Preliminary analysis of process hazard situations

The Preliminary Analysis of Process Danger situations (APPP) is a simple and inductive method of analysis whose objective is to identify hazards and dangerous situations, assess the associated risks, as well as the events that may cause harm to workers, to processes, to a given activity, installation or system.

Introduction

The APPP is a simple and inductive method of analysis whose objective is to identify hazards and dangerous situations, assessment of associated risks, as well as events that can cause harm to workers, processes, an activity, facility or system dices.

It is the analysis most commonly used at the beginning of a project development, when little information is available on the details of the design or on the operating procedures and can often be a precursor to additional studies or provide information for the specification of the project. design of a system.

The APPP should serve to locate the types of possible accidents in the installation, such as toxic leaks, fires, explosions, leaks of flammable substances, etc., and to verify the essential elements of the security system in the general sense of an industrial installation. or services.

It can also be useful when analyzing existing systems, in order to prioritize dangers and risks for later analyzes or when circumstances prevent applying a more extensive technique than the one being used.

Its main objective is to eliminate hazards and minimize risks to the safety of processes, facilities, people, the environment, as well as the health of workers, taking preventive measures.

Here is the complete document with all its tables and annexes.

preliminary-analysis-of-the-situations-of-danger-of-processes-APPP

Input elements

The input elements include:

• The information about the system to be appreciated, details of the system design that are available and relevant.

Process

A list of generic dangers and dangerous situations and associated risks is formulated, taking into account characteristic considerations such as:

• the materials used or produced and their reactivity, the equipment used, the operating environment; The overall arrangement; the interfaces between system components, etc.

In order to identify risks for their subsequent appreciation, a qualitative analysis of the consequences of an unwanted event and its probability of it occurring can be performed.

The PPP should be updated during the design, manufacturing and testing phases in order to detect any new hazards and to be able to make corrections, if necessary. The results obtained can be presented in different forms, such as tables and tree diagrams.

Results

The results include:

• a list of evaluated hazards and risks; recommendations on the form of acceptance, the recommended controls, the specifications or design requirements for a more detailed appreciation.

Strengths and limitations

Strengths include:

• It can be used when the existing information is limited, allowing risks to be considered well in advance of the system life cycle.

Limitations include:

• A PPP provides preliminary information; It is not fully comprehensive, although it does provide information on the risks and how they can best be prevented.

To achieve the analysis, a process needs to be followed with which existing hazards can be identified and mitigated, considering variables such as:

• Selection of the area to investigate. Identification of potential hazards. Assessment of the causes of hazards. Description of potential effects of hazards. Classification of hazards according to their nature. Controls and measures to mitigate existing hazards.

It is based on 3 pillars:

• Engineering experience, Security trial, Guides and forms.

goals

1. Identification of the inherent dangers of:

• Processes.ProductsServices.

1. Estimated Evaluation and Assessment of Risks on:

• Plant Personnel. Facilities. Environment. Neighboring facilities.

1. Adoption of measures.

• Elimination of RisksReduction of Risks.

PPP is a basic risk analysis technique for evaluating process risks. The APPP methodology includes the execution of the following activities:

• Definition of the borders or limits of the facilities to be analyzed; Collection of information on the facilities, processes, activities, operations and the characteristics of the dangerous substances involved; Definition of the analysis modules; Realization of the PPP itself (complete the form) for each analysis module); Preparation of the statistics of the scenarios by frequency and severity categories and the list of suggestions (recommendations) generated in the study; Analysis of the results and preparation of the report.

The scope of APPP covers all dangerous events whose causes have their origin in the analyzed facilities, covering both intrinsic failures of components or systems, and operational errors (human errors), especially those derived from procedural failures. or applying them.

Process units, storage, pipelines, terminals, substations, public services and other facilities that may pose a risk to safety, health and the environment must be considered.

They are excluded from the analysis of dangerous events caused by external agents, such as falls from planes, helicopters or meteorites, earthquakes and floods. These types of external events were excluded due to their frequencies of occurrences considered extremely remote. However, according to the criteria of experts, the analysis of these dangerous events can also be considered.

