Possible points or questions to debate in the conceptual space around epistemology and pedagogy:
Epistemology involves understanding a science: understanding what it is, what it is, from what problem has arisen. It implies understanding it as and as a historical process that it is.
If we are trying to characterize what epistemology is in relation to pedagogy, it is because we are starting from a previous understanding: we understand by understanding, we start from the assumption that we need to understand science (a certain science) if we intend to teach it, in the correct sense of this teaching that involves promoting scientific training in those who participate and not simply receive this training.
I think that progress has now been made in this understanding, if we already take it as a logical assumption to start from if we are participating in a true training process. By assuming that this understanding must be achieved prior to any training process, this means that without understanding, no training can take place. (In order for "my student" to be trained, or better, to be trained, it is necessary that he "understands", says, suddenly, a teacher, commenting on this particular topic).
This understanding should not only be of an intellectual type when we say that we have understood this or that scientific concept, but personal, emotional, as when a child says that he feels understood not only by his teacher, but by the group in which he is integrated. This understanding, prior or essential to any training process, occurs in many real, vital cases in the educational space, but in an implicit, if not unconscious, way: a teacher can say: I, as a teacher, know that my group, my students understand me (they understand in this case), without knowing exactly how or if they will continue to do so later. But you don't know how to promote, achieve, or maintain that understanding.
We must, therefore, rely on pedagogical knowledge, as a pedagogical understanding of the training process. We have to become aware of how this comprehensive-formative process is being achieved, not only to understand or understand it better or more completely, but to be able to achieve it in the following formative acts that we undertake.
It is essentially the teacher who must be aware of how to achieve training as the intention of their training project. As a teacher, he may have the following preconception: “I know that my students understand (and even understand well) what I teach them, but I don't really know why or how they do it, as I am very busy preparing what I am going to teach, let us leave this topic –not even assuming it as a problem- to others, pedagogues or psychologists, who can mediate to clarify things, but personally I think I do not need it to efficiently carry out my work ”.
If education has been thought as it is or should be from the conceptual field called "pedagogy" or "pedagogical knowledge"? This task is the one that should be required of a discipline such as since Modernity an attempt has been made to characterize its emergence and constitution.
The educational process as a training process must be carried out with the greatest possible awareness, that is, understanding what is actually taking place not only in the teacher who initiates and carries it out, but now, especially, in the student. This would be the pertinent meaning of pedagogy, as a thinking discipline, constituted in and from Modernity. In other words, the raison d'être of pedagogy is not to create, discover or systematize "methods" or procedures that would allow teaching to be carried out, with the greatest possible effectiveness or efficiency. Its reason for being, that is to say, its rationality is oriented to the understanding (knowledge and deepening) of the educational process itself, as a training process. You can't understand, then, today,pedagogy as a discipline (or specific knowledge) that, in the face of the epistemological model of scientificity, was dedicated to "inventing" and promoting the most appropriate methodology for said teaching work. Understanding in this way the rationality of pedagogy, it can be seen that this task was being carried out in the modern era. In this, also known as the "age of science", it was believed to be able to evaluate any theoretical project with the criterion of scientificity, Galileo-Newton-Copernicus type. In other words, any process that claimed to be scientific or related to science, had to adapt this model to its practice or apply the guidelines set forth by said new practice. This is the scientific context in which the first modern pedagogical project was developed.Scientism was then configured in the conceptual field of education and pedagogy. Physicalism entered and configured this framework to project and carry out education, but not to think and understand it as such. This is why this episteme could not really account for or "explain" the entire training process. And in this sense, it should continue to be problematized from the proposal presented by, for example, Gadamer and other contemporary authors, not because now hermeneutics finally took account of this educational problem. I suggest rather that from philosophy there is the possibility of thinking about education and the formative and pedagogical process that it fosters, but not only from this contemporary philosopher. From Plato himself, for example, he had been thinking about what education is,although it must be admitted that this and other first reflections on the knowledge process and its implication with the educational process have not had the appropriate