Introduction
In principle, public audit does not exist. Although it is intended that the application of the audit in the government sector can be called as such. This claim is not only responsible for the lack of transparency in the management of public funds and the poor accountability, but for the concealment that the audit is a source of opacity and impunity.
Since its inception, auditing arose to serve power, so its practice privileges secrecy, as demanded and is exercised by power itself. The same power that decides what comes out and remains in the dark; mutual complicity between the audit and the power For this reason, the transition of partners from the big audit firms to the associations and institutions that lead the audit and control, and vice versa. A movement that not only strengthens your interests but maintains a monopoly on your knowledge. However, since the crisis of Enron to Lehman Brothers, from the Greek to the Spanish, both in the private and public sectors and throughout the world, it has withdrawn from putting the audit on the bench of the accused, explaining that the irregularities have been the product of individual actions,when the participation of auditors has been shown. Or, a diluting generality, when affirming that it resulted from the deficiencies of the regulatory framework. However, as much as it is interpreted or justified that it is ambition or unethical, negligence or the impossibility and difficulty of detecting fraud and corruption. Or that the reforms derived from the Enron case, such as those implemented by the 2008 international crisis and the recent reform of the European financial system in 2013, have laid the foundations to guarantee that another crisis will never happen again. But in the past the uselessness of said reforms has been evidenced, and in the present account, the audit was removed from the interrogations and reflectors, validating that the auditors are obliged to maintain secrecy and thus,the only thing they have guaranteed is impunity for power.
Derived from the conception in private auditing, which holds against recurring crises and corruption scandals, which guarantees the reliability of financial information, and the supposed public audit affirms, the inspection entities (it is omitted that they are superior because more they seem inferior) they guarantee the public interest, accountability and transparency. This reiterated apology for the audit has caused its practice to be permanently uncritical, authoritarian and undemocratic (3 As), before the complacency of those who lead the way of the audit and oversight.
This document does not deal with private auditing, although the dominant trend emphasizes its preeminence over that developed by the supervisory bodies, and it is the reason that their collaboration is implored. Rather, a change or transformation in the vision of the audit is attempted, which does not depend on the conditions and assumptions that have led students and professionals of the audit to the inability to recognize the falsity of their activity. Caused by: the lack of capacities and competencies in the auditors to analyze and criticize the ideas, norms, procedures and guidelines of the audit and control; not to cite or judge specific cases in public; of not giving reasons or accounting for their actions and results; hiding information that affects the public interest due to threats or fear of losing your job; and,to be treated as taxable and manipulable subjects, from the most modest auditor to the Superior Auditor, Comptroller General, or another equivalent.
On the contrary, re-knowing the auditors' right would lead to establishing the audit as a citizen right, but before it is a priority, the construction of the public audit.
1. Culture of debate
The uniformity or harmonization of thought in auditing and control has been the most pernicious obstacle to driving innovation. For example, Juan M. Portal, head of the Superior Audit of the Federation (ASF) in Mexico, stated that public life is “a space of dissent and confrontation, which is not conducive to greater economic development and a more harmonious coexistence and productive ”. So it is not surprising that it has become the most fervent driver of accounting harmonization, and is now promoting the national audit system. But the idea is not new or original from the Superior Auditor of the Federation, it has arisen from the very center of power. In Europe, the audit has already undergone a harmonization process, before the European Commission issued the Green Paper,in October 2010, on what changes would be necessary in the audit to be solid and independent. And before it published the results, Mario Alonso Ayala, vice president of the Spanish Institute of Sworn Censors of Accounts (ICJCE) titled his article "The green book is very green." And in a column in the magazine Auditores, without an author's signature, he pointed out in this regard, “The document has been criticized for being out of date, as it has recovered debates that were closed (…) Furthermore, in Spain legislation on these issues has just been passed with unanimous parliamentary and great professional agreement ”(Number 14, January 2011, p. 7, author's bold), a uniformity that did not prevent the deepening of the crisis. Thus, a slogan runs through Europe, America and all over the world: dissent is prohibited. No, you are not allowed to think differently,much less exercise the right to dissent. As the Senior Auditor said, "Our work must be viewed in a constructive way and not negatively." But it is not a question of hurting or hurting their feelings, but of evaluating the management of a country's public finances. Given that when faced with questions from public opinion to establish a relationship between high levels of corruption and its results, he replied that it is improper. Asserting, the diversion of resources exists in Mexico due to "a system of incentives created by legal inconsistencies and structural problems, which encourage recidivism in irregularities", adding "if those guilty of national ills are not punished, this is not attributable to the Superior Audit of the Federation ”. In other words,"In this economic crisis, auditors are not part of the problem, but of the solution" declared the vice president of the ICJCE who ended up being its president, more would he have been appointed if he had agreed with the Green Paper and declared that the audit is part of the problem?
