For the effective application of the Strategic Principles it is important that the strategos develop some personal skills. These will facilitate the necessary transition between the concepts and the demands of the action.
The Skills are essentially perfectible over time and their development depends a lot on training and methodical practice. Experience has enormous value for strategos, barely surpassed by knowledge; The Strategy is perfected in action and it is a process of continuous interaction between constituted and constituent energies. The product of this interaction is never similar to another and the identification of the development patterns demands a lot of intuition, deduction, interpretation; and all these faculties almost always adorn a person's professional practice experience.
1) Ability to interpret and apply concepts in terms of space and time relevant to the specific needs of the situation:
Knowledge of the Strategic and the Strategic Principles is still a set of theories and concepts. Its usefulness is necessarily perfected through an appropriate interpretation and application of its very essence. The Strategic and the Strategic Principles are in themselves imperative concepts, they demand immediate action, but this fact alone often ends up being insufficient if it is not accompanied by the necessary ability to interpret and apply them according to the specific particularities that the situation demands. The concepts do not change, but the situations do, and in each case it is necessary to start the interpretive and application process again.
The wise statement that expresses "there is nothing more practical than a good theory" comprises a small set of "secrets" that it is necessary to know:
The concept, of course, does not behave like this, its changes obey very slowly developing reflexive dynamics, many times they never occur.
Any situation or event can be interpreted from some theoretical concept or postulate. This always happens, regardless of whether the concepts or theories are or are not in a position to "solve" or "solve" a certain situation; in any case, they are always available to interpret the situation and guide actions. Let us look, for example, at the situation presented by cancer disease: it does not have a concrete solution, but it does have a set of concepts and theories that interpret it, to the point that it is probable that it cannot be remedied.
To interpret and apply a concept to a given situation, therefore, the situation and not the concept must be studied. The concept is known (or at least available), what is not known in depth is the Situation. The concept that will respond to the situation does not change (it is given somewhere), the situation does.
The deep and fast study of the Situation constitutes the first step to approach it by means of a guiding concept. The strategos must never make the mistake of focusing on the study of the concept, they must quickly embark on a careful study of the situation.
It is certainly probable that situations will arise that warrant an in-depth revision of the existing concepts and theories themselves, but what probability is there of all the phenomena that occur daily? And even so, in these few cases, the reformulation or revision of a concept will always start from having interpreted and applied a previously existing one. Therefore, there is not enough reason to waste time: you should immediately study the situation.
See the case in which the strategos meets an Organization that is successful in the market despite the fact that there is a significant imbalance between the attention paid to the functions of the Business and the one given to the functions of the Bureaucracy. Is it possible to suppose that in this case the concept that affirms that privileged attention should ALWAYS be given to the Business should be studied? Or is it definitely more important to study the situation to understand why (or what is more likely, until when?) the situation will have this character?
If, on the other hand, an Organization successively finds significant successes by applying work formulas in the Market that do not respect the strategic precept of always maintaining the Initiative, will it then be justified to study the Strategic Principle, or will it be more convenient to study the behavior of the competitors that organization has to find the reasons for such dysfunction?
When the interaction with the Conflict begins, the concepts are not studied, the situations are studied. From there arises the interpretation and the best mechanism of action.
The most practical way to study a given Situation is by identifying its Symptoms. From them the strategos must qualify the phenomenon. Symptoms are representations that the state has, they explain it clearly and avoid the delinquent process of making an inductive diagnosis. The Symptoms "speak" of the reality in which they are embedded with a transparency that leaves little doubt in the mind of an expert. There comes a time when the strategos of only identifying a few symptoms is able to make a deep diagnosis, in the same way as an experienced doctor. The Symptoms are the “identification cards” of the situations, thus they are presented to whoever wants to know them, thus they anticipate, even, their future states.
Studying the Symptoms is equivalent to studying the entire Situation and the strategos must be behind them like an expert prosecutor.
