Strategies to achieve sales goals

By answering this question, the Strategic Command Unit begins the final part of the Strategy Implementation Process.

The how?" is definitely the central question. And there are two reasons for establishing the question at this stage of the Process: firstly, to be sure that both qualitatively and quantitatively the objectives can be achieved, that is, that there are ways to do it; secondly, to establish from here the guidelines that will condition the following stages of the process, especially the Identification and Evaluation of Strategic Resources and the Positioning and Mobilization stage of these resources.

Among all the analyzes and contributions that many thinkers have made in the business world, the synthesis obtained by working with the precepts of two of them, seems to be the most practical and effective that can be had in the description of the complex process of how to develop a Strategy:

The first precept corresponds to the Japanese thinker Kenichi Ohmae, who establishes that there are Four Routes or Paths to develop the Strategy:

1. Concentrating efforts on Key Success Factors

2. Taking advantage of any type of Relative Superiority

3. Implementing Aggressive Initiatives

4. Making Innovations

The objectives of the Organization can be achieved through the Sales Strategy following one of these four paths. The good and the important thing is that each of them is broad and flexible enough to "contain" many minor actions or directions. On the other hand, the Four Routes allow to apply, in the same way, both Offensive and Defensive movements, as well as all its variants.

It is not reasonable to assume that an Organization may choose to take more than one of these paths simultaneously. Each presents different focus considerations.

The first path favors the use of factors that the Organization has determined as its own strengths. The mobilization of these factors gives solidity to the Sales Strategy, even more so if they are directed precisely against the weaknesses of the competitor.

The Key Success Factors form a solid foundation on which the Sales Strategy can be developed. This can be concluded even from the point of view of common sense: one's strengths will always constitute an objective advantage in the effort to carry out the task, and if in addition to this they are used precisely to affect the opponent's weaknesses, the expected results can be seen at less optimistically.

The Route of Key Success Factors is also consistent with a Strategic Principle: "Attack only when you have an advantage over your opponent."

It is the responsibility of the Planning efforts to identify and appropriately qualify the Strengths of the Organization. The UCE and the Strategos are left to ratify or question the criteria, based on the knowledge and operational experience they have had with it. From then on, it only remains to complete the strategic outline on the route of the Key Success Factors, if it had been found as the most appropriate.

When the Organization does not have the security or the sufficient conviction to know that it possesses the Strengths that constitute (or that they can do), Key Success Factors in the development of the Strategy, then Route number two becomes an advisable option, among others things because it sustains the spirit of the first, that is, the use of an advantage.

Taking advantage of any kind of relative advantage is a strategic imperative and is practically a constant among the conditionings of the action, to the point that it becomes an alternative meaning of the Tactic.

Taking advantage of the Relative Advantage, unlike taking advantage of the Key Success Factors, can mean for the Organization a greater investment of effort and time. It also demands better operating conditions of the Strategic Resources, which will bear the burden of the task in a greater proportion than that represented by the demands of the Route of Key Success Factors.

The latter may be the result of long work over time, the product of strategic processes and successes accumulated in the Organization's past or past history, and as such have their own livelihood and do not need the sustenance of Resources. Strategic, moreover, the Organization's Aggregated Strengths can constitute, in turn, a Strategic Resource.

The way to take advantage of Relative Advantages, on the other hand, generates an absolute demand on Strategic Resources.

It is worth now to make an interesting reflection: of the four Routes that Ohmae raises as options to develop the Strategy, the second, that is, the Exploitation of Relative Advantages, rescues like no other, the essential virtues of the Strategy as an ordering concept of actions. In processes sustained over time, this route also becomes the most used. The very nature of the Conflict determines that actions based on Key Success Factors, Aggressive Initiatives or Innovations cannot always be sustained over time. In time the only sustainable thing is the possibility (and the ability) to take advantage of any relative advantage to prevail over the opponent.

It should not be forgotten that the Strategy is, finally, a study of experiences, of thousands and thousands of Strategos throughout hundreds and hundreds of years of history, interacting with the Conflict. This is. And that valuable experience (if it helps escape the possibility of dogma as such), affirms that the use of Relative Advantage is the prevailing condition in time to develop the Strategy.

For this reason, the Organization must always be prepared to travel this route, much more than it may eventually be to travel the other roads. The two that immediately precede and precede it, are older brothers (taking advantage of key success factors) and younger brothers (Aggressive Initiatives), but in time things revolve almost steadily around the need to take advantage of relative advantages.

The third route to develop the Strategy lies in implementing Aggressive Initiatives. This route normally leads to Attack, or at least Deterrence. It can of course be viewed as a defensive option (specific circumstances must always be kept in mind), but essentially corresponds to Attack.

Aggressive Initiatives involve Risks greater than those that can be evaluated between the previous or subsequent options, but they also promise greater results.

In homage to the truth, and this can be verified by any study of some depth, the strategic method, its conceptual structure and its own philosophical vision, are not designed for actions of the type of Aggressive Initiatives. Furthermore, all the eastern strategic precepts (especially the ancient Chinese) work around the premise of having a successful Strategy without the need to fire or spill a drop of blood. Sun-Tzu himself, champion of the Eastern Strategos, categorically maintains: "The supreme act of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting."

Aggressive Initiatives are more a matter of timing and as such strategically useful. This in fact determines the nature of the use that they must have: in the first place, not everything can be seen as an opportunity that lends itself to developing Aggressive Initiatives and, on the other hand, no opportunity remains sustained over time, unperturbed, immutable.

Finally, and as its name explains, Aggressive Initiatives are the strategies that receive the most violent responses on the market. This is something to be aware of and to be prepared for. It is difficult to measure the power of an Aggressive Initiative. Nor is it easy to calculate its scope. For all these reasons it is better to prepare for the greatest number of unwanted effects.

These are some final recommendations when the time comes to adopt this path for the development of the Strategy:

• Preferably direct Aggressive Initiatives in the face of absolutely clear opportunities that are being provided by the market or competition, those in which it would be absurd to miss the moment and the moment. If the previous case is not fulfilled, try to implement the Aggressive Initiatives flanking the lines of competitor defense. Never implement an Aggressive Initiative by means of a direct attack on positions that sustain any defensive element. The costs can be very high, almost unjustifiable. The attack by Aggressive Initiatives must go as deep as possible, essentially for two reasons: first, because these opportunities will not always present themselves and merit their maximum use, and second, because immediately after they are achieved achieve the results of the operation,the attacks of the competition as a whole will be sustained and tireless, seeking to promote a return to the initial balance.

The fourth route that guides the development of the Strategy is much more subtle and can be very effective and profitable: Make Innovations.

Many like to understand this as doing new things. And sometimes it is better to understand it that way, because there are not a few people (even the Strategos), who associate the word Innovation with strictly technological factors. Innovation, of course, has no semantic, conceptual or empirical commitment, with specific or exclusive factors.

Innovations must present "novelties", "new things". This implies the presence of the word Different, and when this last word is incorporated into the treatment of the Strategic in the business world, it almost always brings success. A different way of being is innovating, is doing new things. The new is always different.

Now, it must be very clear where and how the Innovation is located, or ultimately what is being innovated ?.

In the first place, Innovation is not present in the “way of doing things to work the market or deal with the competition”, that is, Innovation is not the Strategy itself. To the question of what is being innovated? The answer cannot be presented, The Strategy.