appropriation. The approach would be this, in synthesis: there has been a reflection from philosophy about what education is or should be, but it has been reduced to one more theory about education. I propose that in a theoretical agreement we collect or rethink those reflections that have been given more or less systematically about education. In other words, let's rethink education from Plato since we mentioned it, but also from other philosophers and writers who have raised the subject of education in their works.The approach would be this, in synthesis: there has been a reflection from philosophy about what education is or should be, but it has been reduced to one more theory about education. I propose that in a theoretical agreement we collect or rethink those reflections that have been given more or less systematically about education. In other words, let's rethink education from Plato since we mentioned it, but also from other philosophers and writers who have raised the subject of education in their works.The approach would be this, in summary: there has been a reflection from philosophy about what education is or should be, but it has been reduced to one more theory about education. I propose that in a theoretical agreement we collect or rethink those reflections that have been given more or less systematically about education. In other words, let's rethink education from Plato since we mentioned it, but also from other philosophers and writers who have raised the subject of education in their works.Let us rethink education from Plato since we mentioned it, but also from other philosophers and writers who have raised the subject of education in their works.Let us rethink education from Plato since we mentioned it, but also from other philosophers and writers who have raised the subject of education in their works.
Let's think about education, as it is currently given as a process that is with its problems and with all that it implies, from said reflections or thematizations that have already occurred in the past, to verify not what has not been applied to said theories of the past, but to reflect in and from the present on this problem. It is possible to carry out this task because we start from the assumption that this formative process is characterized by its historicity. As a human process, it is historical, it has been carried out since man assumed his rationality as an essential project. According to Kant, man as such can and should be forming: he constitutes himself as such a rational being insofar as he assumes his rational project in freedom and autonomy. Man must decide for himself how to form, without waiting for dominant guidelines,external, that they would only try to alienate it. That is why it is valid that today we rethink the formative process from pedagogy but built it from its historicity, that is, from the reflection that a Plato, for example, already proposed to education. The dialogicity of knowledge, through the maieutic method, is a viable proposal today in education if we understand it as the way in which Socrates discussed with the sophists, not pretending to teach them anything, but inciting them to the question, to the inquisitive, investigative reflection, ultimately instance. This critical awareness of how thinking occurs in the learning subject and which must be the essential criterion in the autonomous training process, is what must always be promoted by every teacher. When it doesn't happen,This teacher becomes or is reduced to being a passive transmitter of a discourse that only dominates its results, it can be effectively, but without knowing where they come from or how they have been produced. He then limits himself to transmitting only what he does know well: knowledge as data, which his students must be forced to memorize, to master, just as he has just done.
Science has been thought from various philosophical currents. What is or should be the most pertinent at this time for the scientist himself, considered as the subject who does or produces science, or for the other subjects who must understand it, in the case of the teacher, teach it, or that of the engineer or in that of the technician, apply it in specific processes, to solve real problems? There are several themes implicit in the above approach: how should such epistemological reflection be achieved or produced in the current context? To whom should such reflection be required? In the university space, this debate is more propitious now than it was, for example, ten or twenty years ago. The contemporary episteme will allow a more comprehensive approach to the scientific research process.There have been various theories proposed to think the sciences that it is necessary to analyze to see how they have been applied or have served to think them from their production or research to their dissemination or application. It is necessary to undertake the previous task to think about what the current paradigms have been, how the various scientific theories have been applied or elaborated. What has been tried to defend, what conception of the world was intended to impose or spread. To ask whether those who had to do with the sciences were elaborating by themselves these various theories or interpretations of what a science was or if it has always happened that it is only from philosophy that the process of knowledge has been thought, implicit in each science.And that is why there have been -or must be recognized- more or less erroneous interpretations of what is itself a science. These questions in turn imply other assumptions more or less thematized in