In economic theory as in accounting research, the neoclassical view has remained until a couple of decades ago as the dominant research program. However, various schools have developed approaches that “relax” the fundamental considerations of the neoclassical program, such as the assumptions of perfect competition, perfect information, and individual and rational choice.
From an Investigative perspective, Institutional Economics, and specifically the neo-institutionalist approach, (with representatives as outstanding as DOUGLASS NORTH and WILLIAM FOGEL (Nobel Prize winners 1993), FURUBOTN AND RITCHER (1997), COASE (1937) and (1960) and others as outstanding) has been presented as an attempt to incorporate the theory of institutions in the economy, proposing, among other things, that individual choice is influenced by social institutions, of which accounting and its interrelationships make it participate.
The new Institutional Economy1, can be defined initially as “a global analytical framework to examine and explain the development of the western world; a framework that is in accordance with and complements neoclassical economic theory. ” In this way, economic analysis based on rational choice is used to explain the changes that have occurred in history, through the phenomenon of economic growth.
Through the institutional framework prevailing at each historical stage and assuming the rational choice of agents, it is possible to explain why certain historical and social phenomena occur in societies, and in part their modes of interaction can be explained.
Institutions are the incentive structure of a society, and these determine the allocation of resources of an economy. The economic growth of a society has been achieved by creating an institutional framework that induces increases in productivity and that allows the fulfillment of contracts and exchange, that is, the reduction of transaction costs and the definition of property rights.
When there are no institutions that guarantee efficient exchange, incentives arise for agents to seek a private benefit, regardless of the social cost that this implies. For the exchange to work, property rights must be clearly specified. If there is no such specification, the exchange will be at high transaction costs and there will be no incentive to achieve an efficient allocation of resources; thus, if there are no incentives to comply with the laws (it is costly to comply with them), the agents will decide not to comply, and this will affect economic development, since it will be more efficient to seek income transfer than the creation of wealth.
Thus, if socially accounting is a discipline that is in charge of the appropriate management in every sense of the word, it is done with the information (this is to verify what are the incentives of the agents, where and how their rights of representation are represented). property, eg,) is its closest aspect to economic reality, linking criteria of equity, economy, efficiency and productivity, moving in a contemporary context, it must respond to the needs posed by the neo-institutional theory and in particular to the concept base of analysis of this work and various studies on the subject, such as the maintenance of transaction costs balanced with the interests that all the architects of social and collective processes deserve.These will be a clear social incentive in regard to the creation and operation of organizations that respond to the approaches made by said theory, where they adapt to a framework of shared well-being, where society finds the appropriate habitat for the creation of wealth through its well-defined and distributed contractual relations according to the "normal" incentives that emanate from said institutional conception and not, on the contrary, by anomalous incentives that propitiate the appropriation of surpluses for lack of assurance of the rights that each agent owns the interests he pursues.where society finds the right habitat for the creation of wealth through its well-defined and distributed contractual relationships according to the "normal" incentives that emanate from said institutional conception and not, on the contrary, by anomalous incentives that promote appropriation of surpluses for lack of assurance of the rights that each agent has over the interests that he pursues.where society finds the right habitat for the creation of wealth through its well-defined and distributed contractual relationships according to the "normal" incentives that emanate from said institutional conception and not, on the contrary, by anomalous incentives that promote appropriation of surplus for lack of assurance of the rights that each agent has on the interests that he pursues.
Given this order of ideas, the objective of the essay is to present the development that the institutional economy has given around the concept of transaction costs, as well as to analyze the research approaches that have had the most relevance, relating such concepts with new perspectives or accounting trends within their recent research approaches, to verify their relevance in their own field of study.
The work presents an initial conceptualization, based on the pioneering works of Coase (1937) and Coase (1960), to then explore the implications on the efficiency of the economic system, under the existence of transaction costs, presenting the developments that in the modern theory of the signature they have been given from the work of Williamson, to later relate the analyzed economic program and its accounting implications in what has to do with transaction costs and property rights, making a small application to a specific case, ending with the developments that this approach has had in Colombia,commenting on which can be part of an accounting study to finally finish off with a reflection on network coordination as an analysis that both economics and accounting can implement in the task of lowering transaction costs.