Every Strategy is New and Different from all the others. No two strategies are the same, nor can they be classified as "old" or "old", the Strategy in this sense is timeless. There are as many Strategies as there are Strategos, before, now and after.

Therefore the precept of Making Innovations does not apply to or refer to the Strategy. Rather, it refers to the Offer, to what the Strategy can bring to the theater of operations and may constitute a way of achieving the stated objectives.

In which Innovations can the Sales Strategy be supported ?:

A new product, a new service, new services, new features, new uses, new applications, etc. All this multiplies the number of objective agents in the market, and it also places them in a position to receive a new, different offer that is not (at that time) being worked on by a competitor (for something that has to constitute an Innovation).

Among all the innovations that can be considered (the truth is that this universe is only limited by the borders of your own imagination), it is always strategically advisable to start the evaluation with products and services that do not involve a “jump” or exit from the Business. This is in keeping with the nature of what has been described for the treatment of the first question of the cycle What are we going to sell ?. Innovations that force Business discrimination are not necessarily bad ideas, but in fact force the Sales Strategy to adopt different criteria.

If Kenichi Ohmae gives us important guidance to start the answers to How are we going to sell ?, the English author Barrie James complements them perfectly.

James describes a set of strategic action guidelines, which he calls Strategic Approaches, that ideally fit the stage that comes immediately after the Organization and the Strategos have defined the Route or Path for the development of the Strategy. These guidelines still have to do with the vision of conflict treatment over a longer period of time, therefore they precede the consideration of more precise and detailed actions. However, they are absolutely important guidelines in the development of the Strategy.

You may disagree with James in calling these guidelines Strategic Approaches. In fact, as will be seen later, it is not a "way of seeing things" or an ordered system of precepts and thoughts; These orientations constitute the Grand Arrangements of the Strategy and for this reason it is sometimes better to refer to them as the Grand Strategy.

The Great Strategy constitutes a vision of the development that the Sales Strategies must have in the course of the campaign. Referring to the latter in the plural is logical because the Great Strategy may include, in itself, the consideration of more than one Sales Strategy. All this depends on the magnitude of the Objectives that have been set and the difficulty that the task presents. Obviously there are many cases in which the Great Strategy is absolutely unnecessary because the task dimension does not need to have a greater vision than the development of a Sales Strategy. In those cases the Strategy implementation process should simply ignore this step.

When referring to the Great Strategy as a vision of the development of the Strategies, the case of many Strategies and many Businesses is not necessarily being treated, it is rather, most of the time, a single Business and a single Strategy that changes over time. The way in which these changes should occur over time shapes the nature of the Grand Strategy.

The forms that the Great Strategy can take are:

1. Sequential Strategies. - "They are series of successive steps, each one dependent on the previous step, leading to a final objective"

The Great Strategy that is based on the existence of Sequential Strategies, normally deals with difficult objectives to achieve. And for this, it is necessary to mobilize the Strategic Resources of the Organization in successive "waves", exactly as the waves of the sea unfold when they touch the beaches: one after the other, with rhythm and order, tirelessly.

Depending on the difficulty of the objectives to be met, many Strategies can be developed “in sequence”. This is not a matter of time, it has more to do with the ability to organize successive movements of resources.

An important fact to keep in mind about Sequential Strategies is that they should preferably work focused on the same objective, one that finally ends up being obtained after successive efforts. In this case, the Great Strategy will have defined movements that will be grouped into Strategy No. 1, then Strategy No. 2, then Strategy No. 3, and so on to the extent deemed sufficient, all of them working in successive “waves” over the objective.

In addition to being very useful in attacking difficult targets, Sequential Strategies help a lot in the process that the Sequence of Movements itself establishes in the process of implementing the Strategy, that is, the Offensive, then Consolidation of Positions, then Dominance. of Positions and then the Defense of Positions. Sometimes these four stages of the Movement Sequence must be worked with more than one Strategy and there arises the need to have a Great Strategy defined with four component Strategies or four mutations of the main Strategy for each of the stages of the sequence.

2. Cumulative Strategies.- “They are sets of actions, apparently random but actually planned to achieve results that progressively add up to those achieved before. Over time they produce great results. ”

Unlike the Sequential Strategies in which the strategic actions arrive: one, then another, then another, etc., in the Cumulative Strategies the actions arrive: one more another, more other, more other, etc.

The effects are different, the Sequential Strategies put more pressure on the target, the Cumulative Strategies print more weight. Both work "in depth" but with different mechanics. If a previous example helps us, the topic can be well illustrated: Sequential Strategies are like sea waves that attack the beach, one after another, the waves reach the beach but just as they arrive then they leave, before a new one appears. In the case of Cumulative Strategies, the waves reach the beach and progressively fill it with water, one plus one plus one…, to the required point.

Normally the Great Strategy that is formed to work with Cumulative Strategies should have time in their favor. This method of strategic work is heavy, it can have a lot of power but it is slow. It is generally used to planarly wear down the opponent, to the point of causing an oversight or creating a loophole that allows for faster and more forceful strategic action.

This type of Great Strategy is also common among large competitors, those who will definitely need many campaigns to resolve situations.

In any case, the Cumulative Strategies never constitute the random sum of several strategies, on the contrary they are highly planned, because they must even anticipate the development of future events with the smallest margins of error.

3. Indirect or Deterrent Strategies. - “They use psychological pressure to defeat the enemy, thus avoiding physical conflict. These strategies emphasize political, economic, social and psychological pressure instead of force, trying to knock the enemy off balance before the bulk of the forces come into action. ”

Normally, these types of strategies are not conceived or developed to work alone, they generally form part of a set of strategic intentions and therefore are incorporated within the framework of a Grand Strategy. They may be accompanied by an Attack Strategy, a Defense Strategy, etc. What is pursued with this Great Strategy is to prepare the field of operations in the most convenient way for your own interests, and this preparation involves the use of any indirect method that may help. Negotiations, Demonstrations of Force, Apparent or Camouflage Movements, Threats, etc. are famous and very effective in these cases.

Almost the entire arsenal of the Eastern Strategos (mainly Japan and China), is based on the use of these indirect strategies. And they have very positive effects if they constitute an art that is mastered.

The famous book of the 36 Chinese strategies describes a typical indirect strategy and provides a sample of how concrete and how beneficial its use can be:

“Chen Shubao, the last king of the short Chen dynasty, who reigned fourteen centuries ago, was a victim of his own strategy. A consummate poet and good connoisseur of wine, women and music, he directed his court in a blatantly self-condescending and flamboyant manner. He kept his concubine on his lap, even as they listened to reports of state affairs from their ministers and generals.

What would later become the Sui dynasty had consolidated its power in northern China, and when its founder Yang Jian learned of Chen Shubao's dissolute character, he decided that the time had come to cross the Yangtze River and conquer the south. He appointed General He Nuobi to head this mission.

The south bank of the Yangtze River was powerfully fortified. He Nuobi ruled out a direct confrontation or surprise attack. Instead, he deployed his forces along the north bank, set up colorful tents and banners, and began to move troops from one side to the other.

Seeing all this activity, the commander of forces Chen assumed that the invasion was imminent and put all his troops on alert.

But the Sui troops did not attack, and after a while Commander of Forces Chen concluded that these were simply routine maneuvers. Little by little, the Chen troops began to tire of waiting for an enemy that never arrived and relaxed their vigilance.

