For the preparation of this presentation I had to make conceptual clarifications in my own epistemological perspective, because in previous research as in "categorical networks for the conformation of the scientific accounting structure" presented before the XXII Inter-American Accounting Conference held in Lima in 1,997, I wielded the thesis: “the historicist conceptual frameworks such as paradigms (of Thomas Kuhn), research programs (of Imre Lakatos) and Research Traditions (of Larry Laudan), which are part of the so-called historicist epistemology, do not allow us significant Methodological contributions in the theoretical development of accounting science, limiting itself to providing us with a historical vision (external history) of the progress of our science,which is insufficient in the task of shaping the scientific structure of accounting (internal history) ”. Hence, in this research, he preferred the use of Wolfgang Stegmüller's so-called structuralist epistemology and especially the category of “theoretical networks” by Ulises Moulines, to which, for semantic reasons and the level of development of accounting science it I called it "categorial network." Of course, with this I am not claiming that structuralist epistemology is incompatible with historicist epistemology. In the words of Stegmüller, this conception leads to an informal semantic theory of science that in turn "adding certain pragmatic concepts, allows a constructive criticism and a partial justification of the philosophies of Kuhn and Lakatos ”.
Structuralist epistemology is therefore the continuation and overcoming, based on details and deepening, of the historicist vision; but Stegmüller cautions that "no 'structuralist' is morally obliged to become a 'Kuhnian' and no 'Kuhnian' is forced to do or even become interested in the kind of work begun by P. Suppes and continued by JD Sneed (original structuralists) ”. With this last precision, I state that structuralist epistemology has historicist epistemology as one of its constitutive elements, the first is analytical and systematic and the second is empirical and historical. Thus, it is easy to carry out historicist studies without leaving structuralism.
Historicist epistemology responds to the objective of evaluating the state of development of sciences, as well as in accounting science, from its scientific communities, from its paradigms. In this II International Seminar on Accounting Research, according to the agenda, the notion of Paradigms by Thomas Kuhn will play a central role in the discussions and will give us a very interesting vision of the scientific accounting progress and its current behavior.
The category “Paradigm” was used in all its heuristic and semantic breadth and richness by Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), and marked an important milestone in the study of science and its remarkable influence (and continues to this day in some epistemologists with a postmodern and hermeneutical tendency) in epistemology, generated a series of criticisms from philosophers of science such as Popper, P. Suppes, D. Shapere and others, including the term paradigm. Well, they consider that "paradigm" is a confusing and imprecise concept, they even call it a metaphor. Kuhn recognized this insufficiency in a post-scription to the work mentioned for his 1969 edition. In it he proposes replacing paradigm with disciplinary matrix.This restriction made to get out of the criticism by making new clarifications introduced new features, but also accepting its weakness, and thus demonstrating that his thinking was evolving by making improvements to his approaches to face criticism.
This paper called Emerging Paradigms in Accounting Science raises three main Theses:
- The accounting utility paradigm is not enough to solve current transcendental enigmas in accounting science such as the one called “knowledge accounting”. The current stage of accounting development is that of a “science in crisis”, due to the emergence of rival theories that try to solve the enigmas posed to the accounting utility paradigm, struggling to gain majority acceptance from a paradigmatic perspective in such a way that allows accounting science to:
Recognized scientific achievements, and, Set of shared commitments in the accounting community.
- The implications of the Kuhnian approach to scientific development are applicable, with the reservations that Kuhn himself formulated in his "Second Reflections on Paradigms", in the stage of science in crisis in which accounting science finds itself. Aspects such as rivalry of theories, the generation of transcendental enigmas, the incommensurability of knowledge and a probable "scientific revolution" are manifested in the current stage of development of accounting science.
The first part of this work is aimed at detailing the fundamental premises of historicist epistemology in the study of scientific change, as well as detailing the scope of Kuhnian thought and especially the concept of paradigms, the stages of: normal science, science in crisis and scientific revolution through which scientific change is going through in all sciences.
The second part of the work is aimed at characterizing the change of Paradigms within accounting science, identifying its disciplinary matrix, and its base elements such as symbolic generalizations, models, values, and shared examples. It also characterizes the current state of accounting science as that of "Science in Crisis", identifying the transcendental unsolved enigma, and the rival emerging theories that try to propose satisfactory solutions to these accumulated problems.
The third part of the work tries to show the scope of a rival theory to the utility paradigm, in the understanding of the so-called knowledge accounting, that is, the path to the accounting scientific revolution, the first formulations of an authentic accounting science, the incommensurability of knowledge that it will generate, the taxonomic change of the paradigmatic alternatives and the most radical enigma: the accounting of knowledge, origin and vicissitudes.
Finally I must warn in this presentation that although the II International Seminar on Accounting Research complies, I see it in the agenda, precisely with the objective of evaluating the current development of accounting science from a historicist perspective of epistemology, from the communities In accounting science, from the paradigms, the following stages of the comprehensive evaluation of accounting science are still missing, that is, this means that we are taking only the first step in the task of turning it into an authentic science. A subsequent task to that of the historical evaluation of the accounting scientific development, will be to propose the mechanisms and ways to turn it into a science capable of offering descriptions, explanations and predictions of the accounting fact,For this, it will require a scientific theory and the other elements of science that Bunge raises in his Decatupla, which is why "new epistemological and methodological perspectives will be required in the construction of an authentic accounting science", which could mean the new theme a develop in subsequent events.
The important collaboration of Lic. Zósimo De la Cruz Sullca Director of Research at ICODE Instituto Contabilidad y
EMERGING PARADIGMS IN
PART ONE
THE PARADIGMS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCES
HISTORICAL EPISTEMOLOGY IN THE STUDY OF SCIENTIFIC CHANGE
There are many reasons to try to understand the dynamics of science, dealing with it epistemology. Some reasons may be of a practical nature, such as the interest in guiding the development of certain areas of research, and others of a theoretical nature, such as elucidating the nature and scope of scientific knowledge. To date, we do not have a conception of how science works and evolves that has achieved general, or at least majority, acceptance. What exists is a variety of epistemological approaches (empiricism, historicism, structuralism, etc.), which, while proposing illuminating hypotheses of certain aspects of the scientific enterprise, are widely discussed and none achieves a majority acceptance.The so-called historicist epistemology emerged at the beginning of the 1960s as a criticism of the “inherited conception” of empiricism and Popper's positivist falsationalism, questioning the possibility of being able to axiomatize the empirical sciences, as well as having neglected the historical process of gestation of scientific theories (external history of science), originating with this historicist perspective a cognitive turn in the philosophy of science.
Both Khunn (Paradigms), Lakatos (scientific research programs), Laudan (research traditions) are recognized as the founders of historicism, each adopting to a greater or lesser degree a realistic perspective in their philosophy, and also as their methodologies they have influenced the subsequent evolution of scientific epistemology towards a more rational basis.
These historicist theories proposed in epistemology and that seek to account for scientific development and change share some fundamental premises, namely and that we list below:
- The history of science is the main source of information for building and testing models of science. In particular, models that attempt to account for scientific dynamics must be supported by the study of effective practice and be subject to empirical testing. There is no single way to conceptually organize experience. Although experience is a fundamental ingredient in the acquisition of knowledge, science is not only experience but also, and above all, the ability to see the same facts in different ways. All the "facts" of science are theory-laden. Scientific theories are always constructed and evaluated within broad conceptual frameworks. These conceptual frameworks are formed by a series of basic assumptions (assumptions) that establish,among other things: i) the interests for which theories are built and what is expected of them (what problems should they solve and what field of phenomena should be applied), ii) their ontological commitments (what entities and processes are postulated as existing), and, iii) their methodological commitments (which criteria should be adjusted for their evaluation).
