurity in Venezuela, and especially the Homicide rate is the number of armed people in the country. In July 2006, the Minister of the Interior and Justice declared that the number of firearms in the country amounted to 6 million, which in PROVEA estimates (2007: 342) would mean that in a period of three years the number of firearms weapons increased by 20%. This NGO, following investigations on the subject, affirms that in the country there is a firearm for every 5 people;An indicator of this phenomenon could be the crime rate of “illegal possession of weapons”, which has increased constantly since 2000.

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Own elaboration.

That is why we point out as an important aspect for the analysis the way in which the political opposition, through the private media, managed to position insecurity in the first place on the public agenda. An issue that since the 1980s has been among the main concerns of Venezuelans (Santos, 1998) and that since 2006 has not ceased to be at the top of the public agenda as the "main problem of the country." ³¹

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• 31 Between 2007 and 2009, the Venezuelan Institute for Data Analysis (IVAD) reflects that the majority of Venezuelans have insecurity as the main problem in the country. In a survey, carried out in March 2009, which was carried out at the national level, with a sample of 1,200 people interviewed, 86.1% of those surveyed pointed to insecurity as the main problem in the country (by mid-2008 it was also the main problem with 77%). Http://www.rnv.gov.ve/noticias/index.php?act=Attach&type=post&i d = post-2-12223086682.ibf, http://www.vtv.gob.ve/files/bar%C3 % B3metro% 20IVAD-Seijas% 20Mazo% 202009_0.pdf

2.4. Responses in political-criminal matters

The government in 2006 expressed its inability to cope with its campaign and its political action in matters of "citizen security." He never admitted that both on the level of perceptions (which eventually build realities) and on that of concrete reality, insecurity (subjective and objective ³²) has been increasing. Officials related to the matter did not transcend the discussion on media constructions, forgetting that beyond that debate, they must execute concrete policies. It could be said that the propositional discourse in this matter was non-existent, ³³operating a kind of "spiral of silence" in the main political actors of the government regarding the issue of insecurity, favoring the positioning of the opposition's discourse. ^{3. 4}

It is just two years after 2006, possibly taking into account the results of the constitutional referendum of December 2007, that President Chávez takes into account, for the first time, the issue of insecurity in his speech: “… the same thing happens with the issue of insecurity, which to some extent I feel is like a debt because nine years have passed and we have made little progress, but hey, we are going to regain momentum and now we are going to regain ground and lost time. " ³⁵

In this way, government criminal policy has been characterized especially by inaction (with some exceptions in the legislative sphere). Criminal policy and citizen security for a State that does not want to have an authoritarian court, or to fall into typical practices of the political right, is something extremely complex and difficult to face. Especially if it tries to be consistent with the protection of the most vulnerable sectors of society and the search for a better quality of life for all.

• 32 When we refer to “objective insecurity” we focus especially on the increase in the homicide rate, since in general the crime rate has decreased, as we have already pointed out.33 An important exception to this statement was the creation of CONAREPOL which we will detail later.34 “In times of drastic change, it is very necessary to pay attention to how to behave so as not to be isolated. When the order of things remains stable, most people do not clash with public opinion if they do not violate the current norms of decency; it won't even fall into a whirlwind of the spiral of silence. What to do or not do or say is so obvious that the pressure of conformity acts like the atmospheric pressure we live under: we are unaware of it.But in pre-revolutionary and revolutionary times, new sensations are experienced. The support of opinion leaves governments until they finally collapse; and individuals, losing confidence and security of what is to be praised or condemned, try to link to the new guidelines. In these hectic times and under these pressures, it is more difficult to understand the functioning of public opinion and to find adequate words to describe it ”(Noelle-Neumann: 107-108).35 February 2008, on national television, taken from PROVEA (2008: 356).In these hectic times and under these pressures, it is more difficult to understand the functioning of public opinion and find adequate words to describe it ”(Noelle-Neumann: 107-108).35 February 2008, on national television, taken from PROVEA (2008: 356).In these hectic times and under these pressures, it is more difficult to understand the functioning of public opinion and find adequate words to describe it ”(Noelle-Neumann: 107-108).35 February 2008, on national television, taken from PROVEA (2008: 356).