current epistemological reflection. The most essential assumption, which in turn allows me to justify this particular reflection at the moment, is that of the historicity of the scientific process: Science is a process under construction, in permanent elaboration. It must be conceived as a continuous process to which unfinishing is essential, as Canguilhem said. From the approach of the research problem,The entire scientific production process is being carried out or carried out in such a way that the same initial questions could have been changed or restated as many times as it was necessary to do so in order to give a more adequate account of what was intended to be problematized. That is, assuming historicity as the main assumption of this current epistemological reflection, supposes understanding science not as something already given, as when systematic interpretation is imposed especially with respect to physics or exact sciences in general, taking them as an axiomatic-deductive set. By taking the sciences, including the so-called social or human sciences or spirit sciences, as finished sets, already given, written or systematized, it is believed that history has already been overcome, that is,It has already passed its process of constitution, elaboration and systematization as sciences and that the only thing that would interest us, in the present, today, is to receive them as such, dominate them and be able to apply them as soon as possible, because that is what we would try to do with they: take them to the technique because therein lies their importance and that is why time and money were invested in the U. to investigate them and reach final results. This is, in short, the technical and scientific context that dominates current scientific research in the university context.take them to the technique because therein lies their importance and that is why time and money were invested in the U. to investigate them and reach final results. This is, in short, the technical and scientific context that dominates current scientific research in the university context.take them to the technique because therein lies their importance and that is why time and money were invested in the U. to investigate them and reach final results. This is, in short, the technical and scientific context that dominates current scientific research in the university context.
Let us resume, by way of synthesis, the various interpretations or theories that have been elaborated about what has been the work of science since Modernity. These various “theories of knowledge” tried to understand or “explain” what the knowledge that was carried out within each science consisted of. Empiricism said that knowing was perceiving the object and obtaining from it an idea or concept that should be an exact copy of said real object. Science achieves real or true explanation if it represents exactly the reality observed or perceived by the scientific subject. The truth of the theory produced in this way lies in the exact correspondence with the real object: "adaequatio res et intellectus". Scientific truth is the exact correspondence with the reality from which it comes or to which it has already explained as such.It should also be noted in this first considered approach to the theories of knowledge in Modernity that scientific theory (and hence its truth, its correspondence) has been taken from the real, has been extracted from the real object, as its essential part. The real object is taken as if it had two parts: one essential, the one that is properly about knowing, removing or extracting, and the other, inessential, which is directly perceived by the subject who is carrying out this process of knowledge. This inessential part, the accidents or external appearances, is what must be discarded, put aside, as when in the gold extraction process, for example, you have to leave the grit to keep the nuggets of the valuable mineral that is try to extract. The theory is true, then,if it agrees or corresponds exactly or completely with the essence of the object you are trying to know. This is the realistic or empiricist interpretation of science in Modernity. Hume, Locke, and Bacon thus conceived the work of modern physical science. It should be borne in mind that Aristotle also gave a realistic interpretation of physics in the Greek context: geocentric astronomy corresponded with what was seen directly, but without doing this "extraction" task: true science was constituted from what that any subject without pretending to be a scientist yet, could verify: it was a matter of observing the real well and making an exact copy, but here in the photographic, real way, of the observed object without making any separation or breakdown with respect to the observed.It was about integrating all the observed elements found, without leaving or separating any in particular. Hence the Aristotelian theory in physics and even in the other sciences to which it was devoted, such as rhetoric, logic, or even the other natural sciences such as zoology and medicine, had to correspond with all the observed reality, that is, with the entire real object. The scientist in classical antiquity, as in the example of Aristotle, had to be a total sage, he had to elaborate universal schemes that explained everything real. Hence the idea of wisdom or encyclopedia: whoever wanted to do science had to explain all the reality that could be known or that would have to be fully known if one wanted to be a scientist. Aristotle is the model of the universal sage who knows everything or develops theories about all reality.