These conceptual frameworks acquire specific characteristics and different names according to the author (paradigms, research programs, research traditions, inter-theoretical networks, etc.), but in general they are considered as the basic units of the analysis of science.
- The conceptual frameworks themselves change. These are certainly structures that have a longer half-life than their associated theories, but are by no means fixed or ahistorical entities. Hence the concern to propose models that account for the most profound and long-term changes at the level of budgets. Science is not a totally autonomous enterprise. Since there are no algorithmic procedures for the evaluation and comparison of theories (there is no universal measure of their success), the theoretical change is subordinate for the reasons that, in each context, exist in its favor; This situation gives rise to “external” factors (ideological, social, psychological, etc.) playing a role in scientific development. The development of science is neither linear nor cumulative.As the rule is rather competition and conflict between rival theories, almost always the acceptance of one theory implies the rejection of another, and this can lead to explanatory losses. It is even considered that the coexistence of diverse approaches is essential for the growth and improvement of scientific knowledge.Science is a company whose rationality is impossible to determine.Only empirical investigation of its mechanisms and results over time can reveal us in what consists of scientific rationality. Therefore normative standards or principles must be drawn from the historical record of successful science Models of scientific development do not have a neutral basis for testing. Since the basis for testing these philosophical models is the history of science,And since there is no history of science that is methodologically neutral (all history supposes certain ideas about what science is), the problem of establishing the relationships and interactions between the history of science and the philosophy (methodology) of The science.
THE KUHNIAN MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC CHANGE
Most of the theses listed above were articulated for the first time in the model proposed by Kuhn, forming a global conception of science alternative to the "inherited conception" of empiricism. Kuhn's work constitutes a crucial turn, a "revolution", in the development of the philosophy of science, placing the problem of scientific change at the center of discussions.
The Kuhnian model establishes a series of successive stages in the development of a scientific discipline.
2.1. PRE-PARADIGMATIC STAGE
It begins with a stage called "pre-paradigmatic", in which various "schools" coexist that compete with each other for dominance in a certain field of research. There is little (or no) agreement among these schools regarding the characterization of the objects of study, the problems to be solved and their order of importance, the most appropriate methods and procedures, etc. What is characteristic at this stage is that the research carried out by competing groups fails to produce a cumulative body of results. This period of the schools ends when the field of inquiry is unified under the direction of the same set of basic assumptions, which Kuhn calls "paradigm." Researchers agree that one of the competing approaches is so promising that the others abandon,and they accept this approach as the basis of their own research. This transition, which occurs only once in each scientific discipline and is therefore irreversible, creates the first consensus around a paradigm, and marks the step towards mature science. It should be clarified from now on that Kuhn uses the term paradigm basically in two senses: i) as a concrete achievement or accomplishment, and, ii) as a set of shared commitments.
The first sense refers to successful and surprising solutions to certain problems, which are recognized by the entire relevant community. These applications or specific solution cases serve as examples to follow in subsequent investigations. The second sense refers to the set of basic assumptions or commitments shared by the community in charge of developing a scientific discipline. This set includes commitments to certain ontological assumptions: i) symbolic generalizations (fundamental laws), ii) models (research procedures and techniques), and, iii) criteria for evaluating theories.
The relationship between the two senses of paradigm can be seen as follows: paradigm as a set of shared commitments (second sense) is what those who model their work on certain paradigmatic cases assume (first sense).
2.2 NORMAL SCIENCE STAGE
The consensus about a paradigm (second sense) marks the beginning of a stage of “normal science”. Normal science basically consists of a problem solving activity (riddles) like a kind of puzzle game. Through this activity, the current paradigm becomes more and more precise and better articulated. The stage of normal science is conservative; the objective is not the search for novelties, neither at the level of facts nor at the level of theory. It is about stretching to the maximum, both in scope and precision, the explanatory potential of the dominant paradigm. As the set of basic assumptions is not considered problematic or subject to revision (failure to solve problems is generally taken as a lack of ability of scientists, not as counterexamples),You work all the time under the same rules of the game, and this allows the results to all occur in the same direction and be clearly cumulative. Hence the meaning and measure of progress, within each period of normal science, are well defined.
The role that paradigms play as concrete or exemplary achievements (first sense) is central in the development of normal research. Scientists solve problems by recognizing their similarity to exemplary cases, identify new data as significant, and new generations learn the meaning of basic concepts by solving model solution problems. These exemplary cases are the connection between experience and theory; they show how to see and manipulate nature from a certain theoretical perspective. The cognitive content of a discipline is not embedded in a series of explicitly formulated statements and rules, but in its paradigmatic exemplary cases. In this way, paradigms, in both senses of the term,they are the essential guide for research in normal science periods.
2.3 STAGE OF SCIENCE IN CRISIS
Contrary to its purposes, normal research - with its increasing specialization and extension of the field of applications - leads to the posing of problems ("anomalies") that refuse to be solved with the tools of the paradigm in question. While it is true that the adequacy between a paradigm and "nature" is never total or perfect - there are always unsolved problems from the beginning - the emergence of certain anomalies suggests that something is wrong at a deep level, and that only a change in the basic assumptions will make it possible to find a solution. This stage in which the efficacy and correctness of the paradigm itself is questioned is the stage of "science in crisis". With the crisis begins the "extraordinary science", that is,the activity of proposing alternative theories that imply a rejection or modification of the basic assumptions accepted until then. It is in these periods when philosophical reflection on these assumptions or foundations is on the rise. The proliferation of alternative theories and perspectives is of crucial importance in the development of science, as scientists never abandon a paradigm unless an alternative paradigm exists to resolve anomalies. Crises are ended in one of three ways:for scientists never abandon a paradigm unless there is an alternative paradigm to resolve anomalies. Crises are ended in one of three ways:for scientists never abandon a paradigm unless there is an alternative paradigm to resolve anomalies. Crises are ended in one of three ways:
- The questioned paradigm is finally shown capable of solving the problems that caused the crisis; not even the most radically novel approaches manage to account for the anomalies, for which they are archived (they are reserved for a future stage where better conceptual and instrumental), and an alternative paradigm emerges that resolves the anomalies and begins the struggle to achieve a new consensus.
2.4 SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION
Kuhn describes the paradigm shift as a "scientific revolution." Kuhn's theses about scientific change are targeted by the traditional models of the evaluation and choice of theories (both confirmationist and refutationist), and the notion of rationality presupposed by these models. By describing the paradigm shift as a revolution, Kuhn is denying that the choice between theories belonging to different paradigms is a question that can be solved by applying a neutral algorithm. The choice between rival theories cannot be resolved unequivocally only by logic and neutral experience (as the logical empiricists claimed), nor by decisions clearly governed by methodological rules (as the Popperians proposed).The differences between the contenders during a scientific revolution can become so profound that they prevent any agreement from being reached on what counts as a decisive argument in favor of any of the competing paradigms. So finally the paradigm shift depends on the consensus of the scientific community, let's see how this happens:
INCONMENSURABILITY OF KNOWLEDGE
The bodies of knowledge separated by a revolution, that is, inserted in different paradigms, are very difficult to compare, and it may be the case that there is no common measure of their success, that is, they may be “immeasurable”. The differences that separate the defenders of rival theories (and that are responsible for the incommensurability) are differences in the basic assumptions of the paradigms: differences in the criteria that determine the legitimacy of both the problems and the proposed solutions; differences in the conceptual network through which the world is seen (in the way experience is conceptually organized), which implies that there is no neutral language of observation; differences in assumptions about what entities and processes nature contains (in the ontology being postulated);and differences in the way of applying and ranking values such as consistency, simplicity, empirical adequacy, precision, fertility, etc. Then, as a paradigm shift carries with it fundamental differences -which generate changes in the meaning and use of the language of rival theories_, and as there is no appeal instance above paradigms -a privileged framework of universal principles_, in debates cannot be based on common premises and, therefore, it cannot be proved that one theory is better than another. There can be no logically competent or decisive argument in favor of either theory. Hence the only path left is that of persuasion: each of the conflicting parties tries to convince the other to make its own basic assumptions.The absence of decisive arguments means that those who refuse to accept the new paradigm cannot be branded as illogical or irrational; and for the same reason, this acceptance does not occur simultaneously. When consensus around the new paradigm is finally restored, a new stage of normal science begins. In this way, once a scientific discipline has reached maturity, it repeatedly goes through the sequence: normal science-crisis revolution-new normal science.once a scientific discipline has reached maturity, it repeatedly goes through the sequence: normal science-crisis revolution-new normal science.once a scientific discipline has reached maturity, it repeatedly goes through the sequence: normal science-crisis revolution-new normal science.