CONCEPTUALIZATION
The new theory of the firm starts from the consideration that transaction costs affect the choice of agents, as well as the institutional framework in which they operate.
In general terms, transaction costs can be defined as those necessary to order or create and operate institutions and guarantee compliance with the rules.
It is immediate to think in terms of “friction” within the economic system (Furubotn and Richter, 1997). Specifically, there are costs associated with the use of the market (in terms of the exchange of property rights), and the definition of resources (in terms of the definition of property rights), as well as costs of market administration and verification of compliance with the rules, all of them of important repercussion within the generation and distribution of social wealth.
Coase (1937, ref 1960 and Nobel discourse 1991) found as a determinant for the existence of companies, the search to minimize transaction costs, by internalizing exchanges, which, if carried out in the market, would become more expensive. Thus, it states that "Within the company, these market transactions are eliminated, and the complicated structure of the transaction market is replaced by the coordinating businessman" (…)
“The main reason why it is profitable to establish a company seems to be the existence of costs to use the price mechanism. The most obvious cost of organizing production through the price mechanism is to establish precisely what those prices are. ” (…)
The same rationality of minimizing transaction costs arises from the original work of Coase: “market operation carries costs, and that by forming an organization and allowing an authority (entrepreneur) to direct resources, certain of those market costs are saved "
Even Coase (1990) explains the existence of the market based on Transaction costs: "markets are institutions that exist to facilitate exchange, that is, they exist to reduce the costs involved in carrying out transactions" (p. 14). In addition, for these markets to function, and for the exchanges to be fulfilled, institutional arrangements are required, such as rules that allow verifying and complying with the exchanges (definition of property rights and their protection), in this way the rules arise to reduce transaction costs in the markets, at which point the adequate design of accounting systems can operate as a moderator of the same costs, making use of Professor Mattessich's proposals regarding, that it is a research program concerned with such references from the environment,and that it promulgates macro rules closer to those of social negotiation.
Williamson (1985) defines opportunistic behavior as the origin of transaction costs, in the non-fulfillment of contractual obligations, which originate monitoring and protection, an association that reveals the tie to key accounting principles or as Mattessich would call the basic assumptions of the theoretical construction.
For North (1990) the basis of transaction costs is found in information costs, understood as the costs of measuring what has been exchanged and the costs of protecting and enforcing what has been agreed. However, he presents transaction costs as within production costs in this way: “total production costs consist of the inflows of land, labor and capital resources that participate both in transforming the physical attributes of a good, such as in those of negotiation, definition, protection and forced fulfillment of property rights ”.
This position would benefit the business valuation in terms of allocation, and association of costs to the attributes that deserve it, whether in private or public organizations, being able to incorporate financial information as, for example, an intangible item.
However, compliance with contractual arrangements only occurs if it benefits both parties, opportunistic conduct will entail an uncertainty in the exchange, and the transaction cost reflects that uncertainty: it will include a risk premium for non-compliance with contractual arrangements.
This level of risk will be an institutional factor, in such a way that the institutional framework will determine the transaction costs, in terms of "friction" that was alluded to at the beginning of this work, and therefore including them through the appropriation of an accounting system will result in the most approximate knowledge that it has of said risk premium and its impact on the valuation made by the interested parties. sticking to the parameters that an institutional field of action marks for them.
Determinants of Transaction Costs in the New Theory of the Firm
For Williamson, institutions arise with the objective of minimizing transaction costs. He returns to Coase, in his analysis of the emergence of the company and argues that the company is explained more as a power structure, than as a production function.
Transaction cost economics is focused on developing incentives that minimize transaction costs ex post to the creation of a contractual arrangement, that is, compliance verification. In this way, the institutions that study the ex post arrangements of the contract acquire great relevance.
For Williamson (1985) it is the consideration of human factors and the concrete aspects of each exchange that define transaction costs, these are that men are opportunistic and limitedly rational, clear behavioral aspect in accounting.
