Foreword
In uncertain times like the ones we live in today, the weakening of public institutions is evident. But, it is not so, if it is intended to demonstrate that the audit entities, be they superior audits, general comptrollers, courts of accounts, or other names, are exhausted or plunged into uselessness; notwithstanding its marginalization or its extinction is demanded. Therefore, it is convenient to analyze a diagnosis on the reality of the Institutions of External Financial Control in Spain, which establishes in the core, "in many aspects of their performance, these external control institutions do not work (…) but it is not time to eliminate them but of deep reforms of the current model, to bring it up to date and make it work ”. Since it is presented to us as a good diagnosis, assertive,that it has paid sufficient attention to the facts and the reality studied, and which has resulted in an explanation with solid bases on the deficiencies in the functioning of the external control institutions in Spain, and on the lines of reform to improve their functioning. Which generated comments from his Peers, qualifying the article as extraordinary, brave, and exclaiming Congratulations! However, the foregoing deviates and confuses the effort to achieve better diagnoses and proposals, by not questioning their assertions, not questioning the limitations, assumptions and contradictions of the thinking in auditing and control.and in the reform lines to improve its operation. Which generated comments from his Peers, qualifying the article as extraordinary, brave, and exclaiming Congratulations! However, the foregoing deviates and confuses the effort to achieve better diagnoses and proposals, by not questioning their assertions, not questioning the limitations, assumptions and contradictions of the thinking in auditing and control.and in the reform lines to improve its operation. Which generated comments from his Peers, qualifying the article as extraordinary, brave, and exclaiming Congratulations! However, the foregoing deviates and confuses the effort to achieve better diagnoses and proposals, by not questioning their assertions, not questioning the limitations, assumptions and contradictions of the thinking in auditing and control.
To do this, it is necessary to start from a deep self-criticism of what we auditors think and say. Because the basic tool in auditing entities is auditing. And everything we have learned from it has been taught to us as a system of knowledge subject to the authority and leadership of institutions and auditing and inspection bodies that have tacitly modeled the behavior and practice of auditors, and imposed the improbability of transforming your model. So it was surprising that the referred diagnosis states that there should only be changes to adapt or update, under the premise that the model is reformable. And in the face of a dominant conception that has privileged harmonization, homogenization, normalization, or unanimity, it seems a wrong attitude to question it, put it in doubt,as if the public reality was not characterized by the complex and diverse, as if the crisis that runs through the world in the economy, culture, and the social world had left the field of auditing and control exempted, and as if the education of the auditors was focused more on analysis and reflection than on rote repetition of the regulations and guidelines of the monopoly of this knowledge, and in the face of a deepening crisis, the best way to educate and disseminate the culture of inspection is to dialogue and debate, contrasting points of view, informing and correcting oneself, because finally, learning would be useless if we do not improve our ability to learn. And the present work tries to turn the safe into uncertain, the certainty into question, and then then,Let us increase our capacity to discover and create a new paradigm in the auditing entities, and perhaps we will plant the germinal seed of structural changes in the university and educational system in auditing, in the historical moment that we live and in the place where we live.
Development
1. Limitations
1.1 The perspective
The difference in the perspective on the situation and problems in the control entities not only depends on how the explanation and interpretation is observed and approached theoretically but from where it is generated, from within or outside the control body. Inside, confidentiality, secrecy and institutional loyalty are required. And this requirement has led to a behavior and research practice in auditing and inspection that is lax without rigor and lacking determination, that is, it does not specify or set limits to the statements, motivating generalizations without sufficiently solid or sustained bases; and in times of crisis, accepting superficial diagnoses only shows a thought that has been silenced under the gags that have impeded its free inquiry. Therefore, it is not surprising that Luis Ma.Ordoki demands that the legislators courage to carry out the reforms to the audit model, but also the author himself is awarded to be courageous.
But if the above were accepted, the question would be caught in the dilemma of courage or cowardice. And no, the transformation of the control entities does not require courage but rather knowledge; nor from congresses or parliaments (although these have become the permanent justification for not changing); nor of the citizens (although these have become the new legitimators of the management of public funds); and neither of the participation of private auditors (although they move from the private to the public field, or vice versa, without being clear that each reality requires its own object (of knowledge) and therefore, its method that demonstrates the entire auditing process.