On the first day of the 589 new lunar year, when Chen Shubao was still sleeping after a night of partying with drinks, women and poetry recitals, He Nuobi organized a surprise crossing of the Yangtze River and invaded Chen's capital, present-day Nanking.

The strategy of crossing the sea confusing the sky works on the basis of the yin-yang relationship between the discovered and the covered, regularity and irregularity, familiarity and surprise. Each of the elements of these opposite pairs can hide the other, and any one of them can transform into its opposite ”.

For a long time Western Strategy thinkers (not just Business Strategy) belittled the quality and effectiveness of the Eastern vision on strategic moves. The only thing they achieved in this effort was to delay the enrichment of strategic thinking to an incomprehensible point.

4. Direct Strategies.- Here are incorporated all those that will be individually discussed later. The reason for treating them among the classification of Great Strategies ends up being simply illustrative. When Direct Strategies are applied that do not have a character that conforms to the Sequential or Cumulative ordering, then the Great Strategy is simply the particular Strategy.

5. Alliance Strategies.- Unlike the previous ones, these have, by category, the nickname of Great Strategy always. Alliance strategies do not occur frequently, and in all cases involve large movements and commitments of resources, objectives, plans, etc. These strategies contemplate special considerations and one of them lies in determining the proper role that the Strategos plays in the process, given that this process has a lot to do with political and institutional interests and is, initially, far from operational considerations of competition and market work.

6. Counterbalance Strategies.- “They are designed to destroy or neutralize military objectives especially important to the enemy. We can find typical military examples in the use of precision bombings to destroy communication hubs and weapons factories. In the business world, some typical Counterbalance strategies used to neutralize an adversary can be found in the challenges of the rival's patents, trademarks, literary property, advertising rights, as well as in the market introduction of products that are directly competitive with the strong of the enemy. Eg IBM attacks Xerox with photocopiers ”

Counterbalance Strategies usually accompany other strategies. The Grand Strategy that contemplates the use of some counterbalance movement does not base the results or the final scope of the objectives on the Counterbalance Strategy itself, rather it finds that it can help or facilitate the process.

However, counterweight strategies can be very effective. Typical are those aimed at ensuring that the adversary's production capacity is neutralized because he may be unable to manufacture a new product and, of course, attacks against neuralgic points of interest of the competitor, for example attacking a geographic market of the competitor in which it is not it has a business presence, as a "counterweight" to a competitor's presence in its own market; or the example James mentions referring to IBM and Xerox, etc.

7. Countervalue Strategies.- “They are aimed at destroying or neutralizing certain enemy population centers, industrial facilities or the country's infrastructure. In the business world, the actions most similar to military countervalue strategies are the neutralization of the competitor's main clientele by providing exclusive services to the competitor, or also the neutralization of the centers that produce raw materials obtaining or controlling their access. "

The most common countervailing strategies are those practiced when a competitor is pressing on the opponent's G-Spot. By means of countervalue movements, the aim is to create instability and chaos in the opposing structure, cutting essential links between the central support structure and the business units, either complicating or damaging the logistics processes of the competitor, its financial stability, its prestige, etc.

When key customers or groups of customers are removed for the competitor without special consideration of the cost that this represents for their own interests, but the effect that this will have on the rival Organization, countervalue measures are being adopted. Its variants can be many and very diverse, but the criterion for action is always to work countervalue "behind" the lines of attack or defense of the competitor, where the vital support networks of the competitive activity of the business are located.

As can be seen, the countervalue strategies cannot work alone, they accompany or complement a line job.

The individual strategies that make up the Great Strategies and that constitute the base on which all the precepts, criteria, orientations and strategic movements are ordered, can be ordered in three large groups:

Attack strategies

Among these is the very essence of the Strategy. MV Frunze said: “In war, victory belongs to those who find in themselves the resolution to attack; those who are merely defensive are doomed to defeat. "

Attack Strategies are the most representative of strategic feeling. Most of the strategic intentions and dispositions of the Strategos gravitate to its character.

With Attack Strategies most of the Strategic Principles are perfected. They are the ones that summarize all the wisdom and ability that the Strategy has as a method of interacting with the Conflict.

Attack Strategies can be classified as follows:

1.- Frontal Attacks: Barrie James says: “The frontal attack is used to penetrate the center of an enemy position, it is possibly the oldest offensive military maneuver. However, frontal attack is a direct assault on the enemy and is, therefore, the least desirable form of attack, since attacks against well-organized defensive systems almost always end in failure. Some of the most spectacular successes and the most catastrophic failures on a battlefield have taken place as a result of frontal attacks. ”

“The key factor for success in a frontal attack both in business and in war is to be sure that you have sufficient resources to overwhelm the opponent and continue the combat, as well as the losses incurred. they are foreseeable and can be supported without breaking the business organization ”.

To carry out a Frontal Attack, the recommendation of Calculation of Proportions that Sun Tzu proposed should not be forgotten: “When there are ten for each of the enemy, surround him. When there are five for each of the enemy, attack him ”.

The orientation is clear: a significant and evident superiority in resources is needed to carry out a Frontal Attack.

This important superiority of resources can respond to three realities:

a) A Comparative Advantage that places the Organization in a specific state of superiority. This advantage may constitute a reality sustained over time or it may be circumstantial. In both cases, it should be used without delay.

The cases in which an Organization has an evident and sustained Comparative Advantage over time are the least. They appear frankly appropriate for the execution of Frontal Attacks. These cases often lead to the question, why, then, is this superiority not being effectively used ?, and among the responses it is more common to find management deficiencies than loopholes in the strategic logic.

Obviously, there may be conflicting opinions regarding the course of action to be followed by an Organization that has significant comparative advantages in terms of the availability of resources, but the strategic criterion demands in each of these cases the immediate and effective USE of superiority.

If there is the possibility of seriously harming a competitor as a result of possessing specific resource advantages, there is no pretext for not doing so. All the different arguments are very close to sophism.

Comparative Advantages differ from Competitive Advantages in that the latter must be "built" while the former "exist". Comparative Advantages are highly coveted by smart Strategos, precisely because they are unusual.

The Comparative Advantages must be taken advantage of immediately and with the greatest forcefulness possible. Otherwise, they are no longer an advantage.

The Frontal Attacks that are based on Comparative Advantages do not even require sophisticated strategic processes, they have "the mathematics" in their favor, the "critical mass" and the inertia that these provoke, to achieve a favorable result.

Eventually, the costs of a Frontal Attack may be higher than those of other strategic movements, but the magnitude of the conquest and the damage that is generated to the competitor usually generously compensates the effort, thus causing that the immediate costs are not significant in time.

Many organizations that work competitively with an evident advantage of resources affirm: "I don't lose money, I gain market." This statement involves a specific consideration of Investment and not of cost or expense.

The Frontal Attacks for Comparative Advantage sustained over time, clearly show the advantage before all market agents, especially customers. In these attacks the advantage is “exposed” in a way that does not cause any type of doubt. This is possible because the Comparative Advantages certainly have in their favor the Objective Criterion, the factual evaluation, and these factors are forceful weapons against any effort of positioning or mental interpretation of a reality.

If a business organization has an evident advantage in product quality, in prices, in benefits, in service, etc., it must manifest it clearly and forcefully to the client, so that he cannot fail to recognize that the advantage is objective and it is economically irrational to discard it. Frontal Attacks put the comparative advantage "in the face" of the client and the competitor. They spare no resources or effort to achieve this effect. Frontal Attacks base their effect on the rational intelligence of individuals, not on the emotional intelligence that conditions almost the majority of responses in the market. And where effects are achieved in the rational it is much easier to complement them with emotional elements. This combination is definitely overwhelming.