Under limited rationality, it will be expensive to consider each of the possible contingencies and contract for each one of them, or even there will be contingencies that will not be possible to foresee, which will increase the costs of compliance with contractual relationships.
Opportunism places incentives for agents to default on some of their contractual obligations.
This framework of conduct involves three aspects of a transaction that will play a role in shaping the level and nature of transaction costs: asset specificity, degree of uncertainty, and frequency.
A transaction has high levels of asset specificity if, as the exchange develops, one party becomes more linked and held by the other party. This degree of power will define the incentives of each party in the development of the contract, so that its fulfillment will be costly.
Frequency influences the relative costs of the various means of reaching a transaction. When a transaction is frequent, agents can create mechanisms, outside the institutional framework, that reduce the costs that are routinely incurred.
From these characteristics, Williamson extracts the concept of “government” of a transaction, understood, this as the terms in which the transactions are adapted as contingencies arise, linking such concept to the predictive capacity of the accounting information acquired for such an end.
Generally, the rules of government arise from the institutional framework (laws) or from contractual formulations of the agents, or through hierarchies, where most of them will have the authority to determine how the contract will be fulfilled.
Transaction Costs in the Coase Theorem
At zero transaction costs, an efficient exchange of property rights will take place, regardless of the legal decision. This proposition, known as the Coase Theorem, is not fulfilled when considering the transaction costs, the negotiation is expensive, therefore the institutional framework of laws will determine the efficiency of the exchanges.
In a world with zero transaction costs, all agents will be able to search for the necessary information and make the necessary contractual arrangements to maximize production, regardless of the liability rules that arise. However, by including positive transaction costs, agents will have no incentive to disclose information, which prevents the emergence of contractual arrangements between agents, as it becomes too costly to create incentives to generate such arrangements. What incentives are defined and what arrangements are generated will already be determined by the institutional framework (rules) that govern the operation of the market.
Transaction Costs and Neoclassical Efficiency
From the work of Coase (1960) and his formulation of the Coase theorem, it has been recognized that the neoclassical model formulates its theory assuming zero transaction costs. Under this perspective, the agent can decide within the market instantly, without information or search costs, or compliance costs of the exchange contracts, nor in their monitoring. Under zero transaction costs, agents can anticipate or decide under the possible states of nature that arise (in the sense of Full contracts).
The existence of positive transaction costs affects agents' incentives and therefore their behavior. In this way, any exchange (contract) is expensive, since time and resources must be used to search for information, costs of carrying out the exchange and the cost of verifying compliance.
Even market failures can occur, where, given the high transaction costs, the exchanges are simply not viable in the economic sense. transactions tend to be formulated in such a way that they maximize the net benefits they provide. In this way, if the costs of making the exchange are greater than the benefit of the exchange, no
In general, it can be argued that perfect competition between anonymous agents (neoclassical exchange) as such does not work and decision-makers are involved in new dilemmas that need a clear definition: agents must incur costs to define the exchange and carry out the contract. This cost of using the market is definable as 1. Costs of preparing contracts (search for information), 2. Costs of preparing contracts and 3. Costs of monitoring and oversight of the fulfillment of contractual obligations, as well as measurement and protection. of the rights to be exchanged.
The neoclassical theoretical framework can be expressed as maximizing agents, with convex utility functions and subject to the choice of goods given the budgetary restrictions, and being price takers. On the production side, there are convex profit functions with decreasing returns to scale. Each firm maximizes its benefits subject to its traditional cost conditions understood under historical, past approaches.
However, by not considering transaction costs, it fails to seek to explain the behavior of agents. The existence of positive transaction costs introduces new restrictions and generates different, "efficient" results. Alessi (1983) shows how the choice of agents can be defined by the minimization of transaction costs, rather than by the maximization of their production functions and with it the expected benefits in the medium and short term.
According to the two well-being theorems, the neoclassical equilibrium is Pareto optimal. At positive transaction costs, agents will consider it efficient to devote resources to acquiring information and verifying compliance with contracts. Then, the paretian notion is left aside and the firm or agent will be efficient if it achieves compliance with the contracts.