I insist on this presentation of the realistic conception of science because it is related to empirical elements, positivists and still rationalists or critical rationalists, and it is the one that many professors have and still maintain in the university environment without daring to take the critical leap or assume a critical and hermeneutical dialogue with other more correct or adequate epistemological theories about what is properly scientific research work. They do not dare to question the aristotelian realistic position because they consider it the most appropriate about what a science is or should be, "their" science, they would say.Why suggest another conception or interpretation if this is the one that best accounts for my work as a scientist and is still the one I have always maintained and the one I have received from my own teachers? If science always is and has been so, why or why should I consider or look for another, the professor would say, generally, when it suddenly corresponds to him to think about this subject.
The other conceptions elaborated since Modernity also have an incorrect or inadequate interpretation of what a science is. Rationalism, from Descartes, Leibniz to Kant and Hegel, tries to complement or justify the previous empiricist interpretation already analyzed. Descartes begins by asking himself about the foundation of this empiricist procedure: how can the subject be sure that he extracts the truth, the essential, from the real object? How can you be sure that you are searching or that you have already found the truth in your relationship with the real? Therefore, it is necessary to start from or suppose a solid, sure, fully valid foundation to find the truth. You find certainty in the same thought: you are convinced of the truth of your own thought. This is how it goes: the only thing I can not doubt,If I doubt everything, it is that I am doubting, that is, that I am thinking. The cogito, I think, is the foundation of the truth of everything that as a subject of science does with respect to the real: I am right in this process of extracting the true theory.
The security of trusting in the work of reason is the sense of modern rationality. Modernity acquires all its meaning in this absolute confidence in the power of reason. There can no longer be any doubt in scientific research work because you have the foundation of truth. This optimistic position that gives all power to modern science is completed with the positivist proposal: if we are sure of the reason, if we understand how science produces the true theory, we need procedures that allow us to carry out that extraction of the truth from the more accurately and adequately and also with the certainty that at all times we are proceeding correctly. It is the subject, as it is stated today, of positivism: not only to start from the real object, its capture, vision or perception, but to master it,manipulate it, approach it completely with the most appropriate procedures or technical operations, for this purpose. Thus the scientific method is constituted as the set of resources, protocols and rules for approaching the real object: from the initial problem statement, the hypotheses are stated, the most appropriate operations are designed for their corresponding verification or verification, then the measurement or obtaining the results that will become the theory to which it is intended to arrive, the theory sought, but which is received or also, in this case, extracted, after this research work, because said theory was also hidden behind of the actual facts investigated, only that only the investigators could or could access it.Let us specify that the initial statement of the problem and the final presentation of the theory that is received as the complete or total explanation that was being sought are tasks that do not require much theoretical work, that is, they are only the initial step and the final step of a procedure, the scientific method, which is already characterized above all by its execution or application. What really matters is the obtaining or systematization of the data obtained, from what is required by the same procedural apparatus, such as field work, surveys, experiments, etc. In this episteme located in the context of Modernity also fits the question that authors like Popper or Feyerabend make from the critical rationalism to this scheme of positivism so unquestionable up to now.The validity of the same procedure is questioned. But criticism does not go to trying to understand what a science really is: Popper questions the absolute validity of the procedure, as we know, but the approach is maintained because it is not possible to question the rational basis from which it started: yes It really is science, but we cannot be so sure of its procedures because some real cases can invalidate the security of the true theory, or in other words, we cannot accept with complete certainty that the theory formulated at the end of the investigative process is true. We enter the field of probability because we will always be in need of testing or testing theories even the most systematized, or safe and exact as those of physics and the natural sciences.But criticism does not lead to trying to understand what a science really is: Popper questions the absolute validity of the procedure, as we know, but the approach is maintained because it is not possible to question the rational basis from which it started: yes It really is science, but we cannot be so sure of its procedures because some real cases can invalidate the security of the true theory, or in other words, we cannot accept with complete certainty that the theory formulated at the end of the investigative process is true. We enter the field of probability because we will always be in need of testing or testing theories even the most systematized, or safe and exact as those of physics and the natural sciences.But criticism does not lead to trying to understand what a science really is: Popper questions the absolute validity of the procedure, as we know, but the approach is maintained because it is not possible to question the rational basis from which it started: yes It really is science, but we cannot be so sure of its procedures because some real cases can invalidate the security of the true theory, or in other words, we cannot accept with complete certainty that the theory formulated at the end of the investigative process is true. We enter the field of probability because we will always be in need of testing or testing theories even the most systematized, or safe and exact as those of physics and the natural sciences.