The Frontal Attack presents the client and the Market with a simple and forceful comparison of factors: Price vs. Price; Quality vs. Quality; Service vs. Service; Provision vs. Benefit; Promotional Campaign vs. Promotional campaign; Product guarantees vs. Product guarantees, etc. The mechanics do not need more than this, it is simple, direct, cruel; it is something that, in short, is done from the front, “with the face to the sun” as César Borgia said.

The Strategos who respects the imperative of the Strategic Principle to make victory the only option, loves Comparative Advantages and wants to be in a position to launch a Frontal Attack every moment of his professional life.

b) A Competitive Advantage can lead to a circumstantial state of resource advantage and allow consideration of a Frontal Attack.

This is the specific case of an Opportunity that arises in the Conflict. But an opportunity that has somehow been “built” over time, given that this is precisely what competitive advantages are all about.

Unlike the Comparative Advantage, this other one does not appear in a sustained way over time, rather it arises circumstantially, in many cases unexpectedly. Normally the Competitive Advantage is the product of other types of strategic ventures, which due to their own virtues have “conditioned” the existence of a state of significant advantage of resources.

Now, the circumstantial or probably unforeseen nature of these opportunities does not mean, at all, that they are not sought by the Strategos. He is fully aware that any strategic action that allows him "at some point" to reach the condition of being able to launch a Frontal Attack, is highly favorable.

But unlike a state that has Comparative Advantages, one of this type requires a lot of skill to be identified at the right time. This is precisely what Opportunity is about. There are certain times and situations in which the Competitive Advantage offers the possibility of launching a Front Attack and they must be taken advantage of immediately.

When the opportunity to launch a Frontal Attack arises, the Organization must set aside all other strategic intentions it would have been holding. Frontal Attacks demand the concentrated and simultaneous use of all Strategic Resources.

c) A competitor's neglect is another way in which a state of affairs can be found that justifies the launch of a Frontal Attack.

This situation also has the form of a valuable Opportunity, but unlike the previous one, in this case the opportunity has not necessarily been built, rather it has come as a “gift” from the competitor.

Now, there may be no better gift than the one that allows us to consider launching a frontal attack, because it is always massive and works in depth.

Here the difference between a "carelessness" and a "vulnerability" is explained. The first is provided for a Frontal Attack, while the second is not necessarily. A vulnerability does not always imply a simple conquest, since it can be quickly reversed. In many cases the vulnerability is consciously calculated by the competitor. Strategos is normally aware of its vulnerabilities, even if it cannot circumstantially act on them. Neglect, on the other hand, is not foreseen in any way, it occurs without any kind of antecedent.

When the opportunity arises due to the competitor's neglect, the precise calculation of the superiority of resources may not necessarily be due to the arithmetic, rather to the low state of readiness and preparation that the competitor's resources present or to the fact that they are seriously engaged in other tasks or problems. These situations offer possibilities of overcoming the contrary resources with the same forcefulness that the case offers in normal comparative situations.

On the other hand, it is not necessary to understand that the “negligence” of the competitor is necessarily due to negligence. There are many oversights that are solely the result of "line extensions" that the competitor must protect. When these lines involve many businesses, many markets, many market segments, etc., they can always present a weak point, one "more neglected" than the others. There the conditions are met for a frontal attack.

If a competitor concentrates his resources, his efforts and his attention on the work of a certain geographic market, for example, it offers "in theory" an important possibility of launching a Front Attack in another of the geographic markets that is disputed. In this case the Front Attack is adjusted to a Counterbalance mechanic. If, on the other hand, the competitor is highly concentrated in a particular segment of the market, it offers the possibility of launching a Frontal Attack on another of the disputed segments.

Although it is true that in this type of case the criteria of supremacy of resources takes a Relative form (that is, advantage of resources in a certain place on the line), it does not, however, justify a Frontal Attack, because the effects of this type Attack attacks are very serious for the competitor "beyond" the specific point being attacked. A frontal attack at a neglected point forces the competitor to withdraw his resources from other tasks, knocks him off balance and can lead to a very different state in the final conditions compared to the starting conditions, even in absolute terms.

Probably the most important consideration that the study of a Frontal Attack should deserve is summarized in James' statement: "Some of the most spectacular successes and the most catastrophic failures on a battlefield have taken place as a result of a Frontal Attack".

The skillful and intelligent Strategos, the one who has carefully evaluated the conditions, will never miss the concrete possibility of launching a Frontal Attack, because his mental disposition is always focused on the first part of the statement: "the possibility of spectacular success".

2. Flank Attacks: James says of them: “ Flank attacks are intended to put pressure on the flanks of the enemy lines in such a way that the defensive lines are overrun and rotated towards the center thereby producing the chaos. In business, flank attacks seek to exploit the weaknesses of the competitor's defenses by applying force against the weakness of the enemy, and are mounted on attacks in a certain geographical setting, for some commercial or technological reason. ”

Along with unconventional attacks, flank attacks are the most common in the business world. Among them, most of the great strategic movements in the competitive fight and in the interaction with the Conflict are explained.

The Flank Attacks respond to the sustained dynamics of the markets. They are included in the perpetual "give and take" of competitive engagement. In terms of the strategic horizon, Flank Attacks are Tactical in nature, because they do not broadly define the Conflict but are seldom highly effective.

Obviously, it is entirely feasible to assume that situations arise where an Attack by the Flanks leads to extraordinary successes or failures, but this is not the norm, it is the exception.

This is especially due to the fact that a majority of the organizations and Strategos live permanently concerned about their Flanks. The Flanks are always interpreted (and with good reason), as those weak points that should not be neglected. And in essence they do so, thereby preventing dramatic outcomes of competitor offensives.

The truth is that every strategic attack movement, and even every strategic movement, generates Flanks. This is inevitable, since in the dynamics of the Conflict it is impossible to hold a compact line indefinitely, there will always be "the sides", "the right and the left", those points where the vision is neutralized, to the point that they become the " dead spots ”in the rearview mirror of the car.

The Organization fails to have a clear vision on its Flanks. They are not the focus of attention for the simple fact that they cannot be, they are vulnerable points for the simple fact that they cannot stop being so.

The only thing that can be done with the Flanks is not to neglect them, and most organizations and Strategos are aware of this.

And when organizations and Strategos forget this fundamental fact, a Flank Attack can have devastating effects, because it tends to target the very center of the Organization's interests.

Flank Attacks are highly recommended when the competitor is conducting a very deep offensive in a geographic market, in some segment of it, with a particular product, holding a specific promotional campaign, etc. These very deep offensives leave the competitor's flanks remarkably exposed, that is, they leave many aspects without protection, without sufficient attention. On these points the "flanking" is applied and with it the competitor is forced to stop his advance and to reorder his defensive schemes, and in the process there is the concrete possibility of having obtained, simultaneously, some particular conquest.

Some authors from the business world argue that the Flanking Attack Strategy is typical of competitors who are the third parties in dispute, that is, those who are not involved in specific frontal attack strategies or specific defense strategies. These authors maintain that the leading organizations, in one way or another, are always involved in defense strategies, while the organizations that follow focus their concern on attacking them permanently. In these situations, they say, the disputed third parties adopt Flanking Attacks by concentrating their efforts on those points that are not being served by any of the others.

