War in Syria. crisis management analysis and its elements in a real case

Since the war in Syria began in early 2011, the country has become the scene of horror and cruelty. The numbers speak for themselves. In the first five years of war, the death toll would range from 330,000, calculated by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, to 470,000, from the Syrian Center for Political Observation. To these must be added the 75,000 disappeared counted by the Syrian Human Rights Network. In September 2016, UNHCR had 4,800,000 refugees registered in neighboring countries, and another 1,120,000 had requested asylum from Europe. On the other hand, the number of internally displaced people was close to 9,000,000 people. For Antonio Guterres, then UNHCR High Commissioner, it was "the most dangerous crisis for global peace and security since World War II."But it seems that all these data are not enough to stop the barbarism, if only to give a truce and set a timetable for negotiations between the opposition, rebels, the Syrian government and international actors.

The sarin gas attack on the defenseless population in Idlib, near Aleppo, one of the few remaining strongholds for the opposition and groups of militiamen fighting the regime, led to a change in the strategy of Washington, where Trump launched an attack against Al Asad, completely unleashing the international crisis resulting from this war. What is not clear is whether Trump will face Putin for this. The Russian president has made clear through his decisive intervention in the Syrian conflict and his repeated vetoes in the UN Security Council that he does not want to let the United States be the only and first power to lead the designs of the Middle East.Access to the Mediterranean port of Tartus in Syria and the future exploitation of gas and oil in the Leviathan fields add the geoeconomic component to Russia's geopolitical interest.

The war in Syria has revealed the sum of interests and geopolitical calculations of the great powers and their pawns in the region. At the same time, it hides another contention little understood in the West: the religious struggle between Sunnis and Shiites that dates back to the bid for the succession of the caliphate and the leadership of the world Muslim community, which now totals 1.6 billion faithful.

DEVELOPING

Although in the study of this real case we are approaching the crisis situation from Bautzmann's perception, when he speaks of "a sudden or violent transition from a political situation to a less stable one", it is worth clarifying that in the region there is a constant tension due to the civil war that today lasts for six years from its beginning.

In a timely manner, this transition occurs after the alleged attack with chemical weapons on April 4 by the Syrian regime, and which has had a balance of 80 dead and a hundred wounded. This act, still under investigation and, therefore, not as obvious as we appreciate in the first articles in the press, was answered by the United States, on behalf of its executive, and without arguing with other instances, with the launch of 59 missiles against the base. from where, according to classified information, the plane that caused the first attack would have left. Their argument, in addition to the customary messianic tone with which they justify their actions within the framework of the fight against terrorism, was to prevent the use of this type of weapon in future actions;in addition to questioning the veracity of the total delivery of the Syrian chemical arsenal to Russia during 2013 for its subsequent destruction.

After the attack and the counterattack, several of the political actors involved in the region showed two sides of the same coin of an extra imbalance in the region; who did not consider it possible that an alleged attack with chemical weapons was carried out, and who were taken by surprise by the response by the American power. This imbalance is evident in the different interpretations in which each of its sides and its allies gave to the situation; Further complicating the scenario of immediate crisis, and the mediated tension of a half-decade civil war with strong allies, such as Russia and Iraq in the case of Syria, and France and the United Kingdom in the case of the Americans.

Based on the above, the situation can indeed be classified as a crisis according to the definitions given by Bautzmann, since despite the fact that the first attack would have been allegedly carried out by Syria, this is nothing more than the strategic pawn (due to its geographical location in the transport of gas and oil) of the powers that play the role in international decisions, and that have an open microphone to argue their actions in the media, making use of local actors to achieve it, and relying on third party validators such as investigations or organizations to corroborate your point of view and basis for your decision; in this specific case, the North American counterattack.

In addition to the aforementioned, the constituent elements of this situation that we have dubbed crisis are pointed out below:

1. The actors

Due to the number of actors involved, we are going to divide them into camps so that we can identify them more clearly, as well as their particular interests. It is necessary to clarify that, although the maximum point of tension had been generated between Syria and the United States, some actors have historically existed and remain, which we will mention below.