Stages

1. Creation of the work team. Consultants and specialists of the organization Define the limits or the scope of the installation to be analyzed Collect the information about the characteristics of the installation: Basic information of the organization, brief description of the environmental characteristics of the environment where the installation, brief description of the processes, areas, facilities, equipment and different technological systems, description of risk control mechanisms and response to emergency situations, etc. Determine the analysis modules. (Functional addresses, UEB's, processes, technological systems, areas, etc. as determined). Hazard identification. Use of checklists, visual appreciation, operations manual, etc. Risk assessment.Determine the scenarios of possible incidents (including accidents) Risk Ranking (according to matrix): Assess the risk of the scenario according to the acceptability criterion (Risk matrix). Establish the recommendations. Recommendations and mitigation measures are proposed by the risk study team (consultants and specialists of the organization), as well as managers, resources and compliance dates.resources and compliance dates.resources and compliance dates.

Fig. 1. Flowchart of the Preliminary Analysis of Process Danger situations, APPP. Source. ODEBRECHT. Preliminary analysis of risk levels - APNR. 2012.

I. Hazard identification and risk assessment

Hazard identification helps the organization to recognize and understand workplace hazards and worker hazards, to assess, prioritize, and eliminate hazards or reduce risks to OSH Safety and Health. Hazards can be physical, chemical, biological, psychosocial, mechanical, electrical, or motion and energy-based, as well as hazards from potential emergency situations (natural, technological, and health).

II. Risks evaluation

Processes for risk assessment should consider daily operations and decisions (eg spikes in workflow, restructuring) as well as external aspects (eg economic changes). Methodologies may include ongoing consultation of workers affected by daily activities (for example changes in workload), monitoring and communication of new legal requirements and other requirements (for example, regulatory reforms, reviews of related collective agreements with occupational safety and health), and ensuring that resources meet existing and changing needs (for example, training in new and improved equipment or products or their purchase).

For the evaluation of occupational risk, the probability of occurrence of the damage and the consequence of being materialized are taken into account.

The possibility that the risk factors materialize in the normally expected damage of an incident (accident) is estimated, according to the following scale:

PROBABILITY	DAMAGE
HIGH	IT WILL ALWAYS HAPPEN: The event has ever been presented or may be presented in the next 10 years. 1 in 10 years. 10 -1
HALF	IT WILL OCCUR ON SOME OCCASIONS: It can happen at least once in the life of the facilities. From 1 in 10 years to 1 in 100 years. 10 -1 - 10 -2
LOW	IT WILL HAPPEN RARE: Conceivable, probable; Although it has never happened in the Work Center, but it has probably happened in some similar installation. 1 in 100 years or more. 10 -2 - 10 -3 or in 10 -3 - 10 -5 years.

Consequences. The materialization of a risk can generate different consequences, each with its corresponding probability. In other words, the normally expected consequences of a given risk are those that are more likely to occur, although extreme damage can occur with a lower probability.

This methodology, when referring to the consequences of the identified risks, tries to assess those normally expected in the event of their materialization according to the following levels:

CONSEQUENCES	DAMAGE
LOW	Injuries without loss of the working day. (Examples: small cuts and bruises, eye irritation, headache, etc.). Without affecting the facilities and the environment.
HALF	Injuries with loss of the working day without sequelae or pathologies that compromise life but do not cause disabling sequelae. (Examples: wounds, burns, concussions, major sprains, minor fractures, deafness, dermatitis, asthma, musculoskeletal disorders, diseases leading to minor disability). Minor or medium damage to facilities and the environment.
HIGH	Injuries that cause disabling sequelae or pathologies that can shorten the life or cause the death of the worker. (Examples: amputations, major fractures, poisonings, multiple injuries, fatal injuries (death), cancer, and other chronic diseases). Serious damage to facilities and the environment. Conditions that can be irreversible or very expensive to recover.

III. Risk Assessment. Risk Matrix

It is the product of the consequence by the probability and represents the magnitude of the damage that a set of risk factors will produce per unit of risk. It is obtained according to the matrix of the following table:

ESTIMATING THE RISK VALUE	CONSEQUENCES
LOW	HALF	HIGH
PROBABILITY	LOW	TRIVIAL	TOLERABLE	MODERATE
HALF	TOLERABLE	MODERATE	IMPORTANT
HIGH	MODERATE	IMPORTANT	SEVERE

Fig. 2. Risk Matrix. Basic Course Safety and Health at Work MTSS and Fraternity -MUPRESPA. 2011.