Al Ries and Jack Trout in their book "The Marketing War" refer to the giants of the United States auto market to exemplify the theme: GMC is a leader in the business and mostly defends itself, Ford Motor Company is the second and mostly attacking, Chrysler is the third in dispute and mostly adopts Flank Attack.

This orientation has a very important illustrative value, but it does not remove the possibility that Flank Attacks may be carried out by any of the actors in a competitive fight. The truth is that the nature of these attacks is so flexible that it can benefit any type of strategic intention.

The only thing that a Flank Attack needs is to identify the important aspects that the competitor is not considering, those that he is not attending to (be groups of clients, entire segments, complete markets, etc.). There, in that weak point, all the strengths and resources are applied. With this an Attack by the Flanks has been perfected.

The final recommendation to carry out a Flank Attack is that it eventually focus on those "sensitive points" that the competitor is not attending to. A sensitive point must be understood as one of importance for the interests of the competitor and the Conflict in general. These points differ from other common ones because their treatment will cause extraordinary effects and with it a change in the state of balance or the balance of the Conflict.

In this respect, a Flank Attack differs from a Flank Counter Attack. In the latter case the aim is to stop the competitor, in the first case the initiative is being taken.

Flank Attacks can be classified as follows:

• Attack on the flanks for Geographical reasons.- These are attacks that are carried out on the competitor in a certain geographic market, obviously not the only one that manages and preferably not the main one. There will always be a market that the competitor is not serving in the best way, probably because its focus is on another. Attacking an ALL market is an effective Flanking Offensive, so it must be privileged over the others. An entire market is a nice prize for initiative and is surely a very hard blow to the general interests of the competitor.

A Flank Attack for Geographical reasons, changes the balance of things, causes a major breakdown of balance.

This type of Flanking Offensive is only surpassed by a Flanking that is based on a Great Counterbalance Strategy, that is, one that weakens the competitor with a new line of products or services or an entire Business in which the own Organization has not yet be involved. For example: if the competitor maintains an ice cream business based on milk cream and another one with “yogurt” ice creams, while the Organization itself only competes in the market with milk cream ice creams, a significant Flanking may occur. when the own Organization attacks the competitor in its Ice Cream Business based on "yogurt", assuming that this Business has not deserved the same attention that the competitor places on the other.

• Flank attack for Marketing reasons.- James says: “Flank attacks in the market consist of assaults that try to exploit demographic and social behavior factors; These factors can be translated into market needs that are not addressed by existing businesses and are vulnerable to an assault. "

These are the most common Flanking Attacks, due to the same fact that they are based on a large set of possibilities. There are almost no limits between demographic and social behavioral factors, and any one of them can be an interesting opportunity to carry out a Flank Attack.

Attacks of this type are highly recommended. According to the ability and insight of the Organization and the Strategos these offensives promise a lot.

• Attack on the flanks for technological reasons.- "Overflowing the competitors through new technologies has the purpose of securing the clientele through an innovative advantage frequently based on a use or application that the competitors will not be able to have immediately."

Flank Attacks for technological reasons are not always within everyone's reach, even when the definition of technology is not necessarily linked to large tasks or demands. In any case, they cannot fail to be mentioned because they carry an enormous effectiveness where it can be put into practice.

The strategies that are formulated from the Strategic Route of Innovations, often resort to this resource, shaping it by means of significant degrees of imagination and suspicion. It should not be forgotten that in many cases the Idea prevails over the technological nature of something that you want to put into practice. This is the case, for example, of the existence of ATMs as a financial service. The concept has a value immeasurably greater than the technological fact itself, and as a whole constitutes an interesting competitive quality, without considering carefully what this should have represented, at the time, for whoever first had the idea.

Most of the technological innovations that justify a Flank Attack should be considered under this logic: innovative advantages and different uses or applications for what is already established in some way and yet is far from the competitor's point of focus..

3. Envelope Attacks: “One reaction for each action of the enemy. A competitive product for every enemy product. In both military and business struggles, the success of an engagement strategy depends on the superiority of the forces or the resources used to envelop the enemy. If these forces are inadequate, the attacking unit is in danger of over-spreading and exposing itself to a rupture by the enemy that will place superior forces against the weakest point of the attack. ”

The Strategies that support Envelopment Attacks are very interesting. They put pressure on the competitor that cannot be easily avoided, requiring him to perform free of possible failures and errors.

These types of strategies generally require a level playing field (in terms of resources) on the part of the contestants.

Envelope Attacks have the advantage of not requiring great efforts in terms of innovation, creativity or imagination. Rather, they focus on the ability to formulate a precise response for each action performed by the competitor: a reaction for each action.

More than a few Strategos prefer to put themselves in the “air tunnel” offered by the competitor ahead (in the same way that race cars “stick” to the car in front of them and face less resistance from the air), waiting for the actions it takes, and then responding more efficiently, capitalizing on all the successes and errors of the rival.

One of the most illustrative examples of the application of this type of Strategy is presented by the companies Boeing and Airbus in the Commercial Aircraft Manufacturing Business. Airbus responds to Boeing with an airplane model for each model that the competitor makes and thus has it "wrapped". While in many cases Boeing invests the greatest research and development efforts, Airbus maximizes its performance by evaluating the experiences and results of its competitor and then responding accordingly.

4. Isolation Attacks: “The key to position defense strategies are fortified strongpoints and trenches, designed to break through enemy frontal attacks. The opposite of position defense is an isolation strategy whereby strengths are left behind by the bulk of the forces to be swept away by subsequent waves of troops or left until they surrender. ”

In the business world, an “isolation” occurs when one of the competitors, due to the actions of the other, is left in a position to have very few competitive advantages or very few comparative strengths with their opponents.

In this case, the competitor has been isolated and therefore in an excessively fragile situation, regardless of the nature of the advantages that it still retains.

Isolation Attacks are carried out on competitors who have a very evident advantage and very difficult to overcome in any particular aspect: quality, price, market coverage, distribution system, economies of scale, etc.

In these cases, it is often more profitable to avoid the cost and time of dealing with the obvious strength of the rival in some aspect and to exert efforts on all the other factors that condition the competitive process. At a certain moment the competitor ends only with his main strength and his own Organization with an advantage in all other related aspects.

Isolation Attacks have the same mechanics as Flank Attacks, but unlike attacks they seek to “take” all (or almost all) elements that the competitor does not care for or develop in the same way as their main strength. In this way it is intended to leave it isolated in its own main attribute.

This type of attack yields very good results because in the process of trying to get the competitor to be isolated in his main strength, he gradually gains ground and erodes the rival. It is one of the few strategies whose partial results have a high degree of forcefulness and effectiveness.

5. Unconventional Attacks: “Unconventional attack, or guerrilla warfare, is a form of combat adopted by irregular forces fighting in limited, small-scale actions against Orthodox military forces. In business, unconventional attack is used as a primary combat strategy in the aggressive role to harass competitors to the point that a company can win concessions in the form of greater market share. ”

Unconventional attacks can be classified as follows:

• Price Attacks: Ex. Selective Price Attacks. Promotion Attacks: Ex. Product Comparison. Integrated Sales Attacks: Closing the door to competitors. Product Attacks: Offering innovative alternatives. Attacks through alliances. Attacks through incursions. Executive: Ex. Hiring outside talent. Attacks by legal maneuvers: Ex. Adduce antitrust legislation, patent appropriation, violation of tariffs, appropriation of trademarks, etc.