PARADIGMATIC CONTINUITY
It is extremely important to note that there is a certain independence between the components of a paradigm and, with this, that the change of paradigms does not necessarily imply a change in all the basic assumptions. For example, the fundamental assumption of historical cost has been present in several paradigms. This makes it possible to emphasize the lines of continuity through the revolutions - without having to deny the strong discontinuities - and to reinforce the platform that serves as the basis for the persuasion process. To the evaluation and choice of theories, Kuhn highlights the role played by values such as empirical adequacy, precision, simplicity, coherence (both internally and with other accepted theories), and fertility, as objective criteria for evaluating and comparing rival theories. But,Despite being the source of good reasons for choosing theories, they cannot give rise to a decision algorithm (they are not sufficient to dictate an unequivocal decision to the entire relevant community). Good reasons are contextually dependent, historically changing, and never conclusive. Thus, Kuhn reconstructs scientific change with a model of reasons (not rules), which allows for diverse interpretations and the non-uniform application of shared criteria.that allows for diverse interpretations and non-uniform application of shared criteria.that allows for diverse interpretations and non-uniform application of shared criteria.
SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY
This approach implies a strong change in the notion of scientific rationality. According to the traditional notion (presupposed in somewhat rhythmic models), all scientific disagreement is decidable in principle. Kuhn rejects this idea in view of the phenomenon of incommensurability, and leaves room for deep historical disagreements. If disagreements and conflicts are constitutive episodes in the development of science, and if science taken as a whole is the best example of rationality at our disposal, we must assume a notion of rationality - and a model of choice of theories - that let us reconstruct these episodes as rational.
Disagreements, then, are the result of individual variability in the application of shared criteria in each context. The diversity of trials in times of crisis and revolution allows the group of scientists, as a whole, to "hedge their bets." The lack of unanimity allows the risks to be taken in these periods to be distributed among the group members; Thus, some scientists will persist working on theories that are in difficulty (which are often successful), while others will explore new theories and develop them until they can convince others (which happens in revolutions)
PARADIGMATIC RELATIVISM
Kuhn's way of posing the problem of paradigm shifts involves a certain kind of relativism. The thesis that there is no appeal instance above the paradigms implies a relativization of the norms and evaluation criteria to the different paradigms, and also implies the breakdown of the ingrained association between rationality and ultimate foundations. Scientific changes can be reconstructed as rational (as supported by good reasons relative to the context), although there are no absolute principles of rationality, transcendent to any conceptual framework. The search for the method that would guarantee correct scientific practice and justify the resulting knowledge, considered by classical philosophers as the central objective of a theory of science,it is rejected by Kuhn based on his historical analyzes. Kuhn finds that the most outstanding episodes in the history of science violate the alleged methodological canons, both those proposed by inductivists and deductivists, and that this has not impeded the success of the scientific endeavor. The abundant historical counterexamples seem to show that rather the methods themselves change and evolve through paradigm shifts.The abundant historical counterexamples seem to show that rather the methods themselves change and evolve through paradigm shifts.The abundant historical counterexamples seem to show that rather the methods themselves change and evolve through paradigm shifts.
So, if the methods are not universalizable, a theory of science - a methodology - has to offer a model that allows us to understand their change and development. As a result of Kuhn's work, it is emphasized that no component of the scientific enterprise is immutable or absolute, be it evaluation criteria, substantive beliefs about the world, experimental procedures, formal tools, perceptions, data, interests, etc. Everything in science is subject to alteration. The goal of a philosophical theory of science is now considered to be to rationally reconstruct scientific change and development. This reconstruction is done through models that instead of prescribing a priori what has to be considered rational,they rely on empirical and historical investigation of cases that reveal what scientific rationality is and has been. This change in the nature of the methodology gives a strong impulse to research at the meta-methodological level, that is, the level where the different theories about science are evaluated. The problem of designing criteria for comparing and evaluating these theories arises in a new way. Although Kuhn has not dealt with making detailed proposals at this meta-methodological level, his work made it clear that the history of science is the basis for testing the models of scientific development, and that these should be judged based on their adequacy. historical.that is, the level where the different theories about science are evaluated. The problem of designing criteria for comparing and evaluating these theories arises in a new way. Although Kuhn has not dealt with making detailed proposals at this meta-methodological level, his work made it clear that the history of science is the basis for testing the models of scientific development, and that these should be judged based on their adequacy. historical.that is, the level where the different theories about science are evaluated. The problem of designing criteria for comparing and evaluating these theories arises in a new way. Although Kuhn has not dealt with making detailed proposals at this meta-methodological level, his work made it clear that the history of science is the basis for testing the models of scientific development, and that these should be judged based on their adequacy. historical.His work made it clear that the history of science is the basis for testing the models of scientific development, and that these should be judged according to their historical adequacy.His work made it clear that the history of science is the basis for testing the models of scientific development, and that these should be judged according to their historical adequacy.
SECOND PART
PARADIGMS IN ACCOUNTING
Throughout the history of accounting thought, many authors making use of the Kuhnian position of the development of science have raised different paradigmatic perspectives that would have been produced in our Science.
These paradigmatic perspectives of other authors generate paradoxes with respect to our proposal based on the same Kuhnian model and the historicist epistemology itself, whose basic premises were raised in the first part of this paper, they are also incommensurable with our thesis about the current state of development of accounting science that I sustain as a science in crisis and that were outlined in the introduction to the presentation.
In this regard, we must mention, albeit briefly, Wells (1996) who considers that accounting exceeds the period of revolution of conceptual theoretical structures in the 1940s, and from that time on the different phases begin to reach the Khun's normal science concept, Wells considers that before the 40 'there were only some logical advances in the structuring of accounting science, so he identifies it with a "pre-paradigmatic" stage of accounting, which constitutes a first Paradox with respect to our proposal that accepts that Paccioli was the initiator of the legalistic paradigm in accounting with his work Summa Aritmética more than 500 years ago. A similar position of the non-existence of a predominant paradigm until before 1940 is adopted by Richard Matessich,but through the perspective of Research Traditions (by Larry Laudan), and applied to the accounting field, they would show the following research traditions: Research Tradition nº1 (Stewardship Program), Research Tradition nº2 (Valuation-investment program), Research Tradition nº3 (Information-strategic program).