In the example of the Organization that privileges its bureaucratic functions over those of the Business, an evident Symptom of the problem can be identified in its diminishing returns or in its insufficient market share or in its intrinsic competitive weakness, which probably now lies in a potential state, or in the own competitive weakness of the opponents who ultimately are the ones who "allow" such a situation to be effective (and temporarily not harmful).
On the other hand, an Organization to which things are "going well" despite not maintaining any Initiative in the market, will present obvious symptoms of "bureaucratic obesity", high cost structures (because defensive positions always cost more in the long-term), low-quality human resources, low growth, etc. In short, a significant Opportunity Cost.
The answer to the Situation is found in the study of it. The concept or theory that will serve as a vehicle will then come in addition.
Once the Symptoms have been identified in the process of studying the situation, it is appropriate to disaggregate it according to the cause-effect relationships that explain it.
For each effect there is always a cause, that is, a criterion of the origin of the process. On the other hand, each effect leads to a following state of being of things, that is to say, it establishes a criterion of destiny of the process.
That is why each Situation essentially has an origin and a destination. The origin can be identified, the destination can be calculated.
To identify the causes that generate a certain Symptom of the situation, the strategos must turn to that tool that is a faithful companion of the wise: the question Why, over and over again: why ?; why?; why?. There is a reason that explains the existence of each symptom! And there is also a reason for each reason!
In this way, the inquiry is led in a spiral to the origin that most helps understanding.
From the Why, we will then arrive at the What, that is, that which explains the nature of the effect.
Point. At this moment, the strategos is among the roots of the Situation that he wants to understand and with which he must interact through the concepts and theories he knows.
In order to calculate the destination to which the effects generated by the Situation can lead, the strategos must ask: How far? How far can the current state of affairs lead us? This is essentially an inertia calculation, like the one a car driver can do when he takes his foot off the gas and calculates how far the thrust will take him.
The question how far? Obviously, it must be considered, considering that nothing different is done to modify the action or the course, thus presenting a clear idea of the perspectives that a certain situation has.
When the investigation of the cause-effect relationship is applied to the symptoms of the situation, the definitive step is taken in its understanding and interpretation.
In case negative effects are identified, it is necessary to work on the cause in depth.
If positive effects are identified, it is necessary to work on the effects on its future and probable turning point. That is, if the effect of the current situation is positive, the work should be considered from the point at which it is calculated that the effect will diminish in its positive character, probably to the point where it will cease to be so. The work of the strategos before positive effects that a situation presents should not be short-term, it must involve projections and forecasts. Because one thing is certain: any positive effect today will no longer be tomorrow!
Up to this point, the strategos has already identified and applied the concepts and theories that best correspond to the nature of the situation. If there is an error or success, it has nothing to do with the method. Successes and errors must still occur; they in any case rate the action and this is the first thing that was intended. As the skill of the strategos improves, fewer errors and greater successes.
The last stage of the process requires monitoring the evolution that the specific situation has. The actions taken will generate changes of state in the situation, the same ones that as an effect will successively produce the same in later stages; This will require that the entire process be repeated over and over, to the point that it is confused with the very dynamics that the situation has.
So the concept or theory is in a state of "symbiosis" with practice and neither of them can be recognized without considering the other.
2) Ability to quickly interpret situations and events that constitute conditioning factors for strategic approaches (Visualization Skill).-
Whereas through the ability to interpret and apply concepts, the strategos develops in past and present tense, through the ability of Visualization, he must work in the future tense. This ability represents benefits of great importance for strategic development.
The multitude of elements that condition the development of the Strategy can be grouped into three large groups:
- Elements that are within the Organization Elements that gravitate around the characteristics of the Conflict (the competitor, the client, etc.) Elements that are part of the supra-system that incorporates the previous two: economic trends, politics, cultural factors, legal, social, diplomatic, etc., etc.