IV. Recommendations. Proposed Preventive Measures.

The organization shall ensure that workers at all levels are encouraged to report hazardous situations so that preventive measures can be put in place and corrective actions can be taken.

The risks identified and their evaluation, when this is required, form the basis for deciding whether to improve existing controls or implement new ones, as well as planning in time and updating actions.

The table shows the criteria to be followed for decision-making in the case of qualitative assessment.

Qualitative Procedure for decision-making in actions to reduce or eliminate risks.

Risk level	Action and Planning in time
Trivial	It is not required a specific action. Observance of the environmental working conditions must always be maintained at each job.
Tolerable	No need to improve preventive action. However, more cost-effective solutions or improvements that do not place a significant financial burden should be considered. Risk is tolerable and there is no imperative to apply risk reduction measures. However, if obvious measures are envisaged that contribute to further reducing risk and the application of cost-benefit analysis favors the implementation of such measures, they should be adopted.
Moderate	Efforts must be made to reduce risk by determining the precise investments. The measures to reduce the risk must be implemented in a certain period of time. When moderate risk is associated with high consequences, further action will be required to more accurately establish the likelihood of harm as the basis for determining the need for control measures. Give priority to engineering measures aimed at reducing the frequency of occurrence of undesirable events, and then complement them with measures (engineering or administrative) that minimize and mitigate the consequences thereof.
Important	Work should not begin until the risk has been reduced. Considerable resources may be required to control risk. When the risk corresponds to a job that is being carried out, the necessary measures must be taken to settle the operations in a short time and proceed to control the risk. It is advisable to visualize all the risk reduction options, through the combination of engineering and / or administrative measures, which allow the frequency of occurrence to be decreased and / or the consequences of possible accidents to be minimized.
Severe	The present condition is unacceptable and it is mandatory to adopt measures that reduce the frequency of occurrence and / or the severity of potential accidents. You should not start or continue work until the risk is reduced. If risk, even unlimited resources, cannot be reduced, work should be prohibited. It is important to exhaust in the first instance all the possibilities of engineering measures conducive to reducing the frequency of occurrence of the accident, being unacceptable to claim only the adoption of measures aimed at reducing consequences.

Proposed preventive measures.

Measures for the assessed risks will always be proposed and this will be done taking into account its preventive nature. Based on this, the classification of the measures will be as follows:

• Measures of forceful technical and engineering controls: They are aimed at controlling the source of risk or the agent (danger). These are aimed at modifying processes or mechanical structures.

These can be Active (Elimination or reduction of the generation of the risk agent (danger) by substitution of equipment or components.) And Passive (Placement of safety barriers in the work areas or sections between the risk agent (danger) and the worker). These will always be the first measures to evaluate.

Safety and environmental protection measures are included.

• Organizational Control Measures: They include Work Practices and operational and organizational controls to minimize the impact on the worker by the risk agent (danger). Example: staff rotation, organization of work shifts, alternating standing and sitting tasks, etc. They also include those related to the training and information processes of the personnel, Revision of the rules and procedures of Occupational Safety and Health, improvement of working conditions, Health surveillance (Conducting Medical Examinations, Morbidity from Accidents and Common Diseases and professionals) and preparation of response plans before emergencies. Personal measures:It is the last measure that must be taken since this does not disappear the risk, it only places a protective barrier between the worker and the critical point of entry of the risk agent (danger). Example: The use of EPP and EPC.

When the evaluation results reveal an intolerable risk, action must be taken immediately without waiting for the planning process.

Priority:

The priority of the actions to be carried out must be related to the order of magnitude of the risks, that is:

Severe and Important Risk: Priority I

Moderate Risk: Priority II

Tolerable Risk: Priority III

Trivial Risk: Priority IV

Date of fulfillment of the planned objective: The date on which the measure can be executed is indicated.

Responsible: Indicate the name of the person designated to implement the preventive measure or to comply with the prevention plan.

Terms and definitions

Organization: person or group of people who have their own functions with responsibilities, authorities and relationships to achieve their goals.

Process: set of interrelated or interacting activities that transforms inputs into outputs in an organization.

Worker: A person who performs work or work-related activities that are under the control of the organization. Workers include top management, managers, and non-managers.