Even, The New Firm Theory has considered transaction activity as part of the production process, and modeling developments have been presented in the same way: convex transaction technologies and within the neoclassical framework, in such a way that optimal results are achieved, taking into account the transaction costs within the decisions of the firms.
INTERACTION BETWEEN ACCOUNTING AND NEOINSTITUTIONALISM
As we saw in the previous section, transaction costs are something very relevant in today's economy. The timely information, the lack of it, the value of it, the opportunism of the organizations and their interactions make up the fertile bed of current economic relations and therefore of the neo-institutional current.
Deviating from these advances in perfecting the vision of the environment and reality can be detrimental to the extent that the disciplines that ignore these tendencies will be missing the opportunity to filter with new lights the reality that surrounds them.
As accounting as a science and as an application in different systems could be observed, it is largely related to the concepts of cost, rights, and AP remuneration relationships, which are connoted by new and enriching insights provided by the economic perspective.
Such progressive dynamics confers on the accounting discipline the attributes, pertinent to direct its recent approaches towards the areas where the paradigm shift is taking place. These can be, for example, the link between NEI and directed accounting. Towards the measurement of knowledge, based on the weight that, for example, the Securyty and Exchange Commission of the United States assigns to the value of knowledge as a risk reducer, minimizing the costs that of the contractual scheme are generated.
It is clear then that the utility of the economic program transcends accounting epistemological developments, or better complements them by offering new development perspectives. With such clarity, Professor Enthoven (1985) exposes it when he analyzes the new trends towards the point of disciplinary development and, in general, the relationship that these ideas have with the macro trends of current economic and social conditions.
Professor Enthoven says in his article, one of the challenges and purposes of accounting focusing on current trends, is the search for the measurement of productivity and efficiency, which as already explained within the framework of neo-institutional developments have a of its most prominent aspects in recent years.
It is not surprising then that as such accounting within a positive-normative conception, which makes use of an empirical tool (new empirical research) adopts within different accounting systems and schemes the approaches of economic and social discipline as interdisciplinary support, to verify the relevance of these approaches in the present and future development of accounting as a scientific discipline.
The link that exists between the economic and accounting research program is not casuistry, it is the result of an interaction, which currently does not cease. However, it should be noted that in order to support and contrast economic developments with the new research structures of the accounting discipline, there is the risk of remaining on paper and continuing to act under the terms that are criticized of the model initially formulated and which still permeates very well. deeply within the approaches that applied accounting science handles and I say applied because in the theoretical field new perspectives are revealed that have not yet been exploited, perhaps due to the same limitations imposed by the real and perhaps institutional framework within which even the At the moment the accounting, the economy and the society move with all its participants.
Delimit clear rules of the game among the participants in the process, as indicated by North, (1993), Coase (1960), etc., within the neo-institutional framework, valuing and clearly distinguishing what are the rights and obligations that arise from an established institutional framework, within of which, multiple contractual frameworks are included, with multiple players, assessing and distinguishing which are the remunerations and punishments (game theory) that the participants of the process should receive, which and who are affected in absolute terms by the adverse transaction costs its rationality, as the institutional schemes of the moment are reformulated for the sake of a better distribution of wealth, of power, in order to minimize the costs of an adversely uncertain reality,These are questions that accounting science cannot ignore; it is these difficulties that the discipline must overcome to find the role that it has as a discipline and instrument of measurement, information management, strategic and scientific analysis.
It is necessary that, as the economic theory in its recent neo-institutional analyzes, about transaction costs as members of the processes of wealth creation, its circulation, decision and monitoring of the process, both with regard to private institutions and public, accounting as a discipline in interdisciplinary development must ensure a normative check in the sense of evaluating this neo-institutional trend, so that then the representations made by accounting at a pure theoretical level, demonstrate that its basic principles adapt to the new expectations they generate the social ecosystem that contains it, and which must not be fed by conceptual structures that are not part of the present world economic development in its most explanatory aspects,as is the NEI.