The work of the strategos on the elements that make up the first two sets (the Organization and the Conflict), has a rather Tactical character, given that they achieve certain behavior depending on the development acquired by the application of the Strategy. The “control” that the strategos has over the elements of both sets is rooted among all the actions that are carried out to apply the Strategy. Right there is the entire “control board” of the situation.
Something similar does not happen with the elements that make up the third set, those that can be understood as components of the environment that the previous two incorporate.
The strategos have little or no control over the elements of this set; the Organization as a whole (regardless of what the strategos means), lacks the capacity to affect these elements as it can essentially do with those that are part of the first two.
The elements of this third set can, obviously, affect the development of the Strategy and the interests of the Organization in the same way that any of the other internal elements or elements that are part of the Conflict can achieve.
When it is discussed in greater depth (in the next chapter), the role of the Strategic Intelligence Resource, it will be possible to verify that the set of environmental variables is a specific part of the survey and information processing work. But with this alone the importance of the subject is not completely covered. The strategos must have specific skills to identify and interpret the behavior of these variables in their conditioning dynamics on strategic approaches. This goes far beyond the mere provision of information.
The ability of Visualization cannot compromise with the analysis of every factor that may be involved in the environment, it needs to resort to a process that prioritizes and sensitizes those variables according to the particular interests of the strategic approach that is being executed. Certain factors have a greater degree of importance for the approach than others, they have greater power over it, they can condition its development in a definitive way.
The strategos must first identify these factors, must "separate" them from the rest, must "individualize" them.
Many times this process does not necessarily appear among the tasks that the Organization carries out to plan strategic actions. An extended evaluation of the probable conditioning factors is applied in the planning process. Actually, it MUST do so as it is one of the few instances where the Organization will extensively evaluate variables.
The Plan, on the other hand, has no operational responsibility for “visualizing” the behavior of these variables as the planned actions are executed. The Plan complies with being the best possible plan, period.
Let's take an example: If an Organization has developed a work plan for one year of management, the analysis of the environmental variables has been restricted to this time window to explain more precisely the nature of the plan. However, as the actions envisaged in the Plan are launched, two aspects of the initial considerations change dramatically:
1) Treasury shares are generating changes in the situation, most likely beyond what was planned in the Plan
2) the horizon of "one year" of work extends day by day beyond the initial boundary provided by the Plan, that is to say that on the first day of implementation of the planned actions, the time horizon has already been extended up to day 367 in terms of the initial considerations of the Plan; On the 30th of the actions underway, work is being carried out on a time horizon that already extends 400 days above the starting point of “one year” that the Plan considered. This is the same as trying to make a movie by taking pictures at the highest possible speed.
Visualization requires strategos to be clear about precisely that movie. But this is only feasible if the task focuses on the most important and sensitive factors.
When the strategos have identified those sensitive variables in the conditioning of the Strategy, they must study them with the depth expected from the expert. You must know perfectly its nature, its mechanics and its behavior. No mystery of these variables should be reserved for you, whether they are related to economic, political, legal, technological, social, etc. aspects. You must know everything about them and that is why it is necessary that they are the indispensable factors, the important ones, those on whose behavior the strategic approach depends intimately.
It will be necessary to evaluate if it is necessary that the real experts on the subject accompany the strategists in these efforts, that is, a team of people who closely monitor the behavior of the variables. This in any case as a complement to the necessary role of the strategos.
The interpretation of the factors arises precisely from the deep knowledge that is reached about them, and when the strategos reaches this level of knowledge, it transcends each action and each tactical operation that the Strategy comprises, thereby endowing it with the necessary “protection” before the interference of external variables.
Visualization skill is thus something that has much of the essence of the Strategic: practice and effectiveness, "the more difficult the objective, the easier the task."
Identification of a handful of highly sensitive and important variables, in-depth knowledge of them and permanent monitoring of their evolution based on the work of the Intelligence system. On these foundations stands the ability to visualize events or trends that the future holds.