Another work worth mentioning is that carried out by the American Accounting Association (1977) under the title Statement on Accounting Theory and Theory Acceptance (SATTA). This association of accounting professors, analyzes the various paradigms that concur with each other, and concludes that the current accounting field is developed under the prism of a multiparadigmatic discipline with no predominance of any of them. They establish a classification in three categories of paradigms. First, the classical approach in which it includes the 2 traditional orientations: positive-inductive and normative-deductive. The second point of view of utility where decision models and the interests of decision-makers are located. By last,there are those who try to apply statistical means locating in this regard the theory of economic value or economic information. This vision of the non-existence of a predominant paradigm or “multipradigmatic” perspective would indicate the following: i) that accounting still remains in a pre-paradigmatic stage in the absence of a predominant theory, not yet entering a normal science stage, ii). to try to distort the Kuhnian vision about the necessary rivalry between the existing theories in the accounting field, of which one of them prevails, and to affirm that many theories coexist simultaneously, and whose contents are complementary or "commensurable" in specific accounting applications or problems.Generating a second paradox in relation to our thesis of the existence of a predominant paradigm in each stage of the accounting development, and even more, that at present the utility paradigm is losing predominance in the presence of transcendent enigmas that cannot be solved by the utility paradigm, before which rival theories have been emerging that give satisfactory answers to these enigmas, the theory of social responsibility and the theory of critical knowledge (which will be developed later) and that indicate the stage of science in crisis in the accounting field.Before which rival theories have been emerging that do give satisfactory answers to these enigmas, the theory of social responsibility and the theory of critical knowledge (which will be developed later) and that indicate the stage of science in crisis in the accounting field.Before which rival theories have been emerging that do give satisfactory answers to these enigmas, the theory of social responsibility and the theory of critical knowledge (which will be developed later) and that indicate the stage of science in crisis in the accounting field.
A third paradox in relation to our Kuhnian vision of the development of accounting science is raised by Argentines Oswaldo Chávez and Lucio González Bravo in their work for the XXII Inter-American Conference on Accounting Lima-1997, who point out that although accounting does not hold the level of science in the absence of laws or scientific hypotheses, and because it proposes different solutions for valuation (historical cost, replacement value, etc.) and a paradigm cannot have several solutions for the same problem, and, because the accounting community It paralyzed all research from 1930 on, for having chosen the non-scientific path for the development of our discipline, orienting itself to excessive normativism to the detriment of positive accounting.In this sense, they consider that there is a “not strict” paradigm but sufficient to consider accounting as a field of social technological knowledge (which does not deny that it is scientific) and that the predominant paradigm in accounting is Technological. This "non-strict" Kuhnian vision of accounting by Argentine authors attempts to evaluate the existence of structural and positivist aspects of accounting (internal history) from a historical perspective, the same as I pointed out in the introduction, gives us a vision external development of accounting science, on the side of sociological, psychological, semantic, etc (external history), not being rigorous for that reason. Although the task of philosophizing about how to scientifically structure accounting is essential,However, for this, other epistemological and methodological perspectives are required for the construction of theories that historicism does not meet, as apparently if the structuralism of Stegmuller and Ulises Moulines, the Fundherentism of Jhon Dewey, etc., have this potential and that originate Our point is that historicist epistemology allows us to take the first step, that of rigorously evaluating the current state of accounting science, which is why subsequent steps are required and that will probably constitute the subject of a following international scientific research seminar: “new epistemological perspectives and methodologies in the construction of an authentic accounting science ”.as apparently if the structuralism of Stegmuller and Ulises Moulines, the Fundherentism of Jhon Dewey, etc., have this potential, and that give rise to our point that historicist epistemology allows us to take the first step, that of rigorously evaluating the current state of the accounting science, which is why subsequent steps are required and will probably constitute the subject of a following international scientific research seminar: “new epistemological and methodological perspectives in the construction of an authentic accounting science”.as apparently if the structuralism of Stegmuller and Ulises Moulines, the Fundherentism of Jhon Dewey, etc., have this potential, and that give rise to our point that historicist epistemology allows us to take the first step, that of rigorously evaluating the current state of the accounting science, which is why subsequent steps are required and will probably constitute the subject of a following international scientific research seminar: “new epistemological and methodological perspectives in the construction of an authentic accounting science”.that of rigorously evaluating the current state of accounting science, which is why subsequent steps are required and will probably constitute the subject of a subsequent international scientific research seminar: "new epistemological and methodological perspectives in the construction of an authentic accounting science."that of rigorously evaluating the current state of accounting science, which is why subsequent steps are required and will probably constitute the subject of a subsequent international scientific research seminar: "new epistemological and methodological perspectives in the construction of an authentic accounting science."
From our Kuhnian perspective on the development of accounting science, the history of accounting thought allows us to notice profound changes in paradigms, among which we can point out:
- The registry or legalistic paradigm (started with Paccioli) The economic benefit paradigm (Economic Balance) The Utility Paradigm (useful information for decisions) New emerging paradigms
1. REGISTRATION OR LEGALIST PARADIGM
Accounting was born and developed eminently linked to the purpose of registration, the legalistic conception that characterizes this first stage of our discipline, in which books are attributed the character of reliable evidence is a good example of this.
Hence the archaic precepts that the books should be bound, lined and foliated are understandable, also bearing them clearly, in order of dates, without blanks, interpolations, scratches or amendments, and without signs of having been altered. Only in this way did they exercise the role of reliable evidence.
The fundamental concern of the writers, if not the only one, refers to the most adequate way to record accounting data, a circumstance that leads all authors of this time to present with great thoroughness and detail the complex system of books and annotations that back then it was the accounting discipline.
In this regard, a definition of what was understood by accounting at that time is the one stated by Cerboni who in his "Primi Sagi de Logismografía" (1873) considers accounting as the doctrine of the responsibilities issued that are established between the people who participate in the administration of the Assets of the Companies ”. And that gave rise to the so-called personalist school.
This paradigm evolved to what was proposed by the Contista school, which states that accounting is the science of accounts, the object of which, according to Delaporte, is: "to elaborate the appropriate rules that govern their annotations". In this way, the commitments shared in this first paradigmatic stage of accounting is the importance of accounting records as reliable evidence and the importance of the accounts.
Batardon in 1919 affirms that accounting is the science that teaches the rules that allow recording economic operations carried out by one or more people. Thus, it reaffirms that the registry and accounts appear as the only dimension of accounting.
2. PARADIGM OF ECONOMIC PROFIT
The registration or legalistic paradigm had an influence until around World War I, being displaced by a new paradigm in which the economic vision prevails and with it the objective of accounting to know the economic reality of the company. While it is true that the economic orientation is not absent in the registry or legalistic paradigm, it is treated only as an enigma derived from the changing economic environment that surrounded companies and that became less understandable for accounting through the first paradigm in special in the last years of its validity. Eugene Schmalenbach with his work the Dynamic balance is the one that advocates the need for asset control of companies, and defines accounting as follows:Accounting studies and analyzes heritage in its static and dynamic aspect in order to know the economic reality in quantitative terms and at all its organizational levels… "
Another author Fabio Besta establishes a clearer delimitation of accounting in relation to the economy of the company, Besta distinguishes three phases in its administration: management, direction and control, so that the functions of accounting refer to this last stage. His vision arises in opposition to the "counting" position, placing special emphasis on the economic nature of accounting. "Accounting from a theoretical point of view, studies and enunciates the laws of economic control in farms of any kind, and deduces the appropriate rules to follow so that such control is truly effective, convincing and complete, from a practical point of view, is the orderly application of these norms to the different farms ”.