To a large extent, this governmental inaction may also be motivated by diluting the issue of security within general social policy, losing its necessary specificity. ³⁶For PROVEA (2008: 355), both in the President and in senior officials, “the belief that poverty is the efficient cause of violence, therefore the improvement in the population's living standards, the promotion of processes of social inclusion, the extension of citizenship and the reduction of unemployment and informal employment, would be enough to restore the democratic coexistence of Venezuelan society. Such belief, widely spread in the region, is not based on proven theory: on the contrary, even more so in the case of Venezuela, it contributes to reaffirm more a circumstantial relationship between poverty-violence than that of cause-effect. " And indeed, during the last ten years, poverty rates have decreased notably, from a percentage of poor people nationwide to 50,4 for 1998 to a percentage of 33.6 for 2007 (INE in PROVEA, 2008: 367), keeping an inversely proportional relationship with the homicide rate.

This inaction is such that it is only after the period studied that the government has more interventions in the field of citizen security.

Own elaboration with data from Center for Peace UCV.

• What should never be confused with a criminal policy independent of the general policy

Let's now see some of the policies with which the government reacted to this positioning of insecurity within the 2006 agenda:

1. CONAREPOL and the National Police Law: on April 10 - on the days of the Faddoul scandal and with Kennedy and Sindoni in tow - the Ministry of the Interior and Justice created the National Commission for Police Reform (CONAREPOL). This academic and inter-institutional space worked on the formulation of a police model based on respect for the Human Rights. In this way, the government concentrated all the demand for security on the police issue. Despite the fact that, beyond the construction of the previous situation, the police problem has a long history in the country (more than 30 years) ³⁷; The Venezuelan police have been out of control for some time and the changes of government have not improved that situation; cases of execution are extrajudicial ³⁸They are not new and the victims of these events are the most humble people in the Venezuelan neighborhoods (those with the least power of social claim). At that time, the victimization of sectors with the power of social claim, with great media visibility, was necessary for the government to take charge of these issues. It is in these cases when the influence of the media on the public agenda, and of the latter on the political agenda, become notorious.

• 37 “ The Venezuelan of the 80s between concern about the advance of crimes and dissatisfaction with the work and behavior of the police institutions … (…)… public opinion began to realize that intimidation and abuse of power penetrated the police methodology, especially in the street work carried out by the preventive police forces, and in the investigation and investigation activities carried out by the Technical Corps of the Judicial Police ”(Santos, 1998: 199).38 On extrajudicial executions in Venezuela and the bodies in charge of criminal investigation, see: Avila, 2009. In: http://www2.mp.ma.gov.br/ ampem / artigos / Artigos2009 / 2009_ARTIGO-0602Ano2009.pdf

The truth is that all this rekindled the debate about the need to regulate the police function and to exercise greater controls over the institution, measures that the political actors of the government saw materialized in the creation of a National Police Law (LPN). For its part, CONAREPOL carried out important studies and contributions in this regard; however, apparently, unfortunately this remained in publications for libraries and specialized academics, since there has been no greater willingness of the government to apply many of the proposals of the aforementioned commission. Only two years later the enactment of the LPN was considered, but this was only a part of the whole set of policies that had worked in that space. Composition law alone was to solve the complex phenomenon of insecurity. ³⁹

The positioning of insecurity as the main topic on the agenda caused a parliamentary "urgency" to pass as many laws as possible related to the matter. In the enactment of laws, the government found the best response to media pressure from its adversaries. We will mention the most relevant ones without considering their contents, which would exceed the objectives of this study.

B) Law on witnesses and victims: it was presented on June 27 at the initiative of the Attorney General of the Republic before the National Assembly, enacted on August 22 and entered into force on November 4 of that same year. Record time for the regular legislative process: the law took four months to pass. In this case, the entire weight of the case of the murder of Prosecutor Danilo Anderson (2004) was added to the agenda of insecurity, which was plagued by scandals, among these one of the most outstanding was that of a “star witness” who - in mid-2006 - he needed various protection measures from the Public Ministry. This law would then have a double media genesis.