In this context we could analyze what Einstein's theory of relativity has to do with our studied subject and those that have been elaborated later with Bohr, Planck, etc.
Reflection around the main theories of knowledge or epistemological interpretations in Modernity allow us then to open the debate regarding hermeneutics as postmodern epistemology. After the frustrated attempt of critical rationalism to account for what is fundamentally questioned in the work of science, the hermeneutic approach is spread, so to speak. The hermeneutic turn in the reflection that from contemporary philosophy is carried out with respect to science tries to show or insist on what is properly the work of a science: although the need to start from an absolute foundation or from an absolute truth is questioned, unproven and that it was more like the axiomatic resource from which the entire fabric of a science would have to be built,Other postmodern currents come to question the very search for this founding character in order to theorize or thematize whatever scientific work is. Some philosophers like Vattimo, for example, suggest that hermeneutics must be thought of as a "hermeneutical ontology", that is, it must define which theory or conception of the entity it relies on, in order to be accepted in postmodernity. But what Gadamer is questioning is precisely the necessity that the previous epistemological theories in Modernity were demanding with respect to a foundation or theory from which to start in order to think science. The most interesting thing about Gadamer is that since his philosophy is one of the most widespread in Postmodernity, he moves away from traditional philosophical treatment. Although he supports and acknowledges that his inspirers are Plato, Hegel,Kant and above all, Heidegger, makes a very original or personal treatment of his basic approaches. I think that the reflection that Gadamer develops in all her work regarding the work of science allows us to understand other problems that had not been addressed before or that had not been given the necessary attention by other epistemologists. A single example at this point: the "contradiction" as a condition for accepting the truth of a statement occurs when two statements are given in dialogue: both have the same validity until one contradicts the other. Proposing understanding rather than reflection or understanding on scientific theories guides us towards another way of understanding the work of a science. Knowing is not just a matter of reason. In this process man participates in its complexity:it is all man who knows or tries to know. Furthermore, the subject he knows is in relation to other subjects, in a concrete cultural context, real, historical, and cannot abstract not only from his concrete cultural environment but from his other non-rational, say, sensitive or passionate characters ("existential ”, In terms of Heidegger, his mentor and teacher). This is well understood if we accept his characterization of the subject he knows as a "being-there" according to his version of Dasein. (Not so much, a "being-there", as this key concept of Heidegger himself is generally translated).We would say, sensitive or passionate ("existential", in terms of Heidegger, his mentor and teacher). This is well understood if we accept his characterization of the subject he knows as a "being-there" according to his version of Dasein. (Not so much, a "being-there", as this key concept of Heidegger himself is generally translated).We would say, sensitive or passionate ("existential", in terms of Heidegger, his mentor and teacher). This is well understood if we accept his characterization of the subject he knows as a "being-there" according to his version of Dasein. (Not so much, a "being-there", as this key concept of Heidegger himself is generally translated).
Emphasizing understanding as the task, so to speak, most necessary or essential in the process of knowing, we are opening a new "path" that was very "lost" in the approach that Modernity made with respect to the sciences.
This is the most significant contribution that Gadamer can give us not only to really understand what research work is currently, but how it should be thought in the field of U. It is in a university context in which this acceptance must be better accepted. epistemological approach because in science and for science and to promote scientific training in those who share with us this most gratifying task we must all be open to this unfinished, historical and transdisciplinary dialogue.