Ginno Zapa (1950 and 1962), a disciple of Besta and architect of the school of hacienda economics, defined accounting as: the discipline that studies the procedures followed in companies for the accounting manifestation of management. Vincenzo Masi (1956), creator of the patrimonialist school, was the one who finally configured the scope of the economic benefit paradigm, by stating that “accounting has as its object the study of patrimonial phenomena, their manifestations and their behavior and tries to discipline them in relation to determined company equity.
According to this paradigm, symbolic generalizations are based on the concepts of income and value for the measurement of wealth, the double entry evolved to a duality of the going concern is constituted in the methodological pattern of measurement, the techniques and procedures are selected based on its correlation and uniformity with the fundamental concepts, and the accounting system adequately reflects the economic reality (economic truth) and provides sufficient information unidirectionally to potential users.
As shared values are the search for economic truth: the calculation of the benefit and the financial situation, regardless of who receives it and why. Exemplary: a new financial component appears, equity, therefore the best possible measurement and representation of the equity situation and the profit were the purposes of accounting regulation.
3. ACCOUNTING INCOME PARADIGM
After the paradigm of economic benefit, the next stage is the replacement of the search for a single truth by a truth oriented to the user, which aims and pursues to provide the greatest possible utility in decision-making, with which the values of verifiability and objectivity of the economic benefit paradigm, without
ceasing to be important gives way to relevance. The main objective of accounting is to provide economic and quantitative information that is useful in decision-making for different users: the state, creditors, shareholders, managers, etc.
The search and determination of the objectives of the accounting information (objectives linked to the interests of the different users, often competing interests) and its consequent impact on accounting rules, is a constant attention not only in the specialized literature, but also in accounting regulation, as can be seen from Túa Pereda's proposal of the hypothetical deductive itinerary that must be followed in the issuance of accounting standards, derived from the business environment and the objectives that financial information seeks to achieve (useful for different users). Likewise, this trend can be seen in the IASC conceptual framework:
- Objectives of the financial statements, Fundamental assumptions: • Accrual, • Ongoing management, Qualitative characteristics: • Understandability, • Relevance, • Reliability, • Comparability, • Restrictions to relevant and reliable information, • True image / fair presentation.
Richard Matessich, with his conditional-normative program, also points out that accounting is an applied science, “within the conditional-normative sphere, located at its epicenter in the search for a way to relate effective means to given ends. In general terms, in any applied science the objectives must be clearly defined and then investigated from the empirical and analytical scope the relevant means to achieve those established objectives ”.
From this perspective, the objectives of accounting to provide useful information for a wide range of purposes generate different sets of accounting principles and standards for the purposes of each user, in this way the so-called financial accounting (oriented to external users), accounting managerial (internal users, management), tax accounting (the state as a user for tax purposes), all with different sets of accounting principles and practices as we will see below:
3.1 REGULATORY MODELS IN ACCOUNTING:
3.2 DISCIPLINARY MATRIX
- Models: the double entry, matrix model, Theory Valuation Models: of measure of efficiency of application of norms, Túa Pereda calls it Teleological Verification. There is no proof of propositional veracity. Shared examples: Which become the normative models made explicit in the previous point, copies shared by each user according to their objectives and particular interests. These shared copies lead to the so-called characteristics of the accounting information: Usefulness (opportunity, relevance), reliability (verifiability and objectivity) and provisionality.
At a certain point and until the end of the century, all the problems that had been presented in the accounting field under the predominance of the so-called utility paradigm, were solved through the application of this disciplinary matrix, in what Kuhn calls a puzzle game and which consists of accommodating the problems that arise according to the scope of the predominant paradigm.
As we know, this stage of normal science, claimed by Kuhn as the one that every scientific community must seek to extend as long as possible in order to provide stability to science, was criticized by Popper for considering that this ensured intellectual conformity in The science. This phenomenon has actually been occurring within the utility paradigm, specifically through the application of the so-called common denominator principle, which seeks to obtain relevance in financial information by requiring that only those accounting events capable of being quantified in monetary terms be accounted for.with which new economic events of undoubted importance in the results and financial situation of companies such as intangibles and the so-called knowledge management (which are qualitative and difficult to express in monetary terms) were put aside by accounting regulation (IAS 38 Intangibles).
Another problem that escapes the scope of the utility paradigm is the one that originates the so-called social responsibility of companies and for which accounting should inform society about the way in which the company has been managing the resources they hold and make a balance Social. This problem has been addressed by accounting regulation in a meridian way, for example with IAS 41 Agriculture and the so-called environmental accounting. However, I could not specify whether it actually constituted an enigma not resolved by the utility paradigm. I understand that the presentation of the colleague CPA. Franco Ruiz will try to outline the scope of the emerging theory of social responsibility in accounting. I personally consider a transcendental enigma of the utility paradigm,from which the stage of science in crisis that accounting is currently going through and on the way to a scientific revolution, the accounting of knowledge, has emerged.
3.3 ENIGMS THAT GENERATE LOSS OF RELEVANCE OF THE
UTILITY PARADIGM
3.3.1 NEW CONTEXT OF ACCOUNTING
- a) The Knowledge Economy is here:
- Today, most of the wealth that is generated in the world, is produced not from material objects but from representations of objects.The value of investment capital in the United States in intangible goods exceeded the value of tangible capital in the 80 - The Economist.
The Companies of the New Economy.
Or those that manage knowledge as a basis for obtaining wealth, are the most "successful" in financial terms, let's see: Sales (In millions of dollars)
What resources generate the most value in this economy? .
|
| TANGIBLES OR INTANGIBLES? |
3.4. ACCOUNTING SCIENCE IN CRISIS the so-called new economy has formed a transcendental enigma in intangibles or also called intellectual capital as an expression of INTANGIBLES accounting field, the need to measure and manage them is undeniable, in the face of this the accounting profession through its regulations has issued IAS 38 (intangibles), but curiously its prescriptions are far from the very nature of intangibles, missing a great opportunity to issue more accurate regulations to the current information needs by companies. The accounting regulation about this enigma generates the following limitations
MAIN LIMITATIONS IN THE MEASUREMENT OF INTANGIBLES DERIVED FROM THE UTILITY PARADIGM
- Generates historical and non-strategic information Differences between market value vs. Book value in new economy companies Accounting only records transactions, intangibles are not Treatment of intangible assets: self-generated assets cannot be quantified, they are not depreciable, they increase in value over time Asymmetry of internal - external information Insufficient disclosures of intangibles and risks Comparison principle does not apply to intellectual capital.
3.5 RIVAL THEORY - THEORY OF CRITICAL ACCOUNTING KNOWLEDGE
Faced with this problem, a theoretical proposal arises that indicates the decline of the utility paradigm (or conditional-normativism) to solve these transcendental enigmas in the accounting field. The Theory of Critical Knowledge considers that an Authentic Science is one capable of facing equally and in an interrelated way the two fundamental purposes of all science: i) the search for truth, for causal explanations, which seeks to tell us: How is it? the object you study, or accounting
positive, and, ii) the search for efficiency, for which it has to be prescribed, which seeks to tell us: How should it be ?, or called normative accounting, but both interrelated in a hypothetical deductive itinerary.