Given that this neo-institutional trend affects the responses offered by accounting systems, through its decision models it modifies the already explained efficiency evaluation and monitoring trends that compromise and link recent accounting approaches to social responsibility and their coordination with agents or organizations that frame the transaction costs.
The measurement of these costs and their accounting representation are then involved as a link to the information utility approach for decision-making in environments and scenarios with uncertainty and under parameters not as restrictive as the neoclassical ones, where appropriate information may be required to choose between various institutional arrangements, in which greater incentives lead to the development of a particular activity, to choose one or another type of contract and may be taken into account when emerging from said contractual regime, characteristics such as capacity of prediction required by theoretical, economic and accounting developments.For this case, it is possible to find within accounting the methodological instruments necessary to alleviate the information deficiencies that divert actors from their normal transaction costs, reproducing institutional frameworks that favor very particular interest groups.
The reconstruction that helps to elaborate the accounting bursts in, being permeated in its theoretical concepts, of monitoring and control that it must make of categories such as efficiency, economy, or effectiveness within a contractual relationship. It has the way of implementing among the different agents, instruments that serve to equate what can be said as its "Budgeted Rationality" Weisner (1997), and thus achieves a more equitable field of game rules within the economic space.
An example of this may be the recent advances in business valuation, added value, ABC costs, balance scorecard, which combined can help configure powerful management charts, which can be used to minimize transaction costs in institutional settings. with weakness regarding the clarity of property rights and the relationships that emanate from the principal-agent interaction and the responsibilities attributable to each of them.
In addition to the above, it can help to rethink the common places that this framework offers for the misallocation of social incentives, laying the foundations for the reconstruction of the public and private accounting scheme that will minimize transaction costs in the medium term, encouraging the lowest propensity to establish harmful diversion incentives as already stated, making a clear allocation of responsibilities in the scheme (PA) clearly delimiting their property rights and relevant relationships (degrees of hierarchy and power).
Accounting with its technical and methodological instruments provides an effective form of evaluation, both ex-ante and ex-ante, as handled by the new generation methodologies mentioned above, from which the evidence is provided to link as many sectors with participants in the contractual and social negotiation
An example of such relevance of typically accounting approaches to reality, based on the characteristics of the neo-institutional research program, is as Peter B. Boorsna (1996) exposes in his article on modern public management in the Netherlands. In this work, the NEI base hypotheses are taken into account and it is directed towards the explanation of some aspects of public management, highlighting not so much the transaction costs, based on different main agent considerations.
In this work, the contribution corresponding to accounting discipline as such is clarified in the section, where he provides a model of organization and the budget process, related to what he ends up calling "contract management", where the use of methodologies can be inferred very specific and current accounting such as the balance scorecard or value-added methodologies of continental court, which seek to relate results with performance indicators. Entering a neo-institutional process that Weisner (1997) would describe as a linking process that results where the results and decisions of agents subject to certain institutional frameworks would modify it.
NEOINSTITUTIONAL STUDIES IN COLOMBIA?
Although speaking in strictly accounting terms, the applications and investigations made with reference to the area of the new institutional economy are not very clear, at least two interpretations of this theory have been presented in the country, applying the analytical instruments of the NIE to the problems facing the nation, to give an explanation according to this historical perspective of these circumstances.
The cases referred to are, on the one hand, a study by Professor Kalmanovizt (1997) with respect to the legal framework in Colombia, and another that seems to be situated within a new empirical accounting approach, is one carried out by EDUARDO WEISNER (1997) regarding public performance.
It is clarified that although the works do not strictly fit within the guidelines of an accounting investigation, they can be presented as explanations of specific situations present in the current institutional framework of the Colombian economy.
For Kalmanovitz (1997) in Colombia there are no incentives to develop legal productive activities, given the high level of impunity, the agents recognize that it is more profitable to violate the law than to comply with it. In addition, there is a high degree of state infiltration of sectors of power (drug traffickers), which make the state modify the legal framework according to its interests.