Reform of the COPP: On October 4, a new reform of the Organic Code of Criminal Procedure came into effect, designed with the aim of granting greater procedural benefits to those convicted. This was a response to the demands of the country's prison population, which during 2006 staged several protests requesting procedural benefits. Thus, then, this law also corresponded to two media pressures: the general matrix of the wave of insecurity and the necessary reforms of the penal system and a more specific one referring to the penitentiary subsystem. ⁴⁰

• 39 Another of the recommendations taken into account was the creation of the General Police Council, created in July 2009. This body advises the Minister with competence in matters of citizen security whose mission is to contribute to the definition, planning and coordination of public policies in the matter of the police service, as well as in the professional performance of the police officers. http://www.consejopolicia.gob.ve/40 It is noteworthy that within this reform - which had some progress in criminal enforcement - article 493 was repealed, which proposed obtaining any of the alternative formulas for serving the sentence in a range of crimes, only after the convict would have served half the sentence. This repeal was due to the existence of an appeal for annulment due to unconstitutionality that was being filed before the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, together with a constitutional protection, having issued a precautionary measure in 2005, in which the application of this article until final judgment is issued.

Organic Law on the Right of Women to a Life Free of Violence: on November 9 it was proposed by the Permanent Commission of Family, Women and Youth of the National Assembly and approved on the 25 of that same month. The expeditious approval of this law was due, on the one hand, to the “wave of insecurity”, but on the other-surely of greater weight-, it was also motivated by the ruling of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, in the month of May, in favor of the unconstitutional dismissal - requested in 2003 by the Public Ministry - of several articles of the Law on Violence against Women and the Family. This annulled the legal mandate that allowed the immediate detention of those involved in mistreatment of women or the family. This request was politically counterproductive for the Public Ministry,who was the subject of all kinds of accusations and disqualifications by feminist movements.

Such were the reactions of the feminist movements -many of them allied with sectors of the opposition- that as a result of this situation, the Public Ministry in conjunction with the National Assembly, announced the creation of 100 specialized tax offices to address the problem of violence against women. Without further technical studies or analysis on the real needs in this area; This decision was only a media response to pressures of the same nature from feminist groups. To the two media pressures mentioned, another should be added, perhaps of less intensity, but which was still present: the case of Linda Loaiza, a young woman who was kidnapped in an apartment for three months by an upper-middle-class man, who beat her, He systematically raped and tortured him, causing him very serious injuries.Due to the social ancestry of the person involved, the case had all kinds of delays, was suspended 29 times, the file went through 20 courts and 10 appeals courts, etc… This case, due to its characteristics, was a scandal that has occupied the criminal news since In 2004, it was only in May 2006 (the year of our study on the “wave of insecurity and impunity”) when the accused was sentenced to 6 years in prison. Would there be any influence of the context described so far for the change of rhythm in this case?It was only in May 2006 (the year of our study on the “wave of insecurity and impunity”) that the accused was sentenced to 6 years in prison. Would there be any influence of the context described so far for the change of pace in this case ?It was only in May 2006 (the year of our study on the “wave of insecurity and impunity”) that the accused was sentenced to 6 years in prison. Would there be any influence of the context described so far for the change of pace in this case ?

3. Final Comments

In the previous lines, we have described how the private communication companies positioned insecurity as the main problem in the country, directly influencing the government's political agenda. This type of experience, as we have already pointed out, is nothing new and abundant scientific literature has already worked on and demonstrated these processes. Whose most traditional environments are electoral campaigns. In all of them there is a point in common: the results of criminal policy motivated by alarms, collective fears and demands for greater “security” are predominantly reactive and regressive for the protection of human rights and civil liberties. If to this we add, on the one hand, a clear political intention of its promoters to follow this path,and on the other hand, we have government actors with little capacity to respond and experience in these issues and situations, the situation is becoming more delicate.

Social conflict and violence are issues that deserve a deep, serious and committed political discussion that transcends mere electoral junctures and media-partisan shows. The instrumentalization of these issues by this type of situation makes it difficult to create conditions for the construction and development of democratic policies to prevent and contain violence. Criminal policy should not be subject to the rhythms of the media agenda.

In this sense, it is necessary that government institutions are not so easily seduced or induced by these logics, the conjunctural political debate is inevitable for the government, but the development and execution of coherent, democratic and inclusive policies for the protection of fundamental rights in people's daily lives, it is their duty, as well as being the main reason why people give them the vote. This does not happen with private communication companies, which obey particular interests and do not have the legitimacy of popular voting.

Finally, it should not be lost sight of the fact that those who suffer the most from violence and conflicts are the great majority dispossessed and marginalized, the non-owners, those who are made invisible by the media, unless they appear as perpetrators, it is only in these cases when communication companies offer them a preferential space.

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