The history of the audit to this day has been the unsuccessful search to attribute to other instances, or to other factors the impossibility of transforming the audit institution, however, it has been omitted, obviated, and ignored, that the deficiencies in the current model are derived fundamentally from its tool or instrument that does not work or serve to unravel reality in public entities. For this reason, it is not enough to recognize that the control bodies have failed or to continue betting on the hope that the current model can improve. Perhaps it is the moment, our historical time, to begin to deconstruct a conception that has been imposed as 'normal' and even 'natural'. And to assume skepticism as an attitude of inquiry,to envision a new horizon and a new perspective in the inspection institutions.
Meanwhile, the work of the Secretary General of the Chamber of Comptos of Navarra, reflects the incipient theoretical development, which still does not eliminate the fear of relating the points analyzed with facts, figures, references, percentages, names, and pointing to control entities in the particular and concrete. But how do you go from the comfort of discretion to the discomfort of criticism? When auditors have been 'educated' to remain silent and subject to strict disciplinary control, then they cannot be described as cowards, nor can legislators, who have believed that private auditing is more efficient than that practiced by audit entities. audit, but also that the audit is alien to its problematization. And then then, why reform the control institutions,if the audit firms guarantee compliance with the constitutional mandate of the auditing entities. If, for example, in the Official Gazette of the State in Spain (BOE) of September 13, an order of the Ministry of Economy and Finance has published in which it declares the “insufficient means of the General Intervention of the State Administration (IGAE) and authorized the contracting of private auditing companies to carry out the control tasks assigned to this body ”. In this sense, Spanish legislators have done what was suggested and recommended to them, the de facto trend, that the audit that the control institutions should carry out is carried out by private audit firms, either due to their inability, inefficiency or mistrust., the result is the same,the impersonation of a practice that should be public, in the interest of all, has ended under the criteria of privacy. But if academics, auditing professionals, and those responsible for audit bodies, such as Antonio M. López, Senior Counselor of the Andalusian Chamber of Accounts, approve, “it has pointed out the need to make some changes in the institutions to improve things and to be able to do them better than they are, and he announced, not to rule out in said redesign that private external audits may be used ”. But also in Mexico, as in most of the countries, at various levels of government, they frequently go to private firms to perform audits in public entities.Derived from the fact that the Superior Auditor of the Federation (ASF) and President of the INTOSAI Steering Committee, suggests that for the strengthening of superior audit and “In accordance with the best international practices, audits on financial management, compliance with fiscal obligations and the performance of the ASF, could be carried out by independent professional offices appointed by the Political Coordination Board of the Chamber of Deputies "could be carried out by offices of independent professionals appointed by the Political Coordination Board of the Chamber of Deputies "could be carried out by offices of independent professionals appointed by the Political Coordination Board of the Chamber of Deputies "
This dominant trend shows the appropriation of the public by the private. And it is still intended to accept, "The audit watches over the public interest", apologetic thought of the President of the Institute of Accounting and Auditing of Accounts (ICAC) despite the debacle that looms over Spain. Another fundamental characteristic has been the alleged independence, distant from politics and its determination. For example, Antonio López "has made it clear that the Chamber of Accounts is not politicized, quite the contrary." And in Mexico, the Superior Auditor, "thanked Congress for its support for the consolidation of this Technical Body at the service of the Nation." However, after leaving the ownership of the control institution, at the XIII International Symposium on Accounting and Administration in Zacatecas, on April 5, 2011,He affirmed "most of the political parties have become power mafias only seeking to take advantage of the spoils that the public budget represents", and later added "Democracy is hijacked by the petty interests of political parties." What was interpreted, "The control is hijacked by political interests." Then, why when they are inside the control institutions are they the most fervent defenders and when outside, some become staunch detractors?"The control is hijacked by political interests." Then, why when they are inside the control institutions are they the most fervent defenders and when outside, some become staunch detractors?"The control is hijacked by political interests." Then, why when they are inside the control institutions are they the most fervent defenders and when outside, some become staunch detractors?