Side Syria
Actors	Description	Interests
government Sirius	Composed of the country's Shiite minorities, they make up the government despite officially declaring themselves as a secular state as established by the Baath.	To govern from their religious perspective and favoring those who ingratiate themselves with their form of government.
Russian Federation	Within the context of the Cold War, and even after it, they have become the main ally to defend against old empires and new invasions from the West (properly speaking, the United Kingdom, France and the United States).	To confront them with the western powers, identified as enemies or invaders since the Cold War era.
Iran and China	Both strategic allies of Russia. In the case of China ideologically and in the case of Iran, because it combines with the thinking proliferated by the Arab Spring during 2011 (Boiso, 2011).	To compose a strong economic and arms bloc that is capable of dealing with threats from the West.
United States side
Opposition in Syria	Composed of the Sunni majorities that refer to almost 70% of the Syrian population and towards whom the alleged chemical attack was directed, within this majority are also Islamist groups.	They seek to destabilize and overthrow the secular state (Sunni majority) to impose an Islamic one that establishes sharia (extremist groups)
Great Brittany and France	They represent the ancient empires that occupied the region, especially the French by entering the territory that today is called Syria, but that at the time was part of the promise to create a country called Greater Arabia. They both left the region at the end of World War II.	Control and / or benefit from the exit to the Mediterranean for the transport of oil and gas.
Turkey and Arabia Saudi	Both strategic allies of the United States.	Stop the advance or ideological invasion represented by the opposition side; in addition to economic and historical interests.

2. The individual

At the local level, we can find two religious components that theologically build each side; Shiites and Sunnis.

At the international level, we mainly find a constant push for control of a region with abundant energy resources, by two ideological currents of government and governance that are facing each other. As in the Cold War, its highest ambassadors for this conflict between East and West are the United States and Russia.

3. Loss of reference

The loss of reference in this specific case occurs when, instead of clarifying the events of the alleged attack with chemical weapons, the actions carried out by the actors were framed in the American counterattack, the accusations of the Syrian government through the support of Russia and the silence of international organizations. Furthermore, within the context of the attack, at no time is the crisis located within an active civil war in the territory; it seems that it was just an excuse for world powers to "measure their forces" and exercise their control and authority in the area.

4. The media

All the information of the crisis, in general terms, has been given more of a show treatment than an investigative and informative character. Except for a general investigation into why the use of chemical weapons was suspected in a bombing, the news had no further follow-up, nor resolutions.

Located within this scenario, between diatribes and justifications, the term "crisis" falls somewhat short to encompass the large number of actions taking place around the Syrian territory, and which, the majority, are not related to it, but are pursuing their own interests. Within Oran Young's perspective, then, we will be able to extend the classification of "international crisis", since behind the apparent calm there is hidden a permanent conflictive dimension, and which has been maintained over time despite episodes of cooperation such as delivery (now in question) from Syria's chemical arsenal to Russia.

These aspects make the crisis unfold within a framework of cooperation for common objectives of the actors (in different areas), armed conflict and the intervention of third parties such as international organizations, or the powers that play the role of allies while maintaining their specific goals and your own agenda. In other words, the crisis is not a sudden event but it remains in the area, and it intensifies or not depending on the actions taken by the actors involved, especially those who have great military power.

At this point, and after observing the conflict from its historical perspective, we will focus on the specific crisis through the chronological analysis of the events that triggered the present situation.

In the forecast phase, referring to the identification of the precursor indices of the crisis, we can locate two specific moments that sought, under linear dynamics, to reduce the chances that an attack could be generated using the chemical arsenal. In this sense, at one point it seemed that there had been a comprehensive approach between the United States and Russia to prevent this type of event. Namely, the events were the total handover of the chemical program to Russia by Syria. Subsequently, the eastern power officially delivered the elements collected to the United States so that they could proceed to their destruction to generate a scenario of certainty by reducing the arms complexity of an active and dynamic conflict. However, when the attack happened,and assuming that this was real from the North American perspective, it hints at individual behavior outside the comprehensive approach to conflict management, reflected in the apparent omission when delivering all the available arsenal, creating an environment of mistrust among actors and uncertainty in their relationships.

When examining the prevention phase, we can find that there are both structural and operational elements applied from the international scene, but not strengthened by the internal structure of the Syrian state. Namely, structural prevention can be found in elements such as the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993 that was formalized in Paris on April 29, 1997 after the official establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (Alfonso, 2003), and which entered into force on October 14, 2013 for the Syrian Arab Republic. Similarly, there are several instruments in International Law that can be applied directly or indirectly on the use of chemical weapons in internal armed conflicts, such as, Convention IV of the (Hague Law),formed by the six Conventions of the Peace Conference of 1899 and the fourteen of the Peace Conference of 1907, relative to the laws and customs of land warfare (Riquelme-Cortado, 1999) and article 3 of Protocol II additional to those Geneva Conventions of 1949, and which relates to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Andersson, Nävert, Bingham, Englyst, & Cummings, 1983).1983).1983).