And before the declarations of the Superior Auditor, the deputies of the Congress of the Union agree, like the rest of the inspection entities, finally, all are innocent of corruption and impunity. Because, "it complies with the superior audit to help make transparency and accountability a reality." Replicating the assertions of the audit totem. Yes, the Superior Auditor of the Federation has become the image or figure that represents the intellectual authority of the control bodies. For this reason, his articles published on the ASF website are classified as 'messages', just as if he were the messenger of the gods of Olympus, and we mortals only have to accept them.
And even, the Network for Accountability, a project that "was born from the confluence between academic research, journalism in the background, the action of civil society and institutional responsibility. It wants to be an inclusive and dynamic network, capable of adding and coordinating the actions of the largest possible number of academic and social organizations, public institutions and the media, committed to the design, implementation and monitoring of a true policy of accountability in Mexico. The main objective is to create a context of demand in favor of building an accountability policy. ” It has 72 members, and says "We strengthened the role of oversight,We created the Superior Audit of the Federation and equivalent bodies in each federative entity (…) The change has been far-reaching and it must be recognized ”. However, the above is a falsehood, and as long as it is not recognized as false, there can be no improvement or transformation in auditing, least of all in accountability.
The history of auditing to this day has been the absence of debate on the instrument or tool that enables auditing, that is, auditing. His teaching is based on memorization, which has led to the auditor's deformation. And anthropologists, economists, sociologists, journalists, and other professionals and citizens have made assumptions, bowing to the accepted thinking of the audit and of international inspection bodies such as INTOSAI, and some have dared to affirm that their guidelines are based scientific (see, The Sophisms of INTOSAI and INTOSAI, superfluous cult of independence). And it is the root of the problem, in addressing accountability and transparency they have failed to question auditing and oversight.
The Institution of Inspection, not only in Mexico but also in other parts of the world, has been sacred. And criticism seems heresy. For example, Antonio Arias, Trustee of the Audit Office of the Principality of Asturias in Spain, on his blog, points out, I have been slow to publish the delay of the Court of Accounts of Spain in the audit of the accounts of political parties “because contributing to the discredit of the Institutions it raises some reluctance to me ”. And, Juan Ramallo, member of Room III "External Actions" of the European Court of Auditors, when asked, what are the most important deficiencies in his opinion in the European Court of Auditors, replies, "More than speaking about deficiencies in these controls, I would like to highlight its virtues ”. Representing the dominant conception in the audit world,an approach that visualizes the positive but not the negative, the successes but not the errors, based on the idea that by pointing out the negative, institutionality is weakened, but only if it is recognized, will it be possible to clean up the disorder and strengthen its activity. So, will those responsible for the audit have the capacity to analyze and publicly expose the weaknesses of their work?
Therefore, it is necessary to state that it is correct that the diversion of resources originates from legal inconsistencies and structural problems, but also from the audit and oversight itself. And consequently, the lack of accountability and impunity is attributable to the Superior Audit of the Federation and the Superior Audit of Michoacán (control body in the federal entity) as is the case that will be developed in point 3.
2. Culture of complaint
While Fernando Restoy, deputy governor of the Bank of Spain, praised the participation of the auditors and rating companies "I must say that the work has been very satisfactory and I am aware that they have dedicated a lot of time and resources. The experience and solidity of the Bank of Spain inspectors, who have been very involved in the whole process, have also been key for this ”. A short time later, supervisors from the Bank of Spain denounced "in the work of the inspection, there are relatively frequent indications of conduct that could be criminal, but that the usual way of reacting to the evidence of crime is to look the other way." But the complaint was diluted because "No inspector cites specific cases", despite the fact that supervisors lowered the required provisions,basically to save the income statement of some entity, but 2010 was a particularly complex year for Bankia, key in the Spanish financial crisis.
And it is also the history of auditing and oversight, the articles, essays, and specifically the complaints that come from auditors and examiners, avoid pointing out first and last names and specific cases of companies or institutions.
It is manifested in the conclusions of the First National Meeting of the Public Blogosphere in Spain, that it is necessary to open the doors to change and innovation in public services, promoting new ideas and models of open government and that the pride of being a worker must be defended of the public administration. And transferring the idea to the control organisms. Yes, the doors to change and innovation must be opened in the Court of Accounts, in the Autonomous External Control Organizations in Spain (OCEX), in the Superior Audit of the Federation, in the Superior Audits and State Comptrollers in Mexico and in the Inspection Entities of the world, and the pride of being an auditor in each of them must also be defended.But not through leaks (as has been frequent in Mexico) or through anonymous complaints. The right to audit begins with earning the respect of being an auditor. For this, it is essential to promote the culture of reporting, with courage.
3. Refute audit reports
According to a World Bank study, a condition for the success of audit institutions is the credibility, and one of its bases, that the audit reports are not questioned. However, the good intentions of the Control Bodies did not lead to an improvement in their situation, it worsened, "The complaints in the media about the audit reports and their non-correspondence with reality are abundant." But the problem is not the erosion of public confidence in the auditors, nor the weakness of the control systems, nor the lack of legislation or the lack of rigor of its central notions,but of the capacity of the conception of the audit and control that through repetitiveness has tacitly shaped the practice and behavior of the auditors so that they do not investigate or formulate new problems, despite the fact that the public reality is dynamic, complex and diverse. So it is a priority to take a turn in the vision of auditing and control, reviewing its practice and reports, so that we equate reality with thought. Let's start from the concrete.