Another case, Ana María Martínez-Pina, President of the ICAC, says “All the criteria and rules of auditor independence must be respected and that independence must be preserved. Independence is defined in the law and in the regulations, and the auditors comply with it ”. In contrast, Rafael Pardo Ruiz, President of the Colombian Federation of Colleges of Public Accountants, affirms "The most serious issue in the accounting confidence crisis is the lack of clear rules of independence." Consequently, the analyzes or expositions, from within, of the inspection institutions in general assume a dogmatic character, by not subjecting their ideas, thoughts and conceptions to doubt, questioning, and the recognition of the limits that the relationship between the audit / inspection and the personality of the person who examines them.
From the outside, its former officials, now without limits, expose situations that only accentuate the private and secret nature of the practice in the control entities. And the researchers faced with a closed horizon, the methodological requirement of the investigation remains only in preliminary preparation.
1.2 Standardization
The common, habitual, ordinary, current, and even 'natural' is the adaptation or conformity of the auditor to the standard. This has been constituted as a system of precepts, rules or requirements that have framed the professional activity of auditing and control, under the assumption that it guarantees an effective development, and because from its origin to the present day its acceptance or continuous approval in force by part of the associations, guilds and institutions of auditors, accountants and auditors, which has led to normality.
To the tacit and unquestionable acceptance of principles, such as "whenever public funds are at stake, there must be norms that sufficiently guarantee transparency, accountability and their control." Consequently, it is not surprising that the Senior Counselor of Accounts of Andalusia names INTOSAI, GAO, IFAC, COPCEE, IGAE and FIASEP, “standardizing bodies that have dedicated a good part of their efforts to the issuance of technical auditing standards for the sector. public". Originating that, the recurring crises derived from misconduct or omission in the audit firms or in the control entities end up being diluted as a result of group thinking that at all costs has imposed the continuity of the rules, be it due to conservatism,conformism or interests that take precedence over the democratic right of transparency and the exercise of dissent. Because the 'normal' is total unanimity. And in essence, standardization produces misunderstood loyalty, auditors do not want to 'make waves' or question assumptions, contradictions, and misconceptions and misconceptions in auditing standards. Derived from a conception based on the essentialist postulate, which has sustained fundamental notions, such as: independence and objectivity as permanent or innate. In such a way that an auditor who must maintain and preserve impartiality is 'naturally' demanded. As an attribute, characteristic or value that is implicit in the activity of the audit and inspection, hence its alleged legitimacy. And in consequence,The problem is not found in normality, that is, the general is undamaged, safe, only in the individual is the possibility of failure or error found. For this reason, the code of ethics is insisted upon, but ethics is a personal position taking, where the auditor has the freedom to conform to ethical principles or not, and therefore, how is the auditor's performance validated, in the examination of public funds, if your choice is based on subjectivity?How is the performance of the auditor validated, in the examination of public funds, if his choice is based on subjectivity?How is the performance of the auditor validated, in the examination of public funds, if his choice is based on subjectivity?
And objectivity has been conceived as a 'state of grace' where the auditor ignores economics, politics and the social. And if the investigation appeared in the Middle Ages as a form of investigation of the truth in the legal order, in the Middle Ages of the current control, the control appears as a knowledge subject to the criterion of authority.
Therefore, the examination of the assumption of the auditing standards, should in principle make us move towards the knowledge of the limitations, the conditions and contradictions that have prevented the transformation of the audit entities.
2. The assumptions
2.1 The regulations
From the beginning, it has been established that auditing regulations are a sine qua non condition, constituting the essential requirements that the auditor must observe to carry out his activity. As exemplified by the Senior Counselor of the Andalusian Chamber of Accounts, “It is necessary to point out that, at the international level, IFAC's International Auditing Standards (NIS's) have become a benchmark in the profession. Furthermore, INTOSAI is adopting the ISAs through Guidelines which, together with the Lima Declaration, the Code of Ethics and the Auditing Standards constitute the normative body of this institution ”.
But, in a comment to the referred article, Antonio Minguillón Roy, Auditor of the Sindicature of Accounts of the Valencian Community, warns Luis Ma. Ordoki, “I think you have forgotten an aspect as important or more than those that you have exposed in the article, I will put it in the form of a question: will the OCEX ever clearly and explicitly say what are the technical audit / control standards that they apply in their work?. And certainly, the author forgot in his analysis of the OCEX, the normativity.