Workplace: A place under the control of the organization where a person needs to be or go for work reasons.

Injury and deterioration of health: adverse effect on the physical, mental or cognitive condition of a person.

Hazard: Source with a potential to cause injury and deterioration of health, damage to facilities and the environment. Hazards may include sources with the potential to cause harm or dangerous situations, or circumstances with the potential for exposure leading to injury and deterioration of workers' health (including occupational diseases, common illnesses and death), damage to facilities and the environment.

Risk: Probability of occurrence of damage. It is an effect of uncertainty, an effect is a deviation from what is expected - positive (opportunity) or negative (risk). Probability for consequence. Uncertainty: It is the state, even partial, of information deficiency related to the understanding or knowledge of an event, its consequence or its probability. Risk is often characterized by reference to potential “events” and “consequences” or a combination of these. Risk is often expressed in terms of a combination of the consequences of an event (including changes in circumstances) and the associated “probability” of its occurrence.

Tolerable risk: Low impact risk and is tolerated by people, although measures could be taken to reduce it. TRIVIAL and TOLERABLE.

Not tolerable risk: IMPORTANT OR SEVERE risks of high impact and it is not tolerated by people, facilities or the environment. High priority measures are taken to reduce it to ALARP.

ALARP Risk: Risk as low as reasonably practical, MODERATE. These risks should be studied in detail through cost benefit analysis so that measures can be taken to make it a tolerable risk.

Loss of containment: leakage, release or uncontrolled release of hazardous material, caused by a failure in some part or component of the facilities (containers, pipes, equipment or others).

Risk scenario: determination of a hypothetical event, in which the occurrence of an incident (accident) is considered under specific conditions, defining the potentially affected areas according to the characteristics of the processes, activities and / or materials.

Emergency: a real situation of danger or disaster that requires immediate action. Event, accident that ensues.

Incident: An event that arises from work or in the course of work that could have or results in injuries and deterioration of health, damage to facilities and the environment. Sometimes an accident is called an accident where injuries and deterioration of health have occurred. An incident where injuries and deterioration in health have not occurred, but has the potential to cause them, may be termed a "quasi-accident".

Corrective Action - Action to eliminate the cause of a nonconformity or incident and prevent its recurrence. The definition has been modified to include the reference to “incident”, given that incidents are the key factors in occupational safety and health, however, the activities necessary to resolve them are the same as for non-conformities, through of corrective actions.

Security systems: Set of equipment and components that interrelate and respond to alterations in the normal development of processes and activities in the facility or workplace and prevent situations that normally give rise to accidents or emergencies.

Annexes and records

Not.	Denomination
one	Annex 1. Classification of hazards and their prevention and control measures.
two	Annex 2. Types of hazards.
3	Annex 3. Nature of the agents of dangers and associated damages.
4	Annex 4. Structure of the APPP report.
5	Record No. 1. Determination of the scenarios of possible incidents (including accidents).
6	Record No. 2. Format of the table for risk assessment.
7	Record No. 3. Format of recommendations.

References

1. Prevention of major industrial accidents. Geneva, International Labor Office, First edition 1991. ISBN 92-2-307101-1.NC ISO 14121: 2002 SAFETY AND HEALTH AT WORK. MACHINE SAFETY. PRINCIPLES FOR RISK ASSESSMENT. 2002. Risk engineering manual. Criteria for quantitative risk analysis. PDVSA. 2004. Risk engineering manual. Analysis of risks at work. PDVSA. 2004. Procedure to carry out process risk analysis in PEMEX Exploration and Production. 2008.Internal Regulatory Improvement Committee 144 (COMERI). 08/10/2010. Guidelines for conducting process risk analysis. PEMEX. 2010 Basic Course on Safety and Health at Work. Training and development center for cadres of the SST Directorate of the MTSS of Cuba and the Fraternity-MUPRESPA, Spain. 2011.ODEBRECHT.Preliminary analysis of risk levels - APNR. 2012. NC ISO / IEC 31010: 2015. RISK MANAGEMENT - RISK APPRECIATION TECHNIQUES. 2015 NC ISO 45001: 2018. HEALTH AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AT WORK ─ REQUIREMENTS WITH GUIDANCE FOR USE. 2018.