Regarding operational prevention, we find the UN Security Council, the Blue Helmets framed in the fourth generation Peace Missions, the members of the Syrian Civil Defense (SCD), the ambassadors both of Syria, and of the nations that are part of the dynamics of the conflict, and the armed arms of each of the actors in the conflict. Within the chronology of the conflict, the only ones who were present during the maximum crisis level were the members of the SCD, who were immediately deployed to help those affected; however, they did not take part in any kind of humanitarian action at the time of the American counterattack. The other actors were static actors to the surprise of the attack,Except for the United States Army, which acted using force as an immediate reaction to the attack.

In this sense, we can identify that the prevention strategy against this type of event was effective but not effective. It was effective insofar as it was possible to prevent the spread of the crisis through the use of arms as a determining factor for the imposition of order. However, it was not an effective strategy since, the cutoff took place despite both operational and structural forecasts and preventions, and cannot guarantee the recurrence of this type of crisis in the future due to, in the first instance, the execution of a more non-reflective reactive action (in other words, a specific place was attacked without fully knowing the causes, processes or media that the attacks took place, which at that time was only fragmented / classified speculation and information), and In second instance,because it can no longer be taken for granted that Syria does not have chemical weapons in its possession, which would lead to clarifying their provenance or the omission of any of their allies as accomplices, to hide their existence.

To complement the above, if we refer to crisis management, we can conclude that there was no established and clearly visible management, at least at the time of maximum tension. No joint and military activities were generated to respond to an open crisis, nor were actions taken to seek a return to a normal situation. What was produced was an armed response that momentarily imposed peace, but it does not make it lasting since it becomes more conflictive situations. Also, it is worth clarifying that at the time of the crisis, the main objective was not the restoration of general stability, but the destruction of a designated adversary and a specific objective (Piella, 2012).

In the broader use of that expressed by Bautzmann when he mentions that management also occurs through the use of various modalities of coercive diplomacy, we could say that it required a type of immediate crisis management, however, such management cannot be framed within the concept of Comprehensive Approach or Comprehensive Approach (Shrivenham, 2006), since the military actions in this case- were executed motu proprio, without making use of pooled resources (such as the United Nations armies), without the coordination of international forces and without sharing objectives among the actors in the conflict. The only moment in which there was a degree of Integral Approach, occurred in the phase prior to the actions that caused the crisis,referring to the joint work carried out by the two powers for the collection and destruction of the chemical arsenal under the regulations expressed within operational precautions.

Regarding possible peace actions, we will say that despite the high number of victims caused by the repression of the demonstrations and the bombing of the cities raised in Syria, the international powers were unable to pass a resolution similar to the one decreed in Libya in March 2011, where the UN Security Council passed resolution 1.973 imposing a no-fly zone over Libya to protect civilians and prevent aviation from bombing cities that had risen up against Gaddafi.

UNSMIS - United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria - was established in April 2012 to monitor the cessation of armed violence to end the conflict. But in August 2012, UNSMIS suspended its activities, due to an escalation of armed violence across the country as the conditions established by the Council were not met.

Undoubtedly, the most ambitious initiative was the one proposed at the Geneva Conference on Syria, held on June 30, 2012 at the initiative of the United States and Russia, and with the presence of a large part of the actors involved in the crisis, with the exception of from Iran. It was followed by the Second Geneva Conference held in January 2014, in which the greatest international concern was to combat the jihadist caliphate and not evict Bashar al-Assad from power. Finally, Geneva III started in February 2016 and was interrupted after a few days due to the lack of progress. All this has put on the table the international inability to face this conflict.

Proposals made by the United States, the United Kingdom and France collided, over and over, with Russia's vetoes. Faced with this refusal, Western countries opted to impose sanctions against the Syrian regime, including the prohibition of arms sales, the freezing of transactions with the Syrian Central Bank, the restriction of the free movement of people and the blocking of accounts of its main leaders abroad. These measures have had little impact on the regime, which has always had the complicity of Iran and Russia, which, in addition to diplomatic support, provide valuable economic and military aid.

As for the United States, the Obama administration initially attempted to cut through the interventionist legacy of its predecessor in office: George W. Bush. In reaction, Obama tried to distance himself from the Middle East and declined the containment strategy in Syria trying to prevent the war from affecting his main regional allies: Israel, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. From the first moment, the North American administration showed its rejection of the creation of no-fly zones or, even, of the opening of humanitarian corridors, despite repeated requests in this regard by the opposition. Today, with Trump as president, the top priority remains fighting ISIS and not the defeat of the Syrian regime.

Faced with the ambiguity of the United States, Russia has always made it clear that it would defend the Syrian regime by all possible means. We must not overlook the fact that Bashar's fall would jeopardize his geostrategic interests in the Middle East.