Then, how to explain the analysis of the reality of the External Control Bodies in Spain (Ordoki, Urdazi) that lists deficiencies, such as:
- Not very independent institutions Bureaucratized and not very efficient institutions Few reports and outdated in time Many areas of public management without control Low incidence of operational and management audits Cumbersome and unintelligible reports Control institutions not very visible to society.
And do not consider or involve regulations. Since it concludes, the deficiencies are due, in the first instance, to inspection institutions that do not know how to communicate their work. And secondly, the institutions are not open.
As for the first, there is a general opinion among academics and audit professionals in locating the basic inquiry in communication, in improving language, and as Antonio M. López explains “currently, one of the questions of The greatest controversy refers to the usefulness of presenting the audit work through the corresponding report (…) These aspects, together with the existence of a culture deficit in auditing and control, significantly limit the usefulness of audit reports public, with which they produce a certain disappointment in their users ”. But, when was the enchantment broken on the citizens of the audit and inspection entities?
When the rule of the requirements has not been sufficient to prevent the independence and objectivity of an audit work from being rhetorical. It shows the incongruity between what is said and done, and leads to the lack of certainty of its practice and does not know if it affects management. This would demonstrate the affirmation of the head of the Evaluation and Control Unit of the Supervisory Audit Commission of the Congress Federation, “there is no organized and technically rigorous investigation that demonstrates in an aggregated and detailed way the effects of the audit in public management ”.
Because the entire history of auditing and inspection has been focused on the effects but not the causes. For this reason, in the second instance, the inspection institutions are closed, derived from a practice that deprives information. In other words, auditors who are developing their activity in the public field, their practice is not public. Another contradiction between saying and doing. And although it is intended that the publication of the audit report complies with the principle of publicity, secrecy characterizes the audit.
But transparency goes far beyond publishing the report. It would be fulfilled if the entire audit process is demonstrated, and not, through the unnecessary of an auditor's commitment to ethics or accountability, nor would it be the permanent hope (turned more into an illusion) in legislators to change the control model, nor the deception that sows the hope that autonomy or independence will be generated by legislative decree, and even less maintain the belief that those responsible for the control entities find a way or refuge to isolate themselves from politics Y while continuing to emphasize "The need to reform the institutions of External Control so that they can serve the cause of transparency and the improvement of public financial management." And in the final recap,Ordoki opines "the deficiencies in the functioning of our institutions respond to the established control model itself." And, he adds, "the reform is not only in the hands of those responsible but also, in many aspects, of the legislators, who should decisively introduce essential changes."
Ultimately, the crisis in auditing and auditing institutions has not been recognized, for this reason, criticism of the diagnosis of concrete realities should allow us to recognize that the problems in auditing institutions, their deficiencies or weaknesses they are of a general or global nature. Although 'normality' has exempted the general and is the reason that the regulations are not in the dock, nor has the audit been, notwithstanding that from Enron to Lehman Brothers, from Greece to the euro crisis, accountants and regulators have been blamed for misleading. But private auditing has been unscathed, as governments and parliaments continue to request the audit firms to carry out the functions entrusted to the audit institutions. And in this sense,These are still part of the problem and not the solution.
And the cumbersome and unintelligible not only of the audit reports but of all the activity in the audit institutions is not the result of the lack of communication between senders and receivers, nor does it originate in the poor writing of the auditors, nor by the lack of culture in matters of citizen oversight, it is rather because of a truth of the audit that has been erroneously understood, reducing it to the coherence that said reports are a consequence of the rules. Antonio M. López, exemplifies it, the audit in the public sector has the objective “to establish the degree of correspondence between said information and the established principles and norms”. But, if the standards are transgressable, if the auditor may or may not comply with the regulations. Then then,What is the meaning of the validity or guarantee of a supposedly professional practice that legitimates the management of public funds based on the choice, of one option or another, that remain in the subjectivity of the auditor?