On the other hand, the author acknowledges that Transaction costs are very high, especially in relation to the fulfillment of contracts, since the legal system that should guarantee them, presents incredible levels of impunity.
In an attempt at a historical perspective, Kalmanovitz (1997) shows how Spain brought to America a centralized and formalist political system, where there were no incentives to develop exchanges in the market, since various levels of monopolization of mercantile activities were generated.
In addition, it expresses how since the colony, the judicial system is formal and legalistic, without having an economic vision of the decisions, without protecting the property rights of the agents, because as the author states, "everything that appears as productive will be a feast for the Crown ”(page 3).
In addition, land property rights are defined as inefficient, responding to payment of favors to the Crown or as forms of geographic control over scarce labor.
Finally, there is a clear state inefficiency in the monopolization of force, which, together with the deficiency in the definition of property rights over land, generates phenomena of violence, such as those that have occurred during the 20th century.
For his part, Weisner (1997) seeks to explain the high level of inefficiency that occurs in the public services of Education, Telecommunications and Electric Power, based on the concept of Rent Seekers.
The term Rent Seekers refers to pressure groups that make profits outside the market, and thanks to their position before the State. Examples of Unions that act as Rent Seekers are Fecode, Telecom union. and in general those of the Electric Sector.
In these cases, unions have captured their respective sectors, as, as Weisner demonstrates, it is the unions that define the policies and regulatory framework of their respective sectors.
The analysis by Weisner (1997) presents a historical contextualization from the end of the eighties to 1996, where it shows the levels of inefficiency reached by these analyzed sectors, as the regulation that should be carried out by the State by groups is controlled of specific interest.
In specific cases, it has to be found in the telecommunications sector. The regulatory framework for this sector has been established in the collective agreement of 1996-1997, agreed by the Company with the Union. In this case, the union's strategy as an interest group is appreciated, to design a long-term policy, whose purpose is to protect the company from competition.
For its part, in the electricity sector we find that companies in this sector have been acting with little regulation and no institutional evaluation. As of Law 143, electricity transactions between generating companies, between distribution companies and companies engaged in the commercialization of electricity are not regulated, they are free and remunerated at the prices agreed upon by the parties (Weisner 1997).
Furthermore, there are no clear control mechanisms in companies in the electricity sector. The most usual mechanisms are the stock market, which in this type of companies does not appear in the conventional way; Competition is the second control mechanism, but in this sector there is a state monopoly; the regulatory mechanisms are not very clear and lead to the presence of distortions in the management of companies. This has as a consequence the low efficiency of the electricity companies and the bad public management of their administrators.
The author acknowledges that efficiency in public policies can be achieved through the implantation of clear regulatory mechanisms in the public sector, and mainly by decreasing the power of unions in each sector, through competition in the market, preventing rents from being captured. privately by the respective union.
Lastly, it is necessary to emphasize that Weisner's analysis is based on theoretical references, to make a presentation of the neo-institutional program and its primary sources are basically government documents (laws, resolutions of the regulatory commissions, management reports, etc.).
SOCIAL COORDINATION THROUGH NETWORKS AS A MODERATOR OF COSTS
In the previous lines it is evident that the set of market institutions and society ensure certain basic coordination, although this is disadvantageous in certain cases for some of the participants in the contractual processes of economic development. The recognition of "cooperation" between society, the market and institutions gives way to new forms of social coordination in response to the prevailing economic context.
Globalization requires significant changes in the form of economic and organizational coordination of the economic sectors. Both the idea that the state, as the governing center of society, is the only one capable of driving technological and economic processes, or that society is self-regulating through the market, are currently far from reality. The actors in this play know that owning information costs and situations are not always equitable for everyone. For this reason, in recent years, a new form of coordination is emerging, both at the political, social and economic levels, which modifies the onerousness of institutional risks, based on new very important theoretical contributions.
Put this way for Lechner: «Social coordination through networks is framed within the complexity and diversity of the actors, who intervene (state, private, institutional), such as the importance of cooperation between State, Market and Institutions». The objective of this form of coordination is to formulate and carry out collective decisions on different topics shared by socio-economic agents, linking their various types of organization, optimizing their resources, by improving the terms of understanding the limits and possibilities Of its rights, clear guidelines that we already described follow the neo-institutional economy as well as the new accounting research contributions.