In this way, it considers that the enigma generated by the so-called knowledge accounting has occurred precisely in the absence of a theory that allows understanding the scope of this new business reality and, based on this understanding, search for the necessary rules and prescriptions that allow its manipulation, or in terms of the new economy, knowledge management, but what cannot be measured cannot be managed, and that is the central enigma that cannot be solved by the utility paradigm. The issuance of norms without a theory has limited the scope and application of these, and paradoxically they are not useful and pragmatic (despite these being their final purposes).This normative methodological stance that predominates in the accounting field and that supports the utility paradigm is the one that has been insufficient to understand and manipulate the new realities and has caused the loss of relevance of the utility paradigm, even the formalizing contribution of Matessich is inserted in a normative perspective, which justifies pointing out that accounting is an applied science whose main purpose is the search for middle ends, as opposed to pure ones that seek causal explanations, "an applied science is subject to normative dyes and its objectivity is based precisely in the clear “disclosure” of its objectives and other value judgments within a specific context or situation ”. And because later:“The characteristic of a conditional-normative theory is to determine the objective as well as the instrumental hypotheses (for example, the empirically determined end-means relations) within a theoretical framework. This makes the theory have the characteristic of "conditional" insofar as the clearly revealed norms constitute the conditions for its validity ".
But not only the level of fundamental concepts or "symbolic generalizations" of the utility paradigm are in crisis, also its models, in that sense Samuel Alberto Mantilla points out that the double entry itself would be insufficient for the measurement of knowledge since they do not constitute transactions in which to identify the causal relationship. Similarly, the shared values of usefulness, objectivity and verifiability of the information are not applicable in the treatment of intangibles, which are precisely the opposite. Shared items such as historical cost, depreciation are not applicable, since it is impossible to determine the historical cost of self-generated intangibles and it is counterproductive to depreciate them when they increase in value over time.
The latest research and epistemological advances in this knowledge society reaffirm the need for authentic sciences and accounting is called upon to exercise that claim. In our work for the XVII National Congress of Public Accountants of Peru, Pucallpa 2000 called "The emergentist system in accounting theorization" we pointed out the following characteristics of an ideal accounting theory, the role that the accounting doctrine has to serve as a link between theory and the urgent need to theorize accounting as a preliminary step to solving the problems that are part of its domain and that from a Kuhnian perspective are called Enigmas
HEADING TO A SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION IN ACCOUNTING SCIENCE -
THE ACCOUNTING OF KNOWLEDGE
1. FIRST FORMULATIONS OF AN AUTHENTIC ACCOUNTING SCIENCE
1.1 TRAPPING IN THE SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS OF ACCOUNTING? .
According to the problem raised and known as knowledge accounting, it still lacks foundations and therefore technological applications. Knowledge accounting is understood as a set of techniques and procedures that allow the description of the cognitive states, events and facts of organizations. The study of the theoretical and evaluative foundations of accounting are called accounting theories. Which is why there are many accounting theories without any of them (or in the absence of a more powerful one) achieving predominance. Accounting science, on the other hand, is the study of the regularities of the accounting fact, which is a specific form of economic facts and these are social facts. Accounting science is the explanatory system, some would say hypothetical deductive,theoretical of accounting facts, there are still no strong positions on the constituents of Accounting Science as: object of study, method, etc.
1.2 INCONMENSURABILITY OF KNOWLEDGE
Hypothetically speaking, the problems of knowledge accounting will begin to be solved when a new accounting theory is formulated that includes the new accounting realities and facts, dispenses with models such as double entry and, above all, the traditional equation of assets equal to liability plus equity, this theory, once it gains dominance, would in turn generate new shared values.
Knowledge accounting in the light of the value chain is radically different from traditional accounting, hence new theories and explanatory models of these new realities are required, based on these theorizations accounting (understood as a science) will be allowed applications and technologies relevant to the demands of the so-called knowledge management, but in this task the least we have is time and it is scientific planning, and in short, scientific policy that would not only ensure satisfactory results for accounting, if not even in a shorter period of time. In this regard, you can see: "Philosophy of Scientific Policies - pretext and context of accounting science" ICODE - 2002.
Knowledge accounting is the system / process through which data is transformed into information and this into knowledge. Therefore, different accounts appear depending on the value that is added in each of the stages. According to Samuel Mantilla, the following tables would clearly summarize how accounting is perceived from this new perspective and, above all, what the practical consequences derived from it would be.
2. PROGRAMMATIC OUTLINE OF THE NEW NORMAL ACCOUNTING SCIENCE: THE ACCOUNTING OF KNOWLEDGE
Next, as a programmatic proposal, we launch some proposals that in subsequent works will be contrasted and subject to the epistemological tests required in the claim of forming a Scientific Theory of the so-called knowledge accounting.
2.1 THE ACCOUNTING OF KNOWLEDGE
a) Problematic
As it developed, accounting has encompassed areas that were not previously considered typical of accounting, such as ecology, intangibles, and now intellectual capital, especially knowledge and information.
These new areas were considered in the XXIV Inter-American Accounting Conference Uruguay-2001, in which the following implicit issues were raised in the evaluation of the current accounting model and the search for alternatives:
- Tendency to supply more quantity and better quality of information Balance between financial and non-financial information Scope of the information to be considered by the accounting model to be used
The problem related to "intellectual capital"
- Risks of excessive disclosure The incidence of the “auditability” of the information to be provided Importance of the objectivity of the information and its comparability Possibilities of “equal” access to the information by different users
Recognizing these implicit issues, it was questioned whether accounting provides the traditional accounting statements or the so-called business reports (which do reflect the new areas indicated). On the one hand, those who from a conservative position propose to append as complementary information to the financial statements information on intellectual capital and on the other hand those who consider that the financial statements would be just one more component of the so-called business reports (which are characterized by provide qualitative and non-financial information on intangibles).
b) Metatheoretical Definitions:
Accounting is understood as the set of techniques and procedures that allow the description of accounting statements, events and events. The studies of the theoretical and evaluative foundations of accounting are called accounting theories. Which is why there are many accounting theories. Accounting science, on the other hand, is the study of the regularities of the accounting fact, which is a specific form of economic facts and these are social facts. Accounting science is the explanatory system, some would say hypothetical-deductive, theoretical of accounting facts. Accounting events are made up of accounting statements and events such as financial statements.
Knowledge accounting is the technique that allows the description of relevant knowledge for the development of organizations through an axiomatic system that fulfills a measurable function. The modeling of the organizations that must be measured as a knowledge class is carried out through Artificial Intelligence, in a particular and special way as a Hybrid Intelligence system, that is, organizations considered exemplary of hybrid intelligence.
The development of knowledge accounting necessarily goes through the foundation of its measurement theory. And for this, foundherentism is required, a current epistemological proposal that describes and regulates the potentialities and development of theories and sciences.
c) Conceptual framework
Knowledge accounting is a technique that works with information, knowledge and truth.
2.2. INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE
a) Information
There is no information without material support, in this sense, information is closely linked to signals, understood as material objects or processes that, by virtue of their form, are carriers of information. Information has three senses, namely,
- information as the form or structure of the message: syntactic information information as correlation with senders or events: semantic information information as the ability to change the receiver: pragmatic information. Pragmatic information is of three types: i. Descriptive or theoretical information that refers to knowledge and that can be true or false. This information changes the beliefs of the recipient, ii. Practical information refers to how to do something and it can be effective or ineffective. Change the receiver's abilities, iii. The evaluative information refers to the task, that is, to the preferences, goals, values, and attitudes of the receiver. Change your preferences.
b) Information and knowledge
Information occupies a central place in our civilization, and perhaps that is why it has given rise to the myth that the universe is not matter but information 1. This is false. Let's see, an information system is always made up of human beings, artifacts, or natural objects, etc. All of them materials. Not even the signs are immaterial, every sign is an object that represents another object and is perceived by an organized system. Another aspect of the false vision of information is one, for example, in which a minister tries to flood schools and universities with computers, without dealing instead with the quality of the teachers, the motivation of the students and the content of the information. teaching. Or the research manager who prioritizes projects involving intensive use of computers, without worrying about the importance of the problem or the originality of the approach. They all confuse knowledge with information,and research with the preparation or dissemination of information 1.