Despite the serious crisis in Europe, the supervisory institutions remain mired in 'normalization', holding, "The International Auditing Standards (ISAs) constitute an important source of inspiration for the standards applied by public sector auditors." Consequently, how the audit entities, and the European Court of Auditors itself, will be able to contribute to the debate on auditing standards and propose responses to the crisis, if they take the legitimacy of the standards for granted, beyond any doubt; then, how to think about transformation, if the need to change has not been developed in the majority. Since the 'normal' has been to accept without questioning the regulations.And as noted “the standards play a guiding role in accounting work and leave wide fields to the exercise of professional judgment. In other words, they are broad and flexible, they allow a hermeneutical exercise, of considerable discretion "
2.2 The role of the auditor
Auditing has traditionally been resistant to change. Therefore, it is difficult to recognize that it must transform, and even more, to think that its role is changing. Derived on the one hand, in attributing the deficiencies and limitations to the inspection institutions but not to their tool, the audit. Luis Ma. Ordoki, accepts the first but not the second, by stating “the current crisis situation (…) has revealed that our control institutions, like other supervisory bodies, have not, in many cases, been up to par. of the circumstances or of what was expected of them ”. And, how is the tool or instrument going to be questioned, if the Senior Counselor of the Andalusian Chamber of Accounts states “There is no doubt that,public auditing is one of the most suitable control and monitoring methods to verify public management ”. Which has led the other party to believe that public reality changes but the audit does not. When he himself a Director, affirms “Obviously the External Control Bodies must seek permanent adaptation to a changing reality. In this sense, one of the main challenges that they must take on is to carry out inspection work that is new ”. But, how will the innovation be generated if the audit and inspection have become based on claims that have lacked rigor and conceptual verification, and in the end, have excluded the possibility that its principles and standards may be revealed as completely unfounded.believe that public reality changes but the audit does not. When he himself a Director, affirms “Obviously the External Control Bodies must seek permanent adaptation to a changing reality. In this sense, one of the main challenges that they must take on is to carry out inspection work that is new ”. But, how will the innovation be generated if the audit and inspection have become based on claims that have lacked rigor and conceptual verification, and in the end, have excluded the possibility that its principles and standards may be revealed as completely unfounded.believe that public reality changes but the audit does not. When he himself a Director, affirms “Obviously the External Control Bodies must seek permanent adaptation to a changing reality. In this sense, one of the main challenges that they must take on is to carry out inspection work that is new ”. But, how will the innovation be generated if the audit and inspection have become based on claims that have lacked rigor and conceptual verification, and in the end, have excluded the possibility that its principles and standards may be revealed as completely unfounded.In this sense, one of the main challenges that they must take on is to carry out inspection work that is new ”. But, how will the innovation be generated if the audit and control have become based on claims that have lacked rigor and conceptual verification, and in the end, have excluded the possibility that their principles and standards may be revealed as completely unfounded.In this sense, one of the main challenges that they must take on is to carry out inspection work that is new ”. But, how will the innovation be generated if the audit and inspection have become based on claims that have lacked rigor and conceptual verification, and in the end, have excluded the possibility that its principles and standards may be revealed as completely unfounded.
Consequently, in the world of auditing, phrases such as: "Higher Audit Institutions have tools to explain the management of public funds"; "Inspection constitutes one of the best instruments to guarantee the effectiveness of economic and social development plans and programs"; and, "The role of the auditor is a guarantee of the transparency of financial information." Originating the 'normalization' of the analyzes, by expressing "as can be assumed, the role and function of the external control institutions of public funds, which are assigned, as an essential function, the control of public financial management, is fundamental". From the above it is worth emphasizing,First of all, the thinking of the audit and inspection has been based on the assumption, that is, on assuming that the audit or inspection has certain attributes or characteristics without being completely sure of it. And second, they claim they comply but they don't work. Which indicates the contradiction not only as a particular manifestation in the Secretary General of the Chamber of Accounts of Navarra, but also a general characteristic in the thinking of the audit.but a general characteristic in the thinking of the audit.but a general characteristic in the thinking of the audit.