The Superior Audit of Michoacán, Technical Organ of the Congress of the State of Michoacán, in Mexico, issued the Report of the Results of the Review, Inspection and Evaluation of the Public Account of the State Treasury 2012, in the final part it says to the fit “In the review of spending execution, it was detected that in Federal Programs where there is a mix of resources ”(p. 3919, author's bold). And the deputy Jorge Moreno Martínez, member of the ASM Inspection Commission, which has the competence according to article 17, of the Inspection Law “The Commission will have the responsibility of surveillance and monitoring of the activities of the Superior Audit and (…) evaluate the performance of the Superior Audit (section IV),He pointed out "the current state government used the same 'financial blender' as the last state administration issued by the PRD to allocate labeled public resources to other items." The above seems to interpret and justify the financial disorder in the state finances of Michoacán. And the ASM seems to comply with its motto "Overseeing with Responsibility to Transparent". However, in the presentation of the Report of the Result of the Review and Superior Audit of the Public Account 2006, by the ASF, it was found that:In the presentation of the Report of the Result of the Review and Superior Audit of the Public Account 2006, by the ASF, it was found that:In the presentation of the Report of the Result of the Review and Superior Audit of the Public Account 2006, by the ASF, it was found that:
The State Department of Education did not open a bank account to receive the resources from the Contribution Fund for Basic and Normal Education, but the Ministry of Health also did the same with respect to the Contribution Fund for Health Services, given that the deposits and movements were made by the General State Treasury (currently, the Ministry of Finance), therefore it was not possible to determine the financial products or the purpose given to them. Based on the foregoing, a recommendation was issued for the ASM to attend to and report to the ASF on the steps taken in this observation. And a promotion of administrative sanction was issued, requesting the Comptroller of the Government of the State of Michoacán, to resolve and, where appropriate,It will cover the administrative responsibilities that could be derived from the acts or omissions (see, The opacity in the 2006 Public Account). It is evident that the ASM did not respond to the observation that their respective funds should be deposited in each Secretariat and that resources should not be mixed in the State Treasury, since the same irregularity was detected six budget years later. And consequently the recommendation made by the Superior Audit of the Federation to improve public management was useless. The problem is that nobody assumes responsibility for the financial disorder in Michoacán, nor the ASF, nor the Superior Audit of Michoacán, except the current and former State Executive and Legislative Power, which have the constitutional mandate to monitor public funds and render accounts.
4. Refute the conception of audit and oversight
The history of auditors has been to preserve or maintain the idea, conception or system of auditing and control. For example, in the Audit Manuals, it is repeated that, "The principles related to the audit subject are personal in nature." But also the practice, "By their nature, performance audits can take longer to execute than other audit approaches." As well as its Institution, "The technical, dissuasive and preventive nature of higher control" (if it were really dissuasive and preventive, what should have happened in Michoacán), that is, the principles, its tool (audit) and the control entities they have the character of nature. And according to the dictionary, nature is the essence and property of each being. It is what remains unchanged.This explains why the auditor is a passive receiver who, like a sensitive plaque, is impressed by reality, "Our aim is to obtain a complete and systematic x-ray of public management." In other words, according to the European tradition "The mission of auditors is to issue a technical opinion on whether the accounts of an organization faithfully represent reality", finding in this regard a variety of examples, but in any case, it is the mechanistic vision of the audit and inspection, as if by means of a photograph the reality of an entity were obtained in clear and precise terms. This conception has been unobjectionable in the private sphere, but its weakness is evident in the public sphere. Plus the private audit continues to determine the public,and the crisis (not yet recognized) in the inspection entities originates because no audit reproduces the photographic or radiographic reality. Therefore, the audit information is sterile, as the actions of the inspection entities have been sterile.
conclusion
Michoacán has occupied the attention and interest of the national and international scene due to violence and insecurity, to the extent that Enrique Peña Nieto, President of Mexico has recognized institutional weakness. And in this is necessarily the weakness of the inspection bodies. But in this case it is not feasible to request the support of the Federation, via the Superior Audit of the Federation, given that it suffers the same disease. A serious diagnosis of the weakness in the institutions would indicate that its strengthening implies that of the Control Organizations, and above all, facing the crisis of its current model with its sequel of concealment of the truth.
In Michoacán, only the tip of the iceberg emerged, but it underlies in Mexico and in the world, the exorbitant public debts, the lack of employment, an impoverishment that is increasing every day, and the strengthened scourge of corruption, despite the agencies, prosecutors or anti-corruption offices, see the meager results in Spain or Argentina. However, the construction of the public audit is possible, if it is separated from the errors and the protection of the private audit, from its authoritarian and undemocratic management, by promoting a university education and research where it is feasible to teach to learn the audit and oversight, and to teach how to investigate and investigate new paths, permanently generating questions such as, What public audit do we want?