In this sense, let's look at some other contributions of Gadamer to a hermeneutical epistemology. You cannot speak of a scientific method as a valid procedure for all knowledge as if it were the die or the operative device that would have to be followed in all cases in which it is claimed to know or know about a specific subject. It is assumed that said user manual would already be configured and regulated by physical science or in general by the natural sciences, which are considered, would apply said manual in an exemplary way so that it is imitated or applied exactly by anyone who intended to do science. This is continuously questioned by Gadamer through his work, Truth and Method.
But other concerns or questions appear in relation to this epistemological criticism: if there is or cannot be a so-called scientific method, although until now we all accepted it as such, then, how can we know if any particular teacher is doing science, but not while waiting for the results that may come in his research practice, but in the daily course of his activity as a researcher, but above all, how could we evaluate (measure, control, verify, assign his respective score, etc..) Your activity as an intellectual, or as a researcher in your specific knowledge?
Knowing is no longer an absolute power over the object to be known. It is not intended to know everything and explain (account for) all the research questions or problems that may arise. It is not about dominating or encompassing the entire field of the real object. The very notion of object as counterpart to the subject is questioned: the object of knowledge is no longer spoken of but rather many, diverse, new and surprising research problems that were not expected to be found at every level of reality. New levels of research appear, new insights unnoticed a few years earlier. It diversifies, but above all, the whole field of knowledge becomes more complex, because reality explodes in multiple events, levels, layers, orders and fragments. It can be said that we also had a simplistic and reduced vision of reality,and it has ended up exploiting or manifesting itself as it is. The complexity that is generated from here arises precisely from the debate that has been taking place from the hermeneutics trying to include other concepts or approaches in the current scientific procedure.
The problem that now arises is the following: how to articulate hermeneutic reflection with the previous questioning carried out by contemporary epistemology. I am thinking here of authors such as Bachelard, Deleuze, Koyré, Canguilhem, Foucault, etc.
Linguisticity is one of the traits most claimed by Gadamer in scientific discourse. This linguistic character is verified because the work in a science implies dialogicity. To get to know, the subjects, the researchers, or the teachers and students, what they basically do is dialogue: it is through rational dialogue, respectful of each individuality, rigorous in the choice and enunciation of the topics. (Hence, it is the Seminar as an alternative to the traditional course that best takes up this whole hermeneutical approach of understanding cognitive processes).
In this same sense, how should problems to reflect and investigate be more appropriately posed? All this implies knowing that knowing occurs between various subjects: with and in front of several or all subjects who are in a certain class (or in a forum, conference or academic meeting) and with respect to multiple objects or the reality taken in its complexity.
The concept cannot be mastered as a valid datum in and of itself, but as an element that is articulated in two axes or levels: the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic. We must take the procedure of these two axes of the same linguistic process: when we speak we use signs (concepts) that are first related to others before or after these in each segment or phrase of the spoken chain. This is the syntagmatic chain of signs related to each other and whose meaning is given precisely by the distinction and difference with respect to the other signs used in spoken or written discourse. This is the axis of successivity. But there is another axis of which the speaking or listening subject is not aware: the paradigmatic axis. When we use a certain sign,We are selecting it from the set or system of the language and it means as far as it differs from those that could have been chosen. It is the axis of transversality or simultaneity. This axis is the one that allows us to think about each concept by relating it to the theory of which it is part, or looking at it from the subject, with what she already knows. (As will be seen in Herbart, this approach allows us to understand one of his basic approaches in his pedagogical proposal: you can only know from what is already known and to teach each concept you do not only have to integrate or relate it to others with those who form an integral whole but with those who already know the subject who learns). Knowing implies understanding because you have to do it from a conceptual structure.Thus, the current knowledge present in a scientific theory or in the subject it knows must be characterized. I understand, understand, a certain concept insofar as I relate it to the other concepts that I already possess, which are in turn or should be logically articulated and with the pretense of truth. Understanding then implies, in addition to reflection and knowledge, communication. I understand in relation to the other, with others who are in turn carrying out simultaneous comprehensive processes. I know that I have understood if I can communicate my concepts in an articulated way from the theories or knowledge that I already possess or have built. So, more than informing, so that others receive my speech, it is about talking,it is about achieving an interdiscursive encounter to confront the diverse reflections or understandings elaborated or constructed.
