Are "management sciences" true sciences? Here is an issue that will seem unimportant - according to M. Bunge - to people who have few or very confused ideas, and who only value those that are good tools for action.
Many are the epistemologists who argue that management sciences lack scientific status, since they do not comply with the canons of positivism, no matter how up-to-date and popperian they may be. These canons can be summarized in a few hypotheses:
«The ontological hypothesis (reality is, nature is); the deterministic hypothesis (the real obeys invariant laws); the reductionist hypothesis (the real obeys a composition of simple elements); the hypothesis of the naturalness of deductive logic; hypotheses that in a methodological way were expressed in the hypothetical deductive and minimum action principles »
It is enough to remember, to appreciate how these sciences do not fit into the canons of positivist epistemology, that the theory of organizational contingency of Lawrence & Lorsch (frequently cited to illustrate the way of operating of management sciences) was validated with a sample of only six North American companies.
Notwithstanding the above, management disciplines have enough vitality for the scientific community not to include them in pseudosciences and quackery
Mario Bunge presents in a clear and didactic way the differences that exist between pure science, applied science and technology. Pure science is one that tries to understand reality by addressing cognitive problems of any kind, applied science deals with understanding a part of reality with the hope that someone can transform it.
Technology, on the other hand, has as its center of activity the design of devices or action plans "to control, transform or create things or processes, natural or social." For example, the manufacture of ceramic, glass or steel artifacts is based on scientific laws, but these production techniques are not science but engineering.
Speaking of administrative discipline, Bunge says:
“If management is viewed as a (social) science, then its central objective must be to seek laws and regulations that satisfy or should satisfy administrative activity, from the accountant to the production manager to the public relations officer. On the other hand, if administration is a technology, it will leave that basic research to the pure social sciences, to then deal with designing optimal organization models (in some respect) on the basis of knowledge acquired in the basic sciences, as well as new knowledge acquired in the course of research and administrative experience »
Now, technologies also use science's own research method but, as Morin says, science manipulates to verify while technology verifies to manipulate.
In conclusion, for Bunge management sciences are sciences because of the way they approach problems, but they are not because of their purpose, as they seek to know the best way to produce or control natural or artificial processes. According to Bunge, science seeks disinterested knowledge, which does not happen with the so-called management sciences, therefore they are technologies or should occupy a place in philosophy
It is noteworthy that in the Conference on the epistemology of economic sciences, which are held annually in Buenos Aires, management sciences appear under the heading of Social Technologies and, in other cases, Artificial Intelligence.
Despite the above, there are those who wonder: If the epistemological referent does not support the management sciences, it will not be necessary to change the epistemological referent.
The new epistemological reflection works within each science, because the critique of concepts, methods and principles is carried out by those who use these foundations.
Of course, this does not mean locking oneself into that kind of corporatism that manifests itself in schools, chapels and clans; whose mandarins claim that management sciences are "what they do and teach." On the contrary, it is about recognizing the existence of new sciences that are defined by a knowledge project and not by an object of knowledge.
The new epistemological reflection is an exercise linked to scientific activity, which does not fully merge with it. So we find a general epistemology that systematically reflects on the sciences with the help of these, and disciplinary epistemologies that express the conceptual self-awareness of each discipline.
H. Simon (Nobel Prize 1978) considers that administration (practical science) differs in its object from the sociology of administration (theoretical science). The latter elaborates propositions about how human beings behave in organizations, while the former contains propositions about "how men would behave if they wanted their activity to reach the maximum consequence of administrative objectives with limited means." According to Simon, if when investigating we stumble upon an ethical statement, we can separate it into two parts, a factual and an ethical one, and only the factual is important to science.
Maurice Blondel, as early as 1893, rejects the idea of a science of practice and proposes a science of action: A science of practice should formulate norms of conduct, action is too complex to be guided in that way. It is not about giving a possible solution to a problem, but about carrying out a desirable project. Blondel's thinking was rescued by JL Le Moigne who predicts that when positivism ceases to dominate scientific institutions, management sciences will become social engineering sciences.
Without citing Blondel, but walking in the same direction, Wiener (the founder of cybernetics) violates the principles of positivism when he introduces teleology to the core of scientific research. In chains of circuit reactions, causal descriptions do not contradict teleological descriptions. Precisely, in management practices we find that movement that integrates the final cause with the efficient cause, assuming the need to involve opponents. Of course, we are not referring to the contradiction originated by an error in reasoning, but rather to the heuristic contradiction capable of making a new dimension of reality emerge.
As Morin rightly says, “there are truth problems in relation to goals and norms, and this calls into question the fundamental choices: we have to know that we make these choices, but we must also know, at that moment, that normative truth, ethics, politics, it is not of the same nature as the one that states that a table is a table ».
On the other hand, for there to be freedom, a universe is necessary where there are determinations, constants, regularities on which the action can be based, but it is also necessary that there be potentialities and uncertainties so that the action can develop.
As a corollary, we could put a phrase similar to the one exhibited by adventure films that are part of a saga, the story (that is, the debate) continues.
M. Bunge (1993) «Epistemological status of the administration», In JJ Ader (comp.) And others, Organizations, Buenos Aires, Paidos, p. 52
JL Le Moigne (1997) "The 'epitsemological incoherence' of management sciences". In CUADECO. Notebooks of Economy N ° 26. Santa Fe de Bogota. National university of Colombia.
HD Lawrence & J. LORSCH (1967) Organizations and Enviromment: Managing Differentiation and Integration (Boston, Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration)
M. Bunge (1993), p. 53 - 54
M. Bunge (1976) Technology and philosophy. Mexico. University of Nueva León, p. 12
M. Bunge (1993), p. 52
We have replaced the term "technique" by "technology", in accordance with the differentiation that the same author makes in his work Technology and Philosophy.
M. Bunge (1993), p. 53
E. Morin (1982) Science with consciousness. Publications Europe-America. S / l, p. 56-57
M. Bunge (1993), p. 57.
M. Bunge (1977), "The GST Chanllenge to Classical Philosophies of Science", International Journal of General Systems 4.1, Cited by JL Le Moigne, Op. Cit.
JL Le Moigne, Op. Cit.
R. Follari (1998) On contemporary epistemological defundamentation, Caracas, CIPOST, p. 10 - 12
HA SIMON, Administrative behavior. Madrid. Aguilar. 1972, p. 240
M. Blondel (1950) L 'action, essai d' une critique de la vie et d 'une science de la pratique, Paris, PUF, Cited by JL Le Moigne, Op. Cit.
JL Le Moigne, Op Cit.
W. Wieser (1970) Organisms, structures, machines, Buenos Aires, Eudeba, p. 15
E. Morin (1998) The method. The ideas, Madrid, Chair, p. 189
E. Morin (1982) Op. Cit. p. 199
Ibid., P. 161