We all want to know more and, at the same time, receive less information. The problem of our time is not the scarcity but the excess of information. Anyone who wants to learn something must ignore most of the information they receive and will use filters. That is, to ignore a lot to get to know something.
Information and message is not the same as knowledge. Messages such as "the world in the world" and "time is the maturation of temporality" do not communicate any knowledge, it is empty, but it does inform.
c) Truth and information
Here we are presented with a paradoxical situation.
“A fundamental concept in information theory is that the amount of information contained in a message is a well-defined and measurable mathematical value. The term quantity does not refer to the quantity of data, but to the probability that a message, within a set of possible messages, will be received. When it comes to the amount of information, the highest value is assigned to the message that is least likely to be received. If it is known with certainty that a message will be received, its information quantity is 0. (Frank, 1991: 182).
What Frank is telling us is that when knowledge is true it has zero information. That is, the more information the less true knowledge and the more knowledge the less information. Regarding the above, Piscoya (1997: 101) considers that “tautologies are logically valid but void of informative content. For this reason, they do not serve us as statements about reality ”. Generally speaking, these inferences clash with the vulgar view we have about information.
2.3. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE ACCOUNTING IN THE REPRESENTATION OF KNOWLEDGE
Around 1970 the representation of knowledge emerged as an independent discipline. At that time, several researchers developed what were called semantic network representation schemes, one of the most powerful approaches to representing knowledge. Other important approaches are first-order logic, frames of reference, and production systems.
It is useful to consider a knowledge representation as a combination of data structures and interpretive procedures capable of causing a program to exhibit expert behavior. One of the central themes of research in AI (artificial intelligence) is to develop procedures capable of intelligently manipulating data structures. The effectiveness with which these procedures act on data structures to generate inferences largely determines the competence, or level of intelligence, of the system. This is one of the reasons that knowledge representation is one of the most active areas of current AI research.
a) EPISTEMOLOGICAL AXIOMES OF KNOWLEDGE ACCOUNTING
What follows are some schematic axioms that allow our agent-accountant to reason about the knowledge of another agent (worker or employee) and then tend to its measurement. These schemes will use the axioms that describe the special properties of knowledge, along with the "modus ponens", and a new rule of inference.
The symbols used are: K is knowledge α Agent Alpha, has the knowledge (φ) A scientific knowledge "theta"
∧ "and" ⊃ implies
ψ A scientific knowledge "Psi"
a). distributive axiom ⊃ Kα (ψ)
Which is interpreted as: if an alpha agent knows φ, and also knows that φ ⊃ ψ, then that agent also knows ψ (because we assume that he can use the "modus ponens").
b). axiom of knowledge, postulates that an agent cannot know something that is false.
Kα (φ) ⊃ φ
The alpha agent knows φ, so φ exists, or is.
c). Positive insight axiom: it seems reasonable to assume that if an agent knows something, he knows he knows it.
Kα (φ) ⊃ Kα (Kα (φ))
Agent α knows φ, so it knows that it knows φ.
d). negative insight axiom: if an agent doesn't know something, then he knows that he doesn't know
¬Kα (φ) ⊃ Kα (¬Kα (φ))
Agent α does not know φ, so agent α knows that it does not know φ.
and). axiom of epistemic necessity
an agent knows all these axioms (and also all valid formulas)
From - φ infer Kα (φ)
If it follows that there is φ, then we can infer that there is an agent α that knows φ.
F). Axiom of omniscient logic an agent knows all the logical consequences of his knowledge.
From φ - ψ and from Kα (φ) infer Kα (ψ)
From φ we can infer ψ, and from the knowledge that agent α has about φ we can infer the knowledge that agent α has about ψ.
Applying these axioms we will know if we are dealing with authentic knowledge or if we simply have information, or data. The aforementioned axioms are essential for the measurement or quantification of knowledge, projecting ourselves in its development, then it is necessary to formulate theorems, and on the basis of these, the necessary prescriptions for the accounting function in knowledge accounting.
b) CONSTRUCTION OF A KNOWLEDGE BASE
It is not possible to understand the representation of knowledge without realizing it or, at least, seeing how it is done.
The process of representing knowledge about a domain consists of several stages. The first, informal stage involves deciding what types of objects and relationships need to be represented (the respective ontology). A vocabulary is then chosen and used to code general domain knowledge. After coding specific cases of problems, inference procedures are used to solve them.
In a good representation, all irrelevant details are eliminated, important differences are incorporated and knowledge is expressed at the most general level possible.
Building systems based on knowledge has advantages over programming: the knowledge engineer only has to concentrate on what is valid in the domain, instead of focusing on solving problems and coding the respective solution procedure; the knowledge thus obtained can be used in various ways; In general, debugging knowledge is a simpler task than debugging programs.
The ontologies for special purposes, such as the one that was built for the circuit domain, although they can be efficient in their corresponding domain, if you want to expand their coverage it is necessary to generalize them.
In a general purpose ontology it is necessary to cover a wide range of knowledge and in principle, it should be able to handle any domain.
2.4 THE FUNDHERENTIAL OF MEASUREMENT IN KNOWLEDGE ACCOUNTING
Fundherentism is one of the most promising epistemological currents of today. It synthesizes the structuralist proposal (of Sneed and Stegmuller, collaborators of Richard Mattesich) and the pragmatist in a rigorous way. That is why its treatment is linked to measurement in science.
To measure knowledge and give it a monetary value, which is the essential purpose of the Knowledge Accounting that we propose, we must present knowledge in a hierarchical way and by levels according to the systemic method.
Measurement is a process that consists of attributing a numerical value to an object or a quality, already based on the number of times that some unit quantity is contained in it, or based on its position in a series of greater and lesser quantities of the same class. A quantity such that, by a physical process of addition, it can be obtained from a new quantity, a larger quantity of the same kind, is called an extensive quantity, as opposed to an intensive quantity. The quantity such that there is no known physical process of addition by which a larger quantity of that kind can be produced from a smaller quantity is called an intensive quantity.
To measure knowledge we must analyze the state of knowledge, cognitive events and cognitive facts.
2.4.1 STATE OF KNOWLEDGE
If we use the variables or areas of intellectual capital to represent knowledge management in organizations, its financial and non-financial status at a given date, it would constitute the organizational "state of knowledge". Knowledge of a given thing at a given time includes a list of its individual properties known at that time. This list represents the state of the thing at that time, as known to the scholar.
More in detail. Let us consider an arbitrary concrete thing of a certain class 2. Let us call n the total number of its known properties and F i its ith property, where i = 1,2,… n. Let us also call F i an attribute that represents P i. The list of such attributes is called a function of states of the object in question, or rather of anything of the same class. To be short: a state of affairs function of a class is a list F =
“The state of a thing at a given moment is the list of all its properties at that moment. Since these are values of the functions that represent the corresponding properties, the state of a thing at a given moment is the list of those values. That is, S i =
The set of possible states of a thing can be represented within a state space for the thing. This is the abstract space of n dimensions that sweeps the corresponding state function F =
Every state of a thing of a given class can be represented as a point in a suitable state space. With the passage of time the values of some of the properties of the thing tend to change, so the representative point will move along some path. The extension of said trajectory during a time T is given the name of the history of the thing in question during T. No matter how similar they are, two things will be different and will have different histories, due to differences either in their composition or in its environment. In case they are of the same class, their stories will be representable in the same state space.