Unconventional Attacks hone some of the most important skills the Strategos may have. This type of Offensive Strategy is for everything, it has no limits in terms of imagination and creativity. It only makes one demand: the Organization's ability to be very agile and flexible, so that it can avoid, whenever possible, long and costly confrontations.

The application of this type of Strategy eliminates the differences in magnitude and resource capacity that exist between competing organizations. Through them the small competitor can enter the big leagues and be respected in the same way as anyone, for the elementary reason of having felt the effect of their actions on the Market.

These strategies are being refined more and more. The logic that guides them is being imitated by the dynamics of the strategies that involve investment and the movement of greater resources. These strategies agree very well with the nature of some of the most important trends that exist in the markets today: the atomization of demand, due to the increasing progress of segmentation and the mini-segmentation of markets (the actions themselves to determine “ market niches), the highly changing rhythm of tastes, habits, fashions, etc.

The very trend towards globalization of economies and markets is causing the average consumer to want to “individualize”, and thus feel close to small offer initiatives that differ markedly from those made by “big players”.

Many of the biggest market transformations have originated from the application of unconventional strategies.

Defense strategies

"Defensive Strategies are combat maneuvers used to resist an attack and to inflict such losses on the opponent that he is forced to either withdraw or provide the defender with the opportunity to take the initiative and counter-attack."

Defense Strategies can be classified as follows:

1. Defense of Positions: “Defense of position or point consists of taking advantage of the protection of fortified positions. The defense of position in business involves the development of fortifications or barriers to entry, around a product, a service or a company to protect them against the aggression of competition. "

The defense of positions can be developed around the following elements of work in the theater of operations:

• Differentiation.- This can be a fairly solid point of defense, as the own offer generates in the consumer a concrete idea of ​​difference from the rest of the offer. If the Organization concentrates its efforts on sustaining the quality of the difference in its offer, it builds a solid point of defense. The Position Defense Strategy based on Differentiation closely touches the need to work the product, in this sense the production function becomes more sensitive to sustain the Business.

• Service to the Consumer.- Although it can be understood in many different ways, the Service as such is fundamentally a defense weapon. At most it can be considered as an instrument that strongly gravitates in the Offensive stage that requires Consolidation of Positions, but in any case it is not an offensive weapon. In fact, you cannot generate an attack on the competitor with the offer of a specific Service, the Service is a perception of value that the client develops based on a specific experience with the Organization.

On the other hand, there are few elements that have the consistency of the Service to defend positions and interests. When an Organization reaches a comprehensive and highly professional service management, the effectiveness of its defense can be guaranteed.

• Design.- This is a less forceful element of defense of positions than the previous one, especially if it does not constitute a strength that the Organization would have developed over time. Both Differentiation and Service are tasks that can be "built" relatively quickly to support defense strategies. The design, however, must be developed over time, constituting an exceptional skill in competitive confrontation. Distribution.- While Distribution emerges from the establishment of a structure, it meets all the conditions to be a solid point of defense of the Organization's interests in the theater of operations. In fact, it is a financial and logistical barrier to entry. If you additionally focus on serving a clearly delimited market segment, it can be an almost impregnable position for certain periods of time. Durability.- This is an attribute of the product that must be managed in a similar way to Design in order to be considered a reliable element of defense. Durability cannot form a defensive position in short periods of time. If the Organization has this factor for having developed it over time, then the possibility of using it to defend its own interests is justified. Exclusiveness.- It is often assumed that this factor is built from the role that the Sales Strategy gives to Distribution in the competitive campaign, but on the other hand it can be the nerve center of the entire Strategy if the Organization had defined concentrating here his work in the theater of operations. Exclusivity is generally built by limiting production, maintaining high levels of quality and selling at high prices through well-controlled distribution channels. Apart from this, the product of effective construction, positioning and brand management works also generates a perception of exclusivity that can be used as a point of defense. If all these factors come together, exclusivity is a huge barrier to entry for competition. Image.- It is an effective way of maintaining defense positions but involves a highly professional sense in the management of your interests. It is a complicated task that is reserved for the few, even more so if it constitutes the "defensive column". On the other hand, the Image is the product of sustained work over time and therefore cannot be considered an instrument of contingent work in the theater of operations. In many cases the Image comes associated with the efforts of exclusivity and with it it forms a synergy that strengthens the whole.

An Image-based defense of positions cannot be recommended without the certainty that it constitutes a perfectly consolidated element among the strengths of the Organization. Otherwise it can become one of the most vulnerable elements to support a defense.

• Packaging - As long as it is associated with financial and logistical efforts, it can serve as an element of defense of positions. Otherwise it is a weak factor that can be easily neutralized by competition. Quality.- Quality is not only a physical attribute of the product or service offered, most of the time it is, rather, a product of the consumer's perceptions. If the Organization has quality as a strength, then it has a very solid position defense factor. Competitors will normally have to invest significant resources to try to reverse a comparative picture that is sustained in quality. This provides an advantage of unquestionable value in defense. Reliability.- It is an aspect very similar to the previous one, but it tries to give a greater weight to the objective recognition of the qualities of the product (insofar as it cannot be easily associated with a service), making relative consumer perceptions that are not linked to a concrete experience. Reliability generally goes with strengths built through exclusivity and quality. Pleasures.- Definitively, here we work with subjective aspects of consumer perception. This task requires a particular ability of the Organization in tune with the interests of its clients. The strength of a Position Defense Strategy based on consumer tastes lies in the difficulty of the process itself. Many Strategos favor defense positions that represent a greater degree of difficulty precisely because of that fact, because from here they hinder the offensive intentions of the competitor.

This type of position defense strategy has its "center of gravity" behind the front lines. True strength is found among highly trained and flexible human resources, who can maintain a constantly renewed line of defense.

• Technology.- Napoleon said: "If you have a position, then you simply have it." If the Organization has the possibility of supporting a position defense based on product or service technology superior to that of the competition, then it only remains to complete the entire system around it.

Few position defenses can be stronger, in structure and time. In these cases, the critical path of the Organization's work moves to the production function, which must concentrate its efforts on maintaining technological advantage.

• Value.- Barrie James cites this as another element around which a defense of positions can be formed, but in fact Value can be considered a product of the effective work that is had in any of the other variables. Value must be understood as the appropriate relationship between price and performance of the product or service, from the consumer's perception. This Value will in fact exist if the Position Defense Strategy based on any of the variables described is successful, and if it does not exist, the defensive position itself may be interpreted as non-existent. Costs.- Cost management builds good defense positions. It is available to all competitors as soon as they can adjust their structures internally. Since it requires comprehensive efforts by the system, it becomes with some ease a differentiating element for the Organization. The main problem with this approach is that it normally places the Organization as a central target for attacks by all competitors. The frequency of attacks on defensive positions supported in cost management is usually higher than in other cases, especially since it is an extremely defensive position and has few attributes to quickly generate a counter-offensive. This fact encourages the competitor in his own attacks. Promotion.- This resource is used mostly in offensive efforts, but since its nature places it under the Strategic Principle that maintains that there is no better defense than attack, it can be used very effectively.

Barrie James says of Promotion as an element of sustenance of defensive positions, the following: “a maxim already established in a fast-moving market such as consumer products, establishes that the sales leader must increase its proportion of support for a product faster than the growth of promotional support provided by the market as a whole, since otherwise there is a lower probability of maintaining leadership. ”

Given that dogma is at the most distant point of strategic doctrine, there is no reason to downplay Promotion as an element of defense of positions. In the worst case scenario, it probably only remains to cite that its character places it on the very border between what can be considered position defense systems and mobile defense systems.

