It seems that the idea of losing the fight against corruption in Mexico is out of context. On the contrary, the triumph of the National Anticorruption System (SNA) created with the constitutional reform in 2015 is desired, and its approval is almost unanimous, repeating that it is an extraordinary advance, the most important initiative of the government audit, and a huge legislative effort that lays the foundations for a paradigm shift in all instances to prevent, detect and punish corruption. And even, the academic Mauricio Merino, harangued "We are going for the anticorruption revolution" (www.eluniversal.com, May 6, 2017).And although some columnists affirm that the SNA was born lame, and a "specialist" maintains that the State Anticorruption System of Michoacán would be born dead; What is certain is the existence of a new institutional design that aims to fight corruption, and what needs to be investigated is whether this fight is going to win.
If a fight has been declared, it is because there is a war. Which is all very well to declare war on corruption. But when is it going to be won, or when what has been achieved, or perhaps when there are no more acts of corruption. Which means the lack of clear objectives, although it could be justified that the SNA is perfectible, that it will be progressively perfected. However, from the outset the SNA has lacked the preparation, positioning and information, and this constitutes the best possible weapon to start the fight with full guarantee of victory., even before the battle begins (Sun Tzu, The Art of War). Thus, one has started losing, but the fact is not recognized, and even less does the learning of losing begin. And learning to lose is having the ability to accept that the National Anti-Corruption System has failed. Yes, it has omitted the analysis and criticism of the tool or instrument that makes the audit possible, that is, the audit. More in defense of the legislative work of both the Congress of the Union and the State Congresses, it has been the dominant model of auditing in the control and inspection bodies, responsible for impunity, a condition that has strengthened corruption, and the National System Anticorruption has not foreseen it, and consequently neither the Local Anticorruption Systems. Let's see.
On May 30, 2017, the Governing Body of the SNA elected Ricardo Salgado, as its Technical Secretary, who affirmed “I am going to lead the studies of prevention and detection of corruption” (La Voz de Michoacán, May 31, 2017, p. 1 B). In other words, after the National Anticorruption System has established as one of its basic objectives, to prevent, detect and punish acts of corruption. The Technical Secretary will begin his study when legislation has been passed in this regard. And it is what explains why the National Anti-Corruption System and its Regulations did not determine or specify how corruption is prevented and detected, and if there is no clarity in this regard, much less in its sanction. That is, they started (putting pieces) backwards. And in the same way they have done it in the Local Anti-Corruption Systems.
As in Michoacán, its Anti-Corruption System has considered the following crimes as crimes: bribery, embezzlement, diversion of public resources, improper use of information, abuse of functions, action under conflict of interest, improper hiring, hidden enrichment or concealment of conflict of interest, influence peddling, cover-up, contempt, and obstruction of justice. But, how are you going to investigate and prove influence peddling, cover-up and conflict of interest, among others? Yes, what methodology or procedures will the auditors at the Superior Audit Office of Michoacán or the Comptroller's Office use to investigate and prove each of the crimes that have been established. And evidently the State Anticorruption System of Michoacán has not determined it either.And it will be until those responsible are designated when the studies will begin, such as the Technical Secretary of the SNA.
It has been assumed that the audit is clear on how to carry out the investigation of each one of them.But let's put two cases regarding the diversion of resources. The first, in a sanitary jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health, dengue is detected and it is considered that it is necessary to carry out a sanitary fence so that it does not spread, and what is basically required is fuel and road expenses to move to the commissioned staff. And second, the administrator of a Cereso in the Ministry of Public Security is informed that the gas is about to run out, and if this happens it is possible violent disagreement by the inmates. Then, as is known, the budget insufficiency is endemic in the areas and dependencies, the delay in the eradications and budgets that are useless. Then, both administrators have resources from other items, which means a deviation and incur an irregularity that is the reason for sanction.And if the auditors and their Directors lack criteria to act, the problem, far from being solved, will multiply.
Year after year, the control and inspection bodies report thousands of observations and irregularities, as well as the initiation of a significant number of administrative procedures, and time passes and they generally end in oblivion. However, Juan Manuel Portal, Superior Auditor of the Federation has recalled “the lack of punishment to former officials or former governors for acts of corruption, has not been due to lack of work of the ASF (…) of 740 criminal complaints that the ASF before the PGR have only resolved approximately 30(Without informing if they were in a favorable or unfavorable sense to the Superior Audit of the Federation). In my opinion it is not that they do not want to do it, it is that there is a lag (…) and it is possible that in a future date we will present another 300 or 400 more ”(www.quadratin.com.mx, PGR Lags the punishment for the punishments of corruption: ASF, May 24, 2017). And the Superior Auditor of Michoacán recognized "7 thousand files remain awaiting resolution" (www.quadratin.com.mx, January 26, 2017) And the State Comptroller "From 2001 to 2015 began around 5 thousand procedures administrative against various officials. Of these procedures, only 1,159 public officials were “sanctioned” that is, 23.18% ”(Pure impunity in Michoacán, www.conlupa.com.mx). But the sanctions were limited to: reprimands,warnings and suspensions (which ranged from three days to six months). And in January of this year, SECOEM filed 10 criminal complaints with the PGJE, and almost three months later the Attorney General asserted that the complaints “have not been prosecuted due to lack of information” (www.respuesta.com.mx, 03 April 2017) and to date the situation is unknown. The foregoing shows impunity; and what does it mean that it will be reversed with the approval of the Anti-Corruption System, if the crimes are more complex and if the means to investigate them are lacking. And far from being expedited, it will be aggravated derived from a slow implementation process, see the delay in the appointment of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor, the magistrates of the Administrative Justice Court rooms, and the funds authorized for the operation of the SNA,and of the corresponding adjustments in each entity.
But the main problem lies in the conception held by those responsible for the inspection entities. For example, in November 2015, the Superior Auditor of the Federation, warned of some risks that could compromise its success,In first, he said, the system is based on technical elements to achieve its goals, so it should be alert to any attempt to politicize its operation. Secondly, the system is represented by citizen participation, although it could become bureaucratized or seen in incentives that are what is originally being fought to omit. And in the third instance, it is necessary to make a distinction between subjecting the system to evaluations to improve it and turning it into a forum focused on questioning the institutions (Risks on the horizon, Juan Manuel Portal, www.eluniversal.com.mx, November 12, 2015).
Deep down, Juan Manuel Portal does not want changes (the audit is like that and not otherwise, citizen participation must be limited to the assigned role, and not question the institutions).And we already know what the Superior Audit of the Federation says is repeated as dogma in every control and inspection entity. Consequently, how do you intend to win the fight against corruption with the same audit paradigm? Or do the public audit standards and procedures provide the conceptual and practical tools to investigate each of the crimes that have been established in the Anti-Corruption System? Of course not. And neither will the forensic audit come with its magic wand to solve the problems in Michoacán. Therefore, the Superior Auditor of the Federation looks for reasons not to leave his comfort and by being part of the problem he anticipates his defeat. Paradoxical.If it seems like a strange statement, how trying to fight without arms against a monster with a thousand heads is illogical, but if you really want to win the fight against corruption, you need to illuminate new paths, providing new ideas or solutions, otherwise the triumphalist speech will be part of corruption.