3) Ability to quickly interpret situations and events that warrant strategic responses (Reading of opposite movements).
This ability corresponds to the scenario of Tactical development and therefore it involves a greater intensity in its use and execution. On the other hand, it is also one of the skills that most distinguishes one strategos from another.
The ability to "read" opposite movements is a classic skill of great "quarterbacks" in the sport of American Football. Once the ball is put into motion, the quarterback must have the ability to quickly interpret whether the programmed tactic can be promptly executed or if it must be changed immediately due to the movements of the rival team. The interpretation and the decision must be made in fractions of a second, the same time in which a good part of the rival team rushes towards it with determination.
This type of interpretation works with time and with the contrary circumstances, it does not have the possibility of resorting to any traditional support mechanism. It is an interpretation that is very similar to what one achieves by the reflex act of "reading" something. Through reading the brain interprets a known set of codes and does so instantly, giving them immediate meaning. The mind itself is aware of this meaning and acts accordingly, with the greatest security and confidence. In reading, a couple of important skills come together: the ability to "see" itself and the ability to "decode" immediately what is seen. This is ultimately achieved because you end up seeing the code itself.
The Conflict has a dizzying unfolding of events, each with the power to immediately condition subsequent events, in an endless succession. A succession that can escape all human control without mediating the knowledge and skill necessary to interact with it.
As long as the strategos can immediately interpret the character and nature of the events that are presented, the greater possibilities it gives the Organization to act accordingly and end up favored. While this rapid interpretation corresponds to the intentions and movements of the competitor, it strengthens the solvency of the own Strategy and weakens the rival Strategy.
The "reading of the opposite movements" requires, as in the case of a normal reading, the existence and understanding of a Code. This code explains the development of the competitor as explicitly and reliably as an alphabet and the language that forms around it. This code is nothing more than the set of rules and precepts that the competitor uses to act in the Conflict. Knowledge of these rules and precepts determines knowledge of the code.
Both the strategos and the Organization they represent have a manifest conduct of action in the market and in the Conflict that develops in it. This behavior has clear patterns, defined styles, rules and precepts that are respected and practiced permanently. Much can be done by an Organization to avoid that its codes of conduct are very familiar or evident to the competitor, but he will also do much in the opposite direction, to the point where there will be a certain "sense of things", familiar in any case to both of them. That's the code.
No Organization is unpredictable and neither is it erratic (as long as it can be evaluated as competitive). Every Organization has identity and personality, the same one that is reflected in their behavior in the market and in the conflict. There are things organizations do and things they don't do, there are ways they do it, and there are ways they don't do it. There are very typical actions and reactions (especially), there are levels of persistence and tolerance, degrees of aggressiveness, moderation and continence. There is a typical profile of the person that the Organization hires and a typical profile that it never hires, there is a pattern in the way work teams are grouped and behave, there is a certain mystique. There are abilities and disabilities, there are abilities and clumsiness, there are very solid resources and very fragile resources.There are fears of doing many things, and many things are done with exceptional courage; there are things that are admitted no matter how expensive they are and there are things that are not allowed for all the gold in the world.
The strategos must have the necessary skill to identify the Code. From this knowledge, you will be able to "read" the opponent's actions as they occur. Everything will take on a certain meaning for him and this will allow him to make the necessary decisions.
4) Ability to anticipate the opponent's responses in advance (Anticipation).
The strategos do not make a move without knowing in advance what the opponent's response move will be and ultimately what their second move will be "in response to the response." In consideration of this second own movement, the presence of this management skill in the strategos is necessary.
Achieving this routine is not something easy, especially if you want to avoid inefficient use of time and at the same time you want to preserve effectiveness. For this reason, Anticipation is presented as a skill that the strategos must develop and not necessarily as a management technique. If it had to be understood exclusively as a technique then it could cause inefficiencies and waste of time; instead, his understanding as a skill incorporates it among the inertial attitudes that the strategos must have, "reflex attitudes", behaviors of a natural nature, highly assimilated by the unconscious.