Understanding implies interpreting because I have to understand from the concepts worked on, elaborated and in the process of construction, which in turn are presented in dialogue, in communication. It is obvious that the context of the Author's Seminary or German Seminary is the most appropriate environment to carry out this pedagogical proposal derived or thought from hermeneutics.
How are different proposals for reflection related from philosophy in the classical era with the current context of hermeneutics? Let us analyze some of these proposals in this conceptual space that interest or may have implications with the current reflection that hermeneutics exercises on scientific knowledge and on what the U is or should be today.
Starting from the Platonic dialectic, it can be said that knowledge is assimilated as a process of illumination (dianoia) from things (shadows, doxai) to ideas (true knowledge) through dialogue. But, contrary to what we said about empiricism, the truth is given before starting the process of knowing and this is what guides us. Knowing is discovering, revealing the true reality (essence or entity) of things starting from sensible, real objects (shadows) to the ideas that are articulated in themselves and by themselves. This process cannot be undertaken by the subject himself, since he is immersed in said sensible world, of shadows and appearances and is dominated by this apparently real world. He does not even suspect that there is another reality, another truth. Accept as truth,as the only truth only what you can immediately perceive. In order to begin this cognitive ascent, you need to begin to question this world in which you live and to which you refer when you speak. He needs to be guided by another subject, the philosopher, Socrates, who would have already started on this path to knowledge and who already knows, then, how things are. Only in this way can you discover true knowledge as an illumination, as a "giving birth" to ideas that you did not know were already in your thoughts but that you discover, remembering (anamnesis) through the guidance of your teacher. What should be taken up from this maieutic method for our current reflection on knowledge and its implementation in the pedagogical process,as we are analyzing it from hermeneutics? Scientific knowledge (considered in each of the particular sciences) is not a whole already given beforehand. The subject has to approach the truth through the maneutic dialectic. This exists as such but although it should not be built as it was posed since Modernity, if it must be unveiled, unhide it (truth like aletheia) based on the suspension of the judgment (aporia) in the context of sensitive things in which it was deceived the subject. This uncovering process is effected by moving away, then, from that sensible world and elevating us to the context of the true concepts that would be in the mind of the subject who pretends to know.The subject has to approach the truth through the maneutic dialectic. This exists as such but although it should not be built as it was posed since Modernity, if it must be unveiled, unhide it (truth like aletheia) based on the suspension of the trial (aporia) in the context of sensitive things in which it was deceived the subject. This process of uncovering is carried out by moving away, then, from that sensible world and raising us to the context of the true concepts that would be in the mind of the subject that he pretends to know.The subject has to approach the truth through the maneutic dialectic. This exists as such but although it should not be built as it was posed since Modernity, if it must be unveiled, unhide it (truth like aletheia) based on the suspension of the judgment (aporia) in the context of sensitive things in which it was deceived the subject. This uncovering process is effected by moving away, then, from that sensible world and elevating us to the context of the true concepts that would be in the mind of the subject who pretends to know.This process of uncovering is carried out by moving away, then, from that sensible world and raising us to the context of the true concepts that would be in the mind of the subject that he pretends to know.This process of uncovering is carried out by moving away, then, from that sensible world and raising us to the context of the true concepts that would be in the mind of the subject that he pretends to know.
Author: JOSÉ IVÁN BEDOYA MADRID