• Line extensions.- Another resource that performs its function in the line between offensive and defensive interests. In this case, the strategic evaluation will probably favor it as a defensive resource if it is very well planned, since the apex of this resource in the offensive aspect can, obviously, consolidate the defense.

James quotes: “The introduction of product and service extensions in the business line constitutes a widely applied position strategy when the advocate uses the extension to promote the product and thus take the battle to a new territory, or to the territory from the challenger himself, or to deflect and weaken competitive momentum. ”

The most important factor that this Defense Strategy must take into account is that of considering that every line extension, in itself, produces a weakening of the total line and therefore must be used in the specific concept that James mentions: as an element that make the opponent lose balance and dynamics.

• Ownership.- With the quote from James at this point the purpose of this strategic option is well illustrated: “A common feature of the current fight in business is the acquisition of other companies as a means of obtaining market positions, growth, factors crucial for business. ”

2.- Mobile Defense: “Mobile defenses are strategies aimed at providing the defender with a flexible response to attacks and from there, to take the initiative. In military combat, both tactics and weaponry have been used to facilitate mobile defense; yet a true mobile defense largely depends on the mobility and maneuverability of an armed force. In business combat, mobile defense movements are similar to those adopted by the military, in which attempts are made to respond to the enemy offensive by moving forces to face an attack. Mobile defense strategies in business center around planned product substitution, product improvement, and changes in the length and duration of the product life cycle.The product development strategy provides the organization with the ability to be both active and reactive with respect to competitive and environmental threats. ”

In short, Product and Service Development is the quintessential Mobile Defense Strategy. Under the protective shadow of the concept of "Development" and taking care not to travel through areas that are subtly outside it, one can work with many variables: progressive replacement of products (the case of electronic products provides a good example), adding attributes to the product, multiplying end uses of the product (cell phones are even cameras today), managing product life cycles, etc.

Now, however, unlike what James could assess in the mid-1980s, the term Development does not only qualify the product, it simply becomes the final stage of the process, its final justification. Product development today demands a particular rhythm in the continuous evolution of the entire Organization, therefore, requiring first a Development of the Organization itself to achieve a Product Development that can be the foundation of a Mobile Defense Strategy. The factors that today determine the development of products have magnitudes of a universal order, this reserves this area only for the most excellent, for the most competent, for those with sufficient capacity.

Product development is carried out every moment in different latitudes of the terrestrial globe and from there generates competitive conditioning. It is one of the facts that directly explains the existence of Globalization. If an Organization does not develop at the specific pace that this phenomenon requires, in no way will it be able to compete based on the Product Development Strategy.

Under these premises, the Development of an Organization is now based on the development of its Human Resources, this is a path that presents no alternative. And this development of Human Resources must be understood within wide margins: Education, Training, Training and Indoctrination.

The moment of dealing with the evaluation of Strategic Resources will delve into the nature of the process and the substantial difference that exists between each of its components, but at this point it is worth making a fairly practical assessment: any of the particular strategies that are used to compete in the theater of operations, be they offensive or defensive, require the efficient participation of Human Resources, but in each of them the requirements are different, especially in qualitative terms. An Organization can compete effectively (at least it can achieve this type of results), putting into practice a Flanking Strategy for geographical reasons, resorting to its appropriately trained Human Resources, or it can execute a Distribution-based Position Defense Strategy,with Human Resources sufficiently trained. That is, the requirement in the qualification of Human Resources does not always go through having them perfectly developed in the integrity of the system: education, training, training, indoctrination, at least not in practice.

There are competition conditions that can be met with lesser demands. This is not bad news for organizations as it gives them the indispensable possibility of working to achieve ideal situations and not of having ideal situations to be able to work. The very philosophy of Strategy wants it to be first conceived and treated as the fundamental advantage, in essence it wants to avoid that limitations are the predominant factor between its success or failure. If the Strategy is not, ultimately, a “practical” approach to doing things (its very essence is absolutely pragmatic), then in practice it is nothing that can make a difference.

Due to this character that the treatment of the Strategic has, it is essential to highlight certain things when they, by force, generate some difference with stated principles. This is the case of the integral development of Human Resources to work in a Mobile Defense that is based on Product Development. Here there is no other: either Human Resources are fully developed or another type of Strategy is adopted to support the positions.

3.- Defense Strategies for Preventive Strokes: "A preventive slam is an attack initiated under the assumption of an imminent enemy attack and that a preventive strike will inflict such a physical and psychological setback that the enemy, caught unawares, or You will be unable to mount a defense against future attacks, or you will be forced to request conditions for surrender. In business, the preemptive blow to competition takes a variety of forms, being used as a means of maintaining victory in favor of defense. ”

Preventive Hand Strikes have all the characteristics of Offensive actions and only vary in terms of their scope and their main objective: due to their scope they are obviously more limited than formal attack operations and their fundamental objective is to consolidate defensive positions..

James describes the following types of Preventive Hand Strikes, each of which must be understood as any of the corresponding in offensive actions:

• Hand punches on resources.
• Ensure provision of special inputs, for example.
• Hand blows in technology Hand knocks in the market Financial hand knocks Hand knocks in the clientele Hand knocks in distribution Political hand knocks

4.- Flank Defenses: This defensive method is one of those that best serves strategic purposes of the purest court, because it incorporates subtleties that complement the defensive action itself. These subtleties have shapes that can greatly confuse the competitor and end up tilting the balance clearly in favor of who "apparently" defends himself.

Barrie James describes them this way: "A flank defense strategy is aimed at putting part of the defense force in a position to overwhelm the offensive maneuvers of an aggressor."

When the Organization concentrates efforts on defending a vulnerable Flank and this is not necessarily known to the competitor, in fact it not only has important possibilities to thwart the enemy offensive, but also to take advantage of the greater power of resources as a defense to counter-attack.

Offensive actions, at least in their early stages, wear down the Organization's Strategic Resources much more than defensive actions and if it is added that an offensive (especially flanking ones) meets solid opposition, not only a failure of On offense, the attacker's ability to defend himself is also vulnerable, since he has involved significant efforts in attacking.

The risk of the Flank Defenses lies in the fact of not calculating appropriately where the opposite offensive will take place, because if it does not take place in the expected Flank, and on the contrary it occurs on the central interests, the defender will be in a situation much more complicated.

Again it is worth mentioning that the Eastern Strategy works in a very fine way in this type of actions, they belong to the group that the Eastern Strategos privilege in their study and application; They have even invested considerable effort in developing ways to "invite attack" by a competitor in situations and at times when such attacks are in the best interests of the defense.

5.- Counteroffensive: This is the moment that all defensive action awaits: the possibility of obtaining a resounding benefit from the effectiveness of defensive actions. Barrie James says: "The counteroffensive is the classic response to an attack, the objective of which is to seize the initiative from the attacker, restraining his momentum (or reversing him) by means of a counterattack."

The counteroffensive should not be conceived as a "second part" of defensive efforts, one that is conditioned by the results obtained from the attack and the defense. Whoever defends himself with the aim of launching a counter-offensive, must position his Strategic Resources in a way that deliberately allows him to take the initiative at the right moment. These are cases that the Great Strategy must work many times adopting the orientation of Sequential Strategies: a first Defense Strategy that does not commit excessive resources (the Chinese like to call them "apparent weaknesses") and a second Strategy properly planned to take the initiative once the defense had met the expected objectives. This is how the kickback occurs.