What Anticipation seeks is a management behavior with "added value", and a value that of course has its indisputable weight in the logic of the Conflict.
The decision to make a move or to carry out an action considering the response that the opponent will have and also calculating the subsequent own move, endows that decision with a quality that it could not achieve otherwise. It gives the decision significant power to "control the situation" and avoids costly improvisations.
If the strategos knows the Business well enough, the Conflict in which he is inserted and the nature of the competition, he has the possibility of anticipating the development of things before certain "stimuli" that are generated by the effect of his actions and decisions.. And as long as that anticipation proves to be accurate, it also positively qualifies the skill and gives additional guarantees to the effectiveness of the Strategy.
The Anticipation skill is another tactical skill, it is very close to the contact points and therefore it notably conditions the outcome of the Conflict.
Some people who study the nature of these decisions, 1-2-3, that is, of action (1) considering reaction (2) and having prepared the second action (3), understand that the critical path of the Strategy is actually subject to the final response action (3), because this is the one that really has the highest value from the first moment. However, some other people maintain that the key decision or action is (1) given that this will be answered (2) and this will determine the form that the final action will take (3).
Both are appropriate ways of understanding the spirit of the Anticipation ability, but probably the first one is better framed in the integral nature of the Strategy, which first of all tries to govern its actions being as little evident as possible for the opponent.
The Anticipation skill is developed as an effect of the practice of "success and error", there is no other way. Beyond the basic requirement of knowing the opponent, the strategos is required that Anticipation is always an ingredient that conditions their decision-making: over and over again, to the point where they become mastered.
And probably in the precise matter of achieving mastery over the required skill the importance of each stage of 1-2-3 is defined. When the strategos is not yet excellent in the application of the technique, he must concentrate on the quality and determining nature of the first decision (1); instead, when he already has the necessary skill, he must concentrate the strategic weight of the decision on the response that will follow the opponent's response (3).
5) Ability to know, take advantage of, manipulate or condition the development of the opponent (Study of the strategos and the opposite strategies).-
At this point the subject is already strictly personal. This ability is no longer necessarily directly related to the rival Organization or the Conflict itself. Here it is a matter of knowing the individual or individuals that direct the rival Strategy; it is an approach to people, although this in fact represents an approach to organizational work.
The strategos must know the opposite strategos in the widest and deepest way possible, in this lies the eventual mental advantage that is demanded by the Strategic Principles. This is also the basis for a good part of the Strategy itself, of the movements it involves, of the Stratagems that accompany it, of the Anticipation necessary to make decisions, of the codes that characterize organizational development, etc.
Only by knowing the opposite strategos in depth can you take advantage of their weaknesses, you can manipulate them in their decisions and actions, making them act exactly as you want them to.
Between the opposite strategos being more prepared, solvent and skilled, the greater the need to know him deeply as a person, because only there will identify the cracks that his conduct of the Strategy may have. Because the man precedes the professional and if the professional is very compact, the man never is; in some loophole if they identify weaknesses.
British Field Marshal Montgomery had in the command trailer of his famous 8th Army a rather large photograph of his opponent (German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel), plus the complete set of his literary work, the history of his battles, his professional training and his own life. Montgomery knew very well that he was fighting Rommel and he knew very well how Rommel fought, henceforth acting accordingly and having a lot of patience would give him the advantage.
While things have become much more impersonal today than before and while the existence of the phenomenon is considered much more frequently today as something absolutely independent and unrelated to the power of an identifiable man, it becomes a substantial advantage to have the ability to go against the current and even deduce by common sense that it is man who determines the character of things in the strategic universe. And that this man is like any other: a complete set of weaknesses and imperfections, a creature aware of fear and failure, a permanent opportunity to prevail beyond the limitations presented by resources or circumstances.