This new coordination modality means, for the participants of the corresponding institutional framework, more tasks of management of economic interdependence, fostering networks around initiatives and orientations that benefit both individual and collective interest at the same time, that is, where the costs of transaction do not act in a perverse way. In an era of great uncertainty, which can only be counteracted by intersectoral linkage and the emergence of adequate institutional frameworks, networks can discipline competition, inhibiting destructive dynamics and channeling factors that improve insertion into the global economy. National, regional and international networks create numerous sources of learning and opportunities for organizations,for individuals whether of public or private origin. It is through the networks that regional development plans are established, sector reforms for national and regional benefits, organizational reforms at the macro and micro levels, as well as the legal regulatory framework related to such issues. A network facilitates not only the articulation of the different, sometimes antagonistic, actors and their respective strategic resources, but also the effective execution of the decisions made.and their respective strategic resources, but also the effective execution of the decisions made.and their respective strategic resources, but also the effective execution of the decisions made.
The importance and functional logic of a network responds to trust, since it operates as a mechanism that reduces complexity and, therefore, as a powerful lubricant for cooperation. Cooperation between socioeconomic actors also requires state intervention to promote agreements within networks and show the scope of this new form of coordination.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
- COASE (1937) The Nature of the Company. In The Firm, the Market and the Law. Editorial Alliance. The work is referenced, but the consultation was made in the 1960 publication COASE (1960) The problem of Social Cost. In The Firm the Market and the Law. Editorial Alliance. COASE (1990) The signature, the Market and the Law. Editorial Alliance CALDERON, Fernado. (nineteen ninety five). Governance, Competitiveness and Social Integration, CEPAL Magazine No. 57. FCE, DE ALESSI (1983). Property Rights, Transaction Costs and X-Eficciency. In American Economic Review. Vol 73 No. 01.FURUBOTN AND RICHTER (1997) Institutions and Economic Theory. University Michigan Press.KALMANOVITZ (1997) Institutions, Law and Economic Development. In Weekly Drafts of Economics, No. 69.KREPS (1990). A Course In Microeconomic Theory. McGraw HillLECHNER, Norbert (1997).Three forms of Social Coordination. CEPAL Review No. 61. FCE.NORTH (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. FCE.WILLIAMSON, O (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. FCE.WILLIAMSON, O (1989) The Transaction Costs Economics. In Handbook of Industrial Organization. Vol. 1. North Holland.WEISNER (1997) The Effectiveness of Public Policies: A Neo-institutional Analysis. Third World Editors
1 NEI: New Institutional Economy
North & Thomas (1978) p. one.
The term transaction costs refers to the opportunity cost of an agent to establish and maintain control of resources (in terms of monitoring, protection and reputation).
Property rights are defined as the rights of an agent to make use of assets. Both formal rules and customs are included and their economic relevance depends on how much they are recognized and protected by society.
CAÑIBANO, Leandro (19?) »Definition, Division, Requirements And Hypotheses Of Operation Of Accounting Science»
Lbid… P.53
The development of the theory of transaction costs has been linked, by its formulation, with the development of the idea of the contractual economy, in terms of contracts for the exchange of property rights, rather than the supply and demand of physical assets. In this way, the definition of property rights and their transfer lead to contractual relationships, the fulfillment and verification of which are the source of costs.
TUA PEREDA, Jorge. (198?). «Empirical Research in Accounting. The focus of presence "in the Accounting Magazine of the University of Antioquia, March 1991, Medellín
KRUEGER, A (1974) The political Economy of a Rent Seeking Society. In American Economic Review. LXIV.
LECHNER, Norbert "Three forms of Social Coordination" in CEPAL Review No. 61. Santiago, 1997
Lbid. LECHNER, N….
CALDERON, Fernando. "Governance, Competitiveness and Social Integration" in CEPAL Review No,. 57 Santiago, 1995.
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