2.4.2 COGNITIVE EVENTS
An event in a σ (omega) system, be it simple or complex, is any change in the state of σ 3. In other words, an event e involving σ can be represented by an ordered pair of different states of σ: e ≅
Each event space can be analyzed in a number of subspaces, each of which represents all possible events of a class. The set of events involving σ and is characterized by changes in each member of subset A (Σ) ⊆ P (Σ) of fundamental properties can be called set of events E class A. Thus, E A (∑) and E A (∑ ′) will designate two sets of possible events of different classes involving the systems ∑ and ∑ ′ respectively.
2.4.3 COGNITIVE FACTS
The word fact designates any or all the members of a family of concepts related to that of the concrete or material thing: property or state of a thing, events and processes of things, and others, such as phenomena or appearances that they perceive Some animals. When a qualitatively new thing is formed, one speaks of the emergence of the thing together with its characteristic features or emergent properties. The emergence of anything new is always accompanied by the disappearance of something old 4.
“The facts must be differentiated from the ideas that are used to describe them, especially since the ideas can be false - that is, they may not correspond to the facts in question. (Warning: when not considered in themselves, ideas are facts, namely brain processes.) Unfortunately, sometimes this distinction is not clear, when one says (without thinking) that the proposition p is a fact, not a theory, when what is meant is that p is true to the fact ” 5.
Based on the states of knowledge, cognitive events and cognitive facts allow the change of knowledge, which is called change of beliefs. Let's see how beliefs change.
2.4.4 NON-MONOTONE LOGIC AND BELIEF REVIEW
The theory of belief change deals with the dynamics of belief states, with the objective of modeling the updates of the belief states of an agent or a computing system, as a result of receiving new information. There are several types of belief changes. The simplest is the one that arises from learning something new and is known as expansion. Sometimes, however, this new evidence contradicts previously accepted beliefs, leading to a review of the belief status with a view to maintaining consistency. This revision requires the removal of old beliefs. Other times the discovery that the reasons for holding a belief have disappeared leads to a contraction of the belief state. A review of a set of beliefs K,As a result of learning an evidence A, it can be considered as the succession of a contraction of said set by the negation of A, and then the addition (by expansion) of A. The first step ensures that the incorporation of the new evidence does not will cause inconsistency in K. A contraction operation (and therefore a revision) is not easy to define: given a set K and a sentence C, there are several ways to eliminate sentences that may imply C. If we incorporate, as a criterion of rationality, that the operation results in the least possible loss of information, an informal way of visualizing a contraction of K by a belief C, is in terms of the family of the maximal subsets of K that do not imply C, which is noted K seC.can be considered as the succession of a contraction of said set by the negation of A, and then the addition (by expansion) of A. The first step ensures that the incorporation of the new evidence will not cause inconsistency in K. A contraction operation (and therefore a revision) is not easy to define: given a set K and a sentence C, there are several ways to eliminate sentences that could imply C. If we incorporate, as a rationality criterion, that the operation results in the least loss of Possible information, an informal way to visualize a contraction of K by a belief C, is in terms of the family of maximal subsets of K that do not involve C, which is noted K⊥C.can be considered as the succession of a contraction of said set by the negation of A, and then the addition (by expansion) of A. The first step ensures that the incorporation of the new evidence will not cause inconsistency in K. A contraction operation (and therefore a revision) is not easy to define: given a set K and a sentence C, there are several ways to eliminate sentences that could imply C. If we incorporate, as a rationality criterion, that the operation results in the least loss of Possible information, an informal way to visualize a contraction of K by a belief C, is in terms of the family of maximal subsets of K that do not involve C, which is noted K⊥C.The first step ensures that the incorporation of the new evidence will not cause inconsistency in K. A contraction operation (and therefore a revision) is not easy to define: given a set K and a sentence C, there are several ways to eliminate sentences that may imply C. If we incorporate, as a rationality criterion, that the operation results in the least possible loss of information, an informal way of visualizing a contraction of K by a belief C, is in terms of the family of the maximal subsets of K that do not involve C, which is noted K⊥C.The first step ensures that the incorporation of the new evidence will not cause inconsistency in K. A contraction operation (and therefore a revision) is not easy to define: given a set K and a sentence C, there are several ways to eliminate sentences that may imply C. If we incorporate, as a rationality criterion, that the operation results in the least possible loss of information, an informal way of visualizing a contraction of K by a belief C, is in terms of the family of the maximal subsets of K that do not involve C, which is noted K⊥C.that the operation results in the least possible loss of information, an informal way of visualizing a contraction of K by a belief C, is in terms of the family of the maximal subsets of K that do not imply C, which is noted K seC.that the operation results in the least possible loss of information, an informal way of visualizing a contraction of K by a belief C, is in terms of the family of the maximal subsets of K that do not imply C, which is noted K seC.
Alchourrón, Gardenfors and Makinson (AGM) developed a theory of rational change of beliefs, presenting explicit constructions of exchange operations in particular, those based on the cited maximum subsets, as well as postulates that said operations should fulfill. The AGM postulates of revision of beliefs are eight, six of which are called basic and two complementary. If we denote the revision function with *, and consider sets of beliefs closed by classical logical consequence (theories), these postulates are: K * 1) If K is a theory and A is a sentence, K * A is a theory.
Where *: review of
K * 2) A∈K * A.
A belongs to the class of A reviewed by KK * 3) K * A⊆K + A (the expansion of K by A). The revision of A with K implies an expansion of a
K * 4) If ¬A∉K, then K + A⊆K * A.
If NOA does not belong to K, then the expansion of ka with A contains the revision of A with K.
K * 5) K * A = Kfalse if and only if - ¬A (where Kfalse denotes the set of inconsistent beliefs).
The revision of A by K is equal to K false, if and only if NOA is deduced.
K * 6) If - A↔B then K * A = K * B.
If we deduct A and only if B then the revision of A is equal to the revision of B by K.
K * 7) K * (A∧B) ⊆ (K * A) + B.
The revision of A and B by K contains the expansion of the revision of a by K by B.
K * 8) If ¬B∉K * A, then (K * A) + B⊆K * (A∧B).
If NOB does not belong to the A by K review, then the A by K by B review statement contains the A by K by K review.
CONCLUSIONS
- The Kuhnian conception of scientific development is applicable for the evaluation of accounting science, in which there has been a change of 03 paradigms during its evolution: that of registration, economic benefit, and utility. The accounting utility paradigm has lost relevance: i) for not being able to solve the transcendental enigma called “knowledge accounting” and that is related to the possibility of measuring knowledge and its management within companies, ii) due to the emergence of rival theories such as that of critical accounting knowledge that proposes satisfactory solutions to it. The "science in crisis" stage of accounting will be overcome and a new stage of normal science will be entered when the Theory of Critical Accounting Knowledge gains predominance, and allows its conformation as an authentic science.The implications of the paradigm shift in accounting will involve sacrifices of intellectual content and paradigmatic continuities within the disciplinary matrix of the new normal science, the determination of incommensurable content will start from the agreement or agreement of the accounting scientific community, rather than from logical tests or empirical. Changes will not only occur at the level of "symbolic generalizations" of the utility paradigm, but also models such as double entry would be insufficient for measuring knowledge since they do not constitute transactions in which to identify the causal relationship. Similarly, the shared values of usefulness, objectivity and verifiability of the information are not applicable in the treatment of intangibles, which are precisely the opposite.Shared items such as historical cost, depreciation are not applicable, since it is impossible to determine the historical cost of self-generated intangibles and it is counterproductive to depreciate them when they increase in value over time.
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