3. Contradictions
3.1 Corruption
The International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) in its Strategic Plan 2011-2016, in the Vision, and in point number 5, establishes “Promote the fight against corruption”. And various Forums and Congresses have insisted on the prevention of corruption and fraud and the important role that auditing entities must play in this effort. However, "every other day, cases of corruption, mismanagement and waste are also uncovered (…) in administrations that must be audited by the control institutions, given the passivity of many of them" points out Luis Ma. Ordoki, and the Association of Fraud Examiners of the United States, known by the acronym ACFE, published in 2006,a study conducted by means of surveys of professionals certified in the investigation and fight against fraud, about how fraud is discovered? And the answer was, through the anonymous report, and secondly, its accidental discovery. In addition, Juan Manuel Portal, on the occasion of his protest as Superior Auditor of the ASF, admitted "that the supervisory body must be close to society, since it is the citizens who usually become aware of the irregularities." And the omission in the Lima Declaration of having set aside the issue of corruption and fraud, Bernhard Friedmann, President of the European Court of Auditors, affirmed “It is not that the availability to discuss the issue was lacking. The concern of the delicate figure of the effectiveness control was put before it,whose development depends on a relationship of full trust between the auditor and the audited entity ”. Later, at the same time as the aforementioned statement, in the 90s, the Spanish Court of Accounts presented as study material in its seminars an example of the unfortunate performance of auditors who made serious errors, one of them, the unlimited trust of the auditors with the audited entity (www.fiscalizacion.es, February 7, 2012).the unlimited trust of the auditors with the audited entity (www.fiscalizacion.es, February 7, 2012).the unlimited trust of the auditors with the audited entity (www.fiscalizacion.es, February 7, 2012).
The underlying problem is not the contradiction that, while some put full trust first, others disqualify unlimited trust, but rather that the audit has been based on trust. This has two meanings, the first one expresses the hope that is harbored in society towards the auditor or audit of their performance. The second requires it to be based on facts and evidence. And the crisis of confidence in auditing and auditing institutions is precisely due to citizens who have stopped believing in the reports or opinions of the auditors, in other words, the audit work is doubted. And how is uncertainty not going to be generated, if, for example, in an International Forum on Control it is stated that “the control entities are expressly set up to combat corruption and impunity”. And it is reiterated in,"Research on the Performance and Results of the Superior Audit of the Federation (ASF) a study carried out at the end of 2007 by the Center for Public Opinion Studies of the Faculty of Political Sciences of the National Autonomous University of Mexico, where it is located to the ASF "as a credible body to combat corruption and contribute to administrative improvement" (www.asf.gob.mx). But in another ownership of the ASF, it was affirmed "the government audit is not an express tool as an anti-corruption instrument." So it was not strange or surprising that Deputy Esthela Damián Peralta, president of the ASF Surveillance Commission,At the end of his legislative term, he pointed out "in terms of oversight there are no significant advances that allow for a frontal fight against the diversion of resources or corruption in the public service."
And the problem of corruption continues to be the Achilles heel in the control organizations because they evade facing the contradiction between what their governing institutions say and what each one does in their practice in particular. It is paradoxical that while, Rafael Medina Jáber, President of the Audience of Accounts of the Canary Islands, in his Advance Project, affirms “The function of the Control Bodies must satisfy the information needs for Management, consequently, control cannot be limited to report accounting or legal irregularities ”(www.fiscalizacion.es, February 17, 2008). And, the head of the Superior Audit of the Federation, indicated when taking office, "its objective is to promote forensic audits that seek to prevent the mismanagement of public money" (national press, January 10, 2010).This seems to be justified by the relativism that 'everyone speaks according to their perspective', and which translates as 'each inspection entity does and says according to their situation'. What 'letting do and letting say' represents in the world of auditing and auditing, but it has also meant the conditions that have allowed them to dilute their responsibility. Because no one claims responsibility for serious public debt or permanent fraud and corruption scandals, and even less for the crisis in each society. For example, “GAO has no responsibility for auditing private sector companies, as at Enron, we are taking a series of actions aimed at helping Congress decide what to do in light of the decline and fall of Enron ”. Years later,GAO's actions were shown not to help prevent or anticipate the tsunami that caused the global economic crisis, and of course they were not held accountable. Thus, governing institutions such as Pontius Pilatos 'wash their hands'. Meanwhile, the Superior Auditor of the ASF continues to affirm "trust is based on the basic belief in the existence of a specific technical capacity in the audit body." More so if society faces a deep economic and social crisis, for its resolution, belief is no longer enough but transparency.The Superior Auditor of the ASF continues to affirm "trust is based on belief in the existence of a specific technical capacity in the audit body". More so if society faces a deep economic and social crisis, for its resolution, belief is no longer enough but transparency.The Superior Auditor of the ASF continues to affirm "trust is based on belief in the existence of a specific technical capacity in the audit body". More so if society faces a deep economic and social crisis, for its resolution, belief is no longer enough but transparency.