There are other cases, which are not always desired or sought, in which the counter-offensive becomes an imperative need, either because an unexpected attack has occurred or because the violence of the attack would have overwhelmed all the defenses. In these cases, the counter-offensive becomes of paramount importance and the Organization must be able to carry it out.

In order for the latter to be possible, it is recommended that the Organization keep certain Strategic Resources in Reserve that can be mobilized in emergency situations: most of the time it consists of mobilizing "star" products or services with clear advantages for the consumer (direct route price or indirect for promotions, discounts,, liquidations, etc.), or launch products or services from the other extreme of sensitivity, ones that allow high levels of flexibility in the offer and that due to their characteristics can generate a quick impact among consumers. Other strategic resources that can be kept in reserve are high-impact advertising campaigns, financial funds for short-term support, alliances (with distribution channels, for example), etc.

Barrie James cites the following types of Counteroffensives:

• Product counter-offensive Advertising counter-offensive Production process counter-offensive Financial counter-offensive Partnership counter-offensive Combined counter-offensive

6.- Strategic Withdrawal: Of all the defense strategies this is the most important to understand and manage. Their understanding is normally affected by the very nature of the action, which tends to over-sensitize the expectations and wishes of all members of the Organization (especially Senior Management). Many times strategic withdrawal can be confused with failure, when its objective is exactly the opposite: to preserve the status of the Organization's Strategic Resources in order to find more opportune positions and moments and then take different courses of action. Also on many occasions businessmen are unaware of the experience of organizations that owe not only the existence, but the subsequent prosperity, to an effective Strategic Withdrawal.

Secondly, the Strategic Withdrawal is very difficult to administer, because it involves important movements of resources that by the mere fact of being in this strategic option cannot, at the same time, stop fighting; much less in the risky conditions posed by the withdrawal movement and in the dynamics that have probably generated in the competitor that sustains the attack. The latter is both a serious risk and an important opportunity. The competitor who attacks and perceives withdrawal movements in his opponent, risks more, invests more, involves more resources in the operation and may even work in dangerous states of confidence, underestimating the rival.

This set of facts can become an opportunity. Again there is much to learn in this aspect of the Eastern Strategos.

Barrie James describes the Strategic Retreats as follows: “At one point or another, almost all armies and companies, even when competently managed, well armed and well supplied, have been forced to undertake strategic retreats. The objective of a strategic retreat, a defensive maneuver, is to save as many men and material as possible from an unsustainable position, offering the opportunity to regroup, rearm, and resupply. ”

Alliance strategies:

This heading that James uses to start the description of the Alliance Strategies could not be more appropriate. No alliance has the possibility of fulfilling the purposes for which it has been formed if there is no basic balance between the Strategic Resources of the organizations that form it. There is the justification for the action, at least in its essential competitive component.

The component parts of an alliance must complement each other, with a view to increasing their competitive capacity. The term “complement” is used here intentionally, because essentially this is what an alliance is all about: mutual complement. Be very careful with objectives that aim to "add" instead of complementing, because since alliances are formed to interact with other market agents (competitors essentially), and since this interaction results in an altered state of affairs and different from the starting state, the component parts of the alliance may face a long and uncomfortable process to define “memberships proportional to the sum” that each one calculates to have carried out for the benefit of the alliance. The concept of “complement” is, therefore, more appropriate in this mechanic.

Barrie James does not alter this prevailing concept when describing alliances: “The basic objective of a military alliance is to combine the forces available in the event of war to overwhelm opponents or to persuade potential enemies not to engage in conflict. In war alliances are sought by defenders in response to an attack. In business, alliances are made up of common combat strategies that are formed to serve interests such as maintaining balance in the market, controlling spheres of influence, and protecting corporate interests of companies. These alliances combine financial, commercial, productive or technological resources in such a way that they serve to achieve the common objective ”.

James describes the following types of Basic Alliance Strategies:

• Licenses.- These alliances are the easiest to understand because in many cases they cause full compliance with the objective of complementation that can be achieved by two organizations: one that has a specific license and that does not have the necessary structure to optimize its use and one that has the structure but can benefit from taking advantage of the other's license (s). This can not only generate a good defensive position, it can also generate offensive potential.

• Marketing Agreements.- This is another type of alliance very common and very useful. It is based on the use of two different structures that, with their union, optimize cost, expense and investment structures, on the one hand, and on the other, give more dynamics to their sales tasks. The forms that can be developed in this type of alliances are very diverse, essentially they have no greater limit than that imposed by the very nature of the alliance system. As a defense mechanism, alliances for marketing agreements can be very strong. Eventually problems can occur when the defensive state lends itself to initiate offensive actions; In this situation, there are cases in which the agents that make up the alliance do not achieve uniform criteria or a shared vision of the future.

• Shared Risks (Joint Ventures). - This type of alliances occurs mainly in the development of large operations in the theater of operations. They are frequent, because they are very useful, to complement the efforts required by Mobile Defenses based on Product Development. The magnitude that an alliance of this type can achieve is an important guarantee for the consolidation of a defensive position, especially if it must take care of very important interests. Shared risk alliances have a very important direct relationship with the size of the operation, which is why they are not frequent in the treatment of minor operations.

• Franchises.- In this globalized world, franchise-type alliances provide the operator with the support of an agent with a lot of experience in managing the business. The "franchisor" has access to the experiences of many business units and from them draws important conclusions that support the whole. In most cases, it also has a deep “Know How” that it applies and develops with the franchisee in a systematic way. In turn, this same franchisee contributes an important knowledge of the theater of operations in which the business operates and with this generates a mutual complement that gives great strength to the whole.

Franchise alliances can be useful instruments for the defense of interests, but they are mostly used in offensive processes to open new businesses, develop new markets, new products, etc. Obviously, having a more lasting life cycle than other types of alliances, it supports the interests of the Organization beyond a specific stage of work. Probably this will make it one of the most popular systems in the business world.

• Brand Assignment.- When the brand that one of the operators manages constitutes a strength that can be complemented by the structure support provided by the other operator, an alliance is produced that facilitates many work processes in the market. The specific weight of the Marks is very great; they represent and summarize a set of efforts that should otherwise be developed to their full extent. When this effort can be avoided by adopting a previously existing Brand, the operation is strengthened. Seller Alliances-Buyer.- When the level of success for both the seller and the buyer depends on the cooperative participation, a Seller-Buyer Alliance Strategy is produced. Such alliances typically take place in large-scale projects and when a product component can have a critical impact on a key success factor, such as cost, packaging, or distribution. Consortium Alliances. - Alliances on the basis of a consortium occur when the cost of competing is extremely high and a company alone cannot finance development, manufacturing and distribution costs. Research Alliances.- They are normally produced in order to combine resources to finance high-cost and long-range research for important technological innovations. Technology alliances and market access.- This type of alliances is common in the circumstances that globalized markets present today and highly conditioned by technological factors. They are important complements to efforts and usually set ambitious objectives, proportional to the size of the venture.

Barrie James cites an interesting and very current example of this type of alliance: “In the case of technology, Japanese companies seek access to new products from the western market. In the case of market access, Western companies seek local alliances to penetrate the Japanese market, under strong control, associating with established Japanese companies with local prestige in production, distribution and in the market. ”