The ties between Moscow and Damascus are not new, since both countries maintained a close alliance during the Cold War that was crowned with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Military Cooperation in 1980.

In the current war against terrorism situation, neither the UN nor the PMS have proven to contribute too much. In fact, they have been unable to alleviate the problem in Syria. And on the other hand, we see how the Islamic State, Al Qaeda and its subsidiaries scattered throughout the Middle East and North Africa are advancing in their desire to spread terror. Since 1994 we have seen a decrease in UN peacekeeping activities, reflecting a loss of confidence after the mishaps of Rwanda, the Balkans and Somalia.

That is why the OMP must turn their modus operandi and adapt, as Mary Kaldor exposes, to the new wars of the 21st century. There needs to be a conscious strategy of supporting cosmopolitan local initiatives.

There is still a refusal to undertake a dialogue comparable to dialogue with the parties to the conflict, consider these partner groups in a common cosmopolitan project and collaborate in the elaboration of a joint strategy to develop a citizen base in favor of peace. There is a trend, among Western political leaders, that these initiatives are commendable but insignificant; "Citizens cannot build peace," said David Owen when he was a negotiator in the former Yugoslavia. This attitude is perhaps explained by the horizontal nature of communication between high levels, the fact that leaders only speak to other leaders.. Thus, without the cooperation and general consensus of the majority of the local population and the leadership of the main governing authorities, be they the parties to the conflict or government agencies, it is not reasonable or realistic to trust success. Consent, to its fullest extent, is necessary for any prospect of success. Thus, the so-called pacification by force becomes an impossible argument and more, if possible, in this clash of civilizations that we are experiencing.

CONCLUSION

This Syrian puzzle will go down in history as the puzzle that unraveled the United States' plans to veer towards the Asia Pacific, embroiled Russia on a double war front: the war in Syria and the fight against Islamist terrorism that also threatens the territorial integrity of Russia..

Eradicating this threat requires from the developed powers alternatives to forcefulness and military deployment. Responding with bombardment and displaying force to terrorist attacks by jihadists in Europe or by the Syrian government against their people only reproduces the spiral of violence.

The UN must pressure all the parties involved so that the ceasefire negotiated by Russia, Iran and Turkey is respected and demand a calendar of negotiations held over time to agree on a political transition that contemplates the plurality of voices of the crucible. Syrian ethnic and religious: from Shiites and Sunnis, Arabs and Kurds, Islamists and secularists.

SELF APPRAISAL

I consider this work to have been especially the most challenging of what we have done in specialization. Not only for the thematic content, but also for the complexity of the selected examples to carry out this activity; in this specific case, that of Syria.

However, the material presented is only a brushstroke of the true depth that should be given to this module, so much so that it could have one or two more activities to be able to put the analytical components at the service of specific cases.

Of the concepts that most surprised me, largely due to my lack of knowledge of both the subject and the discipline, were the importance of the United States in the elaboration of knowledge about conflicts, not only as a perpetrator, but as a source of methodological models both strategic as well as tactical. Especially when managing crises based on indirect pressure under the concepts of "Failed State", "Sustainable Development" and "Social Engineering"; not because it agrees with its methods, but because it has enough elements to identify actions framed in this type of meaning.

Finally, the great learning or the one that has caught my attention the most revolves around the differentiation between deterrence and conflict prevention. This complements much more the vision he had regarding the UN missions and the differences between imposing peace and managing it through coordinated and complementary actions.

I consider that my degree of involvement is based on my affinity with the subject and the fact that, apart from my obligations towards this course, I am a regular reader of the subject. In other words, more than a professional enrichment, which I know I am having, I consider that this type of situational analysis has an impact on my daily life and my work, since crisis management at macro levels can be used as a reference or guide for the resolution of micro type. However, someone who does not feel the same affinity with the subject will certainly try to see it in depth to see it only in a superficial way.

I have carefully read the material presented in the module and, as I said before, it is only an outline of something that can and must be dealt with in greater depth to generate more academic wealth. In addition to this material, with my partner we decided to consult more sources to give us an overview (historical, social, cultural, economic, etc.) of the conflict addressed, and a complementary bibliography for the expansion of concepts that are passed quickly and without definition. in some passages of the reading, as shown in the bibliographic section of our work.

I reason that our note, mine and that of my partner, is one (A) not only for the quality of the work we have wanted to present, but the degree of rapport we have with the subject, how much we have learned, and what we have We have been able to begin to apply not only the concepts used in this module, but we have also used those of other subjects making this the most analytical work so far.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Naïr, S., Why do they rebel? Revolutions and counter-revolutions in the Arab world, Clave intelectual, Madrid, 2013.

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