3.2 Transparency
An ideal has ended up as a ghost, all the inspection institutions talk about it but nobody sees it. And it seems that the more they deceive themselves in affirming, the audit and control guarantee transparency, the more they hide under the cloak of invisibility. For this reason, "practically no one remembers the external control institutions." Or, as argued, the Lawyer of the Court of Accounts of Spain, Pilar Jiménez Rius, "no one has mentioned the Court of Accounts or their autonomous counterparts" in reference to the fact that they are the great forgotten of this crisis in helping to solve the problem. Perhaps, because no one hides as well as the institutions of control.
But it could not be otherwise, if the discourse of the auditing entities about transparency turns out to be a dead letter, or is it not contradictory to speak of transparency when their activity must be governed by secrecy and confidentiality?
conclusion
Auditing, a fundamental practice in auditing entities, is not constituted by the total of what can be said to be true about its theoretical weaknesses. Since in all its history it has recognized its truths but not its errors. And when the falls of Enron, Lehman, the falsification of public accounts, and the epidemic of fraud and corruption in both the public and private sectors have occurred, which reflect the scale of the current crisis, 'normality' has been imposed through of praise and praise for standards issued by INTOSAI or GAO that represent best practices at the international level. Accepting that they continue to be an example, given their interpretation that what happened was caused by ambition, lack of ethics, lax controls, plus whatever the explanation, it is omitted to examine,if the audit taught by the standardizing bodies, its conception, foundations and regulations, has stopped responding to the challenges of today's society. For example, the thesis continues to hold: auditing is a necessary condition for accountability and transparency. But it is ignored, for the audit to build transparency it is necessary that the audit be demonstrated in clarity. It is not enough that public funds should remain in a glass box, the audit must necessarily be shown in full light. However, the perspective in the auditor, and therefore, in the auditing institutions has been constrained and limited by assumptions that accept the norms as a hermeneutical practice. Yes, from the Greek god Hermes,in charge of taking secret messages to their recipients on Olympus and once with them, he was the one who had to decipher them.
Any resemblance to the role of the auditor is not coincidence or coincidence. Nor the primacy granted, again, to accounting through its reform and harmonization. Or, the rendering (not of accounts but of losing) the fight against corruption, of the control institutions. When the responsibility is transferred to another instance, to the Anti-corruption Agency or Office. However, both claims have in common, the exclusion of auditing from the public agenda as a topic of discussion. Despite the fact that the inspection institutions have failed, or the audit firms (even if they commit themselves to submit transparency reports) remain more comfortable as carriers and interpreters of secrets than to demonstrate their impartiality.
But a great stumbling block arises if the audit has been conceived from its origin as a technical one, and it is intrinsically normative, that is, it can be complied with or not. Deriving that there is no guarantee because it is a choice, and therefore, leads to relativity; where each auditor and each of the control entities assume not only their freedom to decide on their actions but also to justify and legitimize themselves, as a closed practice, distant from the gazes of the common citizen.
No, it is not possible to continue hoping that the control entities will be transformed by the will of the legislators, nor by the initiative and effort of the 'standardizing bodies' since they reproduce the assumptions and contradictions that have limited and held that the truth in the audit, whether public or private, is achieved by repeating the criteria of authority. For this reason, it appeals to the hope of constitutional autonomy, a legal construction that aims to protect the inspection institutions from the interference of political and economic interest, but which finally evades to recognize, the audit as a basic instrument or tool in the inspection constitutes the obstacle greater to transform the supreme audit institutions because it is uncritical, authoritarian, and anti-democratic (the three As). Plus,Yes, the audit and control entities could be changed, if it really became a discipline, as a form of knowledge, of differentiating the public from the private reality, of determining that each one has its own object of study and correspondingly its method. Yes, the foregoing places us in a strange conceptual horizon, which no longer holds that independence and objectivity are permanent values but must be demonstrated in each review. In the light not in the dark. Then, the guarantee of independence in the control entities will not be the product of a legislative decree but of a methodological construction that must be carried out, audit after audit, and then,The values in the audit and supervision will not be immanent or natural but must be demonstrated in each practice in its concreteness.
