The purpose of this essay is to know the logical and analytical thinking of Juren Habermas, where logical and analytical knowledge work for a more just society.
Without a doubt, democracy is and will always be a common idealism. The agreement is a bit like that of the plaintiff and the defendant in litigation when they cry out in unison for justice to be done. Habermas, to a large extent, started the contemporary discussion around this concept. The idea of democracy can be achieved in its origins and in its further development towards better applicability. Habermas says that human rights are an important ingredient of democracy.
He states that the majority of the population can be sure that it represents the democratic will of the community, only to the extent that everyone, including the minority, has been respected. Habermas concludes by saying that if there is a conflict, moral reasons must prevail. Undoubtedly, when people go around the world claiming to be in favor of democracy, they are frequently expressing support for different interpretations that, without a doubt, are no longer legitimate for that reason. The controversy in this regard should not die, since perhaps that is the only way to achieve the long-awaited arrival of the Kantian dream of "perpetual peace."
Undoubtedly this has its origin in the intuitive ideal, of a democratic association, by means of which it is carried out through argumentation and public reasoning of the citizens in conditions of equality. Citizens in this community model share a commitment to solving collective decision problems through public reasoning, considering their associations as legitimate, insofar as they establish a scheme for free and public liberation.
Habermas says that liberalism has of necessity to appeal to a totally inadequate metaphysical notion of normative justification in the modern '' disenchanted '' period, an expression of Max Weber frequently invoked by Habermas, that is, Weber understands the modernization process as ''disenchantment''.
Existe un sistema de creencias al que se apegan las personas, de esta manera si se tuviera que responder a la pregunta de porque hay que obedecer a las autoridades, la respuesta se fundaría en ese sistema. Se diría que el mandato divino reconocido por la comunidad requiere que los integrantes acepten incuestionablemente al mandatario terrenal así como a sus mandatos. Habermas sostiene que en la modernidad la verdad y la legitimidad no dependen simplemente del convencimiento y de la anuencia de los sujetos, sino del consenso razonado.
However, Habermas does not conclude that human rights are only justified if they enjoy the approval of the majority forces, on the contrary, he is one of the most staunch defenders of human rights within a constitutional framework, considering that they should not be understood as a counterweight to the democratic process, but as something very important. The will has normative weight only to the extent that basic human rights are respected. '' The principle that all state violence emanates from the people, '' Habermas notes, '' must be justified according to the circumstances, in terms of freedom of opinion, information, congregation, association, belief, conscience and confession, as well as the right to participate in elections, political parties and citizen movements, etc.
It states that freedoms, basic to individuals, are not simply one of the subjects of deliberation, but help to form the structure that enables deliberation. It is important to appreciate how Habermas stands somewhere between two extremes, the liberal tradition inspired by Immanuel Kant and the republic infused by Jean Jacques Rousseau. In the words of Habermas '' Rosseau and Kant, by concept of autonomy, try to conceive the reason for the union of practical reason and sovereign will in such a way that the idea of human rights and the principle of popular sovereignty are interpreted reciprocally.
Final reflection
It is certainly not easy to take the work of Jurgen Habermas together. Its theme is somewhat sociological and philosophical, as well as scientific and political. The rights we have explored derive not from the democratic process, but from reflection on the presuppositions of the practice of moral discussion.
Once these rights are discovered, their function seems precisely to limit the operation of the democratic process, discrediting those collective decisions that violate them. Criticizes the lack of rational consensus with respect to the principle of the current society, it is a moral censure with which Habermas cannot be content. The increasing rationalization of the world of life runs parallel to the increasing systematic complexity.
* Cohen, Joshua 1989, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, The Good polity: Normative analysis of the state, Alan Hamlin / Phillip Petite, eds.
